An ethnographic study conducted in the fall in three regions of Russia: Buryatia, Krasnodar
Territory and Sverdlovsk Region, revealed the following trends:
1. Russian society remains politically demobilized and de-ideologized.
Contrary to popular belief about its rapid militarization, we see
that war is becoming a familiar and therefore invisible part of
reality. For example, compared to the first year of the war, the
number of war symbols in public spaces is decreasing in all three
regions. War does not become a source of new ideas in the
cultural life of cities and villages, integrating into familiar and
already proven cultural formats. The war is not discussed in
public places and, with rare exceptions, in local online
communities.
2. The participation of people in various types of military volunteering
and collective assistance to the army, which is usually mentioned
as an example of the mobilization and militarization of Russian
society, is usually associated with administrative pressure, moral
norms of the community (relating to mutual assistance) or the
desire to help loved ones, and not with the desire - to bring
Russia’s victory closer.
3. Conflict in relations between opponents and non-opponents of the
war is gradually decreasing, and between those who remained
in Russia and those who left it is increasing. This happens both
because the shared experience of living through a difficult
situation within the country becomes more important for many
Russians than differences in views, and because people discuss
the war less.
4. At the same time, reducing conflict in relations between opponents
and non-opponents of war does not always lead to an increase
in the cohesion of society. Since people try to live as if there is
no war, and the state does not talk about losses and problems
associated with the war, then everything the negative consequences of the war are either normalized or
relegated to the realm of personal difficulties that there is no one to
discuss with and which everyone is forced to cope with on their own.
5. At the same time, many people are strengthening their national identity, and
sometimes there is a demand for greater solidarity. It is important that
strengthening national identity does not lead to Russians adopting official
imperial nationalism. Unlike the Kremlin, ordinary people live in a world of
nation-states, and not in a world of imperial fantasies (according to which
Ukraine is not a real state and Ukrainians are an inferior people).
6. Apolitical war-justifying Russians are becoming more critical and increasingly
doubtful of official explanations for the conflict. Their criticism differs from the
criticism of opponents of the war, but also has a moral nature. For opponents
of the invasion, war is a moral crime against Ukraine, while for apolitical
Russians, war destroys the “moral foundations” of Russian society - the
integrity of the family or the value of humanity
the negative consequences of the war are either normalized or
relegated to the realm of personal difficulties that there is no one to
discuss with and which everyone is forced to cope with on their own.
7. Regardless of their views on the war, many Russians are increasingly distrustful
of political news from a variety of sources. Instead, they trust local media: local
issues and news covered by these media seem more important and relevant to
them. People don’t believe that they can influence anything, so they don’t want
to watch news about the war or talk about it.
8. The feeling of uncertainty is what truly unites Russians today. Despite the fact that
people develop different strategies to cope with this feeling, it still greatly
complicates the ability to plan their lives and plunges Russians into pessimism.
