INTERVIEW | Ukraine's infamous military intelligence number 2: here are the lessons Estonia needs to learn from us
On September 15, Vadõm Skibitski, the deputy of the head of Ukrainian military intelligence, Kõrõlo Budanov, gave a rare interview to Eesti Päevaleh, in which he explains the state of the Russian military at the front, tells who are Putin's main confidants, and also gives recommendations that Estonia should definitely learn from Ukraine's experience.
General Skibitski, the reason you are in Tallinn is probably the handover ceremony of Colonel Margo Grosberg in Estonian military intelligence. Please describe the cooperation between Ukrainian military intelligence and the Estonian Defense Forces Intelligence Center.
Margo is an old friend of mine. We have worked together for years. The same applies to the Estonian military intelligence team. Our cooperation is really good. [It started] already during the 2008 war in Georgia. After that, we made some decisions regarding cooperation with our friends with whom we have common interests to prepare certain intelligence products together. It mainly concerns the threat from the Russian Federation. Currently, this cooperation continues in several areas, including SIGINT (signals intelligence - ed), HUMINT (human intelligence - ed), OSINT (intelligence using public data - ed), analysis.
What has changed in this cooperation now during the war?
For now, we know what we need to know about the Russian Federation. The main focus of your military intelligence is probably on the preparation of the Russian military forces and military reform, [in which] new units and armies are created in Russia, and in particular in the Western Military District in Moscow and the Leningrad Region. In our opinion, this is dangerous for your country as well as for other Baltic countries and other European countries.
You are talking about Minister of Defense Shoigu's reform plan for the armed forces. What is your assessment of how this is going to be implemented?
One of the Russians' problems right now is personnel and equipment. This is especially true of modern equipment to be given to new units.
We know what the problems of this reform are for Russia regarding the creation of new armies - for example, the creation of the 25th Army in the Central Military District and, possibly, the creation of a new army on the Kola Peninsula. One of the Russians' problems right now is personnel and equipment. This is especially true of modern equipment to be given to new units.
Please describe this problem. The New York Times recently wrote that Russia has been able to accelerate the production of both new tanks and artillery shells.
The Russian Federation is trying to accelerate the production of missiles, ammunition, modern weapons, but in our opinion, Russia can now produce new missiles, but in many cases they are sent directly from the factory to the units fighting against our country. Therefore, one of Russia's problems is the production of supplies in warehouses so that they have the resources to continue a full-scale war against Ukraine with modern weapons. Especially with tanks. For example, Armata - where are they? Nowhere!
One of the problem areas is foreign components. The fact that the international community decided to increase sanctions really affected Russia's ability to produce modern weapons and munitions. It is for this reason that Russia is trying to cooperate with Iran, Belarus and North Korea. This is one piece of evidence that shows Russia's problem with producing munitions, MLRS systems, new artillery systems, aircraft and other armaments on its territory.
So you really think that Western sanctions really work and that it is difficult to get, for example, microchips in Russia?
Yes, indeed, it is. But we would like to see an even better picture of the impact of sanctions. Currently, Russia is trying to avoid sanctions by importing the necessary elements through third countries, creating new companies that buy these elements together, and transporting them to the country through, for example, China or Kazakhstan.
So when you talk about Russia's military power, you're not so much concerned with the amount of iron they have at their disposal, but more with the mass of people they can command?
Yes, it is definitely a threat and a problem for us. Why? Because Russia has insane human resources for waging war. You probably know about the huge losses that befell Wagner under Bahmut and elsewhere.
In exactly one year since Putin ordered the mobilization to begin, Russia has mobilized over 300,000 people. According to our information, Russia continues this process in several regions without much publicity and fuss. They still mobilize 10,000 to 12,000 people every month. With these people, Russian losses on the battlefield are covered and new units are created in several military districts. After a short training, these units go to Ukraine.
There is a lot of talk about Russia's possible new mobilization. Do you think it will?
We discussed it yesterday with our [Estonian] colleagues. It seems to us that Russia does not want to organize a large mobilization. First, there were elections in September. Next, preparations are being made for the presidential elections. We have to admit that autumn and winter time is not good for warfare due to weather conditions. Our assessment is that the Russian Federation may start mass mobilization after the presidential elections. But again, I have to say that Russia actually continues this process all the time, only covertly.
How long do you think Russia can continue fighting?
Maybe one or two years. First of all, Russia did not achieve its main strategic goal, i.e. the complete occupation of Ukraine. Then, when the original plan failed, their main goal was to occupy the left bank of the Dnieper River. At the moment, their goal is very simple: to completely occupy Donetsk and Luhansk regions and, of course, to hold their positions in the temporarily occupied Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions and, of course, in Crimea. One of the main goals of the Russian Federation is to control the entire water area of the Black Sea and thereby project power to the Mediterranean and from there to the Atlantic Ocean.
One of the main goals of Russia is to control the entire water area of the Black Sea.
You say one, maybe two years. So what happens?
We will continue our fight. Our strategic goal is to restore the state borders of 1991. The international community must understand that even in this case, Russia can continue waging war. A new security environment is currently being created in Europe and around the world. We all need to understand what will be the place of the Russian Federation in this.
You recently revealed that there are currently 420,000 Russian troops in the war zone. What condition are they in? How well equipped are they? What is their will to fight?
This is not an estimate, but actual data. Of course, the question now is the quality of these units. It is completely different now than at the beginning of the war. Why? Because during 2022, we really destroyed the elite Russian military, including the airborne forces, including the Marine Corps. These units operated in the most dangerous directions of war for our country. Therefore, they also suffered the biggest losses. For example, the 155th brigade of marines brought from the Pacific Ocean is already using the fifth or sixth rotation of soldiers. They are not now the usual classic marines, but are assembled on the basis of ship crews or logistics units.
The situation is the same with airborne troops. Two weeks ago, Russia decided to send the 76th Airborne Division from Lyman to Zaporizhzhia. But the strength of these units is maybe 50% considering their losses and morale. I will give an example. Last year, Russia created the so-called Third Reserve Army Corps, but it did not undergo full training. And they are sent to fight in the Donbass region. The same situation currently exists with the 25th Army of the Central Military District. According to the plan, Russia must have it created by November 1. But during the last month, units of this army have already been sent to the Lõman region. The same goes for the 2nd Army. Units mobilized without preparation and training are simply civilians. Such is the quality and combat capability of the new units of the Russian Federation on our territory.
Is it possible to estimate when the Russian defense will collapse?
It is not easy, because in Russia there will be enough personnel to throw into the war for a long time. Unfortunately, the Russian Federation currently still has the means to continue the war.
What have been the biggest surprises for you during this war so far?
We are prepared for any possible actions that the Russian Federation may take. This includes, of course, tactical nuclear weapons. We understand the capabilities of Russia, their tactics and command structure in each segment, including Bakhmut, Kupyansk, Lyman, the Crimean Peninsula and the Black Sea.
How to prepare for the use of tactical nuclear weapons?
We monitor the presence of nuclear weapons in Belarus very carefully. We know what has already happened and we know what Russia's next steps are. We know what weapons Russia has on the territory of Belarus and what the possible consequences are if such weapons are used against us in particular. For many countries, including the Baltic States, Poland and Western Europe, it is nuclear blackmail. This is putting pressure on you and your population and the authorities, especially during elections. The Russian Federation tried to use nuclear blackmail for its own national interests. We observed such a situation last August. The attitude of other countries, including China, is crucial for Ukraine. China absolutely does not support the [possible] decision of the Russian Federation to use nuclear weapons in war.
What did you observe about nuclear weapons last August?
At that time, Russia talked about the possible use of nuclear weapons in the direction of Crimea. They said that if Ukraine continues offensive operations in the direction of Crimea, it could lead to the use of nuclear weapons. That didn't happen.
You said you were monitoring the situation and preparing for such a scenario. What is the current situation with the nuclear warheads on the territory of Belarus and how big do you think the possibility is that Russia will use them?
First, we have the experience of observing preparations for the possible use of nuclear weapons. For example, we have this experience from the time of the occupation of Crimea in 2014 in connection with the Black Sea Fleet. The Black Sea Fleet holds regular exercises in February and March to practice the movement of nuclear devices from Krasnodarsk Krai to the Crimean peninsula and to prepare for example the use of nuclear bombs by bombers or the use of nuclear-tipped missiles from cruisers such as the Moscow, which has been completely destroyed by now.
That is why I was not surprised by Russia's actions on the territory of Belarus in June and July. First of all, all objects in Belarus that were used by the Soviet Union during the Cold War were inspected. We then watched them move special equipment from missile bases in the Russian Federation to Belarus. We saw the same on the Crimean peninsula.
And of course we know what equipment Russia can take to Belarus. First, there are two types of nuclear devices for missile systems - Tochka-U - and for aircraft. Russia can move two types of nuclear warheads to Belarus. But all nuclear weapons remain under the control of the Russian forces, and their use requires the personnel and crews of the Russian Federation. These are not Belarusian nuclear weapons, but Russian ones.
Speaking of Belarus, what do you consider a possible military threat from that direction? And secondly, how is Lukashenka doing?
Since the beginning of the war, Lukashenka has tried to avoid direct participation of Belarus in the war. We follow very carefully everything related to strategic exercises. Such exercises were organized by Russia and Belarus on the territory of Belarus. At that time, and especially before the start of the invasion, we saw that from a military point of view, Russia completely controlled the territory of Belarus. They can use Belarusian territory without Belarusian permission. We saw this in joint exercises before the invasion began. In fact, it was a preparation for the start of an invasion from the territory of Belarus. All the main units of the [Russian] Eastern Military District, the armies and most of the airborne forces were sent to Belarus. It was a very, very big threat to our country.
From a military point of view, Russia completely controls the territory of Belarus.
The next real threat came in December and this January, when some units of the First Tank Army of the Western Military District were transferred to Belarus for exercises. There were a total of almost 12,000 military personnel. But then they returned to Russia. And the next threat is the use of Belarusian airspace for airstrikes and missile attacks. They use Iskanders and, for example, Tupolev-22 bombers. But at the moment we do not see a big threat of an attack coming directly from the territory of Belarus, nor a threat of deep operations on the territory of Ukraine. Borderline provocations are possible, but we are ready for it.
How long can Lukashenko stay in power, and if he falls, will he be replaced by the democratic opposition or the next dictator appointed by Putin?
Opposition abroad? It is zero. It means nothing. Unfortunately, this is the reality. As for Lukashenka and Putin, they are Tsars in the style of the Russian Empire. They remain in power until death. Without any democracy. Without the opposition, without any possible leader or person who would say I want to be president, I want to start reforms, I want to change the picture in Russia [nothing will happen].
You say that opposition abroad means nothing…
This means some information operations, maybe some influence operations, some connections with Western society. But without being present on the territory of Belarus, the [impact] of the opposition's actions is zero.
I assume the same is true for Russia?
The [local] opposition is a pocket opposition – communists and Zhirinovsky-likes. It's all the same.
We are talking about Ukrainian military intelligence. How do you set your goals and measure results during wartime?
We were ready for war. We started modernization in 2014. We improved our capabilities in areas such as electronic intelligence, satellite imagery, human intelligence, OSINT, analytics and cyber, including cyber attacks. Before the war, we also improved our combat capability, in particular we increased the number of special forces. Currently, our units are very well equipped with artillery, air support, drones and unmanned aircraft, they are well trained. They have good experience in organizing all kinds of operations, including deep in the occupied territories and on Russian territory. It is important for us to gather information and help our armed forces prepare their operations. And, of course, to fulfill the goals in some directions, for example, especially in Crimea. We continue to de-occupy and liberate our territory step by step.
Can you describe how you select targets for special forces?
It's not a secret. Why? Because we currently use the same approach as NATO members. We have NATO procedural rules and standards. Critical targets are military facilities of the Russian Federation, military industrial complexes, logistics and transport systems. This is the classic approach.
In an earlier interview, you said Putin was at the top of your kill list. How's it going?
I didn't say hit list, but I remember that interview. I was talking about those in power and the military. This is a list of high priority people to prosecute. It also includes Shoigu and Gerassimov, for example, because civilians die because of their actions. They have completely destroyed Mariupol and our infrastructure. They are the war criminals of modern warfare. Take Surovikin for example. Look at his actions not only in Ukraine, but also in Syria. We remember the destruction of Aleppo and other cities by rocket attacks.
There are other persons on the list, including oligarchs, arms manufacturers, occupation forces and organizers of the so-called elections in the occupied territories at the beginning of September. Or those individuals in the Russian Federation who are responsible for deporting our children. It is the responsibility of the Russian authorities. Russian leaders are personally involved in criminal activities against our country.
Can you describe Putin's current decision-making? Who are his closest advisers? Who is he listening to?
There are several groups of influence in the Kremlin, the so-called Kremlin Tower. But now there is a very small circle of trusted people around Putin: Shoigu, Gerassimov, [FSB chief Alexander] Bortnikov, [oligarch and Putin "banker" Yuri] Kovalchuk, as well as [deputy head of the presidential administration] Kiriyenko, who organized the election process. Also as head of [Anton] Vaino's administration. Putin has a close relationship with a small group of people with whom he has worked for a long time. But he has tried to distance himself from them.
There are not many people who want to give Putin information or make suggestions. Why? Because they are afraid.
Our assessment: the entire Russian power structure is a pyramid. All decisions are made only by Putin. There are not many who want to give him information or make suggestions. Why? Because they are afraid. They fear the same fate that has already befallen many individuals, such as Prigozhin or others whose reach has been curtailed. We saw the same situation in the 1930s under Stalin.
In your opinion, Putin's decision-making mechanism is still flawed because he is automatically fed inaccurate or embellished information?
I think he understands the situation at the front, in Russia, in Russian industry and economy. That is why he is trying to find a solution to problems related to equipment and ammunition, for example. He is trying to establish new economic relations with China, India and the so-called Big South. And to export Russian resources to these countries. Russia lost its gas market in Europe, sanctions have been imposed on Russian oil and its transport. He understands that.
So what is most dangerous to his regime right now? Is it the military situation or the economy or the mood of the society, the next possible round of mobilization? Or is nothing threatening him?
This is a very complicated topic. From the point of view of the Russian Federation, one of the dangers is when the power in the Kremlin changes. Putin's circle is trying to avoid this and control everything that happens in the country. From their point of view, this is understandable.
What will the upcoming winter bring?
We are preparing for missile strikes on energy infrastructure and artillery strikes in areas near the border. We know that Russia has started saving missiles. For example, we have not seen H-101 missiles for two or three weeks. They only use UAVs, Shahed drones. Of the missiles, only some Iskander ballistic and cruise missiles are used. Therefore, our conclusion is that Russia can produce a certain number of missiles and they will keep them for the winter period in order to repeat the scenario of last year, which means full blackmail and the desire to destroy the energy facilities of our country.
Can Russia itself produce Shahed drones?
Yes. They started production of Shahed in Alabuga factory. Some parts come from Iran. We see that 25-30% of the components of the Shahed wreckage falling on our territory are produced in Russia. For example, parts of the batteries and energy system, navigation and antennas have been changed on those manufactured in Russia. We know how much Russia is trying to produce them. But we come back to sanctions and the fact that they need to get certain parts from abroad.
If the war ended now, how long would it take Russia to rebuild its military power?
It depends entirely on how the war ends.
I'll let you define it.
In our opinion, in the course of the war, we have reduced the fighting ability of the Russian Federation. The Russian Federation needs ten years to regain the military power it had before the start of a full-scale war in Ukraine. Russia needs three to five years to restore some of the more sophisticated weapon systems, missiles or so-called modern weapons.
And again, it depends on the outcome of the war. The collapse of the Russian Federation? Our position is that the Russian Federation needs complete demilitarization, which also concerns nuclear weapons. Why? Because otherwise, Russia will remain a permanent threat to Ukraine, the Baltic states, Europe and Central Asia.
Central Asia seems to be undergoing major geopolitical changes, which have been triggered by the war in Ukraine. How do you think what happens there will affect the big picture in the coming years?
Central Asia is a very important region for several countries. To the Russian Federation, it is a former Soviet region and is under the influence of Moscow. Also for China. We can see how actively China operates there because of the resources there and because it is a logistical channel through which to send its goods to Europe. For the European Union - again, for example, Turkmenistan is important because of huge resources, Kazakhstan because of oil and gas. And of course, this region is a foreign market for the European Union. USA - Ditto. Central Asian countries understand their position well. That is why we see a process of decentralization in the region, so to speak. If earlier these countries were afraid of Moscow, now they see the result of the war in Ukraine - the decline of Russia's influence in the world. Russia's ability to provide them with financial aid is decreasing, economic ties are decreasing, and a good example from a military point of view is declining military cooperation. When the Collective Security Treaty Organization organized strategic exercises on the territory of Belarus, Kazakhstan sent 11 people there. They were just observers. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan sent about 70.
We have not yet talked about Moldova and the Transnistria region, where there are maybe a thousand Russian soldiers and a lot of ammunition.
We know all about the munitions there and the equipment stored in the warehouses in Cobasna. We watched this very carefully at the beginning of the invasion. But it is an old, Soviet-era moona. Russia can currently take only a certain amount of ammunition from these warehouses. However, its presence may help local Transnistrian capabilities. But we see that the process of reaching an agreement is also underway in Moldova and Transnistria. Chișinău's position to resolve the situation peacefully is very clear. Solving this problem was not easy in the case of the collapse of the Soviet Union, but it will be easy when the Russian Federation collapses.
Do you think it is possible that Ukraine could help to demilitarize Transnistria someday?
Yes! We help Moldova to restore constitutional order on the territory of their country.
It is not worth dwelling on Prigozhin's fate. But Wagner was one of Russia's most effective forces in the war. What is their future?
I think the future of these soldiers is in some other private military organization operating under the control of the Russian Ministry of Defense in Africa and the Middle East. The Russian Foreign Ministry is actively working in Africa to make arrangements to replace Wagner with another military company under Russian control. From Belarus, Wagner's soldiers returned to Russia. Many signed a contract with the Ministry of Defense, some with Rosgvardia. And some of them are trying to find a new job in some other private army because this is their job, salary and life. As they say in Russian - soldatý udači . Do you remember the talk about how dangerous Wagner is from Belarus to Poland and the Baltic countries? And what happened? Nothing. A very important question for us is why Lukashenka gave Wagner permission to go to Belarus.
And what is the answer?
This is one intelligence gap. Why? Because, in our opinion, this move was really dangerous for Lukashenko's regime.
How closely do you monitor the mood of the people in the occupied territories? There are two sides to the question. First, how difficult is it to reintegrate people from these areas into Ukrainian society after liberation? Second, is there any way to counterclaim?
We are monitoring this very closely. In Donetsk and Luhansk, this is one problem, because these areas have been occupied for a long time. Children who were ten or 12 years old in 2014 are today 20, 22, 25. They are completely different people. They have lived under Russian propaganda and pressure from both Russian and local authorities. Russia has established economic ties with Russia in these regions. Therefore, it will not be very easy to bring people from these areas back to our society in the future.
The situation is completely different in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions. They have lived under occupation for a relatively short time. According to the law, HUR is responsible for organizing, coordinating and supporting the resistance movement in the occupied territories. Russia uses a new method there. In Donetsk and Luhansk, it took a long time before people were given Russian passports. In Zaporizhzhia and Kherson, they were forced to be Russian citizens and take a Russian passport from the beginning. Without a Russian passport, you cannot get medical care, education, buy a car or real estate, or start a business. The Russians are exerting enormous pressure to integrate this region very quickly. But we and the people there understand it. Right now, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia are a war zone, and we are trying to support our people, our patriots, our resistance movement.
You said at the beginning of the interview that countries that are not at active war have a lot to learn from you. Please name three key areas in which Estonia and our defense forces should definitely learn from your experience.
First of all, you - your state leaders, residents - understand the threat emanating from Russian territory. You know that Russia's border means a daily threat, accompanied by provocations, hybrid techniques, as well as possible public conflict. Therefore, you must have preliminary information regarding the possible actions of the Russian Federation against you on various lines.
Second, your armed forces, the entire power structure, must be prepared for a possible conflict or war. This also means improving air defense systems. This is very important. You know the first rocket strikes hit our critical infrastructure on the first night of the war.
Third, you need to prepare defensive positions and capabilities for a potential land attack. And, of course, to prepare the population - mobilization reserve, resistance. Second, the population must know what to do during wartime. It's not easy. It concerns kindergartens, schools, universities, factories, companies. The whole society needs to know what their role is to protect your country. The questions are very simple, but the work is huge.
