Poor Cenk Tosun's efforts, for the Erdogan propaganda machine, have been glossed over by everybody.
Turkey
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Most of Turkish German people seem to support him, and a lot of them aren't really integrated in Germany (generally stay only with other Turkish people).
Interestingly, those who have left for Germany late in their lives (study, job) seem to be anti-Erdogan. At least those I know.
Interestingly, those who have left for Germany late in their lives (study, job) seem to be anti-Erdogan. At least those I know.
Good luck to Erdogran. I like the bloke. Would gladly have him in Pakistan.
I'm curious to know your line of reasoning here. Do you really think he'd help Pakistan move forward in the right direction?
You don't know the beginning of how backwards our country is. At least this guy bought jobs, industry, energy, has a notion of statesmanship (even if it is just arrogance). Currently we have dictators who are voted in every 5 years.
It might have been a good argument years ago, but he doesn't even have the economy anymore. He's been gradually gutting the country for some time now, selling off everything and closing down businesses at the expense of foreign firms. He was also dumb enough to ostracize the people who originally made Turkey's economy successful, which is probably why the former is happening.
In terms of being a despot, I think he'd be in his element in Pakistan as much as any of what you've already had. The only reason he isn't quite there in Turkey now is because he's still trying to overcome a few more obstacles (Atatürk's legacy, for example) in order to be just that.
If Turkey sticks with him long term, it's proper fecked. If it manages to get rid soon, it will still be a slow rebuilding process.
Is the economy in Turkey bad? As a tourist you don't really understand anything in detail.
I've always thought of Erdogan as someone who's been Pro-Turkey, our political class are anti Pakistan and pro-corruption. I don't know much about the internal politics of Turkey, the reporting in the Pakistani media is usually about the positive stuff like investment and charity work, and I don't really trust much of what I read in the western media. Anyone who is pro-islam is slated in the western press.
Erdogan was lionized in the Western press for years until the 2013 protests and the Syrian conflict.
2013 - i wasn't watching the news then. i had a life back in those days.
Pretty bad, yeah. Back in May 2014, 1 Euro could buy 2.88 Liras. Today, 1 Euro can buy 5.28 Liras. I picked that measurement because it was relevant to me, but it still illustrates just how badly the Lira has become devalued, a slide it's been on for quite some time now. Prices there are getting more and more ridiculous by the week and there doesn't look to be any end in sight.
He is "pro-Turkey" in the sense that he and his supporters love the Turkey that they want it to be, not what it is today. He most definitely isn't pro-Turkey if we're talking about Atatürk's Turkey i.e. secularist. He runs a highly oppressive regime that has locked up thousands upon thousands of journalists and civil servants that need to be swept aside if he is to achieve his goal.
The truth about Erdoğan is that he's the ultimate opportunist. He uses whatever means necessary to keep himself in power, manipulating various groups (nationalists, Kurds, liberals, etc.) before stabbing them in the back when they've finished being useful idiots for him. The problem he faces today is that he has used too many people and potentially leaves himself without enough allies to keep his grip on power, so he will fall back heavily on his religious base who have always been there for him. Under the right circumstances, however, even they would be dispensable. He's the ultimate fraud who has played the game very well.
There is serious support for Erdogan in Germany, but I'm very suspicious about both claims. I think there's a lot of gut feeling involved in these discourses. I'll try to point out my issues with the first one (Erdogan support).
The statistics & surveys on Erdogan/the 2017 referendum etc. I've seen in the past 18 months or so mostly suggest that, while we're talking about a significant percentage of supporters, it's not a majority (let alone "most" Turkish-Germans). I also suspect there are differences between German nationals with Turkish background, dual citizens, and Turkish nationals living in Germany. In most debates this usually isn't accounted for, in favour of a more generic use of the term "Turkish-Germans".
To give a few examples what I'm talking about, here's a rough estimation I made a year ago, after the Turkish referendum (using the stats on Turkish nationals & dual citizens in Germany, turnout, voting results):
https://www.redcafe.net/threads/turkish-referendum.428131/page-3#post-20737367
So among all Turkish nationals and dual citizens eligible to vote, a little more than 30% actually voted for Erdogan in Germany. (Not sure what I meant with the edit back then, just ignore that.)
Those not included above were obviously German-only citizens of Turkish descent, because they couldn't vote. Two months ago, a German election-themed study came out on this particular group (as well as Russian Germans). Part of it was a comparison of the popularity of German top politicians & Erdogan, and the results are pretty interesting:
So Merkel scored an average of +1.6 while Erdogan landed at -2.5, way worse than all German politicians listed bar Gauland.
Having said all this, I'm not suggesting these numbers necessarily give the full picture. And there may be contradicting numbers out there, I haven't looked systematically. I also don't want to deflect from the obvious fact of Erdoganism in Germany, but merely point out that the popular narratives deserve much more scrutiny than they usually get.
Fair enough, I said these are only flashlights and there may well be contradicting arguments. A (purely speculative) counter-argument might be that those who feel strongly about Erdogan (positively or negatively) were likelier to participate, and the ones who didn't may be less interested on average. Do you perhaps have data on those who didn't vote, or political opinions in general?
To be clear: the post I quoted stated most Turkish-Germans seem to support Erdogan. To me, that suggests approval rates of ~60-70% upwards (if we're not nitpicking, 51% would be "half" rather than "most"). That's the popular narrative I referred to, and I said in the light of some of what I've seen, this claim deserves more scrutiny. If then the result is really that bad, fine (or rather: shit). But my point was it has to be supported instead of just taken for granted without further ado, as it often is.
What would you say about this?
Even when factoring out Kurds and Alevites, the approval rate is still -1.9 (on a -5 to +5 scale). But I admittedly can't say much about the survey's methods and general validity.
(This one: https://www.researchgate.net/profil...ion-Study-IMGES.pdf?origin=publication_detail )
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There might be contradicting arguments/feelings, but I don't see it from the data you quoted. Those who feel strongly about Erdogan (or politics in general) are more likely to participate in elections. I dont think thats controversial to say, but I don't see the connection to your argument. It would support your claim, if very few Turkish citizens, who live in Germany, would have actually voted. Yet at a first glance (and I might be wrong about this), a voter turnout of roughly 50% for people who are living abroad, is extremely high. A high turnout in combination with a high share of pro Erdogan votes indicates in my opinion that Erdogan is a) pretty popular in Germany and b) also very good at mobilizing voters.
I have no idea about this study, but its difficult to measure popularity. Additionally I don't think one can simply put Turkish and German politicians on the same scale (the study didn't do it). It would be interesting to see how other Turkish politicans are seen. That said this is a very weak data point compared to the election data.
I don't find it particularly surprising. Erdogan has tried to connect with this demographic, while opposition figures can't do that, because they don't have the same reach. Its also worth noting, that organizations like DITIB are close to the AKP and quite influential in their domain.
This BpB article makes a similar argument:
In the end most subjective articles I find convincing and the very little quantitative data we have indicate that it is what it is: Erdogan is pretty popular with Turkish citizens, who live in Germany (= relatively more so than with those who live in Turkey).
Connection was that those strongly influenced by Erdogan/AKP are (probably) likelier to vote, therefore may make up a higher percentage among the voters than among the non-voters. But, as I said, that was only speculative reasoning.
So I get your argument is that the overall turnout (in a diaspora referendum) is a strong indicator of the political leanings of those who didn't vote themselves, at least under these specific circumstances (strong nationalism, AKP campaign, etc.) Never thought of it that way, and it still doesn't seem very conclusive to me at first sight. But I take that with me as a possible interpretation, perhaps it grows on me.
German-only nationals (the majority of Germans of Turkish descent) don't appear in the referendum data*, so imo it needs quite a bit of extrapolation to draw conclusions on them from that. The results I posted on Erdogan's image among this demographic are at least a hint regarding the question of his popularity in that specific group.
Point taken on the difficulties of comparing Turkish with German politicians, but Erdogan's approval score as such is still low (2,5/10 overall; 3,1/10 without Kurds/Alevites). Assumed the survey isn't total nonsense, that must at least be explained.
Otherwise I hope I could make clear the question isn't if Erdogan is popular or not. He definitely is, it has grown in the past years, and may still grow further in the wake of society's general descent into tribalism. It's about how well-funded rather widespread claims of "most Turkish Germans are pro-Erdogan" are, because they're also compatible with certain prejudices, and may therefore too readily be taken at face value by some. Which on the other hand doesn't mean you can't be right, but as I said, some critical examination is justified.
*or did you mean the data on the German elections from that survey? In that case scrap that sentence of mine.
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My thoughts on this are far simpler and less sophisticated. I don't know much about the political leanings of those who didn't vote. A general observation is that diaspora turnouts are on average a lot lower than those at home. I think most of our discussion is actually about semantics and not about the content.
About the study: I don't think that it is useful to compare the popularity of Turkish politicans and German politicans with such a methodology.
About the study: I don't think that it is useful to compare the popularity of Turkish politicans and German politicans with such a methodology.
The facts about voting results and turnout are of course undeniable and also bear some further-reaching implications. A reason for the semantics-heavy discussion may be that I primarily referred to a particular qualitative statement throughout the exchange ("most Turkish Germans..."), while your angle seems to have been more general. That probably leads to a bit of labouring on meanings and interpretations.
I agreed on that, but still think it can be read without the comparison aspect as well:
Anyway, for me it's absolutely okay to leave it at that. I'll take something out of it.
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Sectarian people in Istanbul dumped a truck load of rubbish in front of an Armenian church and wrote "This nation is ours" on the church entrance and walls.
99 years today sine Ataturk arrived in Samsun to kick-start the Turkish resistance:
While that may be somewhat true for some few cities it isn't for the vast majority of Germany, the Turkish Germans make up a large portion of companies like Daimler, BMW or Siemens workforce and are generally well integrated in cities like Stuttgart or Munich. I have lived in two German cities where I had a substantial amount of neighbors with Turkish heritage, and to describe it as anything but a peaceful coexistence is ignorant. They speak German, work in German companies and their children attend state schools, what are they if not integrated?
Yes they clustered together into neighborhoods like immigrants everywhere did initially, but those neighborhoods have become much more diverse in the past 30 years and the second generation generally moves on, often into the suburbs. Obviously there's still crime but I'm fast to point out that it isn't more than in such perfectly homogeneous countries as Poland or Hungary, crime always exists anywhere where there's people.
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99 years today sine Ataturk arrived in Samsun to kick-start the Turkish resistance:
I love this guy. He wanted Turks to move on after his death and not worship him, but he's long been the ultimate obstacle that has kept that dictator awake at night. A true leader, unlike all of the unaccountable thieves of today.
Currently at 5.70 and climbing. I said in another thread that my grasp of economics is terrible, but I know this isn't good. This is horrible. He's leading the country over the edge at an alarming pace, and yet there's still a very realistic chance that he'll just go and steal the election.
Everyone agrees that the central bank has to raise interest rates or turkey will follow the path that Argentina went down many times. Erdogan pressures them not to do that due to shorttermism (and potentially crazy ideological assumptions).
Yeah, but having every printed money with his face was the most hilarious thing I have ever seen.
Holy shit, it was less than 5 when I was there in last August/September.
Coming from the UK - where all the banknotes have the queen's face on - it didn't seem odd to me, especially not when he led a war of independence against five nations looking to divide the land up between themselves. No idea why you get your face on them all for sitting around on your fat ass and waving to crowds of idiots every now and then.
Interesting, Erik-Jan Zurcher is a serious historian of Turkey:
Sunday is a Big Day for Turkey. Here’s What to Expect
http://www.gmfus.org/blog/2018/06/19/sunday-big-day-turkey-heres-what-expect
BRUSSELS — Turkey’s June 24th elections will be a critical test for Turkish democracy. Whatever the outcome, there could be an opportunity to repair Turkey’s troubled relations with Europe and the United States. But the prospects for improvement are hardly a foregone conclusion and would require substantial shifts in attitude at the public and leadership levels. The prevailing mistrust and friction draws on deep historical anxieties. The atmosphere of combative nationalism is widely shared across the Turkish political spectrum — and is mirrored across the Atlantic and in a number of European capitals.
The key variable is President Erdoğan himself. He has little if any political capital left in Washington, Brussels, Berlin, or Paris. This very high stakes election will be closely watched as a test of political legitimacy. International observers are increasingly concerned, not just about Turkey’s democracy and the rule of law, but about Turkish stability. If Erdoğan gets a renewed mandate and fully implements a presidential system, existing Western concerns over Turkey’s internal evolution will be reinforced. In an era of practical, transactional diplomacy, it may be that Turkey’s European integration and convergence with Western norms no longer matter. But if so, the scrutiny of Turkey’s foreign and security policy behavior will be even heavier. Partners cannot have it both ways. From the purchase of Russian S-400 surface to air missiles, to pressure on the People’s Protection Units (YPG) in Syria, to mounting tensions in the Aegean, to the detention of allied nationals, Ankara’s policies have left much to be desired from a Western viewpoint. And Ankara has its own complaints about European and American policies toward Turkey and its neighborhood. Turkey’s explicit desire for diversification and an implicit preference for non-alignment in foreign policy are now deeply entrenched. Arguably, a victorious President Erdogan might see virtue in a lighter approach to the West. But beyond political tactics, the sources of his behavior, and the conspiratorial worldview that has taken hold in Turkish society, may well prove durable.
Whoever wins on June 24th, it will take a brave politician to change course when some 73 percent of Turks hold unfavorable views of Europe, and some 83 percent dislike the United States. Should opposition candidate Muharrem Ince win the presidency — a long shot, but not inconceivable — some degree of change is possible. At a minimum, Europe and the United States can expect a less confrontational style, and perhaps some shift on the S-400 issue. Given the deep concerns over Turkey’s domestic trajectory, Western partners will surely want to give any new leadership the benefit of the doubt. There is a great deal to repair in Turkey’s foreign and security policy relationships. But nationalism and sovereignty consciousness will likely be the hallmarks of Turkish–Western relations for some time to come.
-Ian Lesser, Vice President, Foreign Policy; Executive Director, Transatlantic Center
Five Factors that Will Determine the Outcome of Turkey’s Election
ANKARA — Even in the final week of the campaigns, it is difficult to project the outcome of either the presidential or the parliamentary election in Turkey. President Erdoğan and his People’s Alliance enjoy hugely asymmetric access to media and public resources. Apart from this obvious advantage, there are five factors that could impact the outcome of Sunday’s elections.
The first factor will be President Erdoğan’s emotional bond with his followers. While many expect the recent economic downturn in the Turkish economy — marked by devaluation of the national currency, rising inflation, and dramatic increase in interest rates — to turn a significant part of his voters away from the current president, this effect may be limited. Voters today tend to vote from an emotional rather than rational place.
The second factor will be the emergence of Muharrem İnce as a unifying leader of Turkish opposition beyond his formal position as the presidential candidate of the main opposition Republican People’s Party. Compared to Erdoğan, İnce is organizing rallies in more places, attracting not only bigger but also more enthusiastic crowds. He interacts with them and in television interviews with skill. İnce has already guaranteed the consolidation of the opposition vote in the second round of presidential elections if there is one, but the question is whether he will attract votes from Erdoğan supporters?
The third factor will be the emergence of the moderate nationalist İYİParty in Turkish politics and its leader Meral Akşener as a presidential candidate. With her nationalist background, Akşener is better positioned to attract Erdoğan’s supporters, although she will have problems attracting the Kurdish vote for the same reasons. Akşener has also organized well-attended and lively rallies throughout the country, but she suffers from a tremendous disadvantage as pro-government media gives her literally zero airtime. Given İnce’s solid voter base, it is unlikely that she can make it to the second round — but taking a sufficient number of votes from Erdoğan will ensure that there actually is a second round.
The fourth factor will be the performance of the pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (HDP), but this one concerns the Parliamentary elections. As HDP is not part of any alliance, it needs to pass the 10 percent threshold to make it to the parliament. If they cannot, the People’s Alliance formed by Erdoğan’s AKParty and the nationalist MHP will enjoy a comfortable majority in the parliament, but if they do then the election may possibly end up with a divided parliament. HDP enjoys a dedicated voter base, but the question is if the election day atmosphere in southeast Turkey will encourage all of them to go out and vote.
The final factor is the integrity of the elections, which has become a very big issue in Turkey. Opposition parties claim that there were irregularities in the referendum that took place last year with appeals to the Electoral Commission, but their appeals were rejected by the Electoral Commission. Opposition parties are on high alert for possible rigging on Sunday, but the question is if they have the capacity to place at least one observer at every voting center. Whatever the outcome, these elections have proved that Turkey still enjoys competitive politics and a dynamic society.
-Ozgur Unluhisarcikli, Director, Ankara Office
http://www.gmfus.org/blog/2018/06/19/sunday-big-day-turkey-heres-what-expect
BRUSSELS — Turkey’s June 24th elections will be a critical test for Turkish democracy. Whatever the outcome, there could be an opportunity to repair Turkey’s troubled relations with Europe and the United States. But the prospects for improvement are hardly a foregone conclusion and would require substantial shifts in attitude at the public and leadership levels. The prevailing mistrust and friction draws on deep historical anxieties. The atmosphere of combative nationalism is widely shared across the Turkish political spectrum — and is mirrored across the Atlantic and in a number of European capitals.
The key variable is President Erdoğan himself. He has little if any political capital left in Washington, Brussels, Berlin, or Paris. This very high stakes election will be closely watched as a test of political legitimacy. International observers are increasingly concerned, not just about Turkey’s democracy and the rule of law, but about Turkish stability. If Erdoğan gets a renewed mandate and fully implements a presidential system, existing Western concerns over Turkey’s internal evolution will be reinforced. In an era of practical, transactional diplomacy, it may be that Turkey’s European integration and convergence with Western norms no longer matter. But if so, the scrutiny of Turkey’s foreign and security policy behavior will be even heavier. Partners cannot have it both ways. From the purchase of Russian S-400 surface to air missiles, to pressure on the People’s Protection Units (YPG) in Syria, to mounting tensions in the Aegean, to the detention of allied nationals, Ankara’s policies have left much to be desired from a Western viewpoint. And Ankara has its own complaints about European and American policies toward Turkey and its neighborhood. Turkey’s explicit desire for diversification and an implicit preference for non-alignment in foreign policy are now deeply entrenched. Arguably, a victorious President Erdogan might see virtue in a lighter approach to the West. But beyond political tactics, the sources of his behavior, and the conspiratorial worldview that has taken hold in Turkish society, may well prove durable.
Whoever wins on June 24th, it will take a brave politician to change course when some 73 percent of Turks hold unfavorable views of Europe, and some 83 percent dislike the United States. Should opposition candidate Muharrem Ince win the presidency — a long shot, but not inconceivable — some degree of change is possible. At a minimum, Europe and the United States can expect a less confrontational style, and perhaps some shift on the S-400 issue. Given the deep concerns over Turkey’s domestic trajectory, Western partners will surely want to give any new leadership the benefit of the doubt. There is a great deal to repair in Turkey’s foreign and security policy relationships. But nationalism and sovereignty consciousness will likely be the hallmarks of Turkish–Western relations for some time to come.
-Ian Lesser, Vice President, Foreign Policy; Executive Director, Transatlantic Center
Five Factors that Will Determine the Outcome of Turkey’s Election
ANKARA — Even in the final week of the campaigns, it is difficult to project the outcome of either the presidential or the parliamentary election in Turkey. President Erdoğan and his People’s Alliance enjoy hugely asymmetric access to media and public resources. Apart from this obvious advantage, there are five factors that could impact the outcome of Sunday’s elections.
The first factor will be President Erdoğan’s emotional bond with his followers. While many expect the recent economic downturn in the Turkish economy — marked by devaluation of the national currency, rising inflation, and dramatic increase in interest rates — to turn a significant part of his voters away from the current president, this effect may be limited. Voters today tend to vote from an emotional rather than rational place.
The second factor will be the emergence of Muharrem İnce as a unifying leader of Turkish opposition beyond his formal position as the presidential candidate of the main opposition Republican People’s Party. Compared to Erdoğan, İnce is organizing rallies in more places, attracting not only bigger but also more enthusiastic crowds. He interacts with them and in television interviews with skill. İnce has already guaranteed the consolidation of the opposition vote in the second round of presidential elections if there is one, but the question is whether he will attract votes from Erdoğan supporters?
The third factor will be the emergence of the moderate nationalist İYİParty in Turkish politics and its leader Meral Akşener as a presidential candidate. With her nationalist background, Akşener is better positioned to attract Erdoğan’s supporters, although she will have problems attracting the Kurdish vote for the same reasons. Akşener has also organized well-attended and lively rallies throughout the country, but she suffers from a tremendous disadvantage as pro-government media gives her literally zero airtime. Given İnce’s solid voter base, it is unlikely that she can make it to the second round — but taking a sufficient number of votes from Erdoğan will ensure that there actually is a second round.
The fourth factor will be the performance of the pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (HDP), but this one concerns the Parliamentary elections. As HDP is not part of any alliance, it needs to pass the 10 percent threshold to make it to the parliament. If they cannot, the People’s Alliance formed by Erdoğan’s AKParty and the nationalist MHP will enjoy a comfortable majority in the parliament, but if they do then the election may possibly end up with a divided parliament. HDP enjoys a dedicated voter base, but the question is if the election day atmosphere in southeast Turkey will encourage all of them to go out and vote.
The final factor is the integrity of the elections, which has become a very big issue in Turkey. Opposition parties claim that there were irregularities in the referendum that took place last year with appeals to the Electoral Commission, but their appeals were rejected by the Electoral Commission. Opposition parties are on high alert for possible rigging on Sunday, but the question is if they have the capacity to place at least one observer at every voting center. Whatever the outcome, these elections have proved that Turkey still enjoys competitive politics and a dynamic society.
-Ozgur Unluhisarcikli, Director, Ankara Office
Religion and Politics in Turkey: A Background to Turkey’s 2018 Elections
https://www.themaydan.com/2018/06/r...nd-turkeys-2018-elections/?platform=hootsuite
https://www.themaydan.com/2018/06/r...nd-turkeys-2018-elections/?platform=hootsuite
In the first days of June, the İsmailağa Cemaati released a statement on its website in which they declared that the conservative religious movement had chosen to vote for Mr. Erdoğan in the upcoming presidential elections which will take place on Sunday, 24 June. The statement was immediately reported by numerous news platforms.
The İsmailağa movement has been growing for years thanks to its capability to address ‘the periphery in the metropolis’ (Çakır, 1990), namely the new immigrants to the large cities which tend to feel uncomfortable in the multicultural, secular and liberal urban space. Under the leadership of Mahmut Ustaosmanoğlu (1929-), the movement since the early 1980s has distinguished itself from the larger Turkish Naqshbandi movement for its anti-modernization stand and for strict application of Hanafi Law. Its members are easily recognizable because men wear a shalwar and white turban, keep their beards, and shave their hair; while women wear a black niqab, which leaves visible only the eyes and nose.
The statement by the İsmailağa was certainly not a surprise. The choice to point to a party has not been uncommon since the introduction of democracy in Turkey. The movement has usually preferred the Refah Partisi (Welfare Party, RP) – Saadet Partisi (Felicity Party, FP) line, the parties established by Necmettin Erbakan (1926-2011), the founder of the Islamist political movement in Turkey. Erbakan’s party in the 24 June elections is running in a coalition with the Kemalist CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, Republican People’s Party) and the newly established moderate nationalist İYİ Parti (Good / Oğuz Tribe Party). However, in the past elections the SP had underperformed because of the 10 percent electoral threshold, which had strongly limited the capability of small political formations to run in national elections. Moreover, the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party, AK Parti) has been dominating Turkish politics for the past 16 years and, after the July 2016 attempted coup, all religious movements fear state repression.
After the coup, the largest religious movement in the country, the Fethullah Gülen Movement (FGM), was declared a terrorist organization (as Fetullahçı Terör Örgütü, FETÖ) because of the role in the coup of its leadership and adepts in the security apparatus. Since then, all religious movements have been seen as suspicious by state agencies and by large segments of the public, which is less willing to make donations or showing support to these movements.
Religion, Sufi Orders and Politics in Turkey: 1950 to Early 2000s
Moreover, religious movements and lodges have been an active element of Turkish public sphere since 1950. After the proclamation of the new Turkish Republic in 1923, all Sufi lodges and religious organizations were closed or forced to go underground. Only with the end of the one-party regime of CHP and the rise of the Demokrat Parti (Democrat Party), in 1950, there was a liberalization toward religious activities and religious movements and, since then, lodges were largely tolerated. The Demokrat Parti was a center-right party which relied also on the support of religious networks to collect votes, particularly in the peripheral areas of the country. In this period the most active groups were the so called Nurcu movements, which where animated by the followers of Said Nursi (1877-1960), a very influential religious authority.
In the 1960s, various religious orders contributed to the Islamic revival in Turkey, after being involved in political activities and media outlets. In this period, the most active among them were the Naqshbandi movements, which were the most relevant movement until late 1990s. The Naqshbandiyya is a Sufi order established by Bahauddin Naqshband (1318-89) in Central Asia. A turning point for the order was the establishment by Ahmad Sirhindi (1564-1624) of the Mujaddidiyya branch, which adopted more puritan and political stands. Another key sufi master of the order was Khalid al-Baghdadi (1779-1827) who established yet another branch and introduced the Naqshbandiyya to Anatolia with a pronounced loyalty to the Ottoman state as an object of Muslim unity and cohesion, and a concomitant hostility to imperialism (all features that still characterize it today).
Starting from 1950s the Turkish state eased restrictions on religious education and the presence of religion in the public sphere. However, in the 1980s the state even further eased these restrictions, it favored religious education, and gave larger powers to the Diyanet (Directorate of Religious Affairs), the public body which overviews religious life and mosques in the country. In the same period various Naqshbandi groups transformed themselves from purely religious networks into educational and cultural associations.
However, during the “28 February Process” of 1997 when Turkish army engineered toppling of the elected government led by Erbakan in what is coined a “post-modern coup,” the government cut all funding to nongovernmental religious communities and brotherhoods. Other schools were closed and religious movements put under strict control by the authorities. Again, many movements and orders preferred to go underground. This process was reverted after the 2002’s rise to power of AK Parti. This last party created a liberal environment where all orders and religious movements were allowed to operate. However, symbolic changes like the lift of the ban on the veil in schools and public offices was possible only in 2013.
Pragmatism and Religious Movements in Turkey’s Political Life
The foregoing discussion shows that there has always been a link between religious movements, orders and the political parties.
On the one hand, all the orders and movements have frequently argued that they are not involved in politics; the most famous remark on this topic came from Said Nursi who stated ‘I ask in the name of Allah to protect me from the devil and from politics’ pointing to its corruption and immorality. On the other side, however, all orders and movements are connected with politics for pragmatic reasons, mainly to protect themselves from the secular state, gaining financial support, construction permits, and licenses for private schools. The FGM, which has its roots in the larger Nurcu movement, always denied interest for (party) politics yet it built an unprecedented web of adepts in the police, armed forces and the bureaucracy. Naqshbandi networks, instead, invited their followers to engage in private enterprises but favored also attempts to join established political parties.
Can We Predict Religious Voters’ Behavior?
In turn, political parties also need orders and religious movements because they are primordial social networks powerful as the tribal, familiar or hemşehri (fellow townsman) bounds and organizations, always longed for by all Turkish political parties irrespective of their ideological background (Guida, 2014; Meeker, 2002).
However, it is difficult to measure the ability of orders and religious movements to influence their followers’ choice in the privacy of the voting booth. For instance, in 1995 elections the FGM supported Erbakan’s RP (Akyeşilmen & Özcan, 2014). However, in a study conducted in the city of inner Anatolia Kırıkkale in 1995 the most popular party among the readers of the newspaper Zaman – the paper run by the movement – was the center-right moderate Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party, ANAP) followed by the nationalist Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Movement Party, MHP). RP was only their fourth choice (Çaha, Topak, & Dalmış, 2004, p. 112). In the following elections, the movement built close relations to the center-left party of Demokratik Sol Parti (Democratic Left Party, DSP), established by Bülent Ecevit – the 1970s leader of the Kemalist CHP. Unfortunately, we do not have statistics on the choices of the movements’ followers then, however, the greater majority of followers who I met in 1999 elections refused to vote outside the center-right spectrum. Clearly, Kemalism, even in its moderate form, was (and remains) a taboo among conservatives in Turkey.
The İskender Paşa Dergahı, a Naqshbandi order very powerful under the leadership of Mehmet Zahit Kotku (1897-1980) also failed to shift votes. Erbakan was a follower of Kotku and his master helped him in creating an engine factory and, later, supported him in his early political career. However, after the 1980, the movement switched its support towards Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party, ANAP) lead by Turgut Özal, also a follower of Kotku (Guida, 2005). Özal was supported by the movement in the creation of a moderate political party even after the death of the charismatic master.In mid-1990s, the order was led by Kotku’s son in law, Esat Coşan (1938-2001) and with Özal’s death in 1993 the ANAP changed radically. The followers of the movement, again, returned to support Erbakan’s parties despite the fact that Coşan harshly opposed and criticized Necmettin Erbakan.
The Religious Periphery in Turkish Political Life
Even if the capability of religious movements and orders to mobilize votes is modest, it is undoubted that religion has a key role in shaping and maintaining conservative values. In the words of a Turkish scholar: “New political parties emerged to represent the values of the periphery, which had been cloaked in tradition. At the core of these values were some form of religiosity, awe and suspicion of the state, and local heterodoxy which, in turn, bred decentralization as well as avoidance of the government, its officials, and their alien culture” (Kalaycıoğlu, 2007, p. 234).
What Kalaycıoğlu calls ‘periphery’ was the portion of Turkish population that was exposed less to Kemalist secular reforms and ideas. During the 1950s, the periphery remained attached to religious values and maintained a strong attachment to nationalist values with a profound admiration of the glorious Muslim and Ottoman past (something that Kemalism aimed to conceal). Religion remained a key element of Turkish identity. In a survey conducted in 2006, 44.6 percent of Turks defined themselves first as Muslims, whereas only 30 percent define themselves first as citizens of the Turkish Republic (Çarkoğlu & Toprak, 2007, p. 44). However, this figure did not meant support for the introduction of Shari’ah law that remains marginal (8.9 percent in 2006 (ibid., p. 81)).
During the one-party regime, Kemalism also neglected rural areas and focused on urban centers for its project of modernization. This produced a strong feeling of mağduriyet, victimization among conservatives living in the periphery. Moreover, forms of discrimination toward the pious or, for instance, the ban of the veil or beard in schools and public offices strengthen the feeling of being marginalized.
Throughout the rapid process of Turkish urbanization, the periphery moved toward urban areas and gained access to higher education and public office. However, the process of urbanization did not lead to socio-economic and political integration. Religious orders and movements often have helped to sustain, transmit, and support alternative identities based on religion. After the 1990s, private schools, student accommodations and economic enterprises – promoted by different religious groups – offered students and employees success at university entrance examinations and careers but maintained some form of peasant or small town culture, psyches and virtues. Students and employees were encouraged to take part in religious instruction and ceremonies, study Ottoman grandeur and to criticize Kemalism.
Turkey’s Kulturkampf and 24 June 2018 Elections
In the long run, there has been the creation of a Kulturkampf, a deep division along cultural lines between two large communities – secular and pious – which affects political and electoral behavior, as well as being at the center of a clash between elites, including Islamists of varying positions. On the one hand, there are those whose lifestyles are shaped on the basis of a secular image of the good society. On the other, there are those who structure their lives and view of society around values of tradition and religion (Kalaycıoğlu, 2011; Mardin, 1973).
Kulturkampf has been a key factor in influencing Turkish voting behaviors (Kalaycıoğlu, 2007, 2011). In the past sixteen years, AK Parti has been able to monopolize socially conservative, religious and economically satisfied community of voters by amplifying the role of Kulturkampf. It was able to build the monopoly thanks to a positive record of economic growth, expansion and melioration of welfare state, as well as the 10 percent threshold and the rise of the costs of politics. Small political parties of the center-right were easily co-opted (for instance Suleyman Soylu’s Demokrat Parti and Numan Kurtulmuş’s HAS Parti).
Opposition parties were unable to alleviate the conservatives’ fears of a backlash of Kemalist secularism or to respond to their concerns. Both CHP and the Kurdish-leftist Halkların Demokratik Partisi (Democratic Party of the Peoples, HDP) have welcomed in their ranks conservative politicians and smoothed their critiques of religion or religious education. Even the main challenger of Tayyip Erdoğan, current president and chairman of AK Party, at the presidential elections – Muharrem İnce – has many times stressed his ‘peripheral’ background and the fact that his mother and many members of his family are veiled. Nevertheless, conservative voters remain diffident. In the upcoming election, though, the chance to participate in the elections with a coalition has given the chance to Islamist Erbakan’s old FP and İYİ Parti, born from a split in the nationalist party, to overcome the threshold and attract conservative votes. Both of them rely on tradition, religion and nationalist sentiments to challenge AK Parti.
Whatever the result of the upcoming presidential and legislative elections both religious movements and religion as identity will be a key element of the different parties’ discourse and will certainly influence voters.
The İsmailağa movement has been growing for years thanks to its capability to address ‘the periphery in the metropolis’ (Çakır, 1990), namely the new immigrants to the large cities which tend to feel uncomfortable in the multicultural, secular and liberal urban space. Under the leadership of Mahmut Ustaosmanoğlu (1929-), the movement since the early 1980s has distinguished itself from the larger Turkish Naqshbandi movement for its anti-modernization stand and for strict application of Hanafi Law. Its members are easily recognizable because men wear a shalwar and white turban, keep their beards, and shave their hair; while women wear a black niqab, which leaves visible only the eyes and nose.
The statement by the İsmailağa was certainly not a surprise. The choice to point to a party has not been uncommon since the introduction of democracy in Turkey. The movement has usually preferred the Refah Partisi (Welfare Party, RP) – Saadet Partisi (Felicity Party, FP) line, the parties established by Necmettin Erbakan (1926-2011), the founder of the Islamist political movement in Turkey. Erbakan’s party in the 24 June elections is running in a coalition with the Kemalist CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, Republican People’s Party) and the newly established moderate nationalist İYİ Parti (Good / Oğuz Tribe Party). However, in the past elections the SP had underperformed because of the 10 percent electoral threshold, which had strongly limited the capability of small political formations to run in national elections. Moreover, the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party, AK Parti) has been dominating Turkish politics for the past 16 years and, after the July 2016 attempted coup, all religious movements fear state repression.
After the coup, the largest religious movement in the country, the Fethullah Gülen Movement (FGM), was declared a terrorist organization (as Fetullahçı Terör Örgütü, FETÖ) because of the role in the coup of its leadership and adepts in the security apparatus. Since then, all religious movements have been seen as suspicious by state agencies and by large segments of the public, which is less willing to make donations or showing support to these movements.
Religion, Sufi Orders and Politics in Turkey: 1950 to Early 2000s
Moreover, religious movements and lodges have been an active element of Turkish public sphere since 1950. After the proclamation of the new Turkish Republic in 1923, all Sufi lodges and religious organizations were closed or forced to go underground. Only with the end of the one-party regime of CHP and the rise of the Demokrat Parti (Democrat Party), in 1950, there was a liberalization toward religious activities and religious movements and, since then, lodges were largely tolerated. The Demokrat Parti was a center-right party which relied also on the support of religious networks to collect votes, particularly in the peripheral areas of the country. In this period the most active groups were the so called Nurcu movements, which where animated by the followers of Said Nursi (1877-1960), a very influential religious authority.
In the 1960s, various religious orders contributed to the Islamic revival in Turkey, after being involved in political activities and media outlets. In this period, the most active among them were the Naqshbandi movements, which were the most relevant movement until late 1990s. The Naqshbandiyya is a Sufi order established by Bahauddin Naqshband (1318-89) in Central Asia. A turning point for the order was the establishment by Ahmad Sirhindi (1564-1624) of the Mujaddidiyya branch, which adopted more puritan and political stands. Another key sufi master of the order was Khalid al-Baghdadi (1779-1827) who established yet another branch and introduced the Naqshbandiyya to Anatolia with a pronounced loyalty to the Ottoman state as an object of Muslim unity and cohesion, and a concomitant hostility to imperialism (all features that still characterize it today).
Starting from 1950s the Turkish state eased restrictions on religious education and the presence of religion in the public sphere. However, in the 1980s the state even further eased these restrictions, it favored religious education, and gave larger powers to the Diyanet (Directorate of Religious Affairs), the public body which overviews religious life and mosques in the country. In the same period various Naqshbandi groups transformed themselves from purely religious networks into educational and cultural associations.
However, during the “28 February Process” of 1997 when Turkish army engineered toppling of the elected government led by Erbakan in what is coined a “post-modern coup,” the government cut all funding to nongovernmental religious communities and brotherhoods. Other schools were closed and religious movements put under strict control by the authorities. Again, many movements and orders preferred to go underground. This process was reverted after the 2002’s rise to power of AK Parti. This last party created a liberal environment where all orders and religious movements were allowed to operate. However, symbolic changes like the lift of the ban on the veil in schools and public offices was possible only in 2013.
Pragmatism and Religious Movements in Turkey’s Political Life
The foregoing discussion shows that there has always been a link between religious movements, orders and the political parties.
On the one hand, all the orders and movements have frequently argued that they are not involved in politics; the most famous remark on this topic came from Said Nursi who stated ‘I ask in the name of Allah to protect me from the devil and from politics’ pointing to its corruption and immorality. On the other side, however, all orders and movements are connected with politics for pragmatic reasons, mainly to protect themselves from the secular state, gaining financial support, construction permits, and licenses for private schools. The FGM, which has its roots in the larger Nurcu movement, always denied interest for (party) politics yet it built an unprecedented web of adepts in the police, armed forces and the bureaucracy. Naqshbandi networks, instead, invited their followers to engage in private enterprises but favored also attempts to join established political parties.
Can We Predict Religious Voters’ Behavior?
In turn, political parties also need orders and religious movements because they are primordial social networks powerful as the tribal, familiar or hemşehri (fellow townsman) bounds and organizations, always longed for by all Turkish political parties irrespective of their ideological background (Guida, 2014; Meeker, 2002).
However, it is difficult to measure the ability of orders and religious movements to influence their followers’ choice in the privacy of the voting booth. For instance, in 1995 elections the FGM supported Erbakan’s RP (Akyeşilmen & Özcan, 2014). However, in a study conducted in the city of inner Anatolia Kırıkkale in 1995 the most popular party among the readers of the newspaper Zaman – the paper run by the movement – was the center-right moderate Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party, ANAP) followed by the nationalist Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Movement Party, MHP). RP was only their fourth choice (Çaha, Topak, & Dalmış, 2004, p. 112). In the following elections, the movement built close relations to the center-left party of Demokratik Sol Parti (Democratic Left Party, DSP), established by Bülent Ecevit – the 1970s leader of the Kemalist CHP. Unfortunately, we do not have statistics on the choices of the movements’ followers then, however, the greater majority of followers who I met in 1999 elections refused to vote outside the center-right spectrum. Clearly, Kemalism, even in its moderate form, was (and remains) a taboo among conservatives in Turkey.
The İskender Paşa Dergahı, a Naqshbandi order very powerful under the leadership of Mehmet Zahit Kotku (1897-1980) also failed to shift votes. Erbakan was a follower of Kotku and his master helped him in creating an engine factory and, later, supported him in his early political career. However, after the 1980, the movement switched its support towards Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party, ANAP) lead by Turgut Özal, also a follower of Kotku (Guida, 2005). Özal was supported by the movement in the creation of a moderate political party even after the death of the charismatic master.In mid-1990s, the order was led by Kotku’s son in law, Esat Coşan (1938-2001) and with Özal’s death in 1993 the ANAP changed radically. The followers of the movement, again, returned to support Erbakan’s parties despite the fact that Coşan harshly opposed and criticized Necmettin Erbakan.
The Religious Periphery in Turkish Political Life
Even if the capability of religious movements and orders to mobilize votes is modest, it is undoubted that religion has a key role in shaping and maintaining conservative values. In the words of a Turkish scholar: “New political parties emerged to represent the values of the periphery, which had been cloaked in tradition. At the core of these values were some form of religiosity, awe and suspicion of the state, and local heterodoxy which, in turn, bred decentralization as well as avoidance of the government, its officials, and their alien culture” (Kalaycıoğlu, 2007, p. 234).
What Kalaycıoğlu calls ‘periphery’ was the portion of Turkish population that was exposed less to Kemalist secular reforms and ideas. During the 1950s, the periphery remained attached to religious values and maintained a strong attachment to nationalist values with a profound admiration of the glorious Muslim and Ottoman past (something that Kemalism aimed to conceal). Religion remained a key element of Turkish identity. In a survey conducted in 2006, 44.6 percent of Turks defined themselves first as Muslims, whereas only 30 percent define themselves first as citizens of the Turkish Republic (Çarkoğlu & Toprak, 2007, p. 44). However, this figure did not meant support for the introduction of Shari’ah law that remains marginal (8.9 percent in 2006 (ibid., p. 81)).
During the one-party regime, Kemalism also neglected rural areas and focused on urban centers for its project of modernization. This produced a strong feeling of mağduriyet, victimization among conservatives living in the periphery. Moreover, forms of discrimination toward the pious or, for instance, the ban of the veil or beard in schools and public offices strengthen the feeling of being marginalized.
Throughout the rapid process of Turkish urbanization, the periphery moved toward urban areas and gained access to higher education and public office. However, the process of urbanization did not lead to socio-economic and political integration. Religious orders and movements often have helped to sustain, transmit, and support alternative identities based on religion. After the 1990s, private schools, student accommodations and economic enterprises – promoted by different religious groups – offered students and employees success at university entrance examinations and careers but maintained some form of peasant or small town culture, psyches and virtues. Students and employees were encouraged to take part in religious instruction and ceremonies, study Ottoman grandeur and to criticize Kemalism.
Turkey’s Kulturkampf and 24 June 2018 Elections
In the long run, there has been the creation of a Kulturkampf, a deep division along cultural lines between two large communities – secular and pious – which affects political and electoral behavior, as well as being at the center of a clash between elites, including Islamists of varying positions. On the one hand, there are those whose lifestyles are shaped on the basis of a secular image of the good society. On the other, there are those who structure their lives and view of society around values of tradition and religion (Kalaycıoğlu, 2011; Mardin, 1973).
Kulturkampf has been a key factor in influencing Turkish voting behaviors (Kalaycıoğlu, 2007, 2011). In the past sixteen years, AK Parti has been able to monopolize socially conservative, religious and economically satisfied community of voters by amplifying the role of Kulturkampf. It was able to build the monopoly thanks to a positive record of economic growth, expansion and melioration of welfare state, as well as the 10 percent threshold and the rise of the costs of politics. Small political parties of the center-right were easily co-opted (for instance Suleyman Soylu’s Demokrat Parti and Numan Kurtulmuş’s HAS Parti).
Opposition parties were unable to alleviate the conservatives’ fears of a backlash of Kemalist secularism or to respond to their concerns. Both CHP and the Kurdish-leftist Halkların Demokratik Partisi (Democratic Party of the Peoples, HDP) have welcomed in their ranks conservative politicians and smoothed their critiques of religion or religious education. Even the main challenger of Tayyip Erdoğan, current president and chairman of AK Party, at the presidential elections – Muharrem İnce – has many times stressed his ‘peripheral’ background and the fact that his mother and many members of his family are veiled. Nevertheless, conservative voters remain diffident. In the upcoming election, though, the chance to participate in the elections with a coalition has given the chance to Islamist Erbakan’s old FP and İYİ Parti, born from a split in the nationalist party, to overcome the threshold and attract conservative votes. Both of them rely on tradition, religion and nationalist sentiments to challenge AK Parti.
Whatever the result of the upcoming presidential and legislative elections both religious movements and religion as identity will be a key element of the different parties’ discourse and will certainly influence voters.
5 Charts That Show Turkey's Capital Flight Problem Is Getting Worse
By
Fercan Yalinkilic
June 19, 2018, 6:11 AM EDT
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/arti...l-flight-problem-is-getting-worse-in-5-charts
By
Fercan Yalinkilic
June 19, 2018, 6:11 AM EDT
-
Both foreigners and locals are getting their money out -
Corporate sector faces foreign debt refinancing squeeze
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/arti...l-flight-problem-is-getting-worse-in-5-charts
Muharrem İnce has the better of him in this election. I'm absolutely positive about that.
The only real question is, can they resort to their normal tactics and corrupt the election enough to swing it in his favour. I have a sick feeling they will.
The only real question is, can they resort to their normal tactics and corrupt the election enough to swing it in his favour. I have a sick feeling they will.
Muharrem Ince in...
Izmir
Ankara
Istanbul (right now)
I read something yesterday about how Ince went for a risky strategy by engaging in a personality contest with the dictator. To call it a contest is laughable. Ince has wiped the floor with him.
Only real question now is can enough people turn out tomorrow to translate that into a significant number, one that will be backed up by the Iyi Party and HDP next week to remove him.
Izmir
Ankara
Istanbul (right now)
I read something yesterday about how Ince went for a risky strategy by engaging in a personality contest with the dictator. To call it a contest is laughable. Ince has wiped the floor with him.
Only real question now is can enough people turn out tomorrow to translate that into a significant number, one that will be backed up by the Iyi Party and HDP next week to remove him.
Can you explain in a few words who Ince is, what he did in the past, what makes him so popular and what his plans would be?
Started out as a teacher from a working class background, entered parliament at 38, CHP MP for small city near Istanbul called Yalova (currently in his fourth term). Twice tried to become CHP chairman but was beaten by Kılıçdaroğlu on both occasions.
His political career thus far has been defined by his very vocal opposition to AKP polices e.g. removing immunity for parliament members, which Kılıçdaroğlu supported and saw Selahattin Demirtaş placed in prison.
His popularity stems from him being a legitimate contender i.e. he's charismatic and intelligent enough to beat them to the punch, which has taken Turks aback because it's practically been unheard of since the AKP came to power.
His proposals include reducing the threshold a party requires take its place in parliament from 10% to 5% (significant, as Kurdish people with the HDP won't be screwed, and it opens the door for other, smaller parties), changing anti-terror laws (somewhat ambiguous when read like that, but safe to say a change in direction from everyone being labelled a terrorist like happens in Turkey today), and free education (obviously a topic he's passionate about since he was said to be a good teacher).
His political career thus far has been defined by his very vocal opposition to AKP polices e.g. removing immunity for parliament members, which Kılıçdaroğlu supported and saw Selahattin Demirtaş placed in prison.
His popularity stems from him being a legitimate contender i.e. he's charismatic and intelligent enough to beat them to the punch, which has taken Turks aback because it's practically been unheard of since the AKP came to power.
His proposals include reducing the threshold a party requires take its place in parliament from 10% to 5% (significant, as Kurdish people with the HDP won't be screwed, and it opens the door for other, smaller parties), changing anti-terror laws (somewhat ambiguous when read like that, but safe to say a change in direction from everyone being labelled a terrorist like happens in Turkey today), and free education (obviously a topic he's passionate about since he was said to be a good teacher).
How is he religion wise? Secular like Turkey should be, or a loon like Erdogan?
As secular as they come. Actually, those far things I probably should have mentioned. He's pretty much the embodiment of Kemalism, and the free education he's proposing is secular. Somewhat amusing story on that front - he was "caught" drinking beer on a beach during Ramadan, but he noticed the camera and carried on drinking. That's what the AKP can't come to terms with - all the mud they're slinging won't stick because he owns everything about himself e.g. he wrote some romantic poems in the past, but he just laughed it off and made a reference to somebody in the conservative AKP having bought a cock ring.
At the same time, his mother and sister wear the headscarf, so the AKP are finding it difficult to even drive home the "but he's oppressing our us and our religion" angle.
Cheers. Good luck. Hopefully he can do it.
Thanks. Awesome picture from his Twitter account.
Crazy how that road on the left is also full of people who wanted to get closer.
Crazy how that road on the left is also full of people who wanted to get closer.
Wow, that’s an insane crowd.Thanks. Awesome picture from his Twitter account.
Crazy how that road on the left is also full of people who wanted to get closer.
Does he have a fair chance in the election?
Absolutely. A lot of the talk has been pessimistic because the media is controlled by the government and nobody seems to have any real idea where some of these polling companies get their numbers from, so they put him on the verge of a glorious first-round victory, of course.
However, here is some perspective - back in 2014, he won with 51.79% as the only real contender against two other candidates. This time, he faces a host of different opponents who all have the potential to not only rally their own bases but eat into his. Karamollaoğlu will take religious voters, Akşener the nationalists, Demirtaş the Kurds, and İnce, who will take the secular vote, can bring all of those together in a second round. To say that he can get anything close to the same number under these enormously different circumstances is ludicrous, but I expected no less. And to anybody not familiar with politics in Turkey, that begs the question, why would they leave him for other candidates? He will always have his conservatives as the core supporters, but he's oppressed the Kurds after breaking the ceasefire, the economy is a mess, and he has run an extremely underwhelming campaign.
Not only do I not put him anything close to a first-round victory, I think his latest statements are an admission of how close İnce might just be. He's been making statements about how people need to go out and vote or they'll suffer the consequences (something along those lines). He knows he can corrupt the process, it's just that he needs a certain percentage to lay the foundations for it. Call me naive, but I'm thinking he might not even have that.
Who knows. What I do know is that İnce is the best possible chance Turkey could have for finally removing him.
I heard Muharrem Ince and Meral Aksener said some bad things about the Syrian refugees currently residing in Turkey, what did they say?