ISIS in Iraq and Syria
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Seems the FSA have taken on the role as Turkey's pawn in all this, shows just how irrelevant they've become.
https://mobile.twitter.com/sham_islam1/status/788400734706409472/video/1
The Iraqi army "After Mosul we will head to Madinah and the Kabah."
The Iraqi army "After Mosul we will head to Madinah and the Kabah."
A particularly relevant article here given how the debates in this thread often play out:
The Debate Over Syria Has Reached a Dead End
Two mutually exclusive, warring narratives now dominate discussions—and neither is sufficient to bring the country back from the brink.
By now, those following the heart-wrenching news from Syria have been saturated with data, analysis, information, and misinformation on developments there since 2011. Many of us have adopted our disparate narratives. This is the case whether we have been observing Syria over the past two decades or whether we suddenly started paying attention in 2011. Unfortunately, in light of the contentious nature of received knowledge on the country, especially under the current conditions, such crystallization is invariably open to doubt or plausible counterargument.
Worse still, there has been increasing gravitation toward two mutually exclusive narratives: (a) that of “pure and consistent revolution,” and (b) that of “external conspiracy.” Both narratives carry grains of truth, but both are encumbered by maximalist claims and fundamental blind spots that forfeit any common ground necessary for enduring cease-fires or potential transitions, as well as postwar reconciliation.
These divisions have crystallized at research institutions, think tanks, and policy circles; among artists and journalists; and at media outlets and satellite television stations in the Middle East, which often portray a caricature of their preferred narrative. The debates occur everywhere—including in kitchen-table discussions within families and among friends—but with different intonations, intensity, and immediacy. The exceptions, ironically and refreshingly, are Syrians living in Syria, who are far more exhausted by these and indeed all narratives, and have on average a much more grounded point of view born out of intense suffering and proximity to what has become a theater of extreme cruelty.
The target of this essay will be less the policy aspects of this debate and the options regarding greater US intervention, and more the broader discursive realm within which debates occur, particularly in online platforms. Policy and narratives are often connected, even if opportunistically and with a time-lag, which is all the more reason to take narratives, especially the most prevalent ones, seriously. Since my aim is to avoid yet another round of counterproductive personal polemics, I will refrain from associating particular individuals or institutions with the two narratives. Instead, my goal is to contribute to the restoration of some discursive accountability and nuance.
To be sure, there is some internal divergence on issues within these narratives, which explains some flip-flopping, especially after the solidification of the jihadist component of the uprising. But the focus here is on the core claims around which narratives are woven...
READ THE REST - https://www.thenation.com/article/the-debate-over-syria-has-reached-a-dead-end/
The Debate Over Syria Has Reached a Dead End
Two mutually exclusive, warring narratives now dominate discussions—and neither is sufficient to bring the country back from the brink.
By now, those following the heart-wrenching news from Syria have been saturated with data, analysis, information, and misinformation on developments there since 2011. Many of us have adopted our disparate narratives. This is the case whether we have been observing Syria over the past two decades or whether we suddenly started paying attention in 2011. Unfortunately, in light of the contentious nature of received knowledge on the country, especially under the current conditions, such crystallization is invariably open to doubt or plausible counterargument.
Worse still, there has been increasing gravitation toward two mutually exclusive narratives: (a) that of “pure and consistent revolution,” and (b) that of “external conspiracy.” Both narratives carry grains of truth, but both are encumbered by maximalist claims and fundamental blind spots that forfeit any common ground necessary for enduring cease-fires or potential transitions, as well as postwar reconciliation.
These divisions have crystallized at research institutions, think tanks, and policy circles; among artists and journalists; and at media outlets and satellite television stations in the Middle East, which often portray a caricature of their preferred narrative. The debates occur everywhere—including in kitchen-table discussions within families and among friends—but with different intonations, intensity, and immediacy. The exceptions, ironically and refreshingly, are Syrians living in Syria, who are far more exhausted by these and indeed all narratives, and have on average a much more grounded point of view born out of intense suffering and proximity to what has become a theater of extreme cruelty.
The target of this essay will be less the policy aspects of this debate and the options regarding greater US intervention, and more the broader discursive realm within which debates occur, particularly in online platforms. Policy and narratives are often connected, even if opportunistically and with a time-lag, which is all the more reason to take narratives, especially the most prevalent ones, seriously. Since my aim is to avoid yet another round of counterproductive personal polemics, I will refrain from associating particular individuals or institutions with the two narratives. Instead, my goal is to contribute to the restoration of some discursive accountability and nuance.
To be sure, there is some internal divergence on issues within these narratives, which explains some flip-flopping, especially after the solidification of the jihadist component of the uprising. But the focus here is on the core claims around which narratives are woven...
READ THE REST - https://www.thenation.com/article/the-debate-over-syria-has-reached-a-dead-end/
https://mobile.twitter.com/omaralsory641/status/788687337630920705/video/1
An officer telling the pilot, "kill them all, don't spare none.. Even the children.. So long they're Sunnis" #mosul
An officer telling the pilot, "kill them all, don't spare none.. Even the children.. So long they're Sunnis" #mosul
Sigh. What can I say? This gives you an idea about how far the brainwashing has gone, even with people who think they're not pro-ISIS.
I'll go out on a limb and say the sound is fake, considering the video is from Call of Duty 4 Modern Warfare. Here is a clip from the original game for you (you can find the area at around 8:52 from a slightly different angle).
By the way, you're clutching at straws here, and the fact that somebody needs to make fake videos like this speaks volumes in itself.
Oh and this is what I was talking about when I said this...
Funny enough PMU and the Iraqi military haven't been going around committing sectarian massacres in Tikrit and Fallujah since those cities were liberated.
This is the reason I stay out of this thread most of the time, it's so fecking hard to know what the truth is in this conflict.
If it really is fake then I'll delete it bro.
Good to see the lack of sectarianism in this operation.
It's ridiculous, even elements of the Iraqi army are flying their sectarian flags on their tanks and having terrorists like the PMU within their ranks wont fill the local Sunni population with confidence. Poor people had to deal with ISIS terrorism now they have to put up with Shia terrorists like the PMU.
Comparing the PMU to ISIS
The Sunnis in Fallujah and Tikrit largely have the PMU to thank for their liberation, they could have stayed and defended the Shia dominated cities but they picked up considerable casualties liberating their Sunni brothers and sisters.
You're pretty much adhering to extremist propaganda if you're putting them on the same level as ISIS and calling them terrorists.
Comparing the PMU to ISIS
The Sunnis in Fallujah and Tikrit largely have the PMU to thank for their liberation, they could have stayed and defended the Shia dominated cities but they picked up considerable casualties liberating their Sunni brothers and sisters.
You're pretty much adhering to extremist propaganda if you're putting them on the same level as ISIS and calling them terrorists.
It shouldn't be about Sunni-Shia the Iraqi government has a duty to protect all it's citizens. Never said they are the same as ISIS but a spade is a spade, the PMU have committed terrorist crimes so therefore are terrorists.
As for extremist propaganda does that include Amnesty? Why did you ignore the link i posted above?
And that's exactly what it's doing. If it were sectarian they would have told the Sunnis to feck off and left them to live with ISIS while they protect the Shia bulwarks in the south. But as it stands they've got 60,000 soldiers outside Mosul, ready to die to liberate its inhabitants.
I'm not ignoring the amnesty link since I'm not glorifying the PMU as angels and I have no doubt they've committed some atrocities (as have pretty much every faction in this meta conflict). But you seem to be downplaying their role in pushing back ISIS and liberating mostly Sunni cities. Bluntly put - without their role, ISIS wouldn't have been pushed back as much as they have. Like I've already said, the people in Fallujah and Tikrit largely have them to thank. So your 'spade is a spade' damnation is pretty much false equivalence at its worse.
Also, do you even know what those 'sectarian' flags say?
Some atrocities? Lining up people and executing them ffs, although they don't use knives as ISIS do what's the fecking difference? The amnesty report are saying thousands have been killed, this isn't just a small rogue element, they're terrorists. You seem to want to ignore this, as they have been helping out the Iraqi army against ISIS, but that's not a good enough excuse for me.
As for sectarian flags, there shouldn't be any religious related flags on any of the Iraqi army especially in this situation.
No it isn't, read the actual report:
What that essentially means is, as procedure, men and boys from liberated towns are screened for any possible links to ISIS (since ISIS militants are openly known disguise themselves as civilians). And btw this is procedure from the official Iraqi security forces. Now you could rightly argue that this is being handled poorly, harshly and excessively (it is, the security forces have no idea what they're doing when it comes to screening) but it doesn't mean that militias have killed 'thousands' of people as you state.
As for the flags, I assume you don't know what they say, so I'm not sure why you're so opposed to something you can't read.
I stand corrected regarding the 1000 dead. But doesn't change the fact that Sunnis in that region will feel uncomfortable seeing the same people roll into town word gets around when people get executed, abducted etc on sectarian grounds.
Regarding flags, the ones i have seen are depictions of Ali ibn Talib RA and Hussain ibn Ali, i would link it to you here but twitter is blocked at work. I'm sure there are more explicit ones out there but would have to do some digging.
Who both are reverred by all Muslims, not just Shias. It's not as if they're carrying banners saying "death to all Sunnis, pestilence of the earth".
And if you were a Mosul local living under ISIS oppression, I'd wager you'd welcome an Imam Ali banner over the ISIS black flag.
Yes both revere them but not the same way at all, it's a complete different theology. And no Sunni would depict any holy figure, it's against their theology. Also the flag and depiction I seen was clearly one that is associated with Shias, any Muslim would know this.
@2cents
@Danny1982
The German paper “der Spiegel” published an interesting article about the role of Turkey in Northern Iraq (it is in German). The gist is, that the Turkish military armed and trained a Sunni militia (Hashd al-Watani), founded and controlled by Atheel al-Nujaifi (former governor of Nineveh). They are effectively portrait as Turkish clients, who want to take over local control once ISIS is defeated. Have you heard of them and are they relevant?
@Danny1982
The German paper “der Spiegel” published an interesting article about the role of Turkey in Northern Iraq (it is in German). The gist is, that the Turkish military armed and trained a Sunni militia (Hashd al-Watani), founded and controlled by Atheel al-Nujaifi (former governor of Nineveh). They are effectively portrait as Turkish clients, who want to take over local control once ISIS is defeated. Have you heard of them and are they relevant?
I read pretty much what you've described there. I believe al-Nujaifi specifically requested no PMU involvement in the Mosel operation. I feel like Turkey is trying to assume ISIS's declared role as protector of the Sunnis. Danny will know more.
Always worth pointing out that Turkey has an old claim to Mosul province going back to the Lausanne Treaty, and they've never convincingly relinquished it - http://www.danielpipes.org/270/hot-spot-turkey-iraq-and-mosul
I was actually sad you posted it. Doesn't matter, because the damage isn't being done on this forum.
That's sectarian?! Preserving your identity is not sectarianism. Sectarianism means you spread hate and violence against another sect or religion. In fact preserving your identity (whether it's the Shia, the Christians, the Yazidis...), is especially crucial in this case, because ISIS attempted and committed genocide against these groups. I think the problem in this case (when you're irritated by this kind of flags) is intolerance by you, rather than sectarianism by them. You basically just want everything "Shia" to just disappear, which is more in line with ISIS way of thinking rather than aiming for a united Iraq.
By the way, there is "Allahu Akbar" on the official Iraqi flag (which was put there by Saddam) and after his fall most political parties wanted it removed from the flag, but it was the Sunni bloc that objected to it, and their wish was respected and the phrase was kept in place.
There's reports of Peshmerga removing these flags before allowing the troops go forward. Presumably they're flying their Kurdish flags?
Funnily enough the Iranian flag has the shahada and takbir on it, but you wouldn't know it from a quick glance.
This is exactly what I meant when I said this on the subject earlier answering a question by @2cents :
Their plan was simply to create, train and control a force of Sunni fighters, then replace ISIS in Mosul with this "force" which will enable them to completely control the city of Mosul.
However, the force the Turks are training (and funding) is not even close to being enough to face the forces heading to liberate Mosul now (both in quantity and quality). That's why Turkey can't force its participation in the Mosul op on the ground, and their only bet is political pressure and propaganda to prevent the forces they deem the most dangerous for them from taking part in the fight, and force the participation of their forces in the op to gain eventual control over Mosul's political future.
The Iraqi government, on the other hand, doesn't want that scenario to happen of course. And after being let down by the US and the security council to deal with the illegal Turkish invasion of Iraq, Abadi has gathered all the main forces he has at his disposal and headed to Mosul with a clear statement about the Turkish role in the liberation of Mosul...
as things got really ugly in the last few days between Erdogan and Abadi (Erdogan said some really terrible things about Abadi and Iraq, and was basically talking as if Mosul was a Turkish city).
The fate and the role of those fighters trained and funded by Turkey is still not clear though.
As for role of the PMU, they're not going to be involved in the liberation of the city of Mosul itself and they will not enter the city of Mosul (which would be exclusively the job of the Iraqi army and police), as declared both by Abadi and the leaders of the PMU: (at minute 9:37)
Their main role will be the liberation of Tel Afar and some of the areas West to Mosul, but everybody knows they're going there ready to fight the Turkish troops the moment they get involved in the fight.
However the political future of Mosul (post-ISIS) is still unclear, as little is being said now about it with the fight still ongoing. Expect the picture to become clearer once ISIS is defeated. But as far as the military operation goes, it looks like Turkey is not going to be a major player (or even a player) in the op.
So in short, this Turkish backed "force" is not relevant militarily (they're insignificant in that aspect), but we'll have to wait and see if they're going to be relevant politically in the post-ISIS Mosul.
As for the progress of the operation, it's going as expected so far.
Iraqi PM says Mosul offensive going faster than expected
But with the exclusion of Turkey from the operation I expect a bit tougher fight from ISIS in the coming days.
On the other fronts, ISIS sleeper cells have launched an attack in Kirkuk today which isn't expected to be more than an attempt for a distraction from the Mosul op.
I've seen this map of Turkey doing the rounds in the last week, allegedly originally sourced to a pro-AKP site:
Is this how the parliament wanted the boarders in 1920 without the extension into the Balkan/Greece?
My understanding is that Kemal believed that Turkey's borders should reflect the positions of the respective armed forces at the moment of the armistice in 1918. As the article I posted mentioned, the British took Mosul after that armistice.
I think that this was the rationale behind the Turkish annexation of the Sanjak of Alexandretta/Iskenderun - now Turkey's Hatay Province - in 1939. The region had been occupied by British forces after the armistice and subsequently handed over to the French who made it an autonomous region of Syria. In the late 30s the Turks took advantage of French weakness and organized a plebiscite which many believe to have been rigged (quite likely since the majority of the population were Arab, with a Turkish minority), in which the population voted to become a part of Turkey. Turkish troops then moved in to fulfill their wishes. Syria claims it to this day, and it is included as part of Syria on all official maps in Syria.
I'm not sure what changes which might have occurred after the armistice in Thrace (or anywhere else for that matter) were incorporated into Lausanne, but if they exist you can be sure the Turks haven't forgotten them. In any case I think the map above just reflects some wishful thinking and nationalist chest-thumping. Certainly the Turks have no claim to northern Syria on the same basis as their claim to Mosul.
'It has truly been worse than hell': Iraqi village finally tastes freedom after years of Isil rule
The villagers cried “You have come, you are here! Alhamdulillah (Thanks to God)”, as they ran out from their homes to greet the Iraqi army humvees.
One elderly woman fell to her knees before ripping off her black face veil and bursting into tears.
The Iraqi troops arriving in the village of Khalidia, south of Mosul, on Thursday were the first outsiders most of the residents had seen for more than two years.
The Telegraph, embedded with the 91st Brigade, witnessed the moment it was liberated from Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (Isil).
Ululating soldiers shot up in the air with their kalashnikovs as they celebrated in the dusty Nineveh plains.
A column of tanks and armoured vehicles flying the Iraqi, as well as Shia Hashd al-Shaabi militia, flags poured into the village at midday.
...
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/201...rse-than-hell-iraqi-village-finally-tastes-f/
I guess flying a flag doesn't mean you're hungry for other people's blood after all.
The villagers cried “You have come, you are here! Alhamdulillah (Thanks to God)”, as they ran out from their homes to greet the Iraqi army humvees.
One elderly woman fell to her knees before ripping off her black face veil and bursting into tears.
The Iraqi troops arriving in the village of Khalidia, south of Mosul, on Thursday were the first outsiders most of the residents had seen for more than two years.
The Telegraph, embedded with the 91st Brigade, witnessed the moment it was liberated from Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (Isil).
Ululating soldiers shot up in the air with their kalashnikovs as they celebrated in the dusty Nineveh plains.
A column of tanks and armoured vehicles flying the Iraqi, as well as Shia Hashd al-Shaabi militia, flags poured into the village at midday.
...
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/201...rse-than-hell-iraqi-village-finally-tastes-f/
I guess flying a flag doesn't mean you're hungry for other people's blood after all.
Now you're just being a moron.
@PedroMendez just been going through this a bit more. The Turkish claim of borders reflecting the 1918 armistice was adopted by Kemal and his forces over two conferences in Erzurum and Sicas in 1919. This suffices to explain the claims to Mosul and Alexandretta/Hatay.
However, the National Pact produced by the Ottoman Parliament in 1920 to which you refer expanded slightly on those terms, adding that areas outside those boundaries with an 'Ottoman Muslim' majority should become part of Turkey, and other areas of Arab or mixed population (such as Western Thrace) should be decided by plebiscite. This was produced by the largely powerless Ottoman Parliament in order to appease the growing nationalist sentiment which was beginning to look towards Kemal, and Kemal and the nationalists subsequently adopted it.
Now, 'Ottoman Muslim' referred to Turks and Kurds in Ottoman-speak, as the terms 'Turk' and 'Kurd' didn't carry any nationalist connotations but referred to the languages spoken by the peasants of Anatolia. But these terms were transformed by nationalist ideology, and in its Turkish form 'Ottoman Muslim' became simply Turk - and to this day in Turkish nationalist discourse Kurds are regarded simply as 'Mountain Turks' suffering some kind of false consciousness. Obviously the terms took on different meanings in Kurdish nationalist discourse, but this may help explain any Turkish claim to areas of Syria and Armenia with a Kurdish population.
However, the National Pact produced by the Ottoman Parliament in 1920 to which you refer expanded slightly on those terms, adding that areas outside those boundaries with an 'Ottoman Muslim' majority should become part of Turkey, and other areas of Arab or mixed population (such as Western Thrace) should be decided by plebiscite. This was produced by the largely powerless Ottoman Parliament in order to appease the growing nationalist sentiment which was beginning to look towards Kemal, and Kemal and the nationalists subsequently adopted it.
Now, 'Ottoman Muslim' referred to Turks and Kurds in Ottoman-speak, as the terms 'Turk' and 'Kurd' didn't carry any nationalist connotations but referred to the languages spoken by the peasants of Anatolia. But these terms were transformed by nationalist ideology, and in its Turkish form 'Ottoman Muslim' became simply Turk - and to this day in Turkish nationalist discourse Kurds are regarded simply as 'Mountain Turks' suffering some kind of false consciousness. Obviously the terms took on different meanings in Kurdish nationalist discourse, but this may help explain any Turkish claim to areas of Syria and Armenia with a Kurdish population.
Care to explain why you think these flags are so provocative if you yourself are supposedly not irritated by them?
I've seen this map of Turkey doing the rounds in the last week, allegedly originally sourced to a pro-AKP site:
In their dreams.So Erdogan is going to lay claim to Irbil and Kirkuk too then?
If you and your lil buddy bothered to read my posts it's pretty clear why, and ill say it again as it appears you guys dont read posts before replying I'm not only against these flags but any religious sectarian flags shouldn't be allowed in this situation.
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just seen this , good luck with that.@2cents I was thinking about the national pact thing without really knowing anything about it. I thought it might still have some (cultural) relevance. Turkish nationalism seems to put special emphasis on territorial unity. It was just a random guess and could be total nonsense.
interesting explanations. Thats the kind of knowledge that I casually drop at dinner parties, acting as if it is the most normal thing in the world to know these things. Is is a fine line between looking like a smug bastard and unsettling/impressing your counterpart.
interesting explanations. Thats the kind of knowledge that I casually drop at dinner parties, acting as if it is the most normal thing in the world to know these things. Is is a fine line between looking like a smug bastard and unsettling/impressing your counterpart.
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I've read your posts but I still don't see your point. Shias shouldn't wave imam Ali flags because it'll allegedly scare Sunnis? The Sunni tribes fighting alongside them as well as those they've liberated from isis (see Danny's article above) don't seem bothered by them.
It's a symbol of identity for them. Should the Peshmerga stop waving the kurdish flag as they go into battle?