Geopolitics

[Mciahel Goodman]

@Mciahel Goodman what do you propose the West to do at this moment? Whatever foreign policy mistakes were done in the past, Russia has now invaded Ukraine. The war is real.

So how to proceed if you could determine Western policy from this moment on?

Negotiate immediately. Minimum set of demands from the West. The greater part of Ukraine, including Kiev, (everything to the west of the river), goes to West Ukraine. Russia to foot an enormous multi billion dollar bill to a reconstruction program. Sanctions lifted on that premise. Ukraine welcomed into the EU (West Ukraine), but never Nato. Guarantees of a neutral greater western and eastern Ukraine. You then proceed from there. All of that is achievable.

 

[africanspur]

Negotiate immediately. Minimum set of demands from the West. The greater part of Ukraine, including Kiev, (everything to the west of the river), goes to West Ukraine. Russia to foot an enormous multi billion dollar bill to a reconstruction program. Sanctions lifted on that premise. Ukraine welcomed into the EU (West Ukraine), but never Nato. Guarantees of a neutral greater western and eastern Ukraine. You then proceed from there. All of that is achievable.

You can't be both in the EU and neutral.

*Also addendum, are we involving the Ukrainians in this agreement at all?

 

[VorZakone]

Negotiate immediately. Minimum set of demands from the West. The greater part of Ukraine, including Kiev, (everything to the west of the river), goes to West Ukraine. Russia to foot an enormous multi billion dollar bill to a reconstruction program. Sanctions lifted on that premise. Ukraine welcomed into the EU (West Ukraine), but never Nato. Guarantees of a neutral greater western and eastern Ukraine. You then proceed from there. All of that is achievable.

Would Putin allow a Western Ukraine to prosper with the EU, and thereby show the Russian people that their current life is actually pretty awful? There's been 5000 explanations given for why Putin invaded Ukraine, but one of them is the notion that a free and potentially prosperous Ukraine would give the Russian people ideas about revolution.

 

[africanspur]

I just genuinely think that the circumstances in this case are extraordinary. Even Japan has altered their policy in this instance.
https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220302-japan-willing-to-accept-ukrainian-refugees-pm

Putting aside the fact that Japan has a closer link to the USA than most European countries, shares close geographical links to Russia and is particularly sensitive to the potential actions of a regional great power making aggressive moves within its own backyard, none of that has anything to do with what I said.

You seem to have conflated a few different things. I even said on this page that I can see why Europeans care more (and gave examples of how my own non-European in-laws don't really care, while my Dutch ones obviously do).

What I and others have talked about though are the (especially media) reactions to this refugee crisis compared to refugee crises elsewhere. The language used has been appalling. @NotThatSoph has given another example from her own country as to the totally different way this is being framed, compared to how it was when the same was happening in Syria/Iraq/ Afghanistan/ Yemen etc.

You seem to have taken that to mean a) NATO are at fault and b) all Westerners are racist.

 

[2cents]

You can't be both in the EU and neutral.

Ireland is, although this conflict has sparked something of a debate over the future of Irish neutrality.

 

[VorZakone]

What do the Mearsheimer-esque realists say about Taiwan? What should US foreign policy be regarding Taiwan?

 

[africanspur]

Ireland is, although this conflict has sparked something of a debate over the future of Irish neutrality.

I don't mean with regards to NATO but with regards to the EU defence clause, put in 2009.

Do Ireland not have to follow that?

 

[Classical Mechanic]

Ireland is, although this conflict has sparked something of a debate over the future of Irish neutrality.

That's a false position though isn't it? Ireland's geographical position means that the UK could never allow it to be invaded and conquered by a Putin of this world. It doesn't really need to make any strategic alliances of this kind.

 

[Mciahel Goodman]

You can't be both in the EU and neutral.

There are various models you can use. Finland, is one. Ireland is another.

Would Putin allow a Western Ukraine to prosper with the EU, and thereby show the Russian people that their current life is actually pretty awful? There's been 5000 explanations given for why Putin invaded Ukraine, but one of them is the notion that a free and potentially prosperous Ukraine would give the Russian people ideas about revolution.

This war is no good for Russia or Ukraine long-term. It inflicts heavy damage on each. Allowing West-Ukraine into the EU is not insane. And even if it falls short of EU membership, there is still a deal to be had. What Russia gets is a land-bridge to the Crimea and an end to the uncertainty regarding the East/West sectarianism. The US/Nato and Ukraine get to sell it as peace, Russia can sell it as rescuing the Russian majority in the east. After that, it will be a decade or more before the idea of Russians and prosperity comes into play. What is certain is that this war is bad for both Ukraine (obviously) and Russia. So who is benefiting? The US is the only answer I can see in the short term insofar as their goal is to use Ukraine to bog the Russians down in a costly insurgency plus the added benefit of a militarized Germany and stronger NATO.

 

[VorZakone]

I haven't watched the whole interview yet but Stephen Kotkin gives his thoughts. I think he does make the distinction between Russia as a country and Putin as a person and that we have to take that into account.

 

[africanspur]

There are various models you can use. Finland, is one. Ireland is another.

This war is no good for Russia or Ukraine long-term. It inflicts heavy damage on each. Allowing West-Ukraine into the EU is not insane. And even if it falls short of EU membership, there is still a deal to be had. What Russia gets is a land-bridge to the Crimea and an end to the uncertainty regarding the East/West sectarianism. The US/Nato and Ukraine get to sell it as peace, Russia can sell it as rescuing the Russian majority in the east. After that, it will be a decade or more before the idea of Russians and prosperity comes into play. What is certain is that this war is bad for both Ukraine (obviously) and Russia. So who is benefiting? The US is the only answer I can see in the short term.

As I said above, technically article 42.7 pulls EU states into a collective defence if one is attacked, though whether countries have opt-outs I don't know.

Also as above, are we involving the Ukrainians at all in this partition of their country and decisions on their future?

 

[Mciahel Goodman]

As I said above, technically article 42.7 pulls EU states into a collective defence if one is attacked, though whether countries have opt-outs I don't know.

Also as above, are we involving the Ukrainians at all in this partition of their country and decisions on their future?

A collective economic reaction and diplomatic reaction, but in the absence of an EU army, it isn't clear how this sits with any member state's given neutrality.

The Zelensky government would be involved in the negotiation, as would some counterparts from the separatist regions. It would be a Ukrainian-Ukrainian negotiation mediated by the US/EU and Russia at either side. That's what makes sense to me. The alternative is scores of thousands of dead people over the next few years and an eventual diplomatic resolution. You may as well just get straight to diplomacy when everyone already knows what the various problems are (demographic, primarily, and divided West to East). No Nato, neutrality, Russian compensation, sanctions lifted on a contingency basis (partial reserves redirected to West Ukraine). Potential EU membership for West Ukraine. That is the logical outcome. It will happen sooner or later and later will benefit neither Ukraine nor Russia nor Europe.

 

[do.ob]

Getting the Ukrainians to sign away half their country, Moscow to spend billions on the very government they labeled Nazis and are currently trying to depose (after their economy has already tanked) and the Ukraine into the EU, but as a militarily neutral country - all happening at the same time - sounds quit optimistic.

 

[Mciahel Goodman]

Getting the Ukrainians to sign away half their country, Moscow to spend billions on the very government they labeled Nazis and are currently trying to depose (after their economy has already tanked) and the Ukraine into the EU, but as a militarily neutral country - all happening at the same time - sounds quit optimistic.

A large part of their country has been annexed. It's the majority Russian speaking part that has been engaged in a civil war with the other part for the past half decade. What was already de facto is now de jure. That would be the only real difference. The goal should be a realistic solution now. Or, alternatively, a devastating conflict that rages for years and threatens to spill over into something far worse.

Getting the Ukrainians to continue a fight they cannot win by providing them with weapons is hardly a better solution. Might be better for the US/NATO, though. Note that they want to welcome Russia into the international order once the protracted insurgency is over (five years? ten years?). The "Russia is an outcast" strategy is intended to be short-term. People in the media are not being very honest but occasionally some of their intent breaks through.

As far as the money goes. Is Russia sending them money if it is contingent upon money they otherwise would not have? Yes and no, which means a grey area you can exploit in negotiation.

 

[do.ob]

A large part of their country has been annexed. It's the majority Russian speaking part that has been engaged in a civil war with the other part for the past half decade. What was already de facto is now de jure. That would be the only real difference. The goal should be a realistic solution now. Or, alternatively, a devastating conflict that rages for years and threatens to spill over into something far worse.

Getting the Ukrainians to continue a fight they cannot win by providing them with weapons is hardly a better solution. Might be better for the US/NATO, though. Note that they want to welcome Russia into the international order once the protracted insurgency is over (five years? ten years?). The "Russia is an outcast" strategy is intended to be short-term. People in the media are not being very honest but occasionally some of their intent breaks through.

As far as the money goes. Is Russia sending them money if it is contingent upon money they otherwise would not have? Yes and no, which means a grey area you can exploit in negotiation.

What you're writing might make some sense from behind a computer, but I'm not sure the Ukrainians, as hopped up on a feeling of unity, nationalism and hatred for their attackers will feel like "de facto/de jure, what's the big difference?", nor do I think Putin is likely to agree to reparations, because that would be like an official admission of guilt and defeat - even if that would make sense financially, this whole invasion has turned out to be pure insanity from a financial point of view already. Nor do I believe the West can (politically) just go back to business as usual (or even further) with Russia, while Putin is in office, after he's been thoroughly cast as a purely evil dictator.

 

[Paxi]

 

[carvajal]

but then the Jews do not suffer Apartheid in Arab countries? I read that in Egypt there are 3 left, and in other countries not one.
Are there even open synagogues in those countries? can they reside and practice their religion freely?

 

[Chairman Woodie]

A 55 year-old man with with the political mind of a twenty year-old university campus radical. Some people never grow up. Boyd-Barrett is one of those people.

 

[2cents]

I don't mean with regards to NATO but with regards to the EU defence clause, put in 2009.

Do Ireland not have to follow that?

Lengthy discussion of the issue here -https://ecfr.eu/publication/ambiguous-alliance-neutrality-opt-outs-and-european-defence/?amp

tldr; participation in EU defence need not include military participation, and this “special status” was specifically included in order to account for the neutrality of certain member states.

That's a false position though isn't it? Ireland's geographical position means that the UK could never allow it to be invaded and conquered by a Putin of this world. It doesn't really need to make any strategic alliances of this kind.

I’m not sure what you mean by “false position.” We all understand we are somewhat blessed geographically as long as we remain on good terms with the UK and US. At the same time Irish neutrality is at the heart of our soft power which allows us to punch above our weight internationally. It symbolizes our rejection of the imperial order from which we emerged following WW1, and we are loath to give it up. Although we know, as do our closest neighbors, that we are neutral “in favor of…”

Obviously we are in a rather unique position which doesn’t necessarily apply to Ukraine.

 

[MIC_FIN]

We, UK. Are part of NATO

We left the EU.

This isn't our war.

 

[Cheimoon]

A large part of their country has been annexed. It's the majority Russian speaking part that has been engaged in a civil war with the other part for the past half decade. What was already de facto is now de jure. That would be the only real difference. The goal should be a realistic solution now. Or, alternatively, a devastating conflict that rages for years and threatens to spill over into something far worse.

But virtually none of that is true to my knowledge. The bit Russia really annexed is just the area around the DNR and the LNR. Current Russian gains on top of that appear to still be fairly small, and certainly do not extent to anywhere near the full area of Ukraine east of the Dnipro (that's huge!).

That area has also not been in a civil war with the other at all, that's again been limited to the areas around the DNR and LNR, i.e, a limited part of the eastern half. Further, it appears that Russian-speaking Ukrainians (such as most of the population of Kharkiv) were already not very Russia-minded before, and had turned absolutely against them now.

So simply chopping that half off and giving it to Russia might work well for the west and Russia, but it seems to be really at odds with sentiments within Ukraine. You can't just impose things on people like that, it won't go well. Maybe it's what they should want from a larger perspective, but it's too late to drill that into them now. (Per what was discussed earlier about how those things 'should' go.)

Also, while Putin would probably be happy to receive eastern Ukraine, I think there would be zero chance that he would accept to pay for the reconstruction of the western half.

More likely, I think, is that Russia would get the Donbass and the coastal strip towards the Crimea (which they largely have already) and would make limited reparation payments, while Ukraine would be barred from joining the EU or NATO for 25 years (or whatever period of time). Behind the scenes, there might also be something about guaranteeing that no anti-Russian government would take power in Ukraine (like in Finland post-WW2), but that's not very realistic; you can't really enforce it.

 

[Mciahel Goodman]

But virtually none of that is true to my knowledge. The bit Russia really annexed is just the area around the DNR and the LNR. Current Russian gains on top of that appear to still be fairly small, and certainly do not extent to anywhere near the full area of Ukraine east of the Dnipro (that's huge!).

That area has also not been in a civil war with the other at all, that's again been limited to the areas around the DNR and LNR, i.e, a limited part of the eastern half. Further, it appears that Russian-speaking Ukrainians (such as most of the population of Kharkiv) were already not very Russia-minded before, and had turned absolutely against them now.

So simply chopping that half off and giving it to Russia might work well for the west and Russia, but it seems to be really at odds with sentiments within Ukraine. You can't just impose things on people like that, it won't go well. Maybe it's what they should want from a larger perspective, but it's too late to drill that into them now. (Per what was discussed earlier about how those things 'should' go.)

Also, while Putin would probably be happy to receive eastern Ukraine, I think there would be zero chance that he would accept to pay for the reconstruction of the western half.

More likely, I think, is that Russia would get the Donbass and the coastal strip towards the Crimea (which they largely have already) and would make limited reparation payments, while Ukraine would be barred from joining the EU or NATO for 25 years (or whatever period of time). Behind the scenes, there might also be something about guaranteeing that no anti-Russian government would take power in Ukraine (like in Finland post-WW2), but that's not very realistic; you can't really enforce it.

I mean from Luhansk to Kherson and including Crimea. The south-eastern part which is now fully within Russian control and covers that part which had been home of the two separatist regions. The Russian population largely outnumbers the Ukrainian iirc (and if the Russian majority doesn't go for it, then it won't happen either way).

What you're writing might make some sense from behind a computer, but I'm not sure the Ukrainians, as hopped up on a feeling of unity, nationalism and hatred for their attackers will feel like "de facto/de jure, what's the big difference?", nor do I think Putin is likely to agree to reparations, because that would be like an official admission of guilt and defeat - even if that would make sense financially, this whole invasion has turned out to be pure insanity from a financial point of view already. Nor do I believe the West can (politically) just go back to business as usual (or even further) with Russia, while Putin is in office, after he's been thoroughly cast as a purely evil dictator.

I think what everyone is saying, including those who want the Ukrainians to fight until the last man, makes sense behind a computer in isolation. It practice it will be very different. This is just a reply to @VorZakone and is ideal, not necessarily practical. It's what seems to make most sense, and what seems most likely to happen in some iteration within the next five years, but all kinds of different scenarios are possible. It makes sense if you're removed from the situation, but yeah, might not sound good to Ukrainians on the ground.

 

[Salt Bailly]

We, UK. Are part of NATO

We left the EU.

This isn't our war.

I'm not really sure where to begin. Every sentence is technically correct, but I am still deeply confused.

 

[Mciahel Goodman]

A quarter of a century after the end of the cold war, the “Russian threat” is unmistakably back. Vladimir Putin, Britain’s defence secretary Michael Fallon declares, is as great a danger to Europe as “Islamic State”. There may be no ideological confrontation, and Russia may be a shadow of its Soviet predecessor, but the anti-Russian drumbeat has now reached fever pitch.

And much more than in Soviet times, the campaign is personal. It’s all about Putin. The Russian president is an expansionist dictator who has launched a “shameless aggression”. He is the epitome of “political depravity”, “carving up” his neighbours as he crushes dissent at home, and routinely is compared to Hitler. Putin has now become a cartoon villain and Russia the target of almost uniformly belligerent propaganda across the western media. Anyone who questions the dominant narrative on Ukraine – from last year’s overthrow of the elected president and the role of Ukrainian far right to war crimes carried out by Kiev’s forces – is dismissed as a Kremlin dupe.

That has been ratcheted up still further with the murder of the opposition politician Boris Nemtsov. The Russian president has, of course, been blamed for the killing, though that makes little sense. Nemtsov was a marginal figure whose role in the “catastroika” of the 1990s scarcely endeared him to ordinary Russians. Responsibility for an outrage that exposed the lack of security in the heart of Moscow and was certain to damage the president hardly seems likely to lie with Putin or his supporters.

But it’s certainly grist to the mill of those pushing military confrontation with Russia. Hundreds of US troops are arriving in Ukraine this week to bolster the Kiev regime’s war with Russian-backed rebels in the east. Not to be outdone, Britain is sending 75 military advisers of its own. As 20th-century history shows, the dispatch of military advisers is often how disastrous escalations start. They are also a direct violation of last month’s Minsk agreement, negotiated with France and Germany, that has at least achieved a temporary ceasefire and some pull-back of heavy weapons. Article 10 requires the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Ukraine.

But Nato’s hawks have got the bit between their teeth. Thousands of Nato troops have been sent to the Baltic states – the Atlantic alliance’s new frontline – untroubled by their indulgence of neo-Nazi parades and denial of minority ethnic rights. A string of American political leaders and generals are calling for the US to arm Kiev, from the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, General Martin Dempsey, to the new defence secretary, Ashton Carter. For the western military complex, the Ukraine conflict has the added attraction of creating new reasons to increase arms spending, as the US army’s General Raymond Odierno made clear when he complained this week about British defence cuts in the face of the “Russian threat”.

Putin’s authoritarian conservatism may offer little for Russia’s future, but this anti-Russian incitement is dangerous folly. There certainly has been military expansionism. But it has overwhelmingly come from Nato, not Moscow. For 20 years, despite the commitments at the end of the cold war, Nato has marched relentlessly eastwards, taking in first former east European Warsaw Pact states, then republics of the former Soviet Union itself. As the academic Richard Sakwa puts it in his book Frontline Ukraine, Nato now “exists to manage the risks created by its existence”.

Instead of creating a common European security system including Russia, the US-dominated alliance has expanded up to the Russian border – insisting that is merely the sovereign choice of the states concerned. It clearly isn’t. It’s also the product of an alliance system designed to entrench American “leadership” on the European continent – laid out in Pentagon planning drawn up after the collapse of the Soviet Union to “prevent the re-emergence of a new rival”.

Russia has now challenged that, and the consequences have been played out in Ukraine for the past year: starting with the western-backed ousting of the elected government, through the installation of a Ukrainian nationalist regime, the Russian takeover of Crimea and Moscow-backed uprising in the Donbass. On the ground, it has meant thousands of dead, hundreds of thousands of refugees, indiscriminate shelling of civilian areas and the rise of Ukrainian fascist militias such as the Azov battalion, supported by Kiev and its western sponsors, now preparing to “defend” Mariupol from its own people. For the bulk of the western media, that’s dismissed as Kremlin propaganda.

Russian covert military support for the rebels, on the other hand, is denounced as aggression and “hybrid warfare” – by the same governments that have waged covert wars from Nicaragua to Syria, quite apart from outright aggressions and illegal campaigns in Kosovo, Libya and Iraq.

That doesn’t justify less extreme Russian violations of international law, but it puts them in the context of Russian security. While Putin is portrayed in the west as a reckless land-grabber, in Russian terms he is a centrist. As the veteran Russian leftist Boris Kagarlitsky comments, most Russians want Putin to take a tougher stand against the west “not because of patriotic propaganda, but their experience of the past 25 years”.

In the west, Ukraine – along with Isis – is being used to revive the doctrines of liberal interventionism and even neoconservatism, discredited on the killing fields of Iraq and Afghanistan. So far, Angela Merkel and François Hollande have resisted American pressure to arm Kiev. But when the latest Minsk ceasefire breaks down, as it surely will, there is a real risk that Ukraine’s proxy conflict could turn into full-scale international war.

The alternative is a negotiated settlement which guarantees Ukraine’s neutrality, pluralism and regional autonomy. It may well be too late for that. But there is certainly no military solution. Instead of escalating the war and fuelling nationalist extremism, western powers should be using their leverage to wind it down. If they don’t, the consequences could be disastrous – far beyond Ukraine.

 

[Cheimoon]

I mean from Luhansk to Kherson and including Crimea. The south-eastern part which is now fully within Russian control and covers that part which had been home of the two separatist regions. The Russian population largely outnumbers the Ukrainian iirc (and if the Russian majority doesn't go for it, then it won't happen either way).

Ah okay - that's pretty much what I said as well.

Just FYI, though, that that's like a third or a quarter of eastern Ukraine, and that I think 'the river' would usually refer to the Dnipro, which more or less splits the country in two. That got me confused in your text.

All the same, apart from this and the other aspects mentioned (NATO, EU, reparations), I think Putin would only settle for that if he can also have something to show for his efforts in Kyiv. Given how much he emphasized the need to remove the political leadership, I don't think Putin could accept leaving Zelensky in place - while the Ukrainians and he himself would probably not accept his removal.

All in all, I'm afraid Putin has gone in too far for reasonable solutions (reasonable in whose eyes? but anyway) to work. Also, given how hands off they have been so far, I think the US and its allies wouldn't mind this war continuing at the expense of the Ukrainians. I think they might cynically prioritize the long-term pain this is inflicting on Russia in terms of its international prestige and, especially, enormous financial hurt the continued sanctions and costs of waging war will bring to Russia.

 

[Mciahel Goodman]

Ah okay - that's pretty much what I said as well.

Just FYI, though, that that's like a third or a quarter of eastern Ukraine, and that I think 'the river' would usually refer to the Dnipro, which more or less splits the country in two. That got me confused in your text.

All the same, apart from this and the other aspects mentioned (NATO, EU, reparations), I think Putin would only settle for that if he can also have something to show for his efforts in Kyiv. Given how much he emphasized the need to remove the political leadership, I don't think Putin could accept leaving Zelensky in place - while the Ukrainians and he himself would probably not accept his removal.

All in all, I'm afraid Putin has gone in too far for reasonable solutions (reasonable in whose eyes? but anyway) to work. Also, given how hands off they have been so far, I think the US and its allies wouldn't mind this war continuing at the expense of the Ukrainians. I think they might cynically prioritize the long-term pain this is inflicting on Russia in terms of its international prestige and, especially, enormous financial hurt the continued sanctions and costs of waging war will bring to Russia.

No, I did mean the Dnipro but not literally everything to the east of it as an Eastern-Ukraine (just that high concentration of Russian nationals and Russian speaking population along the south eastern part).

The part in bold is correct, I think, but "hands off" means "physically distant" (arms companies will benefit from taxpayers' money). It seems a dangerous game. Blinken was talking about giving the green light for NATO countries to export fighter jets to Ukraine. Remains to be seen how that can happen, as the airfields are destroyed or occupied, but the more NATO gets involved (beyond sanctions) the less good the outcome looks (it becomes more and more escalatory).

The West has a remarkable capacity to rehabilitate villains. There are almost too many to list but yesterday's terrorist/madman is often repackaged as today's practical ally (Stalin during WW2 is one of many examples, and a good one, too, because he quickly retook his position as villain after his usefulness had been expended). Again, people will wonder about agency but the US is, at this point, in more control of the Zelensky government than people care to admit (financial, diplomatic, and militarily: strategic and economic aid). Anyway, Putin is nearing 70. He hasn't got long left whatever way this turns out, so maybe just offering him a way out might work. Some kind of ironclad transition process.

 

[Cheimoon]

<long quote>

I thought that was a bit of an odd read. A fair bit of hyperbole - the US and UK ultimately didn't engage in the war in eastern Ukraine, and the way Ukraine's actions are described (including that 'naionalistic regime's) seems very generous towards Russia.

But more importantly, it irritates me how all agency is constantly placed only with the west - as if Russia is some kind of automaton that goes through the motions and it's up to the west to respond correctly. But if Putin in 2000 when he got to power would have properly turned west, things would have played out very differently. Given Russia's population size and national resources, it could have a become a dominant force in Europe, turning the geopolitical situation around quite significantly. For example, working closely with Europe would effectively have removed part of the American attraction for European countries, diminishing the US's influence; it would have made NATO redundant; and it would have made Russia look like an attractive partner to the former Warsaw Pact countries and USSR states (instead of the bogey man it now is).

I know Putin didn't do that and the west had to deal with what did happen. But why would the west be only to blame for that? And if Putin was going to continue Cold War power politics, why couldn't NATO do the same, and look for expansion during Russia's time of weakness?

Also, from that perspective, it could even be argued that NATO has done quite well; cause now virtually everything in Europe that Russia could claim is on NATO's side - including Ukraine, for which Russia is now making a last-ditch attempt with which they might wreck themselves as much as anything else. From NATO's perspective, Ukraine's peace and prosperity might be a small price to pay for that achievement.

It's all just as cynical and unpleasant of course (although the Russia-turning-west scenario sounds quite nice actually); but I do think there are other perspectives than the rigid thinking in Cold War blocks that seems to permeate these quotes.

 

[Mciahel Goodman]

I thought that was a bit of an odd read. A fair bit of hyperbole - the US and UK ultimately didn't engage in the war in eastern Ukraine, and the way Ukraine's actions are described (including that 'naionalistic regime's) seems very generous towards Russia.

But more importantly, it irritates me how all agency is constantly placed only with the west - as if Russia is some kind of automaton that goes through the motions and it's up to the west to respond correctly. But if Putin in 2000 when he got to power would have properly turned west, things would have played out very differently. Given Russia's population size and national resources, it could have a become a dominant force in Europe, turning the geopolitical situation around quite significantly. For example, working closely with Europe would effectively have removed part of the American attraction for European countries, diminishing the US's influence; it would have made NATO redundant; and it would have made Russia look like an attractive partner to the former Warsaw Pact countries and USSR states (instead of the bogey man it now is).

I know Putin didn't do that and the west had to deal with what did happen. But why would the west be only to blame for that? And if Putin was going to continue Cold War power politics, why couldn't NATO do the same, and look for expansion during Russia's time of weakness?

Also, from that perspective, it could even be argued that NATO has done quite well; cause now virtually everything in Europe that Russia could claim is on NATO's side - including Ukraine, for which Russia is now making a last-ditch attempt with which the might wreck themselves as much as anything else. For NATO's perspective, Ukraine's peace and prosperity might be a small price to pay for that achievement.

It's all just as cynical and unpleasant of course (although the Russia-turning-west scenario sounds quite nice actually); but I do think there are other perspectives than the rigid thinking in Cold War blocks that seems to permeate these quotes.

The thing is, Putin inherited a Russia which had been taken advantage of by the West during Yeltsin's administration. It was a basket-case. I'm not sure what turning West would have looked like, practically, in that scenario. And NATO was literally redundant in 1991 but "what if" arguments only take us so far. I agree with some of your other points. As for agency, I think it can be both overdone and under-cooked.

The article's chief interest is that it is seven years old and parts of it are timely (the US and UK are, via NATO, involved in eastern Ukraine right now and have been for seven years via proxies, so I disagree with you there).

 

[Wibble]

We, UK. Are part of NATO

We left the EU.

This isn't our war.

What on earth are you talking about? There are non-European members of NATO and non-EU European members of NATO (the UK included). Not being part of the EU doesn't mean that you don't have a responsibility for the defence of Europe.

 

[Cheimoon]

The thing is, Putin inherited a Russia which had been taken advantage of by the West during Yeltsin's administration. It was a basket-case. I'm not sure what turning West would have looked like, practically, in that scenario. And NATO was literally redundant in 1991 but "what if" arguments only take us so far. I agree with some of your other points. As for agency, I think it can be both overdone and under-cooked.

The article's chief interest is that it is seven years old and parts of it are timely (the US and UK are, via NATO, involved in eastern Ukraine right now and have been for seven years via proxies, so I disagree with you there).

Come to think of it, it seems to me like 'involvement' is a matter of mutual perception. If NATO sends instructors, equipment, and ammo, but they say they're not involved and Russia doesn't accuse them of being, then I guess they're not - even if I would agree with you that NATO is clearly inserting itself into the situation (and has been for years). That might be one reason for the reluctance over planes, since loaning planes to Ukraine is quite a different magnitude of 'help with equipment'.

 

[Sky1981]

Cynical thinking but the US would love a protracted war. This will finish one of their boogeymen without even having to drop one bomb. This will end russia as a superpower, regardless of the outcome, nukes aside.

Just a pity and tragic that UKR needs to be involved in all this. Politics is indeed the most evil drive in history.

 

[Mciahel Goodman]

Come to think of it, it seems to me like 'involvement' is a matter of mutual perception. If NATO sends instructors, equipment, and ammo, but they say they're not involved and Russia doesn't accuse them of being, then I guess they're not - even if I would agree with you that NATO is clearly inserting itself into the situation (and has been for years). That might be one reason for the reluctance over planes, since loaning planes to Ukraine is quite a different magnitude of 'help with equipment'.

Definitely. More than mutual perception, but involving it, it has to do with selective perception. Nuclear superpowers need plausible deniability when they engage in proxy wars against each other. The danger here is that much of that traditional plausible deniability (each side knows the other's involvement, but accepts it as par for the course) is on the verge of no longer being plausibly deniable. That's the concern, really, that those things each side traditionally pretends not to see will be impossible to overlook.

 

[Raoul]

Cynical thinking but the US would love a protracted war. This will finish one of their boogeymen without even having to drop one bomb. This will end russia as a superpower, regardless of the outcome, nukes aside.

Just a pity and tragic that UKR needs to be involved in all this. Politics is indeed the most evil drive in history.

It wouldn't require a protracted war since the Russian economy would crumble well before that.

 

[Mciahel Goodman]

It wouldn't require a protracted war since the Russian economy would crumble well before that.

Do you think this ends before June? How long do you think before the Russian economy is crippled to the extent that they can't wage war?

 

[Raoul]

Do you think this ends before June? How long do you think before the Russian economy is crippled to the extent that they can't wage war?

If the US and EU ditch Russian oil and natural gas (in addition to the myriad of other sanctions already in place), then fairly soon imo. In terms of dates, a lot depends on Putin's behavior and how rational he is. If he correctly identifies that his own reign is threatened at home then he will be incentivized to take an off ramp as per rational choice theory. If he wants to remain alive, he will take the approbate actions to preserve what power he still has to save his own life (and not go the way of Gaddafi, Saddam, Ceaucescu, et al.) Conversely, if there's something wrong with him, such as a mental health issue or a terminal illness, then he will also take steps that will expedite his demise.

 

[Sky1981]

Do you think this ends before June? How long do you think before the Russian economy is crippled to the extent that they can't wage war?

Oh they're fecked allright.

The sanctions gonna hit them long after it lifted. Foreign investor gonna think 100 times before jumping into russian market again.

Some that has burnt the bridges would take a while to get back.

And the indexes and stocks wont likely be picking up.

 

[Mciahel Goodman]

If the US and EU ditch Russian oil and natural gas (in addition to the myriad of other sanctions already in place), then fairly soon imo. In terms of dates, a lot depends on Putin's behavior and how rational he is. If he correctly identifies that his own reign is threatened at home then he will be incentivized to take an off ramp as per rational choice theory. If he wants to remain alive, he will take the approbate actions to preserve what power he still has to save his own life (and not go the way of Gaddafi, Saddam, Ceaucescu, et al.) Conversely, if there's something wrong with him, such as a mental health issue or a terminal illness, then he will also take steps that will expedite his demise.

I see the US has recognized the Maduro regime via the backdoor. Looking for an alternative to Russian oil. Caracas is being offered sanctions relief. Interesting to follow in the weeks ahead.

What's to stop Russia from implementing an all-out realignment of their economy along the lines of a temporary war footing? The soviets were able to manage it during the second world war. I suppose that's where internal factors come into play (unmanageable dissent) as well as global factors (interdependency of nations compared to the 1930s).

Oh they're fecked allright.

The sanctions gonna hit them long after it lifted. Foreign investor gonna think 100 times before jumping into russian market again.

Some that has burnt the bridges would take a while to get back.

And the indexes and stocks wont likely be picking up.

Seems there are only two scenarios. One in which Russia is all in with China (assuming they maintain their war effort) and another where they abandon the war effort and are readmitted into the so-called international order (this would seem to imply post-Putin, whether by coup or some kind of security arrangement to let him leave as per the above). I think the Chinese would prefer the first. If they're to become the 21st century hegemon, they will have to confront the supremacy of the dollar at the some point. This seems like a good test run, even if they change their minds and leave Russia to die (which would have consequences for them, too, as that Russia would switch to a more Western-facing outlook and China would be weakened).

My best guess is that Putin can carry this on longer than people expect but it is an absolute guess and depends upon China and Asia more broadly.

 

[Raoul]

What's to stop Russia from implementing an all-out realignment of their economy along the lines of a temporary war footing? The soviets were able to manage it during the second world war. I suppose that's where internal factors come into play (unmanageable dissent) as well as global factors (interdependency of nations compared to the 1930s).

It takes money to do that and they won't have the resources. The sanctions will completely paralyze every notable aspect of Russian economic life.

 

[Superden]

A 55 year-old man with with the political mind of a twenty year-old university campus radical. Some people never grow up. Boyd-Barrett is one of those people.

I'll tell you who never grows up...lots of Palestinian children. What with bring bombed to death.

 

[frostbite]

What's to stop Russia from implementing an all-out realignment of their economy along the lines of a temporary war footing? The soviets were able to manage it during the second world war. I suppose that's where internal factors come into play (unmanageable dissent) as well as global factors (interdependency of nations compared to the 1930s).

The Soviets did it thanks to the forced labour and the gulags. Can Putin restore those soviet enterprises? Who knows?