Russian invasion of Ukraine | Fewer tweets, more discussion

The United said:
Hindsight is 20/20, of course. People thought UA was keeping the Russians busy at Bekmut for months. However, it seemed that the RA was holding the UA there while the rest of them were building all these defensive structures in other places. And guess what? UA is still busy at Bekmut, even now. I don't know if it was or is a strategic failure by UA.
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See, talking about not considering a broader context but cut out certain words. You do know that defensive structures can mean fortifications too? Not all of them have to include digging the frozen (if even the ground was frozen the whole time from Dec to June) grounds. You do know that right?
 
The United said:
See, talking about not considering a broader context but cut out certain words. You do know that defensive structures can mean fortifications too? Not all of them have to include digging the frozen (if even the ground was frozen the whole time from Dec to June) grounds. You do know that right?
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What certain words have been cut out from that quote? Please be specific.
 
Krakenzero said:
What certain words have been cut out from that quote? Please be specific.
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You highlighted the sentence that include words "defensive structures". Since you didn't explain yourself, I had to assume you were talking about the defensive structures, and you kept talking about frozen and muddy grounds that were not impenetrable(really?). Be more specific, then if that was not your intention.

Oh, btw, the BTM-3, a Soviet-era trenching machine, can dig the ground even if it is frozen - WAPO. I didn't say they used those to dig the frozen ground at a certain point. I was just giving you information that they had ways to do it if they wanted to. I have to cover it myself in case some cut-out sh*t is used against me again.
 
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The United said:
I am not sure that their infighting gave any advantage to the UA side whatsoever, as they eventually lost the city with huge numbers of casualties, and there will be more from trying to retake it now. In fact, the city lost most of its areas to the Wagner Group a week after their leader cried about how they didn't get ammunition. The rest of the battle fields do not seem to have had any impact from their mutiny or infighting as well. Of course, we will have to wait, as you said, for the full impact, but it's possible that we wish to see a bigger impact than what actually happened.
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I'd argue that division amongst the enemy's ranks is always good. If it's deciding, I don't know.

It turned out Wagner had ammunition as they seemed to bring all of it towards Moscow, so that bit doesn't really hold. Anyway, we probably won't know until historians get into this. Or Russia completely unravels in front of the world.
 
The United said:
You highlighted the sentence that include words "defensive structures". Since you didn't explain yourself, I had to assume you were talking about the defensive structures, and you kept talking about frozen and muddy grounds that were not impenetrable(really?). Be more specific, then if that was not your intention.

Oh, btw, the BTM-3, a Soviet-era trenching machine, can dig the ground even if it is frozen - WAPO. I didn't say they used those to dig the frozen ground at a certain point. I was just giving you information that they had ways to do it if they wanted to. I have to cover it myself in case some cut-out sh*t is used against me again.
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That was not a cut out, so it's a flat out lie. Also, you are the only one talking about deffensive structures.

Please, explain how Bakhmut is what is relevant in order to allow the RA to dig in in the other fronts, and not the winter which prevented any major offensives. It's certainly a revolutionary vision.
 
Krakenzero said:
That was not a cut out, so it's a flat out lie. Also, you are the only one talking about deffensive structures.

Please, explain how Bakhmut is what is relevant in order to allow the RA to dig in in the other fronts, and not the winter which prevented any major offensives. It's certainly a revolutionary vision.
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I don't have a single clue how to address this specific aspect of lying you mentioned.

It seems you're focused on the winter timeframe, but we're not discussing battles in Siberia during the winter. It didn't even seem to last long this year by some accounts. For reference, the UA started their offensive in June, which is far away from the winter time frame. Meanwhile, the RA conducted big (ish) offensives in Bekhmut, including armor operations in Vuhledar, around that time frame. The idea is that one of the factors could be that the strong determination to defend Bakhmut at any cost may have limited UA's ability to expand their operations on other fronts, giving pretty much easy time for the RA to fortify their positions more from late last year to almost June. The Bakhmut battle resulted in significant losses of manpower and equipment for the UA, while the RA mainly deployed convicts. This could have affected UA's readiness for the summer offensive in a broad sense. Therefore, It's worth considering whether the RA intended this outcome by keeping most of the UA's attention solely on Bekhmut for the time being while trying to take that symbolic city. Or at least it may challenge the view that it was UA troops holding RA troops from doing offensive operations on other places at that time.

If you find these reasons unconvincing, it's okay to disagree and engage in constructive discussion or debate. Don't go around spouting that there are some lies or goalpost-moving stuff. It was just a simple observation (in hindsight) that came from the conclusion that now the UA (and the West) seem to have significant difficulties against the RA's defense that they had months to prepare almost without getting interrupted. It was also about challenging (in hindsight) the view of RA troops getting wasted there could have weaken their defense for the UA counter attack in the summer. Not exactly a revolutionary vision at all.
 
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The United said:
I don't have a single clue how to address this specific aspect of lying you mentioned.

It seems you're focused on the winter timeframe, but we're not discussing battles in Siberia during the winter. It didn't even seem to last long this year by some accounts. For reference, the UA started their offensive in June, which is far away from the winter time frame. Meanwhile, the RA conducted big (ish) offensives in Bekhmut, including armor operations in Vuhledar, around that time frame. The idea is that one of the factors could be that the strong determination to defend Bakhmut at any cost may have limited UA's ability to expand their operations on other fronts, giving pretty much easy time for the RA to fortify their positions more from late last year to almost June. The Bakhmut battle resulted in significant losses of manpower and equipment for the UA, while the RA mainly deployed convicts. This could have affected UA's readiness for the summer offensive in a broad sense. Therefore, It's worth considering whether the RA intended this outcome by keeping most of the UA's attention solely on Bekhmut for the time being while trying to take that symbolic city. Or at least it may challenge the view that it was UA troops holding RA troops from doing offensive operations on other places at that time.

If you find these reasons unconvincing, it's okay to disagree and engage in constructive discussion or debate. Don't go around spouting that there are some lies or goalpost-moving stuff. It was just a simple observation (in hindsight) that came from the conclusion that now the UA (and the West) seem to have significant difficulties against the RA's defense that they had months to prepare almost without getting interrupted. It was also about challenging (in hindsight) the view of RA troops getting wasted there could have weaken their defense for the UA counter attack in the summer. Not exactly a revolutionary vision at all.
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The Battle of Bakhmut was part of summer offensive operations for the Russians aimed at a large encirclement of Ukrainian forces. Ukraine’s retaking of Izyum meant this strategic goal was null, but Russia continued assaults on Bakhmut anyway. They did this, not to support a strategic goal of limiting Ukrainian offensive power, but to promote the propaganda goal of giving Russia a victory after a very bad summer of defeats. Ukraine had already fought its offensive, and had liberated large parts of Kherson and Kharkiv oblasts.

Regarding units involved and casualties - prior to the Wagner / convict forces becoming the main body in Bakhmut, the Russian Army did suffer serious losses of conventional forces - i.e. the 144th Guards Motor Rifle Division was destroyed by September and several Russian VDV units suffered heavy attritional losses throughout the campaign.

Once the battle did get into winter, and Wagner started largely replacing Russian Army units, fighting outside of the city resembled that of Passchendale in 1917 with a cold, muddy, deforested landscape being crisscrossed by trenches. The fighting was horribly slow and brutal, highlighting why you wouldn’t see major offensive operations on any other front during this time frame - it would have led to the same result. Fighting inside of the city would obviously be fought in different terrain, but again, urban operations heavily favor the defender, even with a tiny fraction of the manpower of the offensive force, and history tells us that the attacker would suffer greatly, even without the problems caused by mud. Wagner’s convict forces were largely exhausted by the end of January, meaning Wagner had to once again commit its good units into the fight from February until the end of major operations in May.
 
Carolina Red said:
The Battle of Bakhmut was part of summer offensive operations for the Russians aimed at a large encirclement of Ukrainian forces. Ukraine’s retaking of Izyum meant this strategic goal was null, but Russia continued assaults on Bakhmut anyway. They did this, not to support a strategic goal of limiting Ukrainian offensive power, but to promote the propaganda goal of giving Russia a victory after a very bad summer of defeats. Ukraine had already fought its offensive, and had liberated large parts of Kherson and Kharkiv oblasts.

Regarding units involved and casualties - prior to the Wagner / convict forces becoming the main body in Bakhmut, the Russian Army did suffer serious losses of conventional forces - i.e. the 144th Guards Motor Rifle Division was destroyed by September and several Russian VDV units suffered heavy attritional losses throughout the campaign.

Once the battle did get into winter, and Wagner started largely replacing Russian Army units, fighting outside of the city resembled that of Passchendale in 1917 with a cold, muddy, deforested landscape being crisscrossed by trenches. The fighting was horribly slow and brutal, highlighting why you wouldn’t see major offensive operations on any other front during this time frame - it would have led to the same result. Fighting inside of the city would obviously be fought in different terrain, but again, urban operations heavily favor the defender, even with a tiny fraction of the manpower of the offensive force, and history tells us that the attacker would suffer greatly, even without the problems caused by mud. Wagner’s convict forces were largely exhausted by the end of January, meaning Wagner had to once again commit its good units into the fight from February until the end of major operations in May.
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No one here is arguing about the brutality (or pointlessness of it after some time) of that battle or how it turned out. The question was if UA should have committed to that extend that they were mostly tied to that and possibly neglect the other operations and/or preparing those? Was it their strategic failure? The UA could not start their counter till June. So, the timeline from Jan - Feb to June is still a huge gap. And speaking of having major offensive in winter, UA has not started any major offensive yet even now according to some. They called it probing, right? So, should or could they have done those in the Southen/Eastern fronts at times before June and after let's say March?

But the answer to that would be pretty much simple like no, the UA just could not do much without the Western equipment. Or yeah, well it could have been one of the reasons that the summer offensive seemed to go this way. At least that's what I would expect people based on to discuss. Instead some of the replies are more or less like in football forum - Oh I think this player is shit, and you can't change my opinion.

The casualty stuff is just to emphasize the questions based on if it was worth it and if it delayed the summer offensive operations.
 
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If not Bakhmut, then somewhere else Ukraine was going to face those thousands of convicts anyway. Or at a later moment in Bakhmut.
 
Seems like the offensive is a bit of a fail so far. I can see negotiations in the Autumn.
 
Looking forward to Ukraine taking out completely that bridge to Crimea.
 
VorZakone said:
If not Bakhmut, then somewhere else Ukraine was going to face those thousands of convicts anyway. Or at a later moment in Bakhmut.
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I am not exactly sure what Wagner would do if they captured Bakhmut early, let's say in October. Their intention was probably to take that city as a trophy to boost their leader or brand and leave. I say this based on the fact that I don't see Wagner fighting/participating heavily on any other front or city except for this one in this whole war. Correct me if I am wrong. Of course, in hindsight, having that city earlier may have meant that the Wagner would leave the front early and UA didn't probably have to face thousands of convicts and lose tons of manpower for a city that was eventually lost anyway. It is always better if you can limit your casualties, of course.

So, not being able to take the city for months may have made the Wagner force in UA bigger?
 
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The United said:
The question was if UA should have committed to that extend that they were mostly tied to that and possibly neglect the other operations and/or preparing those? The UA could not start their counter till June. So, the timeline from Jan - Feb to June is still a huge gap.
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That’s a timeline you’re creating yourself. The areas that Ukraine wished to attack were not suitable for offensive operations during the spring thaw / mud period. On top of that, Ukraine was still gathering equipment for the offensive operations and engaging in training large bodies of soldiers behind their lines.
The United said:
No one here is arguing about the brutality (or pointlessness of it after some time) of that battle or how it turned out.
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I highlighted the nature of the fighting outside Bakhmut as an example of what Ukraine avoided by not launching operations of their own in similar geography during the cold mud months.
The United said:
And speaking of having major offensive in winter, UA has not started any major offensive yet even now according to some. They called it probing, right? So, should or could they have done those in the Southen/Eastern fronts at times before June and after let's say March?
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No, for reasons stated. It had nothing to do with Ukraine being “bogged down” in Bakhmut.
The United said:
The casualty stuff is just to emphasize the questions based on if it was worth it and if it delayed the summer offensive operations.
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Completely destroying multiple Russian regular army formations + the Wagner convict conscript force + professional Wagner soldiers… I would say yes, it was worth it, and that’s without getting into the propaganda & political implications that occurred in the fallout of the stalled Bakhmut assault.
 
Carolina Red said:
That’s a timeline you’re creating yourself. The areas that Ukraine wished to attack were not suitable for offensive operations during the spring thaw / mud period. On top of that, Ukraine was still gathering equipment for the offensive operations and engaging in training large bodies of soldiers behind their lines.

I highlighted the nature of the fighting outside Bakhmut as an example of what Ukraine avoided by not launching operations of their own in similar geography during the cold mud months.

No, for reasons stated. It had nothing to do with Ukraine being “bogged down” in Bakhmut.

Completely destroying multiple Russian regular army formations + the Wagner convict conscript force + professional Wagner soldiers… I would say yes, it was worth it, and that’s without getting into the propaganda & political implications that occurred in the fallout of the stalled Bakhmut assault.
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Alright. Appreciate your views on those.
 
glazed said:
Seems like the offensive is a bit of a fail so far. I can see negotiations in the Autumn.
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Folks need to stop thinking of this war as a modern war. This is more like the western front of WWI than it is the western front of WWII. Very limited avenues for armored operations mean it’s mostly a light infantry fight, and that will take time.
 
The United said:
I am not exactly sure what Wagner would do if they captured Bakhmut early, let's say in October. Their intention was probably to take that city as a trophy to boost their leader or brand and leave. I say this based on the fact that I don't see Wagner fighting/participating heavily on any other front or city except for this one in this whole war. Correct me if I am wrong. Of course, in hindsight, having that city earlier may have meant that the Wagner would leave the front early and UA didn't probably have to face thousands of convicts and lose tons of manpower for a city that was eventually lost anyway. It is always better if you can limit your casualties, of course.

So, not being able to take the city for months may have made the Wagner force in UA bigger?
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I don't see how Ukraine wouldn't have faced those convicts anyway. If Wagner captures Bakhmut quickly but also leaves quickly, then we're back to square one as Ukraine would re-capture it. It seems to me that those convicts were going to be used as cannon fodder anyway.
 
VorZakone said:
I don't see how Ukraine wouldn't have faced those convicts anyway. If Wagner captures Bakhmut quickly but also leaves quickly, then we're back to square one as Ukraine would re-capture it. It seems to me that those convicts were going to be used as cannon fodder anyway.
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What I am trying to say is though that convicts were recruited solely by Wagner as they couldn't capture the city while losing tons of men. If they captured it easily, they would not get to the stage of recruiting a lot of them. Obviously, there are complications of how or when UA would retake it. They would meet normal Russia soldiers, most likely.
 
The United said:
If they captured it easily, they would not get to the stage of recruiting a lot of them.
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On the flip side, they wouldn’t have the need to recruit convict cannon fodder without suffering heavy losses before hand.

Yes, Wagner grew, but it grew because other elements shrank significantly.
 
Carolina Red said:
On the flip side, they wouldn’t have the need to recruit convict cannon fodder without suffering heavy losses before hand.

Yes, Wagner grew, but it grew because other elements shrank significantly.
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Agree. I am just not sure if a lot of convicts had to be there in the first place in a different scenario.
 
The United said:
What I am trying to say is though that convicts were recruited solely by Wagner as they couldn't capture the city while losing tons of men. If they captured it easily, they would not get to the stage of recruiting a lot of them. Obviously, there are complications of how or when UA would retake it. They would meet normal Russia soldiers, most likely.
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And when those Russian regular forces get attrited, you don't think those convicts would be sent anyway?
 
VorZakone said:
And when those Russian regular forces get attrited, you don't think those convicts would be sent anyway?
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Probably not. Because Putin outlawed recruiting the convicts to the armed forces? Not sure how true. And the Wagner would have blamed the loss of the city on regular army (which they like to do) since their job was done by taking it in the first place and done boosting their brand in that scenario.
 
Carolina Red said:
Folks need to stop thinking of this war as a modern war. This is more like the western front of WWI than it is the western front of WWII. Very limited avenues for armored operations mean it’s mostly a light infantry fight, and that will take time.
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Well that's one theory. I know some pretty smart military guys who say the Ukranians don't have enough kit to get the job done against a dug-in enemy and words to the contrary are just wishful thinking and Daily Telegraph bullshit. Still nobody knows of course
 
glazed said:
Well that's one theory. I know some pretty smart military guys who say the Ukranians don't have enough kit to get the job done against a dug-in enemy and words to the contrary are just wishful thinking and Daily Telegraph bullshit. Still nobody knows of course
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The theory I posted is basically summarizing what Gen. Zaluzhnyi said recently when people started complaining about the speed of the offensive. Yes, not having an overwhelming equipment advantage, or overwhelming air superiority is part of it.
 
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