Where Beijing has failed is in rapidly delivering the third and fourth round of boosters and in ensuring that the most vulnerable population, those over 60, are properly covered. As of the latest figures cited by
Bloomberg, “only 69% of those aged 60 and above and just 40% of over 80-year-olds have had booster shots.” That leaves tens of millions of elderly with no protection at all. They are the people who
died in Hong Kong.
As far as I am aware there is no fully convincing explanation for this failure to provide comprehensive coverage particularly of the elderly.
There are a lot of
good studies in the specialist literature in medical sociology and psychology that help to explain some of the vaccine resistance.
China became a victim of its own haste in rolling out vaccines on a rough and ready basis to those under the age of 60. This created the perception that the vaccines were
not properly tested or safe for use amongst more fragile elderly people.
China has an unfortunate track record of vaccine scandals and the
lack of good data on the safety and efficacy of China’s shots among the elderly in homegrown vaccine’s clinical trials does not build confidence.
Health workers have been cautious about recommending vaccines for those with high blood pressure or autoimmune disorders and given the negligible chance of COVID infection, there seemed little reason to take the risk. In most of China, COVID has never been more than a news report. Thanks to the success of the 2020 measures, many cities have never logged a single case and elderly people regard the threat as very remote.
The Chinese population and the regime also suffered from “other people’s problem”-syndrome. Not unreasonably they convinced themselves that COVID was an issue for the failed and degenerate West. Rather than joining a broad global front to endorse precautionary vaccination and boosting with whatever vaccinations were too hand, Beijing allowed the media to spread questions about the efficacy and safety of vaccines in general.
But the real question, given the CCP-regime’s supposed grip on society, is why personal attitudes and public opinion matter at all. Why did the regime not impose vaccine mandates?
One part of the explanation may be that the primary aim of zero Covid was to minimize the number of cases. It thus made sense to prioritize vaccinating the more mobile, younger population, rather than elderly people who can be sheltered by simply staying at home.
Remarkably, at the city level where the vaccination program have to be delivered, the authorities have repeatedly shrunk from forcing the issue. During the height of its bout with COVID, Shanghai city authorities gave cash rewards and did vaccination house calls for the elderly. That raised the delivery of a first course of vaccine to nearly 70% of the elderly group. But without a booster that offers only little protection.
When Beijing attempted to impose the
first vaccine mandate in China, the result was an embarrassment. Even with essential retail outlets exempted from the vaccine requirement, within
48 hours the public outcry against coercion forced a retreat. In September, China’s National Health Commission clarified that whilst cash incentives and insurance for “vaccine accidents” are considered acceptable, vaccinate mandates were rejected as national
policy. A Health Commission expert declared that
These practices (mandates) violate the principle of vaccination and also cause inconvenience to the masses. Wu Liangyou said that the new crown virus vaccination should be carried out in accordance with the principles of knowledge, consent, voluntariness and seeking truth from facts, and emphasized that the introduction of vaccination policies and measures must be rigorous and prudent, carefully evaluated, to ensure compliance with laws and regulations, and strictly aside by the bottom line of safety. It is reported that the National Health and Health Commission will guide all localities to make good use of health codes and vaccination codes, and resolutely put an end to the two-code joint inspection and compulsory vaccination.
The squeamishness of the regime when it comes to shots is remarkable. Clearly, the CCP-regime does not resist coercive measures. One can hardly imagine anything more coercive in peace time than the closed loop production system in which workers are confined to their factories. Nor does it shrink from costs. The gigantic testing apparatus of Zero Covid that allows a hundred million people to be tested in a single days is very costly. According to the
Economist:
The 35 largest firms producing covid-19 tests raked in some 150bn yuan ($21bn) in revenues in the first half of 2022 alone. A broker, Soochow Securities, has estimated China’s bill for covid testing at 1.7trn yuan this year, or around 1.5% of gdp. That number, which some consider an underestimate, equates to nearly half of all China’s public spending on education in 2020.
This highlights the need to understand the complexity of CCP rule, the way in which the appropriate limits of its coercive power are defined and the way in which it prefers certain tactics and instruments to others.