Membership was on the cards since the 90s. Russia's invasion of Ukraine was just the tipping point.
Ukraine itself was never a threat to Russia. Ukraine becoming a staging post for NATO forces was/is however.
Here is a video from another angle. Looks like the damage is similar to the first explosion last year. One lane got destroyed, the other lane and the railway appear to be undamaged.
I's say the opposite, the damage looks completly different compared to the attack last year. Most of the damage seems to be on the underside of the span this time and there are no scorch marks and very little debris on the upper side.
Do you imagine NATO has been working on a secret plan to invade Russia?
Because I doubt the Russians think they have been.
They do that anyway. What prompted blowing up the residential apartments in Lviv less than 100m from my in-laws?But I fear Putin will answer with civilian terror as he always does.
They do that anyway. What prompted blowing up the residential apartments in Lviv less than 100m from my in-laws?
Weird that whomever did the bombing didn't target the rail line with a bigger ordnance. The previous explosion got both spans.
I am afraid the situation is a bit different now. We can't really predict this counter-offensive outcome based on the past one for a few reasons:
1). Kherson was a death trap for RA troops with a significant problem of resupplying them. Remember they didn't exactly fight that much near or inside the city. The current frontlines include vast amounts of open land mostly.
2). RA troops just ran away last year. They fight to death now.
3). Defensive trenches and obstacles for miles to key locations. UA seemed to try to use armors to maneuver around like the last time and it pretty much failed badly. This is a very new situation for them to figure out.
4). RA troops got their sh*t together.
5). More RA troops.
At this moment, UA might even have some trouble with Lyman's frontline, which they cleared in the last summer offensive attack. UA may overcome them at some point. But the situation they are in right now is pretty much nothing like what they were in last summer or fall, even with more advanced weapons.
In late 2022, Russia did a partial mobilization after the Kharkiv offensive. After a few months (weeks) of training, they were sent to the frontlines throughout 2023. Various sources, including articles a few posts above your post, suggest that Russian soldiers are now fighting harder and not running away like they did in Kharkiv. You can also see the idea from reports of Wagner using repeated (more intense) human wave attacks since January, occupying Bekmut. They may not be willing to die for Putin (but never underestimate their propaganda), they are punished to some extent if they are seen as surrendering voluntarily. This is one of the reasons why they are now fighting more instead of retreating. There was a video (assuming real) of Russian troops shooting their retreating soldiers right at the start of this counter offensive.I’m not sure I fully agree with much of that. I appreciate that the Kherson area north of the Dneiper was pretty much undefendable without air superiority.
How do you know that Russia currently has more troops (in the areas Ukraine is counter-attacking) than it did in late 2022? You may well be right but I’ve not seen anything to back that up.
As for Russian troops fighting to the death, that seems a highly speculative generalisation. There are still tons of conscripts who are underpaid, underfed, underarmed. They won’t just automatically die for their country.
That said, it would be naive to think that Russia hasn’t learnt anything over the last 500 days. And I agree about the time to build deep defensive fortifications being a huge advantage for them.
I think we'll now see how effective cutting edge cluster munitions are when used in conjunction with Western intel. Russia being Russia used loads of theirs albeit lesser munitions at the start of the war but it seemed random and almost like they were just using them to show off their arsenal (why use them on Kharkiv for example?). The fact Putin has come out to specifically say they have lots left makes me think they used them all up.I’m not sure I fully agree with much of that. I appreciate that the Kherson area north of the Dneiper was pretty much undefendable without air superiority.
How do you know that Russia currently has more troops (in the areas Ukraine is counter-attacking) than it did in late 2022? You may well be right but I’ve not seen anything to back that up.
As for Russian troops fighting to the death, that seems a highly speculative generalisation. There are still tons of conscripts who are underpaid, underfed, underarmed. They won’t just automatically die for their country.
That said, it would be naive to think that Russia hasn’t learnt anything over the last 500 days. And I agree about the time to build deep defensive fortifications being a huge advantage for them.
It's not about intending war as much as pieces on the board should a full scale NATO-Russia war kick off. Having NATO allies on Russia's border is great for NATO and bad for Russia. At least that's the argument and not what you state which would be odd.
Valid points, but we also have to consider some more:In late 2022, Russia did a partial mobilization after the Kharkiv offensive. After a few months (weeks) of training, they were sent to the frontlines throughout 2023. Various sources, including articles a few posts above your post, suggest that Russian soldiers are now fighting harder and not running away like they did in Kharkiv. You can also see the idea from reports of Wagner using repeated (more intense) human wave attacks since January, occupying Bekmut. They may not be willing to die for Putin (but never underestimate their propaganda), they are punished to some extent if they are seen as surrendering voluntarily. This is one of the reasons why they are now fighting more instead of retreating. There was a video (assuming real) of Russian troops shooting their retreating soldiers right at the start of this counter offensive.
Hindsight is 20/20, of course. People thought UA was keeping the Russians busy at Bekmut for months. However, it seemed that the RA was holding the UA there while the rest of them were building all these defensive structures in other places. And guess what? UA is still busy at Bekmut, even now. I don't know if it was or is a strategic failure by UA.
I think we'll now see how effective cutting edge cluster munitions are when used in conjunction with Western intel. Russia being Russia used loads of theirs albeit lesser munitions at the start of the war but it seemed random and almost like they were just using them to show off their arsenal (why use them on Kharkiv for example?). The fact Putin has come out to specifically say they have lots left makes me think they used them all up.
UA is getting something it can specifically use to combat defensive fortifications and it looks like they are getting fighter planes as well, momentum really seems to be steadily moving in Ukraine's favour.
No one is asking for US soldiers to die in Ukraine. All Ukraine asks for is to stop the delay and blockade of strong weapons, which would allow Ukraine to end this war sooner. But many western leaders still fear to corner Putin. As long as only one side fears the escalation, Putin will remain confident. Did you ever hear one statement out of Russia fearing a confrontation with NATO? No, they even threaten it on a daily basis. If you fear something and your opponent does not, you have a weaker position to begin with.
Germany for example started their help by sending helmets! Now Ukraine needs to wait for F-16s until 2024. It's the same cycle over and over again. First the rejection, then discussions, then the acceptance, then the training and at last the delivery half a year later than it could have been.
And Ukraine is paying for the delays with thousands of lives.
I think we'll now see how effective cutting edge cluster munitions are when used in conjunction with Western intel. Russia being Russia used loads of theirs albeit lesser munitions at the start of the war but it seemed random and almost like they were just using them to show off their arsenal (why use them on Kharkiv for example?). The fact Putin has come out to specifically say they have lots left makes me think they used them all up.
UA is getting something it can specifically use to combat defensive fortifications and it looks like they are getting fighter planes as well, momentum really seems to be steadily moving in Ukraine's favour.
For a very specific use, to clear the drenches where they have dug in deep - cluster bombs are very effective in that scenario.Isn't Ukraine getting decades old cluster bombs?
For a very specific use, to clear the drenches where they have dug in deep - cluster bombs are very effective in that scenario.
Aren't most of them from the 2000's + the delivery systems are probably more cutting edgeMaybe, but I doubt 70s and 80s technology is cutting edge
Aren't most of them from the 2000's + the delivery systems are probably more cutting edge
To be honest this doesn't matter much. It's a weapon for area effect anyways and for decades there isn't much left to optimise for such systems.What I've read is that it's either the M483 or M864, which according to Wikipedia are from 1975 and 1987, respectively.
OKWhat I've read is that it's either the M483 or M864, which according to Wikipedia are from 1975 and 1987, respectively.
To be honest this doesn't matter much. It's a weapon for area effect anyways and for decades there isn't much left to optimise for such systems.
Cutting edge is more relevant in regard to precision weapons which these are not and don't need to be.
Also, one point about destroying equipment and logistics is that RA is definitely doing the same thing to UA as well. It is hard to say if UA is getting an advantage from all of it. I think UA does not have the capability to do a fast break this summer by the look of it, and they will have to wait a bit. The issue is, though, whether the wait would make the Russian stronger in term of preparation as well. Most definitely. And I am also not sure if it is a good idea to focus on Bekhmut by UA at this point.Valid points, but we also have to consider some more:
- We know for sure that Ukraine is still holding back powerful troops, as there is a bunch of definitely delivered equipment that we have not yet seen at the front. This fits reports and analysis that they are still in the probing phase of their offensive, they have not yet committed their main attack. Problems at the front lines should be seen in that context. But it also shows that russian defense is quite stable at the moment.
- Ukraine is massively attacking logistics and in the last weeks individual artillery pieces. Essentially what they are currently doing is using a combination of drones and long range artillery to do the job that a NATO force would do through it's air superiority.
- a lot of these small fights seem to include Russia moving reserves to the front instead of keeping them at their second/third line of defense. These movements also make their reserves vulnerable and they sometimes seem to take heavy losses.
A Kherson scenario seems to be what Ukraine is aiming for again and which still seems possible. There the Russians also did not retreat immediately, but when they did, they did so in a hurry. The point at the moment seems to be mostly about suppressing Russian artillery (which is the main focus of their army), both directly and by hitting logistics. Without artillery support and other heavy weaponry it becomes much more difficult to keep Ukraine from clearing and crossing the mine fields.
But of course the question is about the timing - will Ukraine be fast enough that they can have the breakthroughs everybody wants them to see, or will this be a wasted summer? What is now ongoing feels like something that could have statted in the winter as well, given enough equipment.
Thats about as modern as it gets when it comes to cluster ammunition. Most countries have tried to move away from these types of shells so there hasn't been any new types developed for the last 30-40 years.Isn't Ukraine getting decades old cluster bombs?
I'm no expert (nor is anyone here) but I think it's fair to say as soon as the UA left the safety of the area it's anti air coverage on the offensive they hit immediate issues. Fighters would at least allow them to target the attack helicopters which so far have been a big issue when they sit so far behind the front line, fire off their anti tank missiles and disappear. It's not going to solve anything but it makes it more competitive.Do you think the jets which actually get to the front line in big enough numbers to tip the balance? It’s no doubt a good thing, but it feels like a very medium/long term plan. I’m not sure it will change things before the winter.
I agree with the rest of your post, and I suspect Ukraine wouldn’t be doing anything without getting an enormous amount of war-gaming and intelligence advice from the US. I suspect their aim will be to split the Russian controlled area into two by reaching Berdyansk (making the Kerch bridge absolutely key, and rather vulnerable), with the idea that there may be some serious negotiations over the winter. Much as I’d love to see Russia forced to return to 1991 borders I actually think any peace deal will involve them keeping Crimea and the Donbas areas.
Ukraine does have a massive range advantage whereever they use their 155mm artillery or of course GLMRS rockets. Russian counter-battery fire seems to be basically non-existent, at least in some areas. This indicates that the artillery duel is indeed going well for Ukraine.Also, one point about destroying equipment and logistics is that RA is definitely doing the same thing to UA as well. It is hard to say if UA is getting an advantage from all of it.
That would be a good news.Ukraine does have a massive range advantage whereever they use their 155mm artillery or of course GLMRS rockets. Russian counter-battery fire seems to be basically non-existent, at least in some areas. This indicates that the artillery duel is indeed going well for Ukraine.
Think US phased the ones they sent out in 2016 so they are likely relatively old in line with your estimate but UA already has cluster munitions from the cold war era supplied by Turkey which are also US made but I don't think they were 155 howitzer or himars compatible. The recent US delivery is definitely 155 compatible.Isn't Ukraine getting decades old cluster bombs?
I'm no expert (nor is anyone here) but I think it's fair to say as soon as the UA left the safety of the area it's anti air coverage on the offensive they hit immediate issues. Fighters would at least allow them to target the attack helicopters which so far have been a big issue when they sit so far behind the front line, fire off their anti tank missiles and disappear. It's not going to solve anything but it makes it more competitive.
Drenches in general ain't very cutting edge.Maybe, but I doubt 70s and 80s technology is cutting edge
Drenches in general ain't very cutting edge.