Turkish referendum

2cents said:
Good points - for years all we heard in the West about the AKP was how the Turkish 'model' was a supremely successful example of the melding of Islam to modern politics. This didn't even change after Erdogan fell out with Israel in 2010 (it even gave him a bump in certain quarters). Right up until 2012 we had Davutoglu's "zero problems with neighbours" nonsense being used to highlight the model.
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I went to Turkey in 2010 and was surprised at how intensely partisan and pro-Erdogan the media was. I've seen Chinese state media but this was different. In China there is coverage of very local issues, and corruption cases, not much about protests, and bland reports about transfers and promotions for party members. A LOT of front-page reports about state and national economic growth data.
In Turkey there was ferocious stance against "opposition lies" and for Erdogan's policies. Unfortunately I have no idea which paper this was (it was the only English paper on the flight). But it suggested that it wasn't a properly functioning democracy.

@2cents
Sorry, will need a guide. I know zero about what region is whom.
 
berbatrick said:
Sorry, will need a guide. I know zero about what region is whom.
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Sorry - Kurdish regions are in the south-east generally. As you can see, some of these regions voted YES for a variety of reasons, but the general trend in the area is clear, as it is in the more liberal/secular (Mediterranean/Aegean) coastal regions. The Anatolian heartland is strongly YES as you can see, and has always been the region from which the AKP draws its base - it is more rural, conservative, and religious than the coastal areas.
 
2cents said:
Sorry - Kurdish regions are in the south-east generally. As you can see, some of these regions voted YES for a variety of reasons, but the general trend in the area is clear, as it is in the more liberal/secular (Mediterranean/Aegean) coastal regions. The Anatolian heartland is strongly YES as you can see, and has always been the region from which the AKP draws its base - it is more rural, conservative, and religious than the coastal areas.
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Thanks.
With this liberal coasts/conservative heartland divide, this looks a bit like the US, certainly different from Indian votes for Modi which are stronger in most cities (though not weak at all in the vast rural heartland)..
The difference between Turkey and India/US is the Kurdish region; in the US and India there are minority votes in most states, here they are concentrated (I guess it's somewhat similar to J&K, the only Muslim majority state.)
 
berbatrick said:
Thanks.
With this liberal coasts/conservative heartland divide, this looks a bit like the US, certainly different from Indian votes for Modi which are stronger in most cities (though not weak at all in the vast rural heartland)..
The difference between Turkey and India/US is the Kurdish region; in the US and India there are minority votes in most states, here they are concentrated (I guess it's somewhat similar to J&K, the only Muslim majority state.)
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The Kurdish vote isn't monolithic, as you can see from the map. The same issues that divide Turks - e.g. the secular/religious question - also divide Kurds. The Kurds also have a more pronounced sectarian division between Sunnis and Alevis (who tend to be fiercely secular) - while there are also Turkish Alevis, proportionally they make up a far less percentage of Turkish society. And of course you have the Kurdish nationalist question to factor in - many Kurds are bitterly opposed to the PKK and its agenda.
 
PedroMendez said:
With this referendum any pretense about democracy (not that much was left anyway) is gone. I think it is fair to say, that I am usually advocating for very restraint/cautious foreign policy, but that only works when the other side does the same. Erdogan acted extremely hostile towards various European countries (very hostile language and symbolic acts; jailing citizens; mobilizing people with Turkish heritage for his benefits and sadly other things that are even worse). Continuous appeasement is not a functional strategy to handle this. The first step has to be to accept, that there are quite substantial disagreements/tensions between Turkey and Europe, while interest are not aligned anymore.
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I'm pretty sure European politicians and diplomats are fed up since quite some time now and biting their lips out of tactical considerations. No one in the business will have illusions about the way the AKP leads the country. But I guess dealing with partners one personally dislikes is kind of everday life for technocrats, so there has to be a significant contradiction of interests on hard issues and that's where I'm struggling to see what it might be.

As far as I know Europe is dependent on Turkey's cooperation in their strategy to manage the flow of refugees and NATO needs Turkey for access to the Middle East. Erdogan knows this well and makes this cooperation as expensive as possible for the Western states. EU membership is a long way off anyway (or simply won't happen), and it seems he has no problems not getting anywhere in this issue.

So I can't really see where the will to end appeasement should come from, Turkey seems to hold all the cards. I expect some harsher rethoric and some symbolic actions in the future (both has happened already to an extent), but a revaluation of Europe's relations with Turkey would surprise me.

Then again, I have only superficial knowledge of these things. So what could be a lever for pressurising Erdogan, what would hurt Turkey's interests more than it would hurt the EU's?
 
2cents said:
The Kurdish vote isn't monolithic, as you can see from the map. The same issues that divide Turks - e.g. the secular/religious question - also divide Kurds. The Kurds also have a more pronounced sectarian division between Sunnis and Alevis (who tend to be fiercely secular) - while there are also Turkish Alevis, proportionally they make up a far less percentage of Turkish society. And of course you have the Kurdish nationalist question to factor in - many Kurds are bitterly opposed to the PKK and its agenda.
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Thanks.
And I didn't want to create the impression that the Indian Muslim vote is a block either - in fact every non-BJP (Modi) party (usually) courts Muslim votes (potentially causing a backlash and majority consolidation for the BJP). Muslims in a a few states have a reputation of voting for the party that is most likely to beat the BJP, but there are plenty of differences by caste, class, local leaders, sectarian differences, etc. The rise of exclusively Muslim parties (post-independence) is sporadic and limited (and very dangerous).
In my state some Bohras vote BJP AFAIK.
 
@berbatrick Soner Cagaptay in that live video I posted above is explaining right now that the pro-AKP vote actually increased among the Kurds in this referendum relative to the most recent general elections. He says the reasons aren't quite clear yet.
 
Synco said:
I'm pretty sure European politicians and diplomats are fed up since quite some time now and biting their lips out of tactical considerations. No one in the business will have illusions about the way the AKP leads the country. But I guess dealing with partners one personally dislikes is kind of everday life for technocrats, so there has to be a significant contradiction of interests on hard issues and that's where I'm struggling to see what it might be.

As far as I know Europe is dependent on Turkey's cooperation in their strategy to manage the flow of refugees and NATO needs Turkey for access to the Middle East. Erdogan knows this well and makes this cooperation as expensive as possible for the Western states. EU membership is a long way off anyway (or simply won't happen), and it seems he has no problems not getting anywhere in this issue.

So I can't really see where the will to end appeasement should come from, Turkey seems to hold all the cards. I expect some harsher rethoric and some symbolic actions in the future (both has happened already to an extent), but a revaluation of Europe's relations with Turkey would surprise me.

Then again, I have only superficial knowledge of these things. So what could be a lever for pressurising Erdogan, what would hurt Turkey's interests more than it would hurt the EU's?
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I think the power-relations between EU and Turkey are quite different. I think Erodgan has only one lever of power over the EU (or more specifically: over Merkel) and that is the refugee deal. That is somewhat self-inflicted, because Merkel was to much of a coward to take responsibility for her actions. In every other aspect Turkey has no leverage over the EU or over other international actors. Turkey's economy is in a difficult situation and depends a lot of the EU, while NATO (the USA) is continues to be an important pillar of its security system.
We saw that Erdogan had to kiss Putin's ring, once Russia thought that Erdogan overstepped his limits. Russia is not and won't be an ally of Turkey in the near future. Both the EU and NATO have significantly more leverage and Turkey can't turn their back on them without committing economic and political suicide. The only question is if the EU are willing to use its leverage and I agree with your view that this is probably not going to happen for political reasons.

I am not even sure what policy I am actually advocating for except for one, that acknowledges that interests are not aligned.

The EU or individual states could easily communicate that when Turkey continues on its current path, it won't get any support from Europe. No economic cooperation, no political cover and certainly no security guarantees.
If they don't understand that, you can always turn to public gestures that are unambiguous. Like ending the German Nato mission in Turkey or meeting a couple of Kurdish politicians/dissidents.
 
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