Like Ekaterina Schulmann aptly noted despite everything Russia conveniently decides to only leave those international institutions that have already kicked it out.
Russian invasion of Ukraine | Fewer tweets, more discussion
- Thread starter Wednesday at Stoke
- Start date
Sunk cost fallacy?
I was just thinking what would happen if Japan actually did that. What would the rest of the world say?
Fecking Macron, thank christ he's already had his election.I don't think the US wants them to, is ultimately what has the most weight. Japan's defense vis-a-vis both Russia and China is intertwined with the US, so they can't really go starting conflicts of their own unless they want to potentially lose that guarantee.
I’m gonna go out on a limb here & state that this ‘blunted’ comment won’t come back to haunt you.
We would be reminded that the Soviets invaded those islands after Japan formally announced its surrender after the 2 atomic bombs.
Seriously, it was like a violation of a ceasefire. It is a reason no peace treaty has ever been formally between Japan and the USSR/now-Russia.
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They only ever haunt the minds of those disturbed
China, North Korea, Cuba, Venezuela and one or two others would object. Everyone else would either cheer on Japan for kicking Russia when it's down, or else not really care.
That looks more like a proper way to camouflage a tank rather than the funny stuff (carpets and saplings) that Russian vehicles had earlier in the conflict.
It's reinforced my view of him.
It is hard to decide who has been worse so far, Macron or Scholz?
For me it's Scholz as Macron at least has sent some good weapons to Ukraine while Scholz is holding everything up.
Really? The more this goes, the more I see him as the kind of sellout that Philippe Pétain was. Not that Marine Le Pen is any better (since she is pretty much a direct ally of Russia), but Macron has chosen the path of obvious spinelessness. That could be very compromising in the future should NATO be called to do more or to do something else as important.
Don't know if this was what @DT12 was unto at some point. In the short term it seems the sanctions have made Russia richer by driving up energy prices, but I don't know what daily life is like in Russia so I don't know if the sanctions are working or not or simply having mixed effects.
https://spectatorworld.com/topic/sanctions-making-russia-richer/
https://spectatorworld.com/topic/sanctions-making-russia-richer/
Thread on patience and the Ukraine conflict
Hah! Meant to just post the original article.
It's a good opinion to be fair.
Putin has cancelled his annual live press-conference. I wonder what happened there…
Is it to observe something, or like a State of the Union type thing? Just wondering why this one is so special to only be annual.
I’m not going to sign up to read the whole article but it’s a dubious claim that Russia as a whole is getting richer. The oil & gas sales as well as grain are obviously flush a lot of cash to the state budget but the economy as a whole is sinking.
He doesn’t do a lot of interviews and this one is quite huge as there are hundreds of journalists (less and less from independent & international media, obviously, and I doubt that anyone even remotely objective would’ve been allowed in this year) & there’s also questions from the public (some god forsaken village asking for a road etc.).
It was obviously mostly rehearsed even in better years with rare controversial questions getting through the censorship here and there, but it looks like they’re too scared to hold this press-conference even with the completely state-controlled media of today’s Russia.
University of Luhansk isn't a bad institution, and the original campus retains a fair amount of both resources and staff from before the evacuation. Studying economics there is orders of magnitude better than the fates awaiting most of the people trying to reach Europe by boats. He also could have stayed in Rostov, or moved to another city in Russia, if life in Luhansk was so bad.
So I don't really get your point, unless it's "people have more opportunities in both Russia and Luhansk than in the DRC". Which, yes, that's true.
Are sanctions making Russia richer?
Before the invasion of Ukraine, it was by no means certain that there would be a united response from the West. The sanctions imposed on Russia after Vladimir Putin’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 were fairly limited, especially from the European Union. Germany pressed on with the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline to Russia. But now, America, Europe and much of Asia have been united in applying severe sanctions against Russian banks, companies and oligarchs. Three months on, it’s time to ask: are the sanctions working?
The answer from the Bank of Russia’s balance of payment data for January to April isn’t reassuring. It showed that the sanctions are emphatically not working, at least not in the way that they were intended. Russia’s current account surplus (roughly speaking: exports minus imports) jumped to an all-time high at $96 billion — almost four times the same period last year. The total balance of goods and services shows an even wider gap: $106 billion, treble that of last year.
At this rate, Russia’s current account surplus could hit $250 billion. So the extra money being banked by Russia is almost the same amount as the $300 billion of central bank assets and foreign currency reserves that were frozen by the West after the invasion.
Russia is not exporting more oil and gas. But the war — and the western sanctions — have massively driven up the energy prices. To be sure, Russia will suffer once its stockpiles of western goods and components are used up. Several companies will shut down and lay off workers. The recession will be very deep indeed.
But over time, the situation should improve for Putin. Germany — which relied on Russia for about 55 percent of its natural gas and 34 percent of its oil before the invasion of Ukraine — is insisting on a gradual phase-in of energy sanctions to give the economy time to adjust. If gas is to be shipped in, LNG import terminals will be needed. New suppliers and alternative sources of energy will have to be found. This delay gives Putin time. He will be able to obtain sanctioned electronics components through third countries (especially China) and find new export markets. Countries facing food shortages might also turn to Russian wheat, as well as Russian energy.
Where US-led sanctions have been more successful so far are in their secondary, indirect effects. For now, at least, Chinese companies operating in America feel they have to play along with the global boycott. Some have reduced exports to Russia voluntarily. But the Chinese government is seeking to reduce its dependency on the US financial system. If China insulates itself against any future US sanctions, Chinese companies may be more willing to supply Russia. Western sanctions are at their strongest right now because the world is dependent on the US dollar and the US financial market. That dependency will probably not last.
And let’s not hold our breath for Europe to cut out Russian gas. Olaf Scholz, Germany’s chancellor, is being two-faced about this (just as he is being two-faced about arms deliveries to Ukraine). How can Germany expect to replace Russian gas while also cutting coal, ending nuclear and pursuing the transition to renewable energy sources at the same time? Scholz’s “clean energy” program is the raison d’être of Germany’s new SDP-led coalition.
It’s hard to find a German TV talk show that doesn’t feature a panelist arguing that Ukraine should capitulate to get Europe’s economy moving again. My guess is that Germany’s political establishment is playing for time, hoping that there will be a peace deal in Ukraine as part of which the sanctions will have to be loosened.
Russia’s best strategic option is to play a long game. Putin might dial down his offensive for the moment, bide his time — and wait until he is able to fund the next stage of his military operations. The West should operate on the assumption that the ultimate goal of German politics is to find a way to re-establish trade links with Russia. The apparatus of corporate Germany depends on repairing relations, which Putin understood when he encouraged the Nord Stream energy supply links in the first place.
Putin may be struggling in the military war. But I don’t think he is losing the economic one.
By Wolfgang Münchau
Before the invasion of Ukraine, it was by no means certain that there would be a united response from the West. The sanctions imposed on Russia after Vladimir Putin’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 were fairly limited, especially from the European Union. Germany pressed on with the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline to Russia. But now, America, Europe and much of Asia have been united in applying severe sanctions against Russian banks, companies and oligarchs. Three months on, it’s time to ask: are the sanctions working?
The answer from the Bank of Russia’s balance of payment data for January to April isn’t reassuring. It showed that the sanctions are emphatically not working, at least not in the way that they were intended. Russia’s current account surplus (roughly speaking: exports minus imports) jumped to an all-time high at $96 billion — almost four times the same period last year. The total balance of goods and services shows an even wider gap: $106 billion, treble that of last year.
At this rate, Russia’s current account surplus could hit $250 billion. So the extra money being banked by Russia is almost the same amount as the $300 billion of central bank assets and foreign currency reserves that were frozen by the West after the invasion.
Russia is not exporting more oil and gas. But the war — and the western sanctions — have massively driven up the energy prices. To be sure, Russia will suffer once its stockpiles of western goods and components are used up. Several companies will shut down and lay off workers. The recession will be very deep indeed.
But over time, the situation should improve for Putin. Germany — which relied on Russia for about 55 percent of its natural gas and 34 percent of its oil before the invasion of Ukraine — is insisting on a gradual phase-in of energy sanctions to give the economy time to adjust. If gas is to be shipped in, LNG import terminals will be needed. New suppliers and alternative sources of energy will have to be found. This delay gives Putin time. He will be able to obtain sanctioned electronics components through third countries (especially China) and find new export markets. Countries facing food shortages might also turn to Russian wheat, as well as Russian energy.
Where US-led sanctions have been more successful so far are in their secondary, indirect effects. For now, at least, Chinese companies operating in America feel they have to play along with the global boycott. Some have reduced exports to Russia voluntarily. But the Chinese government is seeking to reduce its dependency on the US financial system. If China insulates itself against any future US sanctions, Chinese companies may be more willing to supply Russia. Western sanctions are at their strongest right now because the world is dependent on the US dollar and the US financial market. That dependency will probably not last.
And let’s not hold our breath for Europe to cut out Russian gas. Olaf Scholz, Germany’s chancellor, is being two-faced about this (just as he is being two-faced about arms deliveries to Ukraine). How can Germany expect to replace Russian gas while also cutting coal, ending nuclear and pursuing the transition to renewable energy sources at the same time? Scholz’s “clean energy” program is the raison d’être of Germany’s new SDP-led coalition.
It’s hard to find a German TV talk show that doesn’t feature a panelist arguing that Ukraine should capitulate to get Europe’s economy moving again. My guess is that Germany’s political establishment is playing for time, hoping that there will be a peace deal in Ukraine as part of which the sanctions will have to be loosened.
Russia’s best strategic option is to play a long game. Putin might dial down his offensive for the moment, bide his time — and wait until he is able to fund the next stage of his military operations. The West should operate on the assumption that the ultimate goal of German politics is to find a way to re-establish trade links with Russia. The apparatus of corporate Germany depends on repairing relations, which Putin understood when he encouraged the Nord Stream energy supply links in the first place.
Putin may be struggling in the military war. But I don’t think he is losing the economic one.
By Wolfgang Münchau
I don't like his latest statements about "not humiliating Russia" but I'd still give him the benefice of the doubt until the election passes.
He still has another election coming on the 12 and 19th. It might be a formality (runoffs tend to favor his Centrist movements). But it seems there is a risk his bloc might fail to secure a majority. The latest polls are giving him 290 seats on average, that would be a very narrow majority (289 needed)... The result probably doesn't matter regarding foreign policy (presidential prerogatives), but the polls in themselves give him enough reasons to be careful.
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Russian bombardment of Sievierodonetsk ‘pushes Ukrainian troops back to city’s outskirts’
https://www.theguardian.com/world/l...soners-of-war-sent-to-russia-moscow-says-live
https://www.theguardian.com/world/l...soners-of-war-sent-to-russia-moscow-says-live