Ukraine defeats Russia in Kharkiv
What began as a probing attack by Ukrainian mechanised forces towards the occupied town of Balakliia on 7 September has, with astonishing swiftness, turned into one of the most emphatic military victories in modern history. Having found a weak point in the Russian lines at Balakliia, Ukrainian forces swiftly advanced overnight to the town of Volokhiv Yar, and continued driving towards Sevchenkove during the morning of the 8th. Russian forces in the region were hurriedly sent to Sevchenkove to stall what was rapidly becoming a clear danger to a significant section of the frontlines around Chkalovske. However, by the time Russian forces began to arrive, the Ukrainian spearhead had already been rapidly reinforced with mobile reserves, as Ukrainian commanders pushed in units to take advantage of the unexpectedly rapid advance. This rapid Ukrainian reinforcement of local success
allowed its spearhead forces to encircle and then bypass Sevchenkove rather than stopping to fully defeat Russian forces there, driving on towards the strategically critical railhead junction city of Kupyansk.
Since April, Russian offensive operations have concentrated on the Donbas region, comprising Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts. The offensive operations against the critical Ukrainian city of Sovlyansk and the town of Barvinkove in Donetsk were conducted from and supplied through the city of Izyum. After months of bitter fighting, the thousands of Russian troops in Izyum were secure in highly fortified positions and had large stockpiles of ammunition, artillery, armoured vehicles and command and control equipment. However, due to the pattern of roads and
railway infrastructure in northern Ukraine,
all the major supply routes to Izyum from Russia itself go through Kupyansk to the north. Thus, when it became clear on the morning of 9 September that Ukrainian forces
had reached Kupyansk, panic set in throughout the Russian military establishment, and among pro-Russian media and social media commentators. Suddenly, a highly fortified and well garrisoned area of the Russian-Ukrainian frontline to the north of Donbas was cut off from resupply, reinforcement or retreat via any large highways or railways. As Russian panic spread,
Ukrainian forces maintained the initiative, pushing mobile reserves in to secure and expand the corridor of liberated territory from Balakliia to Kupyansk, while spearheads drove south down the banks of the Oskil river towards Izyum itself. At the same time, Ukrainian units around Slovyansk in the Donbas began attacking north towards Izyum and Lyman to threaten a complete encirclement of Russian forces in Izyum.
Thanks to the long-signalled and still ongoing Ukrainian counter-offensive in Kherson,
Russia’s usable reserve forces had almost all been redeployed to the southern front. As such, once the frontlines had been breached and locally available reserve force had been isolated, Ukrainian forces were suddenly able to advance almost unhindered. Thanks to the presence of
medium-range SA-11 surface-to-air missile systems, German-supplied
Gepard mobile anti-aircraft guns and shoulder-fired Manpads, Russian fixed wing aircraft and helicopter gunships were also unable to effectively delay or attrit the Ukrainian force.
The result is the most dramatic collapse of Russian forces in Ukraine since the attempt to take Kyiv was abandoned in April, with the Russian Ministry of Defence acknowledging that its forces have abandoned (or 'regrouped from' in their language)
all their remaining positions in Kharkiv Oblast. Desperate to escape encirclement, and with all the major roads and railway links with Russian-held territory cut, Russian units have largely abandoned their heavy equipment and streamed on foot and in stolen civilian vehicles through the Oleksandrivka gap to reach the eastern side of the Oskil river. Many thousands will have been captured, and with the capture of Izyum Ukraine has not only liberated a vast swathe of territory, but also captured huge stockpiles of Russian ammunition and armoured vehicles that will bolster its forces in the battles still to come.
The immediate and medium-term prospects for Russia are grim. Ukraine’s stunning Kharkiv offensive victory is an unmitigated military disaster for the Kremlin, and one that will demand a rapid response. However, all of the potential choices for how to respond are deeply problematic. Essentially the biggest problem facing Russia is that
it simply does not have enough infantry to properly defend the thousand kilometres of frontline that it has, and prevent partisan and special forces attacks behind the lines, while also retaining reserve forces to respond to Ukrainian breakthroughs or reinforce local Russian successes.
The Ukrainian counter-offensive in Kherson was not a feint or a distraction, though it was undoubtedly intended to draw Russian forces to an area where they could be relatively easily isolated and then attritted by artillery. The fighting is still intense and
Ukrainian forces are still gaining territory back on that front. Therefore, Russia cannot easily withdraw its elite units currently defending Kherson across the Dnipro to help reinforce its collapsing position in Donetsk. For one thing, morale could now easily collapse throughout the Russian Army as the scale of the northern defeat becomes widely known. Secondly, if the defending forces are depleted by redeployment, Ukrainian forces could inflict a second rout on the Kherson front before winter arrives. Thirdly, with the Antonivskyi Bridge and the crossing at Nova Kakhovka rendered unusable for heavy vehicles by continued Himars strikes and
temporary pontoon bridges and ferries being regularly struck too, it is not even clear that Russia can redeploy most of the heavy equipment now on the West bank of the Dnipro to use elsewhere. If Russia attempts to pull troops from other, more thinly manned areas of frontline, then Ukrainian probing attacks will likely discover those weak points and take advantage of them to make further advances.
Russia has been trying to build up significant new forces in Russia itself using troops drawn from newly conscripted and mobilised reserve personnel. The 3rd Army Corps was formed in June and has been receiving significant quantities of high-end equipment, presumably to allow Russia to renew offensive operations once the weather allows in Spring 2023. However, now
elements have been transferred to the Kharkiv front in an unsuccessful attempt to stem the Ukrainian breakthrough. If Russia tries to use the bulk of this new formation and other freshly raised troops to consolidate its faltering position this side of Winter, then it will be risking huge losses among forces that have not had time to train properly after being mobilised, and squandering any chance of having a renewed reserve to regain the initiative in Spring.
It remains to be seen how much further Ukrainian forces can advance without risking overstretch in the coming weeks, and whether Russian forces will suffer further systemic collapses and losses of captured territory. Even if they do, it looks unlikely at this stage that Ukraine can win the war before the worsening weather compels a halt to large scale offensive operations for both sides in November. However, by inflicting such a dramatic defeat on Russian forces in Kharkiv and presenting the Russian military with a major challenge to simply avoid further disasters, Ukraine has put itself in a dominant strategic position.
There can be no more questions from Western partner nations about the long-term prospects for Ukrainian victory on the battlefield, which should help guarantee continued large-scale support throughout what promises to be a very economically and politically difficult winter. The Ukrainian government will now be highly resilient against Russian-sponsored narratives that aim to undermine domestic faith in the Zelenskyy government. The Russian leadership faces very awkward questions about its decision to invade and the way in which it has conducted the war, and has also lost any semblance of a bargaining position to try and compel Ukraine to negotiate a settlement that might lock in some Russian gains. Finally, in the all-important area of morale, Ukrainian troops will be going into a muddy, cold and dangerous winter period with confidence in their victory, while Russian troops must come to terms with a major defeat, heavy losses, the obvious lies of their leaders, and fear of what the Spring will bring.