Russian invasion of Ukraine | Fewer tweets, more discussion

[NotThatSoph]

It might be worth considering that a South Korean politician maybe isn't the best source of accurate knowledge on the topic of dead or injured North Korean soldiers in Russia.

 

[TwoSheds]

Well 20% casualties touted above renders an entire division combat inoperable to the point that it must withdraw or cease to function as a unit and to merge with others.

50% casualties is basically US Civil War at its worst, and the most horrific of WWII/WWI level of casualties that is practically unheard of in modern war (barring your ISIS maniacs who just decide to blow themselves up).

10% casualties like touted above, if the SK's are accurate, is a pretty insane casualty rate for what has essentially been 1 week of operational tempo.

10% is close to the threshold which makes that unit combat ineffective, dependent on force structure.

It doesn't sound like it would make all that much difference the way their special forces are trained and equipped tbh. Their job is to go and cause havoc in whatever way they can, improvising weapons along the way if they need to, they're probably just not all that familiar with modern warfare like drones, radio jamming etc. I would have thought.

 

[AfonsoAlves]

It doesn't sound like it would make all that much difference the way their special forces are trained and equipped tbh. Their job is to go and cause havoc in whatever way they can, improvising weapons along the way if they need to, they're probably just not all that familiar with modern warfare like drones, radio jamming etc. I would have thought.

Why wouldn't it make a difference?

Contrary to Ukrainian and Western Propaganda Russian/North Korean Soldiers are still people and ultimately behave and require the same things any other people have. Having such a high percentage of casualties means that they "cannot go and cause havoc"

 

[VorZakone]

 

[VorZakone]

Russian central bank surprises markets by holding key rate at 21%

Russia’s central bank on Friday unexpectedly left its key interest rates unchanged at 21%, citing improved monetary tightness that had created the conditions to tame sky-high inflation.

The bank on Friday said it would assess the need for a key rate increase at its upcoming meeting in February. It currently forecasts annual inflation will decline to 4% in 2026 and remain at this target in the forward horizon.

https://www.cnbc.com/2024/12/20/rus...markets-by-holding-key-rate-at-21percent.html

 

[TwoSheds]

Why wouldn't it make a difference?

Contrary to Ukrainian and Western Propaganda Russian/North Korean Soldiers are still people and ultimately behave and require the same things any other people have. Having such a high percentage of casualties means that they "cannot go and cause havoc"

Well as long as they're willing to keep walking forward and scavenging for supplies then it's hardly the same as if a tank loses its driver or some other specialised role.

 

[AfonsoAlves]

Well as long as they're willing to keep walking forward and scavenging for supplies then it's hardly the same as if a tank loses its driver or some other specialised role.

It's way more complicated than this.

Militaries have force structures that have tooth-to-tail ratios comprising around the 1:5 - 1:9 range. What this means is that for every combat soldier, there needs to be between 5 to 9 soldiers supporting him/her.

Chefs, doctors, mechanics, haulers, truck drivers, comms guys, ATC, radioman, logistics officers, planners, base operations managers, procurement officers, artillerymen, spotters, Forward observers, general staffers etc etc.

NATO forces tend to be very bottom heavy, in the sense that there are way more support troops than there are combat troops. GWOT the ratio was something like 1:7.8. Russia's is something around the other end, with somewhere around a 1:5 Tooth to tail ratio.

Now, combat casualties disproportionately affect combat troops. Sure, an FPV might get 10km behind lines and manage to slap the barracks killing three chefs, or a cruise missile strike hits a command post and kills/wounds some staffers and the radiomen. But all in all, casualties are predominantly in the fighting troops.

We know this is the case as well for North Korean soldiers because it's been widely reported the majority of them are doing support work deeper behind the lines.

Assume they have a T3R of 1:5, which is the Russian ratio and they take 10% casualties.

Assume a standard battalion of 1000 men, with a 1:5 T3R, you basically have 167 men on combat duty with 833 on supporting roles.

If the battalion takes 10% casualties, with an 80:20 split between combat troops and supporting troops, we're looking at the original 167 combat troops now down to 87 combat troops. The degradation here on capability is essentially halved.

Then there is a trickle effect. For every casualty taken during combat, it takes out 2 more combat troops to support the casualty (atleast US and UK Army Manual standards), it takes more combat troops mid fight to deal with casualties. When you have a full battalion complement, the scaling affect of this is lessened, but when you're already at half strength, this is amplified.

10% casualties is very close to rendering any organization combat-ineffective.

 

[stefan92]

It's way more complicated than this.

Militaries have force structures that have tooth-to-tail ratios comprising around the 1:5 - 1:9 range. What this means is that for every combat soldier, there needs to be between 5 to 9 soldiers supporting him/her.

Chefs, doctors, mechanics, haulers, truck drivers, comms guys, ATC, radioman, logistics officers, planners, base operations managers, procurement officers, artillerymen, spotters, Forward observers, general staffers etc etc.

NATO forces tend to be very bottom heavy, in the sense that there are way more support troops than there are combat troops. GWOT the ratio was something like 1:7.8. Russia's is something around the other end, with somewhere around a 1:5 Tooth to tail ratio.

Now, combat casualties disproportionately affect combat troops. Sure, an FPV might get 10km behind lines and manage to slap the barracks killing three chefs, or a cruise missile strike hits a command post and kills/wounds some staffers and the radiomen. But all in all, casualties are predominantly in the fighting troops.

We know this is the case as well for North Korean soldiers because it's been widely reported the majority of them are doing support work deeper behind the lines.

Assume they have a T3R of 1:5, which is the Russian ratio and they take 10% casualties.

Assume a standard battalion of 1000 men, with a 1:5 T3R, you basically have 167 men on combat duty with 833 on supporting roles.

If the battalion takes 10% casualties, with an 80:20 split between combat troops and supporting troops, we're looking at the original 167 combat troops now down to 87 combat troops. The degradation here on capability is essentially halved.

Then there is a trickle effect. For every casualty taken during combat, it takes out 2 more combat troops to support the casualty (atleast US and UK Army Manual standards), it takes more combat troops mid fight to deal with casualties. When you have a full battalion complement, the scaling affect of this is lessened, but when you're already at half strength, this is amplified.

10% casualties is very close to rendering any organization combat-ineffective.

Do we know wether North Korea brought their own "tail" to Russia or are they just "teeth"? If it's the latter, 10% of that would equal more like 2% of total loss rate and therefore would not render the bigger Russian formations ineffective that incorporate the NK soldiers.

 

[AfonsoAlves]

Do we know wether North Korea brought their own "tail" to Russia or are they just "teeth"? If it's the latter, 10% of that would equal more like 2% of total loss rate and therefore would not render the bigger Russian formations ineffective that incorporate the NK soldiers.

Unless you're part of a giant organization that trains very regularly with each other and has synchronized structures, behaviours and doctrines, (NATO), it's very very difficult to just interchange a tail between yours and a foreign one. You could possibly plug a few regiments here and there across a broader front, but you can't have an entirely organic NK combat force with an entirely Russian supply chain - it will have so many teething issues.

Also, lots of news reports came out that the vast majority of NK soldiers were on support roles.

 

[stefan92]

Unless you're part of a giant organization that trains very regularly with each other and has synchronized structures, behaviours and doctrines, (NATO), it's very very difficult to just interchange a tail between yours and a foreign one. You could possibly plug a few regiments here and there across a broader front, but you can't have an entirely organic NK combat force with an entirely Russian supply chain - it will have so many teething issues.

Also, lots of news reports came out that the vast majority of NK soldiers were on support roles.

Thanks for clarifying, missed those reports.

 

[TwoSheds]

Unless you're part of a giant organization that trains very regularly with each other and has synchronized structures, behaviours and doctrines, (NATO), it's very very difficult to just interchange a tail between yours and a foreign one. You could possibly plug a few regiments here and there across a broader front, but you can't have an entirely organic NK combat force with an entirely Russian supply chain - it will have so many teething issues.

Also, lots of news reports came out that the vast majority of NK soldiers were on support roles.

Just because there are lots of support troops, doesn't mean they're all actually supporting the front line ones, they're probably expected to try and learn from their Russian counterparts to some degree. By the sounds of the way the North Korean soldiers are expected to scavenge their own food and improvise weapons and supplies, they may not actually need as much supporting as your NATO mates.