Geopolitics

[2cents]

I'm sorry, but democracy does not just emerge as a natural consequence of a struggle for independence from colonialism, as countless countries have discovered. For democracy to take root there has to be an establishment and acceptance of the basic pillars of democracy - a free press, an independent judiciary, secret ballots, the very concept of elected government, limited terms of office, etc etc. Many of these essential ideas came from Britain and were absorbed over a long period of time.

But that's not what happened in India, quite the opposite. The British introduced these "basic pillars of democracy" reluctantly and piecemeal, in response to Indian activism of various kinds, with the aim of consolidating and safeguarding their rule. Along the way, they twisted the principles underlying these "pillars" so as to suit themselves, so that a case may be made that many of the problems of Indian democracy today may be traced back to British policies of the 19th and 20th centuries. They ruled despotically to begin with, via the East Indian Company. Then there was an early 19th century debate over whether the maintenance of British rule was best served by continuing to rule despotically or to apply processes of 'modernization'. The intent of the latter was not Indian liberation but rather to safeguard and justify British rule. But it was only after the massive uprisings against British rule across northern India in 1857-59 and the end of East India Company rule that the British really began to introduce representative forms of governance - and this in part due to the advice of Indian elites who had access to British policy-makers (e.g. Sir Sayid Ahmed Khan explicitly argued in his Causes of the Indian Revolt that denial of Indian participation in the Legislative Council was the most important factor in producing the uprisings). Again, the intent was the consolidation and safeguarding of British rule, to ensure that nothing like 1857 ever happened again.

Even then, things such as free press, the rule of law, elections, etc. were all twisted and flawed in such a way as to serve the safeguarding of British rule. The British regularly shut down newspapers and jailed journalists they considered seditious. The rule of law was applied differently to different categories of peoples in different places. A major factor in the founding of the Indian National Congress was widespread reaction to the watering down of a bill initially introduced to allow British subjects to be tried under Indian magistrates but which was fiercely opposed by Europeans resident in India. The British introduced a separate electorate for Muslims in Bengal in 1909 as a classic means of divide and rule. I'll quote from this book:

In 1905, the British partitioned the province of Bengal along religious lines expressly to stifle rising anticolonial sentiment emanating from Calcutta. The plan was masterminded by Herbert Risley, the race scientist who codified the caste system (based on nose measurements) in the 1901 census. His logic was simple: “Bengal united is a power; Bengal divided will pull in several diff er ent ways.” His aim was “to split up and thereby weaken a solid body of opponents to our rule.” Resistance to this “divide and conquer” tactic was vociferous, exploding into the swadeshi movement, including boycott of British goods and institutions. The anticolonial Jugantar revolutionaries drew on many ethical guides, from international anarchism to the Gita, in their turn to political terrorism. The British were forced to annul the division in 1911. They also conceded a measure of local participation in government for Indians in 1909 but, here again, cannily based political identity on religion, creating separate electorates for Hindus and Muslims. In Britain, the move was hailed for “pulling back . . . sixty- two millions of people from joining the ranks of the seditious opposition.” Once electorates were framed by religion, attendant forms of political association and communication— from parties to newspapers— had to be, too, hardening differences and irrevocably politicizing religious identity.​

All these things provoked the resistance which ultimately produced Indian democracy, with all its flaws.

Moreover, power was handed back to India peacefully in the end - it was not the result of a violent revolution. Indeed, one of the reasons the transition was delayed was for fear of widespread violence breaking out between Hindus and Muslims once Britain had left - violence that did indeed begin afterwards on a massive scale.

I'm not sure what the relevance of your characterization of the end of British rule as a peaceful handover of power is. Indians struggled for decades, violently and non-violently, to achieve the sort of rights you are now crediting the British for.

It's also interesting that you mention, by way of contrast with British democracy, Hindu-Muslim communal violence and (elsewhere) Modi's Hindu nationalism, without also ascribing these to the legacy of British rule. While communalism certainly has antecedents in India's pre-colonial history, it was sharpened and hardened by the processes of modernization introduced by the British - things like census enumeration, allocation of resources, electorates, language rights, etc. - as well as by British political policies such as those mentioned in the excerpt above. And Hindu nationalism has its origins in the mid-19th century Hindu reformist movements such as the Brahmo Samaj and Arya Samaj. It developed entirely under British rule from that time to independence. It makes as much sense to argue that Hindu nationalism is entirely a legacy of British rule as it does Indian democracy.

 

[GlastonSpur]

Perhaps, but in that case why is it the UK's credit that New Zealand, Australia and Canada all have significantly higher scores on the democracy rankings than the UK?

What does this have to do with anything? Things fluctuate over time and no-one is saying that democracy is perfect in the UK.

It also depends on how democracy is measured. For example, personally I favour a fully-fledged proportionally representative voting system, rather than our current first-past-the-post system, and see this as more democratic.

 

[RedTiger]

In other words, democracy was ultimately part of the British legacy.

Double down.

 

[Mciahel Goodman]

Please tell me more about this “nationalism by proxy” idea. I don’t agree at all that opposing Russia means somehow adopting Ukrainian nationalism. How does that work?

And it’s “a priori”, not “apriori”. You’re saying everyone is born knowing Russia is evil? That’s ridiculous.

It's "apriori" or "a priori" (Kant and various others, like Hegel, and so on, move back and forth between the two usages and such is usually a matter of personal consistency, whatever the advice of editorial "orthodoxy" in the original annals of correct usage: grammarians are the worst!).

And no, I'm not saying everyone is born knowing Russia is evil, which you must already know (unless you ask me to follow up with some semantically obtuse version of "Well, that's the literal definition of what you've said"). I'm referring to apriorism when I speak of nationalism by proxy, but I'm not going to go into it here. Will come back to it at some point, maybe, if it seems worth it.

There is a difference between trying to understand Russia's point of view on the one hand and supporting or agreeing with it on the other - which you and many others seem to have completely lost sight of in the 'excitement' of the war. @Mciahel Goodman could share some more experiences of how that plays out.

I've never supported/condoned/agreed with the invasion, so not a lot I can add in this context, on how losing sight plays out as I've never lost sight on that particular score.

 

[GlastonSpur]

But that's not what happened in India, quite the opposite. The British introduced these "basic pillars of democracy" reluctantly and piecemeal, in response to Indian activism of various kinds, with the aim of consolidating and safeguarding their rule. Along the way, they twisted the principles underlying these "pillars" so as to suit themselves, so that a case may be made that many of the problems of Indian democracy today may be traced back to British policies of the 19th and 20th centuries. They ruled despotically to begin with, via the East Indian Company. Then there was an early 19th century debate over whether the maintenance of British rule was best served by continuing to rule despotically or to apply processes of 'modernization'. The intent of the latter was not Indian liberation but rather to safeguard and justify British rule. But it was only after the massive uprisings against British rule across northern India in 1857-59 and the end of East India Company rule that the British really began to introduce representative forms of governance - and this in part due to the advice of Indian elites who had access to British policy-makers (e.g. Sir Sayid Ahmed Khan explicitly argued in his Causes of the Indian Revolt that denial of Indian participation in the Legislative Council was the most important factor in producing the uprisings). Again, the intent was the consolidation and safeguarding of British rule, to ensure that nothing like 1857 ever happened again.

Even then, things such as free press, the rule of law, elections, etc. were all twisted and flawed in such a way as to serve the safeguarding of British rule. The British regularly shut down newspapers and jailed journalists they considered seditious. The rule of law was applied differently to different categories of peoples in different places. A major factor in the founding of the Indian National Congress was widespread reaction to the watering down of a bill initially introduced to allow British subjects to be tried under Indian magistrates but which was fiercely opposed by Europeans resident in India. The British introduced a separate electorate for Muslims in Bengal in 1909 as a classic means of divide and rule. I'll quote from this book:

In 1905, the British partitioned the province of Bengal along religious lines expressly to stifle rising anticolonial sentiment emanating from Calcutta. The plan was masterminded by Herbert Risley, the race scientist who codified the caste system (based on nose measurements) in the 1901 census. His logic was simple: “Bengal united is a power; Bengal divided will pull in several diff er ent ways.” His aim was “to split up and thereby weaken a solid body of opponents to our rule.” Resistance to this “divide and conquer” tactic was vociferous, exploding into the swadeshi movement, including boycott of British goods and institutions. The anticolonial Jugantar revolutionaries drew on many ethical guides, from international anarchism to the Gita, in their turn to political terrorism. The British were forced to annul the division in 1911. They also conceded a measure of local participation in government for Indians in 1909 but, here again, cannily based political identity on religion, creating separate electorates for Hindus and Muslims. In Britain, the move was hailed for “pulling back . . . sixty- two millions of people from joining the ranks of the seditious opposition.” Once electorates were framed by religion, attendant forms of political association and communication— from parties to newspapers— had to be, too, hardening differences and irrevocably politicizing religious identity.​

All these things provoked the resistance which ultimately produced Indian democracy, with all its flaws.



I'm not sure what the relevance of your characterization of the end of British rule as a peaceful handover of power is. Indians struggled for decades, violently and non-violently, to achieve the sort of rights you are now crediting the British for.

It's also interesting that you mention, by way of contrast with British democracy, Hindu-Muslim communal violence and (elsewhere) Modi's Hindu nationalism, without also ascribing these to the legacy of British rule. While communalism certainly has antecedents in India's pre-colonial history, it was sharpened and hardened by the processes of modernization introduced by the British - things like census enumeration, allocation of resources, electorates, language rights, etc. - as well as by British political policies such as those mentioned in the excerpt above. And Hindu nationalism has its origins in the mid-19th century Hindu reformist movements such as the Brahmo Samaj and Arya Samaj. It developed entirely under British rule from that time to independence. It makes as much sense to argue that Hindu nationalism is entirely a legacy of British rule as it does Indian democracy.

As I've already said, British rule in India had many bad aspects. But the caste system already existed before Britain arrived, as did militant Hinduism and militant Islam, not to mention horrible practices such as suttee (which British rule stopped).

Blaming Britain for Modi's Hindu Nationalism, nearly 75 years after India gained independence, is really just an extension of the current "decolonisation" trend in which endless excuses are trotted out on behalf of previously colonised nations and all their ills blamed on the ex-colonisers.

 

[Sweet Square]

 

[2cents]

As I've already said, British rule in India had many bad aspects. But the caste system already existed before Britain arrived, as did militant Hinduism and militant Islam, not to mention horrible practices such as suttee (which British rule stopped).

I haven't mentioned suttee or caste. Although, as with communalism, there are many studies that show how British policies transformed the significance of caste, especially in political terms, during the course of British rule.

I'm not exactly sure what you're referring to by "militant Hinduism" or "militant Islam" existing in pre-British India, as these categories are open to interpretation. In any case I haven't referred to either. Perhaps you'd be surprised to learn that there is a serious academic debate concerning the question of whether or not the concept of Hinduism itself existed before the British arrived? But in any case like I said, serious scholars of Hindu nationalism trace its origins to the mid 19th century.

Blaming Britain for Modi's Hindu Nationalism, nearly 75 years after India gained independence, is really just an extension of the current "decolonisation" trend in which endless excuses are trotted out on behalf of previously colonised nations and all their ills blamed on the ex-colonisers.

But I haven't blamed Britain for Modi. I have argued that, were I to apply the same logic you use to credit Britain for India's democracy, I could likewise fault Britain for the rise of Hindu nationalism (which has ultimately produced Modi). Personally I think the entire game of pros and cons/balance sheet approach to the discussion of empire is a really bad way to understand how British imperialism worked and would be a waste of time engaging with if it wasn't so pervasive and damaging. I'd really encourage you (and others) to try to free yourself from this kind of framing. Without committing too much to it, I'd suggest a framework of seeing both Indian democracy and Hindu nationalism as unintended and largely unforeseen products of the engagement and clash of various Indian peoples with British imperialists over the course of almost two centuries, which crucially occurred in the context of British military dominance.

Finally, your characterization of "the decolonization trend" is a caricature, although I have issues with certain aspects of decolonization theory and practice myself.

 

[Cheimoon]

I've never supported/condoned/agreed with the invasion, so not a lot I can add in this context, on how losing sight plays out as I've never lost sight on that particular score.

I rather meant there that people have made the same error reading your posts.

 

[GlastonSpur]

I haven't mentioned suttee or caste. Although, as with communalism, there are many studies that show how British policies transformed the significance of caste, especially in political terms, during the course of British rule.

I'm not exactly sure what you're referring to by "militant Hinduism" or "militant Islam" existing in pre-British India, as these categories are open to interpretation. In any case I haven't referred to either. Perhaps you'd be surprised to learn that there is a serious academic debate concerning the question of whether or not the concept of Hinduism itself existed before the British arrived? But in any case like I said, serious scholars of Hindu nationalism trace its origins to the mid 19th century.

But I haven't blamed Britain for Modi. I have argued that, were I to apply the same logic you use to credit Britain for India's democracy, I could likewise fault Britain for the rise of Hindu nationalism (which has ultimately produced Modi). Personally I think the entire game of pros and cons/balance sheet approach to the discussion of empire is a really bad way to understand how British imperialism worked and would be a waste of time engaging with if it wasn't so pervasive and damaging. I'd really encourage you (and others) to try to free yourself from this kind of framing. Without committing too much to it, I'd suggest a framework of seeing both Indian democracy and Hindu nationalism as unintended and largely unforeseen products of the engagement and clash of various Indian peoples with British imperialists over the course of almost two centuries, which crucially occurred in the context of British military dominance.

Finally, your characterization of "the decolonization trend" is a caricature, although I have issues with certain aspects of decolonization theory and practice myself.

Militant Islam: Muslim conquests in the Indian subcontinent mainly took place from the 13th to 17th centuries. During the many centuries of Muslim rule as many as 60,000 Hindu temples are said to have been torn down by Muslim rulers, and mosques built on 3,000 of those temples' foundations. This is a primary grievance-focus of today's Hindu nationalists, who aim to put "right " these historical "wrongs".

These events pre-date British rule by up to several hundred years. It's therefore not correct to see Hindu nationalism as largely a product of "engagement and clash of various Indian peoples with British imperialists over the course of almost two centuries."

Regarding Indian democracy, IMO it's a real stretch to separate its existence from particular philosophical and legal-politico principles - including from British Common Law - that Britain introduced into India, and which became culturally embedded to a sufficient degree due to the long time span (200 years) of that rule.

Did Britain colonise India in order to create democracy there? Of course not, so I agree that it was originally unintended.

 

[anant]

I'm sorry, but democracy does not just emerge as a natural consequence of a struggle for independence from colonialism, as countless countries have discovered. For democracy to take root there has to be an establishment and acceptance of the basic pillars of democracy - a free press, an independent judiciary, secret ballots, the very concept of elected government, limited terms of office, etc etc. Many of these essential ideas came from Britain and were absorbed over a long period of time.

Moreover, power was handed back to India peacefully in the end - it was not the result of a violent revolution. Indeed, one of the reasons the transition was delayed was for fear of widespread violence breaking out between Hindus and Muslims once Britain had left - violence that did indeed begin afterwards on a massive scale.

There are a lot more people on this thread who know more than me, and can answer your points better, but when the British left India, our literacy rate was 13%, average life expectancy was <30 years. And also, the partition was done so hurriedly, that we are still seeing the consequences of that 75 years later.

So I'm not sure how the transition was some smooth event you're claiming it was

 

[RedTiger]

This is a primary grievance-focus of today's Hindu nationalists, who aim to put "right " these historical "wrongs".

And how any temples were destroyed by Hindu rajputs and marathas? Destroying someone elses cultural artifacts is just a power move. If the Hindus feel aggrieved by temple destruction then I'm sure Buddhists would have a right to be aggrieved by the destruction of Buddhist stupas by Hindu rulers.

 

[GlastonSpur]

And how any temples were destroyed by Hindu rajputs and marathas? Destroying someone elses cultural artifacts is just a power move. If the Hindus feel aggrieved by temple destruction then I'm sure Buddhists would have a right to be aggrieved by the destruction of Buddhist stupas by Hindu rulers.

I'm not justifying it. I'm simply saying that Hindu-Muslim conflict in India did not stem from British rule.

 

[Suedesi]

You discredited yourself selling a totally moot point pushed by Russian propaganda.

And besides, other countries that entered NATO after 1999 met all (strict) criteria to do so and have the right to tell Putin to stick 12 plastic dildos up his ass. Ukraine and Georgia have not met those criteria, not yet anyway.

FFS stop branding everyone you disagree with as Russian propaganda. There's been a healthy debate on the merits of NATO expansion since the mid 90's (aka before you were a twinkle in your father's eye). George Kennan, Stephen Cohen, Henry Kissinger, Jack Matlock even William Burns (current CIA director) and many other preeminent foreign policy illuminaries have expressed grave concerns about Ukraine joining NATO.

For example, here's noted Kremlin lover Kissinger arguing in 2014 that "“Ukraine should not join NATO. . . . Internationally, they should pursue a posture comparable to that of Finland, carefully avoiding institutional hostility toward Russia."

Some more salient quotes from the article in case it's paywalled:

The West must understand that, to Russia, Ukraine can never be just a foreign country. Russian history began in what was called Kievan-Rus. The Russian religion spread from there. Ukraine has been part of Russia for centuries, and their histories were intertwined before then. Some of the most important battles for Russian freedom, starting with the Battle of Poltava in 1709 , were fought on Ukrainian soil. The Black Sea Fleet — Russia’s means of projecting power in the Mediterranean — is based by long-term lease in Sevastopol, in Crimea. Even such famed dissidents as Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and Joseph Brodsky insisted that Ukraine was an integral part of Russian history and, indeed, of Russia.

The European Union must recognize that its bureaucratic dilatoriness and subordination of the strategic element to domestic politics in negotiating Ukraine’s relationship to Europe contributed to turning a negotiation into a crisis. Foreign policy is the art of establishing priorities.

Here is Kissinger's notion of an outcome compatible with the values and security interests of all sides:

1. Ukraine should have the right to choose freely its economic and political associations, including with Europe.
2. Ukraine should not join NATO, a position I took seven years ago, when it last came up.
3. Ukraine should be free to create any government compatible with the expressed will of its people. Wise Ukrainian leaders would then opt for a policy of reconciliation between the various parts of their country. Internationally, they should pursue a posture comparable to that of Finland. That nation leaves no doubt about its fierce independence and cooperates with the West in most fields but carefully avoids institutional hostility toward Russia.
4. It is incompatible with the rules of the existing world order for Russia to annex Crimea. But it should be possible to put Crimea’s relationship to Ukraine on a less fraught basis. To that end, Russia would recognize Ukraine’s sovereignty over Crimea. Ukraine should reinforce Crimea’s autonomy in elections held in the presence of international observers. The process would include removing any ambiguities about the status of the Black Sea Fleet at Sevastopol.

Finland’s case shows that neutrality does not necessarily involve a satellite status. And on the upside, Europe’s neutral nations (Finland, Sweden, Austria, Switzerland) stand out as among the continent’s most prosperous ones.

Before the 2014 war, Ukraine had a critical choice: NATO or the policy of neutrality. The political elite in Kyiv opted for NATO, despite the fact that in 2012, only 13 percent of the public saw NATO as the best security option for the country. Ukraine now faces total destruction and possible dismemberment by an insecure Putin obsessed with imperial status. Putin is solely responsible for starting this war, but this was predictable and thus avoidable. The currently unfolding Ukrainian tragedy is geopolitical malpractice.

 

[Suedesi]

He talked a good game, but ultimately it’s the results that matter. The idiotically naïve “reset with Russia”, failing to read Putin’s interest in invading Ukraine in 2014, the failed “red line” in Syria that enabled mass carnage and invited the Russians in to do the same.

He had good domestic instincts but his foreign policy was incredibly feckless. He didn’t understand when he needed to go hard and became passive aggressive through drones. I will give him credit for the Iran deal and thawing of relations with Castro. But the two key areas where his leadership was most needed, he flopped.

Compared to Dubya and Trump (I know it's almost an unfair comparison), Obama's foreign policy was miles better. Results matter as you say and he didn't feck shit up to use a principle of his doctrine, something that can't be said about Dubya, who supposedly showed strength and resolve but got us mired into two decades long wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Iraq was a completely useless war, based on false premises which resulted in fckall but destruction, deaths and instability throughout the entire region. Afghanistan should have been a targeted military operation to capture/kill OBL and we didn't need to spend 2 decades and waste thousands of lives and hundreds of billions of dollars.

 

[Sweet Square]

Compared to Dubya and Trump (I know it's almost an unfair comparison), Obama's foreign policy was miles better. Results matter as you say and he didn't feck shit up to use a principle of his doctrine, something that can't be said about Dubya, who supposedly showed strength and resolve but got us mired into two decades long wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Libya and more drone strikes than Dubya. They are all war criminals in their own special American way.

 

[2cents]

Militant Islam: Muslim conquests in the Indian subcontinent mainly took place from the 13th to 17th centuries. During the many centuries of Muslim rule as many as 60,000 Hindu temples are said to have been torn down by Muslim rulers, and mosques built on 3,000 of those temples' foundations. This is a primary grievance-focus of today's Hindu nationalists, who aim to put "right " these historical "wrongs".

These events pre-date British rule by up to several hundred years. It's therefore not correct to see Hindu nationalism as largely a product of "engagement and clash of various Indian peoples with British imperialists over the course of almost two centuries."

I think your definition and use of "militant Islam" here is a problem (I'd suggest reading the work of Richard M. Eaton as a counter-balance to your narrative). In any case it still doesn't tell us anything about the origins of Hindu nationalism. Many forms of nationalism lean on historical grievances harking back centuries. To take one pertinent example - a major grievance of right-wing Zionists today is the Muslim conquest of Jerusalem and the building of a mosque and other shrines on the site of the ancient Jewish temple there. That doesn't mean Zionism has its origins in the 7th century. The fact that hardcore Irish Republicans go on about 800 years of British oppression doesn't mean the origins of Irish nationalism lie at the moment of the Norman conquest of Ireland. And so on. Nationalism is constructed largely on historical memories of a vague and partly mythical distant past. But it is a modern phenomenon dependent on such characteristics of modernity as the printing press, growth of literacy, mass communication and mobility, the centralizing bureaucratic state, professional armies, standard education, etc. It happened to be under the British that these things were introduced to India, and under these conditions that a modern Hindu nationalist consciousness first began to grow in the 19th century.

Also, it is not irrelevant that the modern Hindu nationalist characterization of centuries of Muslim rule in India as period of unabated oppression, misery, and temple-destruction draws heavily on British histories of medieval India produced in the 19th century that aimed to justify British rule by contrasting Muslim despotism with the enlightened British.

I'm not justifying it. I'm simply saying that Hindu-Muslim conflict in India did not stem from British rule.

Nobody has argued that Hindu-Muslim conflict has stemmed solely from British rule. I have argued that the nature and significance of Hindu-Muslim conflict was transformed by processes of modernization introduced under the British, and that this played a major role in stoking the communalism that ultimately produced partition and the violence that followed. Seeing "Hindu-Muslim conflict in India" as a kind of trans-historical phenomenon unworthy of serious historical investigation/contextualization is really unhelpful in trying to actually understand its significance and root causes at the crucial moment in 1947.

Regarding Indian democracy, IMO it's a real stretch to separate its existence from particular philosophical and legal-politico principles - including from British Common Law - that Britain introduced into India, and which became culturally embedded to a sufficient degree due to the long time span (200 years) of that rule.

I wouldn't dismiss this argument out of hand, but it's too vague to make much of.

 

[Sky1981]

Colonialist used culture, religion, sectarian as means to divide and conquer. Nothing new here.

A ship of holland troops invaded my country and guess who's doing the fight for them, local landlord.

Class divide and racism are intensified and designed to help control the population. Putting minority in the overseer rule, making them the target of discontent isnt a brand new thing. Collabolators as they say.

Devide et impera

 

[Giggsyking]

UK to give asylum seekers one-way ticket to Rwanda

BBC

When they're white, they're Refugees who need shelter and we can post loads of feel good news articles about them being given a place to stay.

When they're black, they're just Asylum Seekers and they can feck off back to their own country.

Brits complaining about non white refugees!! the sheer audacity of the UK to complain about refugees when they themselves showed up on the front door of every fecking nation on this planet uninvited.

 

[Raoul]

FFS stop branding everyone you disagree with as Russian propaganda. There's been a healthy debate on the merits of NATO expansion since the mid 90's (aka before you were a twinkle in your father's eye). George Kennan, Stephen Cohen, Henry Kissinger, Jack Matlock even William Burns (current CIA director) and many other preeminent foreign policy illuminaries have expressed grave concerns about Ukraine joining NATO.

For example, here's noted Kremlin lover Kissinger arguing in 2014 that "“Ukraine should not join NATO. . . . Internationally, they should pursue a posture comparable to that of Finland, carefully avoiding institutional hostility toward Russia."

Some more salient quotes from the article in case it's paywalled:


Finland’s case shows that neutrality does not necessarily involve a satellite status. And on the upside, Europe’s neutral nations (Finland, Sweden, Austria, Switzerland) stand out as among the continent’s most prosperous ones.

Before the 2014 war, Ukraine had a critical choice: NATO or the policy of neutrality. The political elite in Kyiv opted for NATO, despite the fact that in 2012, only 13 percent of the public saw NATO as the best security option for the country. Ukraine now faces total destruction and possible dismemberment by an insecure Putin obsessed with imperial status. Putin is solely responsible for starting this war, but this was predictable and thus avoidable. The currently unfolding Ukrainian tragedy is geopolitical malpractice.

Finland wasn't in the Soviet sphere, so its neutrality can't be viewed as some sort of example that Ukraine can follow.

Ultimately, its Ukrainians themselves that have to decide their future, not Russia.

 

[Cheimoon]

Finland wasn't in the Soviet sphere, so its neutrality can't be viewed as some sort of example that Ukraine can follow.

Ultimately, its Ukrainians themselves that have to decide their future, not Russia.

Finland was though. Not as much as the Warsaw Pact countries, but their neutrality was under USSR tutelage, not 'properly' neutral. There are summaries here:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Finlandization
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paasikivi–Kekkonen_doctrine

 

[Raoul]

Finland was though. Not as much as the Warsaw Pact countries, but their neutrality was under USSR tutelage, not 'properly' neutral. There are summaries here:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Finlandization
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paasikivi–Kekkonen_doctrine

That's not the same as Ukraine or any of the actual former SSRs. Therefore using it as an example for Ukraine to follow when Putin views Ukraine as part of Russia, wouldn't really work.

 

[do.ob]

That's not the same as Ukraine or any of the actual former SSRs. Therefore using it as an example for Ukraine to follow when Putin views Ukraine as part of Russia, wouldn't really work.

I would also add that not being Slavic probably also helped Finland gain some separation from Russia. The whole comparison seems to be very obviously of the apples and oranges kind.

 

[Cheimoon]

That's not the same as Ukraine or any of the actual former SSRs. Therefore using it as an example for Ukraine to follow when Putin views Ukraine as part of Russia, wouldn't really work.

Well, Finland did form part of the Russian Empire until 1917, and was part of Sweden before that. So the argument that 'the Finnish country' has no historical basis and hence no right to exist could have been made just as easily. In fact, Putin's argument that a western-facing Ukraine is a threat to Russia and that the country (well, 'region' for him) historically belongs with Russia exactly echoes how Stalin saw Finland:

Soviet General Secretary Joseph Stalin regarded it a disappointment that the Soviet Union could not halt the Finnish Revolution. He thought that the pro-Finland movement in Karelia posed a direct threat to Leningrad and that the area and defences of Finland could be used to invade the Soviet Union or restrict fleet movements. Soviet propaganda then painted Finland's leadership as a "vicious and reactionary fascist clique". Field Marshal Mannerheim and Väinö Tanner, the leader of the Finnish Social Democratic Party, were targeted for particular scorn. When Stalin gained absolute power through the Great Purge of 1938, the Soviets changed their foreign policy toward Finland and began to pursue the reconquest of the provinces of Tsarist Russia that had been lost during the chaos of the October Revolution and the Russian Civil War almost two decades earlier. Soviet leaders believed that the old empire's extended borders provided territorial security and wanted Leningrad, only 32 km (20 mi) from the Finnish border, to enjoy a similar level of security against the rising power of Nazi Germany.

As you can see, see that even referring to Ukraine's leaders as nazis echoes the reference to the Finnish leaderships as fascists. (Edit: And the disappointment about the Finnish Revolution away from communism mirrors Russian unhappiness about Euromaidan. I didn't realize it when I first brought this up, but the similarities are uncanny actually.)

And of course Stalin did invade Finland twice, resulting in the Winter War and the Continuation War. So the comparison seems a lot more apt than you think.

 

[nimic]

Well, Finland did form part of the Russian Empire until 1917, and was part of Sweden before that. So the argument that 'the Finnish country' has no historical basis and hence no right to exist could have been made just as easily. In fact, Putin's argument that a western-facing Ukraine is a threat to Russia and that the country (well, 'region' for him) historically belongs with Russia exactly echoes how Stalin saw Finland:

It's not quite the same, since Finland had a great deal of autonomy within the Russian Empire, and were viewed as a separate people and country. They're not Slavic and have a completely different language and culture, so it's honestly quite different to the historical relationship between Russia and Ukraine.

And of course Stalin did invade Finland twice, resulting in the Winter War and the Continuation War. So the comparison seems a lot more apt than you think.

He invaded once, Finland initiated the Continuation War.

 

[Cheimoon]

It's not quite the same, since Finland had a great deal of autonomy within the Russian Empire, and were viewed as a separate people and country. They're not Slavic and have a completely different language and culture, so it's honestly quite different to the historical relationship between Russia and Ukraine.

Not sure how much this Slavic aspect matters, but yes, Russia has no relation with Finland that includes something like the Kyivan Rus. Russia was working on 'properly' integrating Finland into its empire around 1900 though, so they may not have seen this separation as much (as much as Finland opposed that integration).

He invaded once, Finland initiated the Continuation War.

Right, sorry!

Anyway, all that to say that I don't think the idea of the Finlandization of Ukraine is completely out of place here.

 

[nimic]

Anyway, all that to say that I don't think the idea of the Finlandization of Ukraine is completely out of place here.

Oh yeah, I guess I should read more than two posts up. That doesn't sound too far-fetched to me.

 

[berbatrick]

"Autocratic" India gets a double stamp of approval from the real founders of our democracy. Liberal smears have been beaten back, and we're on the side of democracy against autocracy!

https://indianexpress.com/article/i...-during-war-on-ukraine-boris-johnson-7882605/

Modi ‘intervened several times’ with Putin during war on Ukraine: Boris Johnson

Johnson, who spoke at a press conference organised by the British High Commission after the bilateral meeting with PM Modi, steered clear of criticising India for not condemning Russia’s actions.

https://english.alarabiya.net/News/...s-outrage-in-India-with-bulldozer-photo-shoot

The photos of Johnson perched on a JCB bulldozer drew criticism on social media and landed him on the front page of many newspapers - a distraction from the “Global Britain” push that brings him on a two-day visit to the South Asian nation.

Over the last week, bulldozers, including those made by JCB, have been in the news as government officials in several Indian states, including the capital Delhi, used the machines to destroy the homes and businesses of mostly poor Muslims as punishment for allegedly indulging in crimes like stone-pelting during religious clashes with majority Hindu groups.

 

[Moby]

the real founders of our democracy

 

[Dr. Dwayne]

Anyway, all that to say that I don't think the idea of the Finlandization of Ukraine is completely out of place here.

What is this, instilling a culture of alcoholism and firearms? You might as well call it the Saskatchewanization of Ukraine, we at least owe them that much for all of the Ukrainians they gave us.

 

[Cheimoon]

What is this, instilling a culture of alcoholism and firearms? You might as well call it the Saskatchewanization of Ukraine, we at least owe them that much for all of the Ukrainians they gave us.

And sauna! Sauna, dude!

(If there's one thing I miss about Finland!)

 

[Dr. Dwayne]

And sauna! Sauna, dude!

(If there's one thing I miss about Finland!)

Oh yeah, I remember Finny going on about the sauna and the birch whippings. We definitely don't do that back in Saskatchewan, unless the ice fishing hut gets warm.

 

[Cheimoon]

Oh yeah, I remember Finny going on about the sauna and the birch whippings. We definitely don't do that back in Saskatchewan, unless the ice fishing hut gets warm.

Birch whippings, ice baths - screw all that. Sauna!

 

[Dr. Dwayne]

Birch whippings, ice baths - screw all that. Sauna!

Finny said you had to do them all in a particular order.

 

[Cheimoon]

Finny said you had to do them all in a particular order.

Well. Ice bath breaks aren't too bad, but just a cold shower works also. Not sure why I'd whip myself. Finnish beer + sauna and occasional shower breaks is perfect.

If that isn't geopolitics then I don't know what is.

 

[nimic]

Typical scout and former admin (?) interaction, taking the thread way off topic. I've certainly never done that. Rude, innit.

 

[do.ob]

Typical scout and former admin (?) interaction, taking the thread way off topic. I've certainly never done that. Rude, innit.

Let's face it: once the Glaston hot takes and the fullquotes of articles from RT staff dried up the thread was kind of dead anyway.

 

[Gehrman]

And how any temples were destroyed by Hindu rajputs and marathas? Destroying someone elses cultural artifacts is just a power move. If the Hindus feel aggrieved by temple destruction then I'm sure Buddhists would have a right to be aggrieved by the destruction of Buddhist stupas by Hindu rulers.

There aren't any Buddhists left in India apart from the tibetan exiles. Buddhists suffered horribly both from Muslim conquests and some of the hindu's as well. They were completely wiped out in their mother land. Actually these events are used as a narrative by the militant burmanese Buddhist nationalists to justify their genocide of the rohingya.

 

[nimic]

Let's face it: once the Glaston hot takes and the fullquotes of articles from RT staff dried up the thread was kind of dead anyway.

The real whataboutery was the friends we made along the way.

 

[Raoul]

 

[Cheimoon]

The real whataboutery was the friends we made along the way.

I love you all.