Russian invasion of Ukraine | Fewer tweets, more discussion

Guess you could say that. In this January article he refers to Ukraine as a “Nazi-worshipping, thoroughly corrupt nation which has nothing in common with the rest of Europe.” Apart from that the article is noticeable for how much he gets badly wrong.
yeah, haven't read that article but didn't need to. i understood from the limited exposure i've had to him that he was pushing an agenda. i doubt he's been paid by the kremlin to do it because that would see him locked up for life over espionage charges. more likely personal, ideological, axe grinding.
 
yeah, haven't read that article but didn't need to. i understood from the limited exposure i've had to him that he was pushing an agenda. i doubt he's been paid by the kremlin to do it because that would see him locked up for life over espionage charges. more likely personal, ideological, axe grinding.
Sometimes it's not a straight payment for propaganda type thing, but these types of public commenters or scholars find that they have to exist in one specific sphere of thought/argument in order to be relevant enough to make book sales, be paid to pen articles, give talks, etc

I remember one unrelated case of a guy in Brazil who was once an investment manager, wrote books about that and motivational stuff, then started to comment on economics and politics from a right-leaning perspective, then a few years ago switched to commenting from a left-leaning perspective. Not that a person doesn't have a right to change their views, but this is a guy heavy on self-promotion and making a $ for his work. He probably over time just moved into the space where he could stay most relevant, but to keep that relevance he doesn't get to offer balanced perspective/views at any given time, he stays partisan to whatever side he currently finds himself in.

Scott Ritter clearly has had some issues over time. I've heard him talk about his time as a UN weapons inspector in Iraq and found that relevant, and that he was speaking somewhat knowledgeably and credibly had first-hand contact with the shenanigans he reported. Then the US govt did seem to try to screw him with I think espionage charges over sharing intel with the Israelis or Brits of all people. That was dropped, but then he got himself into trouble over the solicitation with minors, and seems like he definitely has an axe to grind ever since.
 
the argument wasn't that ukraine couldn't make breakthroughs. it was that it couldn't win, partially, which i still think is true but depends on how you define win. does it mean ultimate defeat of russia? because that is beyond ukraine and nato.
Why is it?
 
What is your take guys on this conclusion of the article @neverdie posted.


In the end, I still believe the end game remains the same — Russia will win. But the cost for extending this war has become much higher for all parties involved.

The successful Ukrainian counteroffensive needs to be put into a proper perspective. The casualties Ukraine suffered, and is still suffering, to achieve this victory are unsustainable. Ukraine has exhausted its strategic reserves, and they will have to be reconstituted if Ukraine were to have any aspirations of continuing an advance along these lines. This will take months.

Russia, meanwhile, has lost nothing more than some indefensible space. Russian casualties were minimal, and equipment losses readily replaced.

Russia has actually strengthened its military posture by creating strong defensive lines in the north capable of withstanding any Ukrainian attack, while increasing combat power available to complete the task of liberating the remainder of the Donetsk People’s Republic under Ukrainian control.

Russia has far more strategic depth than Ukraine. Russia is beginning to strike critical infrastructure targets, such as power stations, that will not only cripple the Ukrainian economy, but also their ability to move large amounts of troops rapidly via train.

Russia will learn from the lessons the Kharkov defeat taught them and continue its stated mission objectives.

The bottom line – the Kharkov offensive was as good as it will get for Ukraine, while Russia hasn’t come close to hitting rock bottom. Changes need to be made by Russia to fix the problems identified through the Kharkov defeat. Winning a battle is one thing; winning a war another.

For Ukraine, the huge losses suffered by their own forces, combined with the limited damage inflicted on Russia means the Kharkov offensive is, at best, a Pyrrhic victory, one that does not change the fundamental reality that Russia is winning, and will win, the conflict in Ukraine.

The idea that Ukraine was taking huge losses in the Kharkiv offensive while Russia was taking minimal ones, is pure undiluted copium. It's more likely to be the opposite. Russian army was outnumbered, outgunned and outmanoeuvred in that theatre so it was in full retreat. The Ukrainians were advancing rapidly with next to no resistance. You tend to take bigger casualties in a hasty retreat than the advancing army. If the Ukrainians were taking large casualties they would have slowed down, instead of marching on at breakneck speed.

I think they are intentionally mixing information from two different theatres of the war. Russia amassed a lot of troops in Kherson, in anticipation of the Ukrainian offensive there. The Kherson offensive achieved some small successes, but according to various sources that did come at a high cost due to better Russian preparedness there. However what might apply to Kherson, clearly does not apply to Kharkiv. And the efforts to correlate the two are disinformation.
 
What is your take guys on this conclusion of the article @neverdie posted.


In the end, I still believe the end game remains the same — Russia will win. But the cost for extending this war has become much higher for all parties involved.

The successful Ukrainian counteroffensive needs to be put into a proper perspective. The casualties Ukraine suffered, and is still suffering, to achieve this victory are unsustainable. Ukraine has exhausted its strategic reserves, and they will have to be reconstituted if Ukraine were to have any aspirations of continuing an advance along these lines. This will take months.

Russia, meanwhile, has lost nothing more than some indefensible space. Russian casualties were minimal, and equipment losses readily replaced.

Russia has actually strengthened its military posture by creating strong defensive lines in the north capable of withstanding any Ukrainian attack, while increasing combat power available to complete the task of liberating the remainder of the Donetsk People’s Republic under Ukrainian control.

Russia has far more strategic depth than Ukraine. Russia is beginning to strike critical infrastructure targets, such as power stations, that will not only cripple the Ukrainian economy, but also their ability to move large amounts of troops rapidly via train.

Russia will learn from the lessons the Kharkov defeat taught them and continue its stated mission objectives.

The bottom line – the Kharkov offensive was as good as it will get for Ukraine, while Russia hasn’t come close to hitting rock bottom. Changes need to be made by Russia to fix the problems identified through the Kharkov defeat. Winning a battle is one thing; winning a war another.

For Ukraine, the huge losses suffered by their own forces, combined with the limited damage inflicted on Russia means the Kharkov offensive is, at best, a Pyrrhic victory, one that does not change the fundamental reality that Russia is winning, and will win, the conflict in Ukraine.

He's claiming several things that sound at best unlikely and at worst deliberate misstruths, such as:

Ukraine is losing 10 soldiers to every soldier Russia loses in the Donbass

That Russia didn't suffer serious losses in Kharkov.

Russia didn't lose any significant equipment. Yet the transfer of military equiplement from Russia to Ukraine is the highest transfer of military equipment in any one day post WW2.

If all those facts are untrue, it makes his conclusions to be worthless. I'd guess it's a propoganda piece
 
What is your take guys on this conclusion of the article @neverdie posted.


In the end, I still believe the end game remains the same — Russia will win. But the cost for extending this war has become much higher for all parties involved.

The successful Ukrainian counteroffensive needs to be put into a proper perspective. The casualties Ukraine suffered, and is still suffering, to achieve this victory are unsustainable. Ukraine has exhausted its strategic reserves, and they will have to be reconstituted if Ukraine were to have any aspirations of continuing an advance along these lines. This will take months.

Russia, meanwhile, has lost nothing more than some indefensible space. Russian casualties were minimal, and equipment losses readily replaced.

Russia has actually strengthened its military posture by creating strong defensive lines in the north capable of withstanding any Ukrainian attack, while increasing combat power available to complete the task of liberating the remainder of the Donetsk People’s Republic under Ukrainian control.

Russia has far more strategic depth than Ukraine. Russia is beginning to strike critical infrastructure targets, such as power stations, that will not only cripple the Ukrainian economy, but also their ability to move large amounts of troops rapidly via train.

Russia will learn from the lessons the Kharkov defeat taught them and continue its stated mission objectives.

The bottom line – the Kharkov offensive was as good as it will get for Ukraine, while Russia hasn’t come close to hitting rock bottom. Changes need to be made by Russia to fix the problems identified through the Kharkov defeat. Winning a battle is one thing; winning a war another.

For Ukraine, the huge losses suffered by their own forces, combined with the limited damage inflicted on Russia means the Kharkov offensive is, at best, a Pyrrhic victory, one that does not change the fundamental reality that Russia is winning, and will win, the conflict in Ukraine.

Straight out of RAWK's 'sometimes a loss can be a win' playbook.
 
Apologies if it's been posted but this quote from Zelensky in reponse to the attack on civilian infrastructure is quite powerful and worth repeating I think

Do you still think we are one people? Do you still think you can scare us, break us, force us to make concessions? Don't you really get it? Don't you understand who we are? What we stand for? What we are all about?

Read my lips: Without gas or without you? Without you. Without light or without you? Without you. Without water or without you. Without you. Without food or without you? Without you.

Cold, hunger, darkness and thirst are not as frightening and deadly for us as your friendship and brotherhood. But history will put everything in its place. And we will be with gas, light, water and food...and WITHOUT you!"
 
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About that NYTimes article...the Ukrainians wargamed the scenarios with the British and Americans. Seems like EU countries aren't involved in these military matters aside from supplies?
 
By the first sentence I simply mean that ascribing to a sphere of influence worldview doesn't necessitate disregarding other causes of war; saying that encroaching on Russia's sphere is an escalation that risks conflict doesn't mean that appeasement is some panacea. In fact it can't necessitate this because a sphere's power exist due to the threat of force. If Ukraine weren't under some sort of implicit or explicit threat Russia wouldn't have any influence.

So maybe the war would have happened anyway. At some point it was unavoidable, I don't think it was always so but if it wasn't I don't know how big a role the West played. I'm pretty sure it played some role, but it might have been miniscule and irrelevant, I simply don't know. The war would certainly have been different, though, very different.

I'm not saying that Ukraine would have been better off under this or that. I don't know how the different scenarios would look, I don't know their likelyhoods, and I don't know what the Ukrainians would prefer or what they would be willing to risk to achieve that. At the point the war happened Ukraine's preferences are pretty clear, though.

I still don't get the point about futility. You say that the analysis might have held under the USSR era, but it's not like it was inconceivable that the cold war could have turned hot. If that happened the spheres would likely break or move, either because the world ended or because someone came out on top.

About Mearsheimer, I don't know what sort of blame he's talking about. Is he saying that the war wouldn't have happened without the West's actions? If so then he's either right or wrong about that, but Russia's latest setbacks are hardly relevant. Is he laying the moral blame on the West? If so then that's rather spicy, but this latest grandstanding isn't solely about him, it's the "whataboutism posse in the geopolitics thread": it's about anyone questioning the narrative where the West or NATO is nothing but passive observers.

And, again, even if this supposed posse is completely wrong, why would you need to spare them a thought because of Ukraine making a breakthrough? Where has any of them expressed a wish for Russian victory? It doesn't make any sense, and in my view is just an extension of following the war like a game. It's a crowd chant, a boo, not a sentence with actual meaning. This isn't directed at you.
Here's the famous video that went viral, which is how most people, like me, we're introduced to him. When people criticize him I expect this is what they're talking about.

 
Guess you could say that. In this January article he refers to Ukraine as a “Nazi-worshipping, thoroughly corrupt nation which has nothing in common with the rest of Europe.” Apart from that the article is noticeable for how much he gets badly wrong.
It's an amazing read 8 months later. How to be wrong about almost everything.
 
Here's the famous video that went viral, which is how most people, like me, we're introduced to him. When people criticize him I expect this is what they're talking about.



He's one of those guys IR students come across in their studies of various IR theories. He's probably one of the more famous realists of the past 50 years behind Ken Waltz.
 
Good thread as usual from him. I would also caution against triumphalism where the gains of the past week are presumed to continue indefinitely, which isn't very realistic.

It's been difficult not to be triumphalist after that astonishing 48 hour period, but I agree, it's necessary. I think we're hearing an absolute fraction of current actions at the moment, so we shouldn't assume that a lack of movement of lines on a map equates to a lack of offensive activity. There are apparently (may be complete BS, who knows) around 25'000 Russian troops in that area of Kherson that's bordered by rivers on both sides, with occasional rumours of negotiations to surrender. Whether or not that ever happens I'd bet that Ukraine is doing everything it can to systematically degrade Russian armour and create the right conditions for an advance there. Whilst also keeping desperately needed Russian manpower and equipment cooped up in area with very little in the way of resupply, where they can't do a huge amount of damage. I think Western Europe and the US have accepted that this war is going to go on through the winter, and that Putin will use that winter in any way he can. So perhaps there are around 12-14 months before winter 2023/24, where it may be far more difficult to sell the idea of continued involvement to the general public.
 
He's one of those guys IR students come across in their studies of various IR theories. He's probably one of the more famous realists of the past 50 years behind Ken Waltz.
He certainly wasn't wrong about Ukraine getting wrecked as a consequence.

But was wrong about Putin being "too smart" to invade and try to occupy Ukraine, having the examples of history like Afghanistan and being a shrewd tactician. I think he mistakes Putin's desire to control other countries through proxies, like in Belarus.
 
Good thread as usual from him. I would also caution against triumphalism where the gains of the past week are presumed to continue indefinitely, which isn't very realistic.
I am nobody to say he is wrong. But, I feel that his points are more relevant for attacking/invading armies in unfamiliar conditions/territories. I thought the area that AFU captured was not that big and it's their own land anyway. They should be able to defend much better now in those territories (with new equipment, training, and experience of doing it firsthand). Pushing the Russians out as much as possible in the east will put so much pressure on the ones in the south as well. And it seems like there is only minimal loss from the AFU's side for this counter offensive. They may need rest at one point, but it is not like they were doing intensive urban fighting for the last week.

It can be like scoring a goal and dropping off to defend after the first 30 mins to save energy, giving the other side momentum again in a football match. The Russians seem to have trouble with their field decisions and let them make panicked decisions to keep fecking up instead of giving time to find some decent solution for a while yet. If your army is on the run or on the brink of running, you can't make any effective decisions. The biggest favor that enemies can do is to let you settle down early. I'm sure the AFU has had more or less preplanned decisions about what they want to do for months. It is not like they just have to make decisions on the spot every day.
 
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I am nobody to say he is wrong. But, I feel that his points are more relevant for attacking/invading armies in unfamiliar conditions/territories. I thought the area that AFU captured was not that big and it's their own land anyway. They should be able to defend much better now in those territories (with new equipment, training, and experience of doing it firsthand). Pushing the Russians out as much as possible in the east will put so much pressure on the ones in the south as well. And all the sources are saying that there is only minimal loss from the AFU's side for this counter offensive. They may need rest at one point, but it is not like they were doing intensive urban fighting for the last week.

It can be like scoring a goal and dropping off to defend in the second half to save energy, giving the other side momentum again after the break in a football match. The Russians seem to have trouble with their field decisions and let them make panicked decisions to keep fecking up instead of giving time to find some decent solution for a while yet. I'm sure the AFU has had more or less preplanned decisions about what they want to do for months. It is not like they just have to make decisions on the spot every day.

What you’re saying re dropping off is logical, but it’s hardly like the Ukrainian top brass and their NATO advisors haven’t thought of that! They will surely have pushed as far as they feel they can without risking burnout, mass casualties, or encircled troops. I’d imagine there are daily discussions at every level on how to not let the Russians regroup and reorganise whilst Ukraine prepares for its next attack.
 
What you’re saying re dropping off is logical, but it’s hardly like the Ukrainian top brass and their NATO advisors haven’t thought of that! They will surely have pushed as far as they feel they can without risking burnout, mass casualties, or encircled troops. I’d imagine there are daily discussions at every level on how to not let the Russians regroup and reorganise whilst Ukraine prepares for its next attack.
That is what I am saying. I just do not think that the Ukrainians are overstretching at this point (far from it) as some are concerned. But that's my armchair opinion of course.
 
What you’re saying re dropping off is logical, but it’s hardly like the Ukrainian top brass and their NATO advisors haven’t thought of that! They will surely have pushed as far as they feel they can without risking burnout, mass casualties, or encircled troops. I’d imagine there are daily discussions at every level on how to not let the Russians regroup and reorganise whilst Ukraine prepares for its next attack.

I see all of this as a three pronged effort, each of which would happen sequentially. First, stopping Russian advances and incrementally reclaiming lost territory of the past six months. Second, reclaiming all Ukrainian territory seized by Russia post 2014 (Donbas). Third, reclaim Crimea. Whether steps 2 and 3 still happen is probably down to how depleted the Russians are and whether their troops run away in other places to allow the Ukrainians to simply walk back in (that will definitely not happen in Crimea since it is logistically and militarily now part of Russia and will require extraordinary means to expel the people and infrastructure set up there over the past 8 years.
 
Izium civilians sharing this about Russian troops.

“A (Russian) artilleryman came and said ‘Father, we saved you from the Nazis,’” Valeriy said. “And I said to them, ‘Show me one.’”
Valeriy said he spoke to the young soldiers in Russian and tried to make them see that they were destroying the once-close relationship Ukrainians and Russians held, particularly in this part of the country which is so close to the border.

“I told them they destroyed a man’s house, and he was from the Kursk region (of Russia),” Valeriy said. “Everyone here has relatives in Belgorod (in Russia) and other cities.”

He said at one point, Russian reconnaissance forces came to him and asked, “Who have we come to liberate here?”
https://edition.cnn.com/2022/09/13/europe/ukraine-izium-recaptured-intl-cmd/index.html
 
Why is it?
it would hint at something far and away beyond what is currently happening. ww3 basically. everything within ukraine is fair game from a nato pov. start moving inside russia and you'll see escalation all over within a very short period of time. syria. israel. the entire russian border. ukraine itself would be first of course. but there seems to be an understanding about that which makes sense for all sides.
 
I see all of this as a three pronged effort, each of which would happen sequentially. First, stopping Russian advances and incrementally reclaiming lost territory of the past six months. Second, reclaiming all Ukrainian territory seized by Russia post 2014 (Donbas). Third, reclaim Crimea. Whether steps 2 and 3 still happen is probably down to how depleted the Russians are and whether their troops run away in other places to allow the Ukrainians to simply walk back in (that will definitely not happen in Crimea since it is logistically and militarily now part of Russia and will require extraordinary means to expel the people and infrastructure set up there over the past 8 years.

The other major factor will be if Putin decides to do a general mobilization. That may honestly be the biggest factor to consider moving forward because if the answer is no, it's probably only a matter of time until Ukraine regains more territory.
 
Reads like something one of Putin's propagandists on Russian TV would say. It wouldn't surprise me if he's in some way funded by Russian money.

It would be interesting if someone publishes a list of those who received Russian money in the West for propaganda purposes. And how much money each of them received.
 
There are news that the 1st Guards Tank Army has suffered severe losses.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1st_Guards_Tank_Army


https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-zelenskyy-nato-kharkiv-7753fe41f7e03efa0bec0a37e18f3de6

In one indication of the blow sustained by Moscow, British intelligence said that one premier force, the 1st Guards Tank Army, had been “severely degraded” during the invasion and that conventional Russian forces designed to counter NATO have been badly weakened.

“It will likely take years for Russia to rebuild this capability,” the analysts said.

https://www.businessinsider.com/cap...yVgiSBm24fYLJH_A5n4Vko_pTY--hWCYxavcq8wXaLimA

Ukraine says it captured documents revealing that an elite Russian unit lost over 130 tanks in failed attacks on Kharkiv
 
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The other major factor will be if Putin decides to do a general mobilization. That may honestly be the biggest factor to consider moving forward because if the answer is no, it's probably only a matter of time until Ukraine regains more territory.
Even if Russia should do a general mobilization it would likely only prolong the war, but not change the outcome. Ukraine now has the technological advantage and already has a clear numerical advantage in infantery, and they come closer and closer to getting numerical advantages for heavy weaponry by destroying or capturing a lot of irreplacable Russian vehicles. A general mobilization would only result in throwing clueless people without proper equipment into the meat grinder.

The sad thing is that it will cost time and a lot more lives, but as long as there is a steady influx of support for Ukraine they will win this war.
 
There are news that the 1st Guard Tank Army has suffered severe losses.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1st_Guards_Tank_Army


https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-zelenskyy-nato-kharkiv-7753fe41f7e03efa0bec0a37e18f3de6

In one indication of the blow sustained by Moscow, British intelligence said that one premier force, the 1st Guards Tank Army, had been “severely degraded” during the invasion and that conventional Russian forces designed to counter NATO have been badly weakened.

“It will likely take years for Russia to rebuild this capability,” the analysts said.

https://www.businessinsider.com/cap...yVgiSBm24fYLJH_A5n4Vko_pTY--hWCYxavcq8wXaLimA

Ukraine says it captured documents revealing that an elite Russian unit lost over 130 tanks in failed attacks on Kharkiv
Allegedly their most elite/best equipped Field army level formation. Maybe something equating to the US Army's III Armored Corps getting routed (these things aren't exactly comparable).
 
Allegedly their most elite/best equipped Field army level formation. Maybe something equating to the US Army's III Armored Corps getting routed (these things aren't exactly comparable).
They are inteded as one of the spearhead ground forces of the western military district, so yes definetly one of the highest regarded and best equipped formations in the Russian army.
 

From the article:

Solovyov was unwilling to concede Russia’s defeat to the Ukrainian troops and claimed that American and British soldiers were covertly fighting in their ranks. “In the process of preparing the battle-ready Ukrainian troops, it turns out they’ve been rapidly turning darker in color and becoming fluent English speakers. They’re becoming indistinguishable from the mercenaries... Some of them have a Southern drawl, others speak with a British accent. Stop pretending already,” he said. The idea of being defeated by NATO, as opposed to this smaller neighboring country, seems to sweeten the pot for many of the Kremlin’s cheerleaders.

"The west is weak and decadent, our race is is stronger... except when it comes to actually fighting, then the west and the other races are magically strong".
 
If a failed invasion could mean the desintegration of your country, you should be wondering if your country should be integrated the way it is.

In order to say who could "win", we have to determine what "winning" is in the first place. According to Russia's initial demands:

-Recognition of Crimea as russian
-Recognition of LNR and DNR
-Replacing Zelensky with a pro Russian president
-Stop Ukraine's path toward EU/NATO
-Demilitarization
-Denazification (understood as "eliminating the Anti russian sentiment in Ukraine")

I think most -if not all- of them have backfired, no matter the result of the war. The first and maybe the second still have a chance to happen. Would that be enough to consider it a "win"?
 
Even if Russia should do a general mobilization it would likely only prolong the war, but not change the outcome. Ukraine now has the technological advantage and already has a clear numerical advantage in infantery, and they come closer and closer to getting numerical advantages for heavy weaponry by destroying or capturing a lot of irreplacable Russian vehicles. A general mobilization would only result in throwing clueless people without proper equipment into the meat grinder.

The sad thing is that it will cost time and a lot more lives, but as long as there is a steady influx of support for Ukraine they will win this war.

General mobilization would be catastrophic for Russia, they just can't afford to loose their youth, they're already in a terrible demographic situation, soon enough oil and gaz will be the only thing worth something in the whole country (it's already almost the case). Russia's decaying, the only thing that makes them a superpower is the number of atomic bomb they have and the fact that several countries rely on their gaz.
 
General mobilization would be catastrophic for Russia, they just can't afford to loose their youth, they're already in a terrible demographic situation, soon enough oil and gaz will be the only thing worth something in the whole country (it's already almost the case). Russia's decaying, the only thing that makes them a superpower is the number of atomic bomb they have and the fact that several countries rely on their gaz.
If their nuclear arsenal has been as well maintained as the rest of their gear maybe not a lot of that is actually useable.
 
If their nuclear arsenal has been as well maintained as the rest of their gear maybe not a lot of that is actually useable.
AcrobaticAnxiousCaterpillar-max-1mb.gif
 
A pet peeve of mine...

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2...many-more-military-hardware-counter-offensive

‘What is Berlin afraid of?’ Ukraine presses Germany for more military kit

Ukrainian foreign minister accuses German government of ignoring requests for military hardware

The Ukrainian foreign minister, Dmytro Kuleba, accused the German government of ignoring Kyiv’s requests for Leopard tanks and Marder infantry fighting vehicles.

He said Berlin had only given “abstract fears and excuses” over why it was not providing more equipment.