I just cannot see how that is possible. Just a brief look at the array of forces on both sides in the US.
On one side you have a section of young activists and about a fifth or sixth of the Democrat base that dislikes Israel and is willing prioritise that dislike. There is also a growing anti-Israel Nazi movement on the fringes of the GOP (Nick Fuentes, Candace Owens) which has some grassroots support.
On the other side, you have: a supermajority of both parties at both the national and state level, the permanent bureaucracy, intelligence agencies, and military ("deep state"), the most influential Silicon Valley companies, including liberal-coded Google and conservative-coded Palintir, that have deep Israel collaborations including with the IDF, politically active donors, the entirety of the mainstream media, the vast majority of arts funders and universities donors, mainstream Jewish groups, and the organised evangelical movement.
It's as close to a hegemony as possible, and has been for many decades. Yes, sure, some of these can change. If I had to guess, parts of the deep state could switch in exasperation if Israel continues like this. But that still leaves total political, corporate, religious, "high society", and a lot of grassroots support. And the current establishment is future-proofing Israel - I posted yesterday about how Pennsylvania is outlawing BDS and so making protest repression compulsory for colleges. Anti-BDS state-level laws are generally quite common. And with the IHRA definition adopted, it is likely that teaching and talking about this conflict in university courses - which is where those young activists are being produced - will be censored.
I really don't see how you can square what happened at Columbia with any future reduction in support by the US. Every single vector of power was speaking in one voice - police and university, Democrat and Republican, mayor and president, donors and media.
If everything goes right, and it's miniscule chances, in 10 years there could be president AOC with both chambers of Congress under Dems, and a disillusioned CIA/Pentagon top brass, unable to deal with an even more crazed Israeli PM and public, cutting off funding and diplomatic support. But I think there will always be more than enough AIPAC Democrats to sabotage any moves she might make, and AOC herself is much more careful and careerist than she appears.
I get the feeling that you may be consuming so much of this “Israel and the culture wars” stuff online that it seems all-encompassing and defining. Even with that, however, rather than the absolute and permanent consolidation of “Zionist hegemony” or however you want to term it, one might instead see current moves to clamp down on anti-Israel dissent as the panicked product of a very real sense that the wheels are beginning to come off, or at least loosen, in American support for Israel.
Personally I tend to view it primarily as an intra-American affair, and I don’t really take seriously the idea that events in Columbia or American universities more widely are going to have a significant impact on the ebb and flow of history in Israel/Palestine. Although of course that may be due in part to the fact that I don’t live over there as you do, and the time I spent living in Israel in the past convinced me that Israelis themselves don’t worry all too much over it, beyond sincere (though often misguided IMO) concerns with antisemitism and the condition of American Jews.
Moving away from the culture wars, you yourself have posted examples of past times when Reagan and Carter felt comfortable taking a relatively hard line against Begin’s excesses. Going further back, from 1949-1967 the State Department was not exactly a bastion of Zionist sympathizers, the Arabists were a major element whose loss of influence was a result of the overwhelming Israeli victory in the 6-Day War. After which mass American support for Israel really commenced, consolidated by the 1973 war. So history has shown that events and shifts of power in the region can play a role in defining the nature of the American commitment to Israel.
Which brings me to Chomsky’s (and others’) argument that ultimately, American support for Israel is dependent on Israel’s strategic value:
"the evolution of America’s relationship to Israel 'has been determined primarily by the changing role that Israel occupied in the context of America’s changing conceptions of its political-strategic interests in the Middle East'...it would be an error to assume that Israel represents the major U.S. interest in the Middle East. Rather, the major interest lies in the energy reserves of the region, primarily in the Arabian peninsula...
...Had it not been for Israel’s perceived geopolitical role—primarily in the Middle East, but elsewhere as well—it is doubtful that the various pro-Israeli lobbies in the U.S. would have had much influence in policy formation, or that the climate of opinion deplored by Peled and other Israeli doves could have been constructed and maintained. Correspondingly, it will very likely erode if Israel comes to be seen as a threat rather than a support to the primary U.S. interest in the Middle East region, which is to maintain control over its energy reserves and the flow of petrodollars." (from Fateful Triangle)
It’s quite easy to understand American support in the context of the Cold War, and the resurgence in that support in the context of the War on Terror. Going forward, however, it’s much harder to foresee how Israel will continue to be perceived as such a valuable regional client, even if boring status quo “centrists” in the mold of Gantz or Lapid were to recapture Israeli politics. As it is, a full-blown Kahanist Israel will likely prove an absolute nightmare for broader American policy in the Middle East, not to mention self-destructive as pretty much all analogous ideologically-driven states tend to be.
Maybe it's because I was born in the 90s and only have followed this since the mid or late-00s, but I've never understood the optimism of the Palestinians, or the non-Palestinian peace process people, or now the western one-staters. They all have a belief that this nuclear-armed state is going to collapse or yield...maybe it's religion, or maybe one had to live through the fall of the USSR to believe in that?
It’s certainly bizarre to have seen Western leftists fantasizing about an Algerian “solution” in Palestine (witnessed this on my campus) while the IDF are laying waste to Gaza. But
I think I understand where the optimism comes from in the Palestinian case, even if I don’t share it. More broadly speaking, as a historian I tend to assume that change - grounded in theory but ultimately always the product of a multitude of mostly unforeseen contingencies - is inevitable, one way or another.