Russian invasion of Ukraine | Fewer tweets, more discussion

Doesn't mean you'll avoid a war, though, does it, choosing appeasement?

Everyone with an army can influence things within the range of those forces. Doesn't mean they get some kind of exempt status. Part of this idea of a "sphere of influence" seems to be logistical, if the US is funding a group in central America, it would cost more for the Russians to fund that same group from across the globe.

Yet the USSR funded Cuba, which the US couldn't take over, and the US operated on the border of the USSR in Europe, even though it was closer to Russia. So where is this sphere?

Mearsheimer's ideas come from a world where the USSR could compete with the other super power, now Russia has an economy the size of Italy (and that was before the sanctions). They can't do anything outside Russia that's so difficult to counter it's not worth the effort.

No, it doesn't mean that you'll necessarily avoid a war, I don't think anyone is claiming that, but I hardly think "look at Russia losing this war" is a slam dunk against "this is likely to lead to a war with Russia". In fact, it seems to me the opposite of a dunk. I also don't see how Cuba is supposed to disprove the existence of spheres, in my limited understanding the spheres are about exercising soft and/or hard power, it doesn't have to be absolute or imply omnipotence. So in the context of Central America, if you chose a socialist government then you were "inviting" conflict because the US would try to intervene in some capacity. Be it sanctions, embargoes, assassinations, coups or what have you, depending on several factors.

Whether its worth the effort or not, this also seems completely consistent with the spherical worldview, are you not simply arguing for breaking the sphere via conflict? Russia is weak because Russia is a poor country, and it looks like it's even weaker than what most people thought. So if the will is there they can be taken as long as nuclear war is avoided. Is the will there? That depends on the appetite for war, I'd think.
 
Spare a thought for the disciples of Mearshimer and the whataboutism posse in the geopolitics thread.
it's impressive how an "us" versus "them" mentality took hold here. you always said, for example, that such things were about group recognition. but surely that applies here, too? if people you perceive as pushing the envelope do so for recognition within a group, which i don't think is entirely right, then those who point out that fact, as it seems to them, must be pointing it out for the same reason, except it applies to a counter-group.

what i mean is, from my reading ukraine is in the midst of a massive counter offensive. this has been expected for months. how it goes, or what happens, is up in the air. no one knows. my instinct is to say let's check back in a month or two. but i don't see why or how you draw a hostile or anti-ukrainian worldview from people who were discussing and deconstructing the various aspects of the war as it began. i think that's groupthink. it pits a select people here against a select people there, and does so, if we follow your own thesis, for group recognition.

i hope ukraine manage to take back what territory was taken from them. it won't be easy. you'd expect a massive russian response if ukraine begins to turn the tide. i'm thinking "limited wmds" and the like. they'd go entirely scorched earth imo. but at the very least, i think taking back the areas beyond the separatist republics and crimea seems possible. it's about how long they can hold it thereafter.
 
No, it doesn't mean that you'll necessarily avoid a war, I don't think anyone is claiming that, but I hardly think "look at Russia losing this war" is a slam dunk against "this is likely to lead to a war with Russia". In fact, it seems to me the opposite of a dunk. I also don't see how Cuba is supposed to disprove the existence of spheres, in my limited understanding the spheres are about exercising soft and/or hard power, it doesn't have to be absolute or imply omnipotence. So in the context of Central America, if you chose a socialist government then you were "inviting" conflict because the US would try to intervene in some capacity. Be it sanctions, embargoes, assassinations, coups or what have you, depending on several factors.

Whether its worth the effort or not, this also seems completely consistent with the spherical worldview, are you not simply arguing for breaking the sphere via conflict? Russia is weak because Russia is a poor country, and it looks like it's even weaker than what most people thought. So if the will is there they can be taken as long as nuclear war is avoided. Is the will there? That depends on the appetite for war, I'd think.
I'm not sure what you mean exactly by your first sentence.

You're saying helping Ukraine is dangerous because it leads to war, and that pointing out Russia is losing doesn't negate this? Sure, but I wasn't saying otherwise.

Russia was going to invade unless they were simply given the country. The people of Ukraine clearly wanted to resist, no one forced them to. War was going to happen, it wasn't something the US could stop.

Are you saying Ukrainians would have been better off living under Russia than having everything destroyed and many of them dying, asking if it's worth the cost? I don't think there's a clear answer to that.

On Cuba, they did get more attention because they were so close, but it's not this irresistible force. You wouldn't say to the USSR that it was futile to help Cuba because it's so close to the US border.

Mearsheimer's not just pointing out that spheres of influencee exist, and that it's a mistake to help Ukraine. He's saying the US and NATO are to blame for the war happening because they dared to ally themselves with Ukraine, because of its location on the Russian border.

That may have made sense in the cold war when the USSR had more resources. That it would be futile to try to exert more influence than them in certain areas. Makes it harder? Sure, but if Russia signed a treaty with Cuba and the US said that because of that Cuba has to either let the US run Cuba or the US would invade, I don't think blaming Russia would be fair.
 
People are saying that in some of the villages that have been liberated recently in Southern Ukraine, the Russians have killed literally everyone with piles of bodies lying around.
Sounds awful, but hopefully not true (although no reason not to think that)....... but it can't be the ones hoping to negotiate a surrender if it is indeed true.
 
I'm not sure what you mean exactly by your first sentence.

You're saying helping Ukraine is dangerous because it leads to war, and that pointing out Russia is losing doesn't negate this? Sure, but I wasn't saying otherwise.

Russia was going to invade unless they were simply given the country. The people of Ukraine clearly wanted to resist, no one forced them to. War was going to happen, it wasn't something the US could stop.

Are you saying Ukrainians would have been better off living under Russia than having everything destroyed and many of them dying, asking if it's worth the cost? I don't think there's a clear answer to that.

On Cuba, they did get more attention because they were so close, but it's not this irresistible force. You wouldn't say to the USSR that it was futile to help Cuba because it's so close to the US border.

Mearsheimer's not just pointing out that spheres of influencee exist, and that it's a mistake to help Ukraine. He's saying the US and NATO are to blame for the war happening because they dared to ally themselves with Ukraine, because of its location on the Russian border.

That may have made sense in the cold war when the USSR had more resources. That it would be futile to try to exert more influence than them in certain areas. Makes it harder? Sure, but if Russia signed a treaty with Cuba and the US said that because of that Cuba has to either let the US run Cuba or the US would invade, I don't think blaming Russia would be fair.

By the first sentence I simply mean that ascribing to a sphere of influence worldview doesn't necessitate disregarding other causes of war; saying that encroaching on Russia's sphere is an escalation that risks conflict doesn't mean that appeasement is some panacea. In fact it can't necessitate this because a sphere's power exist due to the threat of force. If Ukraine weren't under some sort of implicit or explicit threat Russia wouldn't have any influence.

So maybe the war would have happened anyway. At some point it was unavoidable, I don't think it was always so but if it wasn't I don't know how big a role the West played. I'm pretty sure it played some role, but it might have been miniscule and irrelevant, I simply don't know. The war would certainly have been different, though, very different.

I'm not saying that Ukraine would have been better off under this or that. I don't know how the different scenarios would look, I don't know their likelyhoods, and I don't know what the Ukrainians would prefer or what they would be willing to risk to achieve that. At the point the war happened Ukraine's preferences are pretty clear, though.

I still don't get the point about futility. You say that the analysis might have held under the USSR era, but it's not like it was inconceivable that the cold war could have turned hot. If that happened the spheres would likely break or move, either because the world ended or because someone came out on top.

About Mearsheimer, I don't know what sort of blame he's talking about. Is he saying that the war wouldn't have happened without the West's actions? If so then he's either right or wrong about that, but Russia's latest setbacks are hardly relevant. Is he laying the moral blame on the West? If so then that's rather spicy, but this latest grandstanding isn't solely about him, it's the "whataboutism posse in the geopolitics thread": it's about anyone questioning the narrative where the West or NATO is nothing but passive observers.

And, again, even if this supposed posse is completely wrong, why would you need to spare them a thought because of Ukraine making a breakthrough? Where has any of them expressed a wish for Russian victory? It doesn't make any sense, and in my view is just an extension of following the war like a game. It's a crowd chant, a boo, not a sentence with actual meaning. This isn't directed at you.
 
If your argument was that the west shouldn't support Ukraine then you are in fact arguing for a Russian victory.

Part of that argument has always been that Ukraine couldn't win even with western support. That the Russians would eventually get most of their objectives and west was as they liked to put it "fighting Russia to the last Ukrainian".

This breakthrough makes a nonsense of those views. They were wrong.
 
People are saying that in some of the villages that have been liberated recently in Southern Ukraine, the Russians have killed literally everyone with piles of bodies lying around.
Not that it’s in any way unbelievable going by what we already know about Russian war crimes but “people are saying” are an objectively poor source and Ukrainian DA office has so far reported about 4 bodies of civilians with signs of torture. There’s enough real horrors, we don’t need to spread rumors that don’t have a proper source at the very least. If there are piles of bodies lying around, we’d probably already seen some photos by now.
 
If your argument was that the west shouldn't support Ukraine then you are in fact arguing for a Russian victory.

Part of that argument has always been that Ukraine couldn't win even with western support. That the Russians would eventually get most of their objectives and west was as they liked to put it "fighting Russia to the last Ukrainian".

This breakthrough makes a nonsense of those views. They were wrong.
the argument wasn't that ukraine couldn't make breakthroughs. it was that it couldn't win, partially, which i still think is true but depends on how you define win. does it mean ultimate defeat of russia? because that is beyond ukraine and nato. does it mean taking the lost territory back? these questions were asked by very senior figures in foreign affairs from the outset. they weren't criticisms made by anti-ukranians. they were questions asked by people who wanted clarification over the kind of war their countries were dragging them into. the criticism was always the lack of clarity regarding the goal and ad hoc policy making. saying one thing which implied one level of support one day and another which hinted at something far larger and more escalatory the next.

i do think they're fighting russia to the last ukrainian but that doesn't mean that ukraine can't benefit from it. were the americans not fighting the soviets to the last afghani? did the afghanis care? so of course they're using ukraine. it's not a single-use kind of operation. the ukrainians aren't idiots. they know they have use-value to the west and they know their position. nato wants to fight russia via proxy. ukraine wants to fight russia directly. match made in heaven, no? it's not a contradiction, basically. my only criticism would depend upon what the west does over the next couple of years. not what it's doing now. what happens when the russians push back. and then ukraine pushes back. and on and on. all yet to come.

unfortunately i think this will be a massively drawn out war and last for years with the positions being unpredictable but possibly as they were before february.

the other thing is that if you think people making criticisms of the war are on russia's side, then you have, probably, been misled. some will be, for whatever reason which they themselves will scarcely comprehend, but most are not. most i've seen had almost no negative opinions of ukraine and almost no positive opinions on russia, but a highly critical view of nato. which i think is historically justified.
 
Last edited:
it's impressive how an "us" versus "them" mentality took hold here. you always said, for example, that such things were about group recognition. but surely that applies here, too? if people you perceive as pushing the envelope do so for recognition within a group, which i don't think is entirely right, then those who point out that fact, as it seems to them, must be pointing it out for the same reason, except it applies to a counter-group.

what i mean is, from my reading ukraine is in the midst of a massive counter offensive. this has been expected for months. how it goes, or what happens, is up in the air. no one knows. my instinct is to say let's check back in a month or two. but i don't see why or how you draw a hostile or anti-ukrainian worldview from people who were discussing and deconstructing the various aspects of the war as it began. i think that's groupthink. it pits a select people here against a select people there, and does so, if we follow your own thesis, for group recognition.

i hope ukraine manage to take back what territory was taken from them. it won't be easy. you'd expect a massive russian response if ukraine begins to turn the tide. i'm thinking "limited wmds" and the like. they'd go entirely scorched earth imo. but at the very least, i think taking back the areas beyond the separatist republics and crimea seems possible. it's about how long they can hold it thereafter.

Its meant as tongue and cheek. There have been some good points made in the Geopolitics thread.
 
Its meant as tongue and cheek. There have been some good points made in the Geopolitics thread.
i know. tbf was using your post as kind of proxy. it wasn't particularly aimed at you and kind of extends beyond this thread and topic, too.
 
In short, the Ukrainian army that Russia faced in Kherson and around Kharkov was unlike any Ukrainian opponent it had previously faced. Russia was no longer fighting a Ukrainian army equipped by NATO, but rather a NATO army manned by Ukrainians.

that comes from an article by someone whose work i think is characterised by anti-ukrainian sentiment, or pro-russian, but i think he makes a few good points. in brief, that the ukrainian army has now become a much more cohesive entity. not the hybrid half-soviet half-nato outfit it was, but now a much more conventional nato army. if you ignore his bias you can find some compliments to ukrainian military know-how inbetween the lines. he gives a good overview on how ukraine dummied the russians into making a massive error, too, but he is biased and as such you should probably take his compliments in higher regard because he must be loathed to admit it.

here.

but this is a good example of the group recognition principle @Raoul was talking about. some people, like this, do operate on those lines. it's because their material is monetized. it doesn't extend here, imo, because what we have is an anonymous forum where people just advance arguments back and forth but it does absolutely exist once you throw money and status in real life into the mix.
 
that comes from an article by someone whose work i think is characterised by anti-ukrainian sentiment, or pro-russian, but i think he makes a few good points. in brief, that the ukrainian army has now become a much more cohesive entity. not the hybrid half-soviet half-nato outfit it was, but now a much more conventional nato army. if you ignore his bias you can find some compliments to ukrainian military know-how inbetween the lines. he gives a good overview on how ukraine dummied the russians into making a massive error, too, but he is biased and as such you should probably take his compliments in higher regard because he must be loathed to admit it.

here.

but this is a good example of the group recognition principle @Raoul was talking about. some people, like this, do operate on those lines. it's because their material is monetized. it doesn't extend here, imo, because what we have is an anonymous forum where people just advance arguments back and forth but it does absolutely exist once you throw money and status in real life into the mix.
Irony is that Russian excuse for going into attacking Ukraine was supposed Ukrainian flirting with NATO and what the war achieved is Ukrainian army got modernized and close to NATO standards.
 
that comes from an article by someone whose work i think is characterised by anti-ukrainian sentiment, or pro-russian, but i think he makes a few good points. in brief, that the ukrainian army has now become a much more cohesive entity. not the hybrid half-soviet half-nato outfit it was, but now a much more conventional nato army. if you ignore his bias you can find some compliments to ukrainian military know-how inbetween the lines. he gives a good overview on how ukraine dummied the russians into making a massive error, too, but he is biased and as such you should probably take his compliments in higher regard because he must be loathed to admit it.

here.

but this is a good example of the group recognition principle @Raoul was talking about. some people, like this, do operate on those lines. it's because their material is monetized. it doesn't extend here, imo, because what we have is an anonymous forum where people just advance arguments back and forth but it does absolutely exist once you throw money and status in real life into the mix.

Ritter is well known in the US from his days as an inspector in the 90s, through his arrest attempting to solicit sex from a minor, to his more recent attempt at becoming a policy expert

https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/26/magazine/scott-ritter.html
 
Irony is that Russian excuse for going into attacking Ukraine was supposed Ukrainian flirting with NATO and what the war achieved is Ukrainian army got modernized and close to NATO standards.
indeed. that's something that i've seen the most anti-nato peole in the world point out from the first. that aside from being criminal, because it was preemptive, it was criminally stupid. if they wanted the two apart, their action drove them together.
 
Ritter is well known in the US from his days as an inspector in the 90s, through his arrest attempting to solicit sex from a minor, to his more recent attempt at becoming a policy expert

https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/26/magazine/scott-ritter.html
a storied career. he's only appeared on my peripheral radar since the war began. basically wrote him off as fairly biased man with axe to grind quite early on which is why the about turn is interesting, so thought i'd post it for others.
 
Irony is that Russian excuse for going into attacking Ukraine was supposed Ukrainian flirting with NATO and what the war achieved is Ukrainian army got modernized and close to NATO standards.

In retrospect it was a fabricated excuse all along, just as invading to repel fascism was fabricated. It was all a desperate attempt to assuage a sense of delusional nationalism through empire building. The irony being that it has made Russia crumble on the international stage.
 
the argument wasn't that ukraine couldn't make breakthroughs. it was that it couldn't win, partially, which i still think is true but depends on how you define win. does it mean ultimate defeat of russia? because that is beyond ukraine and nato. does it mean taking the lost territory back? these questions were asked by very senior figures in foreign affairs from the outset. they weren't criticisms made by anti-ukranians. they were questions asked by people who wanted clarification over the kind of war their countries were dragging them into. the criticism was always the lack of clarity regarding the goal and ad hoc policy making. saying one thing which implied one level of support one day and another which hinted at something far larger and more escalatory the next.

i do think they're fighting russia to the last ukrainian but that doesn't mean that ukraine can't benefit from it. were the americans not fighting the soviets to the last afghani? did the afghanis care? so of course they're using ukraine. it's not a single-use kind of operation. the ukrainians aren't idiots. they know they have use-value to the west and they know their position. nato wants to fight russia via proxy. ukraine wants to fight russia directly. match made in heaven, no? it's not a contradiction, basically. my only criticism would depend upon what the west does over the next couple of years. not what it's doing now. what happens when the russians push back. and then ukraine pushes back. and on and on. all yet to come.

unfortunately i think this will be a massively drawn out war and last for years with the positions being unpredictable but possibly as they were before february.

the other thing is that if you think people making criticisms of the war are on russia's side, then you have, probably, been misled. some will be, for whatever reason which they themselves will scarcely comprehend, but most are not. most i've seen had almost no negative opinions of ukraine and almost no positive opinions on russia, but a highly critical view of nato. which i think is historically justified.

My point is that, that argument in bold is wrong now.

Whether it eventually does or not, these breakthroughs show the real possibility that Ukraine could win.

In fact as long as the west continues or increases its support it is more likely than not that they will push Russian out of Ukraine and inflict a considerable and probably irreversible defeat on Russia.

A highly critical view of NATO is one thing but a highly critical view of NATO for supporting Ukraine after the invasion means what? That NATO shouldn't have supported Ukraine which would have lead to a Russian victory.

At what point are these opinions going to be dropped as outdated and surpassed by evidence on the ground. The assumptions of many about Russian power and Ukrainian weakness were wrong and that changes everything.
 
How much choice did the teachers have about going there in the first place?
They weren't forced to go there, it was a voluntary initiative — Russia simply offered significantly higher salaries for those teachers that would agree to work in occupied territories and it was enough. Teachers aren't soldiers — at least not quite yet.
 
that comes from an article by someone whose work i think is characterised by anti-ukrainian sentiment

Guess you could say that. In this January article he refers to Ukraine as a “Nazi-worshipping, thoroughly corrupt nation which has nothing in common with the rest of Europe.” Apart from that the article is noticeable for how much he gets badly wrong.
 
What is your take guys on this conclusion of the article @neverdie posted.


In the end, I still believe the end game remains the same — Russia will win. But the cost for extending this war has become much higher for all parties involved.

The successful Ukrainian counteroffensive needs to be put into a proper perspective. The casualties Ukraine suffered, and is still suffering, to achieve this victory are unsustainable. Ukraine has exhausted its strategic reserves, and they will have to be reconstituted if Ukraine were to have any aspirations of continuing an advance along these lines. This will take months.

Russia, meanwhile, has lost nothing more than some indefensible space. Russian casualties were minimal, and equipment losses readily replaced.

Russia has actually strengthened its military posture by creating strong defensive lines in the north capable of withstanding any Ukrainian attack, while increasing combat power available to complete the task of liberating the remainder of the Donetsk People’s Republic under Ukrainian control.

Russia has far more strategic depth than Ukraine. Russia is beginning to strike critical infrastructure targets, such as power stations, that will not only cripple the Ukrainian economy, but also their ability to move large amounts of troops rapidly via train.

Russia will learn from the lessons the Kharkov defeat taught them and continue its stated mission objectives.

The bottom line – the Kharkov offensive was as good as it will get for Ukraine, while Russia hasn’t come close to hitting rock bottom. Changes need to be made by Russia to fix the problems identified through the Kharkov defeat. Winning a battle is one thing; winning a war another.

For Ukraine, the huge losses suffered by their own forces, combined with the limited damage inflicted on Russia means the Kharkov offensive is, at best, a Pyrrhic victory, one that does not change the fundamental reality that Russia is winning, and will win, the conflict in Ukraine.
 
A highly critical view of NATO is one thing but a highly critical view of NATO for supporting Ukraine after the invasion means what? That NATO shouldn't have supported Ukraine which would have lead to a Russian victory.
yeah i get your point. would just say that most anti-nato types didn't oppose nato's support of ukraine after the war. they took issue with the whole thing prior to the war, going back years. all a bit of a moot point now.

i think it comes back to what does victory look like? pre-february lines? i think that's possible. total defeat of russia? i don't think that's feasible and probably not something nato itself takes seriously, at least you'd hope so. would still say let's see where we are in a few months. russia has shown that taking land is the easy part. holding it is the troublesome aspect. though if money and support is starting to tell, who knows.
 
What is your take guys on this conclusion of the article @neverdie posted.


In the end, I still believe the end game remains the same — Russia will win. But the cost for extending this war has become much higher for all parties involved.

The successful Ukrainian counteroffensive needs to be put into a proper perspective. The casualties Ukraine suffered, and is still suffering, to achieve this victory are unsustainable. Ukraine has exhausted its strategic reserves, and they will have to be reconstituted if Ukraine were to have any aspirations of continuing an advance along these lines. This will take months.

Russia, meanwhile, has lost nothing more than some indefensible space. Russian casualties were minimal, and equipment losses readily replaced.

Russia has actually strengthened its military posture by creating strong defensive lines in the north capable of withstanding any Ukrainian attack, while increasing combat power available to complete the task of liberating the remainder of the Donetsk People’s Republic under Ukrainian control.

Russia has far more strategic depth than Ukraine. Russia is beginning to strike critical infrastructure targets, such as power stations, that will not only cripple the Ukrainian economy, but also their ability to move large amounts of troops rapidly via train.

Russia will learn from the lessons the Kharkov defeat taught them and continue its stated mission objectives.

The bottom line – the Kharkov offensive was as good as it will get for Ukraine, while Russia hasn’t come close to hitting rock bottom. Changes need to be made by Russia to fix the problems identified through the Kharkov defeat. Winning a battle is one thing; winning a war another.

For Ukraine, the huge losses suffered by their own forces, combined with the limited damage inflicted on Russia means the Kharkov offensive is, at best, a Pyrrhic victory, one that does not change the fundamental reality that Russia is winning, and will win, the conflict in Ukraine.

Reads like something one of Putin's propagandists on Russian TV would say. It wouldn't surprise me if he's in some way funded by Russian money.
 
Last edited:
The bottom line – the Kharkov offensive was as good as it will get for Ukraine, while Russia hasn’t come close to hitting rock bottom. Changes need to be made by Russia to fix the problems identified through the Kharkov defeat. Winning a battle is one thing; winning a war another.
my take on it is there is no way he can know any of this. he's right that winning a battle or a breakthrough isn't the same as winning the war but he hasn't given a single source for his conclusion that russia will somehow win anyway. it's ideological, not critical or distanced imo.
 
What is your take guys on this conclusion of the article @neverdie posted.


In the end, I still believe the end game remains the same — Russia will win. But the cost for extending this war has become much higher for all parties involved.

The successful Ukrainian counteroffensive needs to be put into a proper perspective. The casualties Ukraine suffered, and is still suffering, to achieve this victory are unsustainable. Ukraine has exhausted its strategic reserves, and they will have to be reconstituted if Ukraine were to have any aspirations of continuing an advance along these lines. This will take months.

Russia, meanwhile, has lost nothing more than some indefensible space. Russian casualties were minimal, and equipment losses readily replaced.

Russia has actually strengthened its military posture by creating strong defensive lines in the north capable of withstanding any Ukrainian attack, while increasing combat power available to complete the task of liberating the remainder of the Donetsk People’s Republic under Ukrainian control.

Russia has far more strategic depth than Ukraine. Russia is beginning to strike critical infrastructure targets, such as power stations, that will not only cripple the Ukrainian economy, but also their ability to move large amounts of troops rapidly via train.

Russia will learn from the lessons the Kharkov defeat taught them and continue its stated mission objectives.

The bottom line – the Kharkov offensive was as good as it will get for Ukraine, while Russia hasn’t come close to hitting rock bottom. Changes need to be made by Russia to fix the problems identified through the Kharkov defeat. Winning a battle is one thing; winning a war another.

For Ukraine, the huge losses suffered by their own forces, combined with the limited damage inflicted on Russia means the Kharkov offensive is, at best, a Pyrrhic victory, one that does not change the fundamental reality that Russia is winning, and will win, the conflict in Ukraine.
Can a loss be a win?
 
What is your take guys on this conclusion of the article @neverdie posted.


In the end, I still believe the end game remains the same — Russia will win. But the cost for extending this war has become much higher for all parties involved.

The successful Ukrainian counteroffensive needs to be put into a proper perspective. The casualties Ukraine suffered, and is still suffering, to achieve this victory are unsustainable. Ukraine has exhausted its strategic reserves, and they will have to be reconstituted if Ukraine were to have any aspirations of continuing an advance along these lines. This will take months.

Russia, meanwhile, has lost nothing more than some indefensible space. Russian casualties were minimal, and equipment losses readily replaced.

Russia has actually strengthened its military posture by creating strong defensive lines in the north capable of withstanding any Ukrainian attack, while increasing combat power available to complete the task of liberating the remainder of the Donetsk People’s Republic under Ukrainian control.

Russia has far more strategic depth than Ukraine. Russia is beginning to strike critical infrastructure targets, such as power stations, that will not only cripple the Ukrainian economy, but also their ability to move large amounts of troops rapidly via train.

Russia will learn from the lessons the Kharkov defeat taught them and continue its stated mission objectives.

The bottom line – the Kharkov offensive was as good as it will get for Ukraine, while Russia hasn’t come close to hitting rock bottom. Changes need to be made by Russia to fix the problems identified through the Kharkov defeat. Winning a battle is one thing; winning a war another.

For Ukraine, the huge losses suffered by their own forces, combined with the limited damage inflicted on Russia means the Kharkov offensive is, at best, a Pyrrhic victory, one that does not change the fundamental reality that Russia is winning, and will win, the conflict in Ukraine.
Pretty sure they aren’t taking huge losses since the Russian are running away like big girls pants?
 
Pretty sure they aren’t taking huge losses since the Russian are running away like big girls pants?
Yeah that and the fact from the stuff he's writing it seems they have about 5000 soldiers in reserve or something and that's already dried out..
 
The successful Ukrainian counteroffensive needs to be put into a proper perspective. The casualties Ukraine suffered, and is still suffering, to achieve this victory are unsustainable. Ukraine has exhausted its strategic reserves, and they will have to be reconstituted if Ukraine were to have any aspirations of continuing an advance along these lines. This will take months.

Russia, meanwhile, has lost nothing more than some indefensible space. Russian casualties were minimal, and equipment losses readily replaced.
Seems like a misinformed opinion, at least based on the publicly available information, it's obviously hard to assess the losses when neither side wants to disclose their real losses (and Russia does everything in its power not to give out ANY info at all).

Russia has actually strengthened its military posture by creating strong defensive lines in the north capable of withstanding any Ukrainian attack, while increasing combat power available to complete the task of liberating the remainder of the Donetsk People’s Republic under Ukrainian control.
This reads very much alike the reports about the substantial and consistent negative growth of Russian economy.


I've taken a look at the article. I don't know if he's simply an idiot or if he's getting paid (and those options aren't mutually exclusive) but I don't think that this constitutes as journalism.
 
Seems like a misinformed opinion, at least based on the publicly available information, it's obviously hard to assess the losses when neither side wants to disclose their real losses (and Russia does everything in its power not to give out ANY info at all).


This reads very much alike the reports about the substantial and consistent negative growth of Russian economy.


I've taken a look at the article. I don't know if he's simply an idiot or if he's getting paid (and those options aren't mutually exclusive) but I don't think that this constitutes as journalism.
Also the fact he's saying stuff like 'liberation of Donbas' instead of occupation says a lot.
 
In retrospect it was a fabricated excuse all along, just as invading to repel fascism was fabricated. It was all a desperate attempt to assuage a sense of delusional nationalism through empire building. The irony being that it has made Russia crumble on the international stage.
i still think the nato thing was real for russia. if you take syria and the other areas into account, putin and the kremlin were absolutely viewing this as a proxy war against nato imo. and ukraine had become de facto nato state, which is why they had a hybrid kind of outfit in the first place. russia's move, i think, was to create a large buffer and push nato out. if they could have forced regime change in kyiv, then that would have been a massive bonus. i think the initial invasion, with the mile long buildup, had to do with forcing ukraine to blink in tandem with apparent officials who had been bought off or pressured into launching an internal coup. after that failed, they basically had to go back to a more limited kind of war which only ever seemed to encompass the south and the east.

but i say it's moot because it becomes one massive "if they hadn't done this" type argument. if russia had been otherwise, ukraine wouldn't have invited nato in. if nato had been otherwise, russia wouldn't have done whatever. and that kind of argument seems pointless at the moment.