Middle East Politics

[Raoul]

Thanks! Yeah, last I paid attention, which was admittedly years ago, Sadr was thought of as an Iran proxy.

Muqtada, his dad and uncle have always maintained an Iraqi nationalist streak in their approach to politics, which is why they have in the past annoyed the Iranians. This is one element that set them apart from say Abdul Aziz-Al-Hakim and the Badrists, who were full on proxies in lock step with Tehran. This is why the recent news isn’t particularly surprising. It’s a fight that had to happen at some point.

 

[VorZakone]

I was under the impression that there was a Syrian Civil War thread but I couldn't find it through search so I'll post it here.

So I've finally gotten myself around to dive a bit deeper into the Syrian conflict. My previous attempts led me to one conclusion: "holy shit this is complex and superficial articles ain't gonna cut it."

So Assad's power base is the Alawite Shia minority, correct?

And the Alawites first rose to power thanks to the French occupation in the 20th century, because the French needed to put down Sunni movements, and they used Alawites for help? And ever since then, the Alawites remained a powerful group in the Syrian military and that's what allowed the Assad family to hold their power over several decades?

That also explains the defections of soldiers at the start of the Civil War as those were mainly poor rural Sunnis. And of course, it then turned into a geopolitical madness involving Iran, Saudis, Russia etc.

But the geopolitical part is actually the "easy" part for me.It was always the makeup of Syria itself that exploded in civil violence that I didn't understand.

Would the above be a good summary of what has happened?

 

[2cents]

I was under the impression that there was a Syrian Civil War thread but I couldn't find it through search so I'll post it here.

So I've finally gotten myself around to dive a bit deeper into the Syrian conflict. My previous attempts led me to one conclusion: "holy shit this is complex and superficial articles ain't gonna cut it."

So Assad's power base is the Alawite Shia minority, correct?

And the Alawites first rose to power thanks to the French occupation in the 20th century, because the French needed to put down Sunni movements, and they used Alawites for help? And ever since then, the Alawites remained a powerful group in the Syrian military and that's what allowed the Assad family to hold their power over several decades?

That also explains the defections of soldiers at the start of the Civil War as those were mainly enlisted Sunnis. And of course, it then turned into a geopolitical madness involving Iran, Saudis, Russia etc.

But the geopolitical part is actually the "easy" part for me.It was always the makeup of Syria itself that exploded in civil violence that I didn't understand.

Would the above be a good summary of what has happened?

It’s a very big question you’re posing (as you acknowledge in fairness). The broad strokes are basically correct, but there are other relevant details. For example, there is a traditional political rivalry between Aleppo and Damascus which helped produce the Ba’th’s ascendency and with it Alawite dominance. In Ottoman times the large cities of the Levantine interior along the north-south axis (Aleppo-Hama-Homs-Damascus) were more closely linked with the port cities of the Mediterranean coast to their west, and other urban market centres on a west-east axis. So, for example, Aleppo was very closely linked to Tripoli, Alexandretta, and Mosul more so than Damascus. Likewise Damascus was closely linked to Jaffa, Beirut, and Nablus. More generally Damascus had a Mesopotamian/Iraqi orientation while Damascus looked to Egypt.

What this meant was that when the interwar mandates imposed borders which cut these sister cities off from each other, Aleppo and Damascus were left facing each other in a struggle for power in Syria. This was reflected in the composition of the two nationalist parties that vied for power in the 40s and 50s, which were dominated by Sunni elites of each city respectively. And as Syria was at that time a weak, decentralized state (partly as a result of the kind of colonial policies you’ve referred to), these parties inevitably became almost proxies in a larger geopolitical struggle for Syria between Hashimite Iraq (supported by the British) and Nasserite Egypt.

The instability that resulted had the effect of weakening and discrediting each party and thus helped facilitate the rise of the more ideological parties - the Ba’th, the SSNP, the Communists - which had always appealed to the non-Sunni minorities and the poorer, rural population as a means by which to attain some measure of representation in the country’s politics. By the end of the 50s the Ba’th had managed to orchestrate the Union with Egypt which they mistakenly believed they could dominate. After that fell apart in 61 they soon seized power in Syria, but it wasn’t until 1970 that the Alawite-dominated faction of the party really consolidated power.

Another factor might be the fact that Damascus was a traditional stronghold of the Hanbali school of Islamic jurisprudence, which in turn is closely linked to Salafism. Several 19th/early 20th century Salafi scholars of repute were based in Damascus. This may have helped provide a foundation for the rise of the Islamist opposition to the Ba’th in the 70s and early 80s, although it is hard to draw concrete lines of causation. But certainly fair to say that the Muslim Brotherhood campaign of those years was a significant precursor to this war.

Finally, many analysts have argued that a severe drought during the 2000s combined with the partial opening-up of the economy during the first few years of Bashar’s reign negatively impacted much of the Sunni-dominated rural areas. The argument goes that many were forced to migrate to urban slum-type neighborhoods, always a breeding-ground for the type of alienation and resentment that Islamist politics tends to exploit. At the same time, Bashar’s neoliberal reforms did tend to empower the urban middle-class, which includes Syrians of all denominations. These had the most to lose as the country descended to civil war, and so along with the religious minorities constituted the regime’s base during the conflict. As such, they became natural targets for the disenfranchised and increasingly Islamist opposition as the war progressed. I should note that I have seen the ‘drought’ thesis heavily questioned by others. It may be too soon to reliably judge its impact.

(edit): I’d also add that Bashar didn’t do himself any favors by facilitating the entrance of thousands of jihadis into Iraq to fight the Americans during the 2000s. As so often happens, that policy came back to bite him in the arse.

 

[VorZakone]

It’s a very big question you’re posing (as you acknowledge in fairness). The broad strokes are basically correct, but there are other relevant details. For example, there is a traditional political rivalry between Aleppo and Damascus which helped produce the Ba’th’s ascendency and with it Alawite dominance. In Ottoman times the large cities of the Levantine interior along the north-south axis (Aleppo-Hama-Homs-Damascus) were more closely linked with the port cities of the Mediterranean coast to their west, and other urban market centres on a west-east axis. So, for example, Aleppo was very closely linked to Tripoli, Alexandretta, and Mosul more so than Damascus. Likewise Damascus was closely linked to Jaffa, Beirut, and Nablus. More generally Damascus had a Mesopotamian/Iraqi orientation while Damascus looked to Egypt.

What this meant was that when the interwar mandates imposed borders which cut these sister cities off from each other, Aleppo and Damascus were left facing each other in a struggle for power in Syria. This was reflected in the composition of the two nationalist parties that vied for power in the 40s and 50s, which were dominated by Sunni elites of each city respectively. And as Syria was at that time a weak, decentralized state (partly as a result of the kind of colonial policies you’ve referred to), these parties inevitably became almost proxies in a larger geopolitical struggle for Syria between Hashimite Iraq (supported by the British) and Nasserite Egypt.

The instability that resulted had the effect of weakening and discrediting each party and thus helped facilitate the rise of the more ideological parties - the Ba’th, the SSNP, the Communists - which had always appealed to the non-Sunni minorities and the poorer, rural population as a means by which to attain some measure of representation in the country’s politics. By the end of the 50s the Ba’th had managed to orchestrate the Union with Egypt which they mistakenly believed they could dominate. After that fell apart in 61 they soon seized power in Syria, but it wasn’t until 1970 that the Alawite-dominated faction of the party really consolidated power.

Another factor might be the fact that Damascus was a traditional stronghold of the Hanbali school of Islamic jurisprudence, which in turn is closely linked to Salafism. Several 19th/early 20th century Salafi scholars of repute were based in Damascus. This may have helped provide a foundation for the rise of the Islamist opposition to the Ba’th in the 70s and early 80s, although it is hard to draw concrete lines of causation. But certainly fair to say that the Muslim Brotherhood campaign of those years was a significant precursor to this war.

Finally, many analysts have argued that a severe drought during the 2000s combined with the partial opening-up of the economy during the first few years of Bashar’s reign negatively impacted much of the Sunni-dominated rural areas. The argument goes that many were forced to migrate to urban slum-type neighborhoods, always a breeding-ground for the type of alienation and resentment that Islamist politics tends to exploit. At the same time, Bashar’s neoliberal reforms did tend to empower the urban middle-class, which includes Syrians of all denominations. These had the most to lose as the country descended to civil war, and so along with the religious minorities constituted the regime’s base during the conflict. As such, they became natural targets for the disenfranchised and increasingly Islamist opposition as the war progressed. I should note that I have seen the ‘drought’ thesis heavily questioned by others. It may be too soon to reliably judge its impact.

(edit): I’d also add that Bashar didn’t do himself any favors by facilitating the entrance of thousands of jihadis into Iraq to fight the Americans during the 2000s. As so often happens, that policy came back to bite him in the arse.

Thanks, that's some great additional context. How come the Alawite-dominated faction managed to consolidate power?

 

[2cents]

Thanks, that's some great additional context. How come the Alawite-dominated faction managed to consolidate power?

To begin with Alawis were over-represented in the military, partly for reasons you've already mentioned, i.e. French policies. As the upper, Sunni-dominated echelons of the military were decimated by involvement in coups and counter-coups which also bred suspicion and intrigue during the 40s and 50s, lower-ranking Alawis were well-positioned to assume their place. And their religio-ethnic bonds produced a solidarity lacking among those they replaced.

As stated above, the Ba'th appealed to religious minorities looking for a way to break free of traditional Sunni Arab dominance in Syrian politics, so naturally attracted Alawis alongside Christians, Isma'ilis, Druze and others. When the Ba'th first seized power 1963 under a Sunni President (Amin al-Hafiz), many Alawis played an important part and subsequently assumed key positions from where they were able to further facilitate the increasing Alawi domination of the military. An internal Ba'th Party struggle with sectarian overtones then played out, with things coming to a head in 1966 when al-Hafiz attempted a purge of minority army officers, who pre-empted him by launching a coup. This coup brought the Alawis to power in both the party and military, but then an intra-Alawi struggle played out until 1970 when Hafiz al-Assad won out and consolidated the regime.

 

[VorZakone]

To begin with Alawis were over-represented in the military, partly for reasons you've already mentioned, i.e. French policies. As the upper, Sunni-dominated echelons of the military were decimated by involvement in coups and counter-coups which also bred suspicion and intrigue during the 40s and 50s, lower-ranking Alawis were well-positioned to assume their place. And their religio-ethnic bonds produced a solidarity lacking among those they replaced.

As stated above, the Ba'th appealed to religious minorities looking for a way to break free of traditional Sunni Arab dominance in Syrian politics, so naturally attracted Alawis alongside Christians, Isma'ilis, Druze and others. When the Ba'th first seized power 1963 under a Sunni President (Amin al-Hafiz), many Alawis played an important part and subsequently assumed key positions from where they were able to further facilitate the increasing Alawi domination of the military. An internal Ba'th Party struggle with sectarian overtones then played out, with things coming to a head in 1966 when al-Hafiz attempted a purge of minority army officers, who pre-empted him by launching a coup. This coup brought the Alawis to power in both the party and military, but then an intra-Alawi struggle played out until 1970 when Hafiz al-Assad won out and consolidated the regime.

Thanks.

Do you consider Syria to have been a ticking timebomb because of the Alawite dominance? Or do you think the Assad family could have avoided a civil war by loosening their power and transition the country towards a proper democracy?

 

[2cents]

Thanks.

Do you consider Syria to have been a ticking timebomb because of the Alawite dominance? Or do you think the Assad family could have avoided a civil war by loosening their power and transition the country towards a proper democracy?

It's a really hard question to answer beyond the banal observation that any regime whose power ultimately rests on such a narrow foundation is destined to face major challenges in the context of a shift in regional politics such as that represented by the Arab Spring.

There are so many variables to consider. In the context of internal Syrian politics and history, we must think about how Syrian authorities could potentially overcome their suspicion that the type of federalized, decentralized state which a genuine democratic process would seem to demand would turn Syria into a weak regional state to be prayed upon by its neighbors. And what the process would mean for the sectarian and ethnic dynamics of the state, and the types of economic policies to pursue. In terms of broader regional issues, among other things we must consider the Israel factor, the rise of Islamist and sectarian politics, the Iranian Revolution, the historic relationship with Lebanon, the rivalry with Ba'thist Iraq, border disputes with Turkey, the War on Terror, and American/Russian interests.

How do we disentangle all of this in order to imagine, say, an alternative history whereby in the aftermath of the Cold War Hafiz al-Assad sets Syria on a genuinely democratic path during the 1990s? Such a process could not have played out in isolation, but would have been so contingent on factors such as those listed above that it's impossible to discuss it with any degree of conviction, although probably fair to say that none of those factors appears conducive to the proposed democratic process. In other words, you would think that they would each need to be overcome or reconciled in some way in order for such as process to succeed. An extremely demanding task.

 

[2cents]

 

[syrian_scholes]

It’s a very big question you’re posing (as you acknowledge in fairness). The broad strokes are basically correct, but there are other relevant details. For example, there is a traditional political rivalry between Aleppo and Damascus which helped produce the Ba’th’s ascendency and with it Alawite dominance. In Ottoman times the large cities of the Levantine interior along the north-south axis (Aleppo-Hama-Homs-Damascus) were more closely linked with the port cities of the Mediterranean coast to their west, and other urban market centres on a west-east axis. So, for example, Aleppo was very closely linked to Tripoli, Alexandretta, and Mosul more so than Damascus. Likewise Damascus was closely linked to Jaffa, Beirut, and Nablus. More generally Damascus had a Mesopotamian/Iraqi orientation while Damascus looked to Egypt.

What this meant was that when the interwar mandates imposed borders which cut these sister cities off from each other, Aleppo and Damascus were left facing each other in a struggle for power in Syria. This was reflected in the composition of the two nationalist parties that vied for power in the 40s and 50s, which were dominated by Sunni elites of each city respectively. And as Syria was at that time a weak, decentralized state (partly as a result of the kind of colonial policies you’ve referred to), these parties inevitably became almost proxies in a larger geopolitical struggle for Syria between Hashimite Iraq (supported by the British) and Nasserite Egypt.

The instability that resulted had the effect of weakening and discrediting each party and thus helped facilitate the rise of the more ideological parties - the Ba’th, the SSNP, the Communists - which had always appealed to the non-Sunni minorities and the poorer, rural population as a means by which to attain some measure of representation in the country’s politics. By the end of the 50s the Ba’th had managed to orchestrate the Union with Egypt which they mistakenly believed they could dominate. After that fell apart in 61 they soon seized power in Syria, but it wasn’t until 1970 that the Alawite-dominated faction of the party really consolidated power.

Another factor might be the fact that Damascus was a traditional stronghold of the Hanbali school of Islamic jurisprudence, which in turn is closely linked to Salafism. Several 19th/early 20th century Salafi scholars of repute were based in Damascus. This may have helped provide a foundation for the rise of the Islamist opposition to the Ba’th in the 70s and early 80s, although it is hard to draw concrete lines of causation. But certainly fair to say that the Muslim Brotherhood campaign of those years was a significant precursor to this war.

Finally, many analysts have argued that a severe drought during the 2000s combined with the partial opening-up of the economy during the first few years of Bashar’s reign negatively impacted much of the Sunni-dominated rural areas. The argument goes that many were forced to migrate to urban slum-type neighborhoods, always a breeding-ground for the type of alienation and resentment that Islamist politics tends to exploit. At the same time, Bashar’s neoliberal reforms did tend to empower the urban middle-class, which includes Syrians of all denominations. These had the most to lose as the country descended to civil war, and so along with the religious minorities constituted the regime’s base during the conflict. As such, they became natural targets for the disenfranchised and increasingly Islamist opposition as the war progressed. I should note that I have seen the ‘drought’ thesis heavily questioned by others. It may be too soon to reliably judge its impact.

(edit): I’d also add that Bashar didn’t do himself any favors by facilitating the entrance of thousands of jihadis into Iraq to fight the Americans during the 2000s. As so often happens, that policy came back to bite him in the arse.

I'm sorry to say this is a load of crap and has nothing to do with what happened in Syria.

 

[2cents]

I'm sorry to say this is a load of crap and has nothing to do with what happened in Syria.

Ok thanks for the contribution.

 

[Spark]

Should get another bank holiday if he clogs it.

 

[syrian_scholes]

Ok thanks for the contribution.

No worries, reflecting on your post as a whole I realize how the drivel you spout is the same reason why I have to think a 100 times about every word I use when I speak in Arabic out in public here in the US, I also realize because we used the phrase "Allahu-Akbar", which is a phrase we use on the daily, it was used against my people and made people like you call them "Islamists", which in of itself is an islamophobic phrase.

You spout this misinformation that spreads fear of muslims and act as if you are reflecting what happened on the ground, so irresponsible yet so expected of someone who thinks my people are history books and think you can understand them because you read some books about the region.

 

[2cents]

No worries, reflecting on your post as a whole I realize how the drivel you spout is the same reason why I have to think a 100 times about every word I use when I speak in Arabic out in public here in the US, I also realize because we used the phrase "Allahu-Akbar", which is a phrase we use on the daily, it was used against my people and made people like you call them "Islamists", which in of itself is an islamophobic phrase.

You spout this misinformation that spreads fear of muslims and act as if you are reflecting what happened on the ground, so irresponsible yet so expected of someone who thinks my people are history books and think you can understand them because you read some books about the region.

Have you any specific examples of what you’re talking about?

 

[syrian_scholes]

It’s a very big question you’re posing (as you acknowledge in fairness). The broad strokes are basically correct, but there are other relevant details. For example, there is a traditional political rivalry between Aleppo and Damascus which helped produce the Ba’th’s ascendency and with it Alawite dominance. In Ottoman times the large cities of the Levantine interior along the north-south axis (Aleppo-Hama-Homs-Damascus) were more closely linked with the port cities of the Mediterranean coast to their west, and other urban market centres on a west-east axis. So, for example, Aleppo was very closely linked to Tripoli, Alexandretta, and Mosul more so than Damascus. Likewise Damascus was closely linked to Jaffa, Beirut, and Nablus. More generally Damascus had a Mesopotamian/Iraqi orientation while Damascus looked to Egypt.

What this meant was that when the interwar mandates imposed borders which cut these sister cities off from each other, Aleppo and Damascus were left facing each other in a struggle for power in Syria. This was reflected in the composition of the two nationalist parties that vied for power in the 40s and 50s, which were dominated by Sunni elites of each city respectively. And as Syria was at that time a weak, decentralized state (partly as a result of the kind of colonial policies you’ve referred to), these parties inevitably became almost proxies in a larger geopolitical struggle for Syria between Hashimite Iraq (supported by the British) and Nasserite Egypt.

The instability that resulted had the effect of weakening and discrediting each party and thus helped facilitate the rise of the more ideological parties - the Ba’th, the SSNP, the Communists - which had always appealed to the non-Sunni minorities and the poorer, rural population as a means by which to attain some measure of representation in the country’s politics. By the end of the 50s the Ba’th had managed to orchestrate the Union with Egypt which they mistakenly believed they could dominate. After that fell apart in 61 they soon seized power in Syria, but it wasn’t until 1970 that the Alawite-dominated faction of the party really consolidated power.

Another factor might be the fact that Damascus was a traditional stronghold of the Hanbali school of Islamic jurisprudence, which in turn is closely linked to Salafism. Several 19th/early 20th century Salafi scholars of repute were based in Damascus. This may have helped provide a foundation for the rise of the Islamist opposition to the Ba’th in the 70s and early 80s, although it is hard to draw concrete lines of causation. But certainly fair to say that the Muslim Brotherhood campaign of those years was a significant precursor to this war.

Finally, many analysts have argued that a severe drought during the 2000s combined with the partial opening-up of the economy during the first few years of Bashar’s reign negatively impacted much of the Sunni-dominated rural areas. The argument goes that many were forced to migrate to urban slum-type neighborhoods, always a breeding-ground for the type of alienation and resentment that Islamist politics tends to exploit. At the same time, Bashar’s neoliberal reforms did tend to empower the urban middle-class, which includes Syrians of all denominations. These had the most to lose as the country descended to civil war, and so along with the religious minorities constituted the regime’s base during the conflict. As such, they became natural targets for the disenfranchised and increasingly Islamist opposition as the war progressed. I should note that I have seen the ‘drought’ thesis heavily questioned by others. It may be too soon to reliably judge its impact.

(edit): I’d also add that Bashar didn’t do himself any favors by facilitating the entrance of thousands of jihadis into Iraq to fight the Americans during the 2000s. As so often happens, that policy came back to bite him in the arse.

I will start by saying most of what you said neglected the torture of kids, killing of the poor, and raping of women that the regime and its army did to my people, deciding to go with the historical route as an explanation which does NOT represent the humanitarian crimes comitted by the regime, you think only rural areas were affected and were against the regime because of a drought or relegious reasons, when the truth is this regime been taking political prisoners and murdering innocent people for 50 years, and ignoring the fact that people in Damascus and Aleppo were under extreme pressure to not join the protests because of the massacre the regime would have comitted had they joined.

Then you talk about the Hanbali school and how it relates to salafisim, which has no real foundation on the ground, in fact most people in Damascus follow the Hanafi and Shafii teachings, not that most actually use it as part of their daily lives and way of political thinking, but your words paints us as relegious robots who have 0 original thought and are bound to relegion when it comes to polotics.

As for the political rivalry between Damascus and Aleppo, it's not been in play in centuries, it's forgotten history, it may provide some explanations on how the regime siezed power in the 70, but it doesn't reflect the realities of the rebellion that happened.

You don't realize how it feels to have your food and money stolen by political figures who take the wealth of the land, and how it feels to be discriminated against in your own country even though you are part of the "majority", instead you explain it by "islamists" this and "islamists" that, when those islamists were released by the regime from its prisons around 2012, used them against the actual rebels who are from the people, and then regained power in those areas because they have actual control over these groups leaders, at least this part makes me impressed with how the regime turned the western media against the people using the fear of islam that blinded people to the fact that isis barely resisted when the army "attacked".

What about how Obama and western leaders kept lying and making false promises to rebel groups that they will help the people and aid them and then turned a blind eye when the regime kept doing massacre after massacre to cities around Syria, why did you fail to mention that these groups started after a long peaceful period of protests to defend their families and their lands from regime killings?

I'm not even denying that there are terrorist groups now calling themselves muslim and doing as much damage to the people as the regime was doing before in their areas of control, but they aren't the explanation nor the reason the war happened.

In short, we are not relegious puppets who can be explained through history and books, we are a people with thoughts and emotions that were driven into war against not only a dictator but a merciless monster and were left to die by the world at large only to be explained later as "islamists", did we have to abandon our belief system and relegion in order to appease western countries and convince the world to save us from this monster?

I would like to end this post with saying that my post maybe incoherent as English isn't my 1st language and I can't easily express my thoughts with it, but I hope it at least provides some insight into why your post makes me feel sad and aggrieved.

 

[2cents]

I will start by saying most of what you said neglected the torture of kids, killing of the poor, and raping of women that the regime and its army did to my people, deciding to go with the historical route as an explanation which does NOT represent the humanitarian crimes comitted by the regime

I neglected to mention it in that particular post as I took it for granted that the poster I was responding to is already fully aware of the nature of the Assad regime and the reasons Syrians took to the streets in protest in 2011. I would assume that 99% of the people who post in this thread would be aware. I have quite an extensive record of posting on Syria and the Assad regime on this forum and have on more than one occasion laid ultimate blame for the conflict on Assad. Just last April I posted about the recently revealed Tadamon massacre and described it as the "most disturbing" thing I've seen come out of the war. For you to accuse me of ignoring or downplaying that aspect of Syrian politics is not really comprehensible to me. This also applies to the second half of your post, which I am in sympathy with. Your issue seems to be that I didn't discuss the immediate causes and the early stages of the war in that particular post. But that wasn't the intention of the post, it was to give some deeper historical context to a poster who seemed interested. Your anger in this case is misguided, as I've discussed these matters extensively before in previous posts.

you think only rural areas were affected and were against the regime because of a drought or relegious reasons, when the truth is this regime been taking political prisoners and murdering innocent people for 50 years, and ignoring the fact that people in Damascus and Aleppo were under extreme pressure to not join the protests because of the massacre the regime would have comitted had they joined.

Nowhere have I said the war was confined to rural areas. And I implicitly distanced myself from the "drought" thesis by writing "many analysts have argued" and "the argument goes" before noting that it is contested. It's not something I could necessarily subscribe to myself without much more extensive research.

Then you talk about the Hanbali school and how it relates to salafisim, which has no real foundation on the ground, in fact most people in Damascus follow the Hanafi and Shafii teachings, not that most actually use it as part of their daily lives and way of political thinking, but your words paints us as relegious robots who have 0 original thought and are bound to relegion when it comes to polotics.

But I wasn't referring to "most people in Damascus". I'm fully aware that the Hanafi and Shafi'i schools have predominated in the region and that this doesn't necessarily have much significance for how Syrians live their day to day lives. I was talking specifically about the "Islamist opposition" that waged the low-level armed campaign in the 70s and early 80s. Nowhere have I implied that they represented any significant percentage of the wider population. Also, even then I specifically stated that "it is hard to draw concrete lines of causation."

As for the political rivalry between Damascus and Aleppo, it's not been in play in centuries, it's forgotten history, it may provide some explanations on how the regime siezed power in the 70, but it doesn't reflect the realities of the rebellion that happened.

It was certainly in play in the rivalry between the National Party and the People's Party in the 40s and 50s, which is the period I was referring to. Nowhere have I stated that it directly impacted on the events of 2011.

 

[2cents]

@syrian_scholes I wonder if there is a misunderstanding here around the use of the terms “Islamism” and “Islamist” which you describe as “Islamophobic”. When I use them I do not refer to Islam or Muslims generally. I use them to refer to a specific political tendency represented by particular parties and movements. In this sense “Islamists” is basically a translation of Islāmiyyūn which is a term used by these parties and movements to refer to themselves.

 

[syrian_scholes]

I neglected to mention it in that particular post as I took it for granted that the poster I was responding to is already fully aware of the nature of the Assad regime and the reasons Syrians took to the streets in protest in 2011. I would assume that 99% of the people who post in this thread would be aware. I have quite an extensive record of posting on Syria and the Assad regime on this forum and have on more than one occasion laid ultimate blame for the conflict on Assad. Just last April I posted about the recently revealed Tadamon massacre and described it as the "most disturbing" thing I've seen come out of the war. For you to accuse me of ignoring or downplaying that aspect of Syrian politics is not really comprehensible to me. This also applies to the second half of your post, which I am in sympathy with. Your issue seems to be that I didn't discuss the immediate causes and the early stages of the war in that particular post. But that wasn't the intention of the post, it was to give some deeper historical context to a poster who seemed interested. Your anger in this case is misguided, as I've discussed these matters extensively before in previous posts.



Nowhere have I said the war was confined to rural areas. And I implicitly distanced myself from the "drought" thesis by writing "many analysts have argued" and "the argument goes" before noting that it is contested. It's not something I could necessarily subscribe to myself without much more extensive research.



But I wasn't referring to "most people in Damascus". I'm fully aware that the Hanafi and Shafi'i schools have predominated in the region and that this doesn't necessarily have much significance for how Syrians live their day to day lives. I was talking specifically about the "Islamist opposition" that waged the low-level armed campaign in the 70s and early 80s. Nowhere have I implied that they represented any significant percentage of the wider population. Also, even then I specifically stated that "it is hard to draw concrete lines of causation."



It was certainly in play in the rivalry between the National Party and the People's Party in the 40s and 50s, which is the period I was referring to. Nowhere have I stated that it directly impacted on the events of 2011.

While some of my post is because I have not been looking at posts/participating in these discussions on the caf, so I have no idea what you posted before the post I replied to, I think it's really important to emphasize the historical make up of Syria had so little to do with the rebellion, that it's important to me not to make it part of the story of what happened because it dehumanizes the people and what they went through imo.

I'm sorry that you felt my anger, I can't explain in simple words the impact the last 10 years had on my life, I lost this period of my young adulthood on a righteous cause that was lost and it changed my view on the world as a whole and destroyed my hopefull outlook on the future of my country.

As you speak on what happened in the 70s, and while it had some some questionable groups involved, it got burried by regime propaganda, 40k killed in Hama, 80k killed in Aleppo, and I don't know the number of people killed in Homs, and the majority then weren't part of the extremists group, or so it is told by the people of the region who had lost fanily members in that period.

I also would like to say the meaning of the word Jihad is so different in our culture and how it is explained in the media, it's part of the misconception that a lot of the Syrian groups were islamists while Jihad meant in that case literal self-defense, and it was more an act of defiance, later a lot of these groups decided not to stop using it to make them look "less scary" to the outside while some groups chose to stop using in the hope real help would finally arrive, both groups lost and in the end Al Nusra front just took over and it went to chaos, but it's also important to highlight that this was always part of the regime strategy and it succeeded.

 

[syrian_scholes]

@syrian_scholes I wonder if there is a misunderstanding here around the use of the terms “Islamism” and “Islamist” which you describe as “Islamophobic”. When I use them I do not refer to Islam or Muslims generally. I use them to refer to a specific political tendency represented by particular parties and movements. In this sense “Islamists” is basically a translation of Islāmiyyūn which is a term used by these parties and movements to refer to themselves.

I understand that, but a lot of these groups are thugs, which is another part of the conflict within me, do I really want to defend them? No, I don't, do I blame parts of the general populace who followed them? No, a lot of these people are uneducated, easy to manipulate, and just wanted to join the fight to defend themselves, but also as a muslim it doesn't make sense to me to that these people who do not follow actual islamic teachings in most cases, get connected to islam and how this distort the world view on muslims as a whole and like I said it makes me as a muslim think twice when speaking in Arabic in public places in the US out of fear of saying a islamic phrase and being thought of in the same vain as these groups.

Edit: that why even if you didn't mean it in an islamophobic way I feel like this term strengthen islamophobic ideas.

 

[2cents]

While some of my post is because I have not been looking at posts/participating in these discussions on the caf, so I have no idea what you posted before the post I replied to, I think it's really important to emphasize the historical make up of Syria had so little to do with the rebellion, that it's important to me not to make it part of the story of what happened because it dehumanizes the people and what they went through imo.

I think all reasonable people can understand why a strong opposition to the Assad regime existed across Syria in 2011. However that still leaves unanswered questions such as:

(a) why did the protests erupt then and not earlier?
(b) why did the regime refuse to respond to the demands of the protesters?
(c) why did certain opposition groups come to dominate the revolt against others?

The answers to questions such as these can be complicated, although you may not see them as such, and do require some historical context in my opinion. Far more than can actually be given in an Internet forum post really. But I do understand why it may all seem trivial and besides the point to you.

Also for what it’s worth, I think some of your criticisms of my post are actually more relevant to much older posts of mine on here. I’ll quote myself from a private exchange I had with another poster a couple years ago:

I look back on some of my posts on the Syrian War and Saudi Arabia from 2014-16 and cringe a bit. Far too quick to apply the term “Wahhabi” to rebel groups or blame “Gulf funding” etc. for the nature of the dominant rebel factions. I think now much of this tendency was simply adopted from the discourse of the War on Terror, and reflective to some degree of a deeper anti-Islamic public discourse. The language used by bigoted critics of Islam and Muslims on the one hand, and Wahhabism and Saudi Arabia on the other, is often interchangeable.

That last mention of “Wahhabism and Saudi Arabia” may be exchanged with “Islamism and the Syrian rebels” without altering my point in any way.

 

[2cents]

Coincidentally with the news of Khamenei’s ill health, it seems significant protests are ongoing in Iran tonight in response to the death of a young woman in police custody, arrested for violating the hijab regulations.

 

[syrian_scholes]

I think all reasonable people can understand why a strong opposition to the Assad regime existed across Syria in 2011. However that still leaves unanswered questions such as:

(a) why did the protests erupt then and not earlier?
(b) why did the regime refuse to respond to the demands of the protesters?
(c) why did certain opposition groups come to dominate the revolt against others?

The answers to questions such as these can be complicated, although you may not see them as such, and do require some historical context in my opinion. Far more than can actually be given in an Internet forum post really. But I do understand why it may all seem trivial and besides the point to you.

Also for what it’s worth, I think some of your criticisms of my post are actually more relevant to much older posts of mine on here. I’ll quote myself from a private exchange I had with another poster a couple years ago:



That last mention of “Wahhabism and Saudi Arabia” may be exchanged with “Islamism and the Syrian rebels” without altering my point in any way.

A) for Syria at least is pretty easy to answer, tension wqs boiling over after seeing the protests in Tunisia and Egypt which lead to the Daraa kids writing on the walls of their schools "it's your turn doctor" because they didn't understand how scary the regime is and when they were tortured it started everything and the whole country got encouraged watching Daraa's protests

B) While it looks weird to people used to democracies that the regime resisted it came as no surprise to the people, as you talked about the incidents in the 70s and 80s, we knew the regime would rather kill everyone in the country than to lose control because imo the wealth of the country from gas, oil, and everything else was stolen by them and they want to keep it that way.

C) Because there was never any real organised groups to the required level to oust the regime, several groups got leadership of the opposition for a while and still failed at the end, I also think the regime must have had people among those groups to destroy them from within, I really don't think it was as complex as you imagine, it was always destined to fail because imo the US got their oil and Russia got their ports so no one really cared.

 

[neverdie]

has there been any success story from the arab spring? egypt is as autocratic as ever under sisi. syria have gone through hell to arrive at something like what it was before it started. i'd imagine it's far worse because not only do you still have the regime you wanted to oust but you also have terrible people on the other side, too, and an unstable situation. libya is a basketcase and centre of a modern day slave trade. what's tunisia like? seems to me that the counter revolutions won all across the board. libya might be the exception but you'd have to wonder if a counter revolution wouldn't have been a better outcome there given how terrible the nato led operation turned out to be.

which is maybe one key difference. the americans and some europeans heavily backed the rebels against gaddafi because they never did like gaddafi. they did the same in syria because, imo, it was an opening to undermine russia's position there. but they just had rhetoric for egypt and the rest and no real action. countries which were already on board with the american order, so to speak, came out fine. and syria managed to withstand it only because russia acted as counterweight for its own interests.

 

[VorZakone]

has there been any success story from the arab spring? egypt is as autocratic as ever under sisi. syria have gone through hell to arrive at something like what it was before it started. i'd imagine it's far worse because not only do you still have the regime you wanted to oust but you also have terrible people on the other side, too, and an unstable situation. libya is a basketcase and centre of a modern day slave trade. what's tunisia like? seems to me that the counter revolutions won all across the board. libya might be the exception but you'd have to wonder if a counter revolution wouldn't have been a better outcome there given how terrible the nato led operation turned out to be.

which is maybe one key difference. the americans and some europeans heavily backed the rebels against gaddafi because they never did like gaddafi. they did the same in syria because, imo, it was an opening to undermine russia's position there. but they just had rhetoric for egypt and the rest and no real action. countries which were already on board with the american order, so to speak, came out fine. and syria managed to withstand it only because russia acted as counterweight for its own interests.

Interested in this too...I remember what a big deal the Arab Spring was in 2011-ish.

 

[syrian_scholes]

has there been any success story from the arab spring? egypt is as autocratic as ever under sisi. syria have gone through hell to arrive at something like what it was before it started. i'd imagine it's far worse because not only do you still have the regime you wanted to oust but you also have terrible people on the other side, too, and an unstable situation. libya is a basketcase and centre of a modern day slave trade. what's tunisia like? seems to me that the counter revolutions won all across the board. libya might be the exception but you'd have to wonder if a counter revolution wouldn't have been a better outcome there given how terrible the nato led operation turned out to be.

which is maybe one key difference. the americans and some europeans heavily backed the rebels against gaddafi because they never did like gaddafi. they did the same in syria because, imo, it was an opening to undermine russia's position there. but they just had rhetoric for egypt and the rest and no real action. countries which were already on board with the american order, so to speak, came out fine. and syria managed to withstand it only because russia acted as counterweight for its own interests.

I wouldn't call what we have now in Syria as anything like before, most young people has left the country to Bashar and his people, while at least 98% of the people still in Syria are struggling to make it day to day with the economic situation as it is, I have no idea why they are keeping the economic sanctions right now when there is 0% chance the regime will leave and the humanitarian situation in the country is disasterous to say the least, so even far worse is an understatement sadly.

 

[syrian_scholes]

I think the easiest way to explain the economic situation in Syria right now is to compare $ conversion rate

2011: 1$ = 48 S.P
2022: 1$= 4000+ SP

 

[neverdie]

I wouldn't call what we have now in Syria as anything like before, most young people has left the country to Bashar and his people, while at least 98% of the people still in Syria are struggling to make it day to day with the economic situation as it is, I have no idea why they are keeping the economic sanctions right now when there is 0% chance the regime will leave and the humanitarian situation in the country is disasterous to say the least, so even far worse is an understatement sadly.

yeah, i'd imagine it's a hell of a lot worse for all involved. they should end the sanctions. as you say, the regime isn't moving so what it amounts to is collective punishment of the people who have to stay there or have no means of migrating. same as in iraq in the 90s except saddam never had the kind of support russia will give to assad to maintain its port interests. khashoggi was murdered iirc for eventually turning against saudi arabia's role in the arab spring. they funded all the counter revolutions for fear it would undermine their own autocratic establishment. he went from praising the prince's reforms to condemning saudi's role and then ended up butchered in the turkish embassy.

I think the easiest way to explain the economic situation in Syria right now is to compare $ conversion rate

2011: 1$ = 48 S.P
2022: 1$= 4000+ SP

insane. there's also the problem of the oil and so on being stolen directly from syria. billions and billions of it continuously being taken by american convoys. now some would say that's good because it stops the assad regime from getting it, but the assad regime doesn't seem like it's going to collapse even without that revenue. what it does do, though, is make life worse for ordinary people in syria.

 

[2cents]

what's tunisia like?

Unfortunately the state institutions appear to be increasingly under the thumb of one man again, Kais Saied.

countries which were already on board with the american order, so to speak, came out fine

Yemen under Saleh was in the American orbit, albeit facing a relatively low-level Huthi insurgency since the mid-2000s. But subsequently descended to full-scale civil war post-2011.

 

[2mufc0]

@syrian_scholes I wonder if there is a misunderstanding here around the use of the terms “Islamism” and “Islamist” which you describe as “Islamophobic”. When I use them I do not refer to Islam or Muslims generally. I use them to refer to a specific political tendency represented by particular parties and movements. In this sense “Islamists” is basically a translation of Islāmiyyūn which is a term used by these parties and movements to refer to themselves.

I understand where you are coming from when you say Islamist, but the term has been hijacked and often used to smear normal every day Muslims. Not saying you used it this way but it is often used by people who want to make Muslims uncomfortable with their identity with the goal that they will eventually renounce it.

 

[2cents]

I understand where you are coming from when you say Islamist, but the term has been hijacked and often used to smear normal every day Muslims. Not saying you used it this way but it is often used by people who want to make Muslims uncomfortable with their identity with the goal that they will eventually renounce it.

I’m open to alternatives but have yet to encounter a more suitable term. “Fundamentalists” is too broad and too defined by its Christian origins to be very useful, while “Islamo-fascists” is probably more problematic in the sense you describe. “Political” or “radical” Islam are commonly encountered terms also with their own problems. “Islamist” at least has the benefit of being used by these movements themselves.

 

[2cents]

 

[2cents]

Rasht today

 

[2cents]

 

[2cents]

 

[DavidDeSchmikes]

 

[Spark]

Surprised there isn't more discourse on what is happening in Iran. Quickly becoming more viscous and angry than 2009, hopefully we see some meaningful change (i.e. full scale revolution).

If a people deserve change anywhere, it's Iranians.

 

[Organic Potatoes]

Surprised there isn't more discourse on what is happening in Iran. Quickly becoming more viscous and angry than 2009, hopefully we see some meaningful change (i.e. full scale revolution).

If a people deserve change anywhere, it's Iranians.

Do you mean 2019? Because it’s believed well over a thousand died then. Or perhaps you’re referencing 2009 due to the specific nature of it?

 

[Spark]

Do you mean 2019? Because it’s believed well over a thousand died then. Or perhaps you’re referencing 2009 due to the specific nature of it?

I personally don't think Iran has ever been closer to overthrowing the Supreme Leader than in 2009 and even then they weren't really that close. 2019 was the next closest, but the authorities cracked down rapidly (internet off, 1,500 dead). What's interesting about these protests is that it's been sparked by the actions of the state - "morality police" - rather than around an election (2009). People have simply had enough. Coupled with Khamenei supposedly on his way out, events could spiral out of control as they did in 1979.

Only this time there won't be a clergy to take advantage of popular grievances. It's going to get horrible though, I have no doubt the regime will resort to killing scores of its own citizens once more. But it does not seem to be abating.

 

[Raoul]

I personally don't think Iran has ever been closer to overthrowing the Supreme Leader than in 2009 and even then they weren't really that close. 2019 was the next closest, but the authorities cracked down rapidly (internet off, 1,500 dead). What's interesting about these protests is that it's been sparked by the actions of the state - "morality police" - rather than around an election (2009). People have simply had enough. Coupled with Khamenei supposedly on his way out, events could spiral out of control as they did in 1979.

Only this time there won't be a clergy to take advantage of popular grievances. It's going to get horrible though, I have no doubt the regime will resort to killing scores of its own citizens once more. But it does not seem to be abating.

I think they are just as close today because the Iranian population is young, and have now had over a decade to marinate in social media narratives critical of the government. Trouble is, the government has also become more adept at quickly squashing dissent, but that is unsustainable in the long run imo.

 

[2cents]

Yusuf al-Qaradawi is dead

 

[2cents]

Some stuff on al-Qaradawi:

OBITUARY Sheikh Qaradawi, Islamist champion of Arab revolts, dies at 96

Sheikh Youssef al-Qaradawi, a spiritual guide to the Muslim Brotherhood who championed the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings and unsettled rulers in Egypt and the Gulf with his Islamist preaching, died on Monday. He was 96.

https://www.reuters.com/world/middl...ist-champion-arab-revolts-dies-96-2022-09-26/



Yusuf al-Qaradawi Leaves Behind a Complex Legacy
The influential cleric died overnight; though he was often vilified in the West, some in the Muslim world see him as a moderate

https://newlinesmag.com/argument/yusuf-al-qaradawi-leaves-behind-a-complex-legacy/