Any chance of posting the article here? I seem to be getting a paywall
The End of the Army of Conquest? Syrian Rebel Alliance Shows Cracks
Syria’s most successful rebel alliance may have just barely avoided breaking apart. Over the spring and summer of this year, the coalition of Islamist rebels groups known as Jaish al-Fateh, or the Army of Conquest, scored a series of dramatic victories over the regime of Bashar al-Assad in northwest Syria. But in the past several weeks, just as Jaish al-Fateh announced a major new offensive, one of its most hard-line factions, Jund al-Aqsa, very publicly quit the coalition. The acrimony that has followed the withdrawal of Jund al-Aqsa—an ultra-extreme splinter of al-Qaida’s Syrian affiliate, Jabhat al-Nusra—has exposed the persistent and probably unresolvable divisions among Syria’s rebels. And the announcement from rebel corners last week that
Jund al-Aqsa may rejoin Jaish al-Fateh does not mean these divisions are going away.
Northern rebels formed the Jaish al-Fateh
operations rooms, a kind of coordination cell, in March 2015 with the aim of
capturing the city of Idlib, the capital of Syria’s northwest Idlib province. The coalition centers on Jabhat al-Nusra and the Salafist rebels in Ahrar al-Sham, but it also includes five smaller factions that range from less ideological brigades to Jund al-Aqsa. Thanks in part to
newly coordinated and generous backing from Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Qatar, Jaish al-Fateh was able to
not only take Idlib in days last spring, but also overrun a series of key regime military bases and almost entirely drive the regime from the province. In weeks, Jaish al-Fateh had made enough headway that it
posed a real threat to the regime’s strongholds in central and coastal Syria.
Last month, despite an ongoing Russian-backed regime counteroffensive that seems
to have largely targeted Jaish al-Fateh—rather than the self-proclaimed Islamic State, as Moscow first claimed it would—the rebel coalition announced it would
launch a new offensive to take central Hama province. But less than two weeks later, Jund al-Aqsa declared its withdrawal from the coalition in the most controversial terms possible: It not only quit, it nearly
accused some of its former allies of apostasy. Rumors swirled that Jabhat al-Nusra, one of Jaish al-Fateh’s two core groups,
had also suspended its role in the coalition.
Jund al-Aqsa said it was leaving Jaish al-Fateh because of what it called some coalition members’ un-Islamic political positions and because of “constant pressure” from Ahrar al-Sham specifically to fight the Islamic State. Jund al-Aqsa said it would rejoin only if Jaish al-Fateh’s members met its high-ceilinged demands, including that the coalition declare war on Russia and America and commit to a binding Islamic charter. (This despite the fact that Jaish al-Fateh
has administered Idlib city in accordance
with strict Islamic law.)
Jund al-Aqsa’s complaints that Jaish al-Fateh members have supported “projects in conflict with Islamic shariah” seem to have been aimed in large part at Ahrar al-Sham. The latter Islamist rebel group has
evolved lately from a more traditionally jihadi faction to something
more sophisticated and interested in political engagement. But some of its outreach has
provoked criticism from harder-line jihadi elements. Ahrar al-Sham certainly seems to have assumed it was the target of Jund al-Aqsa’s criticisms, as
two of Ahrar’s top leaders issued
sharply worded responses.
But whatever political grievances Jund al-Aqsa mustered, the main reason for its withdrawal seems to have been its borderline refusal to fight the Islamic State. Any Jaish al-Fateh offensive south into Hama will eventually bring rebels face-to-face with the Islamic State. In its statement announcing the Hama offensive, Jaish al-Fateh promised to fight any military force that stood in its way, including the Islamic State. Although Jund al-Aqsa said it viewed the Islamic State’s “caliphate” as invalid and condemned its extremist transgressions, it only said that repelling the Islamic State’s aggression “in the areas where we are present” was legitimate. Instead, it proposed an unlikely truce between the Islamic State and Syria’s Islamist brigades.
Excepting the Islamic State, Jund al-Aqsa is probably at the most extreme end of Syria’s rebel-jihadi spectrum. It has consistently provoked controversy, with its fighters accused of being closet Islamic State sympathizers by other Syrian rebels. In his
response to Jund al-Aqsa’s withdrawal, Ahrar al-Sham’s top religious official implied that Jund al-Aqsa members were still sympathetic to their “brothers” in the Islamic State and that they continued to harbor its fighters. Jund al-Aqsa
has stoned “adulterous” women, helped Jabhat al-Nusra
dismantle various rebel brigades seen
as Western-backed, and even allegedly
assassinated the commander of another Jaish al-Fateh member.
While Jund al-Aqsa is out on the fringe, however, it is not alone, and its members are not the only jihadis in Syria uncomfortable with fighting the Islamic State. In that sense, the Jaish al-Fateh coalition may have been a sort of geographic accident rather than an ideologically uniform alliance. Earlier this year, Syria’s northern rebels had only one active front against the Islamic State, in the northern Aleppo countryside; on all other sides, they faced the regime and its allies, including Hezbollah and Iranian-backed Shiite militias. West of Aleppo, it was possible to put off the question of whether and how to fight the Islamic State in the interest of a project like Jaish al-Fateh that could unite more mainstream rebels with the jihadi fringe. But the coalition’s own success made that untenable: As it advanced, it would eventually be forced to confront the Islamic State and lay bare these internal contradictions.
Jaish al-Fateh’s successes have been attributed in large part to
a new rapprochement between Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Qatar. But even open-handed external support and battlefield momentum may only go so far in holding together Syria’s more mainstream rebels with jihadis like Jund al-Aqsa and Jabhat al-Nusra. However much effort and resources regional powers expend to bolt together ideologically diverse factions, those clients ultimately have their own probably irreconcilable agendas.
Jund al-Aqsa rejoining Jaish al-Fateh will not somehow fix that. As part of the agreement bringing Jund al-Aqsa back in, the rebel coalition will reportedly issue the sort of Islamic charter the hard-liners demanded. A charter tailored to Jund al-Aqsa’s extremist views will not reconcile the politics of these factions. What it could do, however, is succeed in making Jaish al-Fateh’s more mainline members toxic to an international audience, thus
sabotaging their attempts at diplomatic outreach.
Jaish al-Fateh’s unity looks untenable over the long term. The centrifugal forces that drive Syria’s rebels and jihadis apart, from ideology to money to personality, are still at work, even within such a successful alliance. And whatever efforts regional states and rebels themselves make, there may be nothing that can ultimately keep these rebels together.