Turkey

I think modern western democracy is a sham and a long way away from the principles and ideals espoused by people like Mill, Locke, and the popular reform movements such as the Chartists. What good it used to have, simply isn't there anymore and it isn't fit for purpose.

Ataturk had suppressed the population, and there was no tangible benefit for the people as a result of it either. Transplanting those reforms in such a brutal way benefited no one but him and his cronies.
Woah. You praise Erdogan's economic policy but give absolutely no credit to Kemal for his reforms? At all? They had no benefit? I mean that's just crazy.

Sorry mate, it seems you're very much biased because of your religion.
 
One of the organizers is apparently the head of Turkish Air Force. So it seems that there were really high persons involved in the coup, not only a few generals going rogue.
 
Erdogan just had his Palpatine moment. Turkey are doomed now, IMO. He will crush any remaining opposition, and will purge the army installing as its leaders only his pawns (he has been doing this already in the last few years) in order to ensure that this won't ever happen again.

A decade or two from now, Turkey will be a wahhabi state, like the other EU/US 'allies' in the Gulf. A century of secularism is over.

Heh, good analogy.
 
And their secularism wasn't introduced by the West either. Kemal actually had to get Western troops out of the country before he could enact his reforms.
You're having an absolute laugh if you're suggesting the great powers had no bearing on the political direction of the Turkish Republic after their war of independence whether directly (the demarcation of borders) or indirectly, the lack of troops on the ground doesn't preclude the presence of diplomats in the Sublime Porte.
 
I think modern western democracy is a sham and a long way away from the principles and ideals espoused by people like Mill, Locke, and the popular reform movements such as the Chartists. What good it used to have, simply isn't there anymore and it isn't fit for purpose.

Ataturk had suppressed the population, and there was no tangible benefit for the people as a result of it either. Transplanting those reforms in such a brutal way benefited no one but him and his cronies.

Whilst it is true that Ataturk was no angel to religious Anatolians, the bolded part there is utter, utter bullshit. I apologise for being rude but I do know what I'm talking about. My master's dissertation was about Kemalist reforms; and girlfriend is Turkish!
 
You're having an absolute laugh if you're suggesting the great powers had no bearing on the political direction of the Turkish Republic after their war of independence whether directly (the demarcation of borders) or indirectly, the lack of troops on the ground doesn't preclude the presence of diplomats in the Sublime Porte.

Actually he's basically correct. It didn't matter who was present at the Porte, since Kemal made Ankara the new capital. Kemal didn't take direction from any outsiders. Here's a basic outline of what happened.

At the end of 1918, Istanbul and the Ottoman government, including the Sultan, were controlled by the allies (basically, the British), who seemed to have the destiny of the whole of Anatolia in their hands to do with as they pleased (as they would do in the Levant and Iraq). In the Treaty of Sevres (see the big map I posted a page or two back) the allies decided to grant self-determination in Anatolia to the Armenians, Greeks, and Kurds (the latter to be under some kind of European protectorate), leaving 'Turkey' as a rump state in central Anatolia with Istanbul and the Staits under international control. Other zones in Anatolia were to be given to Italy and French. Essentially, it was a 'victor(s) take the spoils' arrangement.

While all this was happening (1918-1920), Kemal had fled Istanbul to eastern Anatolia to organize Turkish resistance to all this. The sultan, under British pressure, dismissed him from the armed forces, but most Turks recognized the sultan was no better than a British puppet at this stage and they rallied to Kemal's cause, and the movement eventually organized the Grand National Assembly and National Pact, where they designated Turkey's frontiers to be those non-Arab regions of the what was left of the empire with a Turkish majority - regions which were now occupied by European, Greek, and Armenian forces, with the Greeks (with allied support) pushing inland from the west coast to occupy more and more of Anatolia. Kemal invaded the Armenian state, and split it with the Bolsheviks, before ousting the French and Italians, and eventually expelling the Greek forces (along with over a million Turkish-speaking Christians).

Kemal made Ankara the capital of the new Turkey, and he won recognition from the European powers (formalized in the Treaty of Lausanne), forcing the British out of Istanbul and fulfilling the territorial claims of the National Pact, with the exception of Iskenderun (modern-day Hatay Province which the Turks took from Syria in 1939) and Mosul (which the Turks still claim to this day).

So Kemal's establishment of the Turkish Republic was carried out in defiance of the powers, and he won due to his military expertise, the powers' post-war fatigue, and his pragmatism (he made no claims to the Arab lands or the Turkish lands east of Anatolia). His ideological orientation was pro-Western, but that was the result of trends that had been taking place in the Ottoman Empire for over half a century, it was never due to the pressure of foreign powers.
 
Can someone teach the military in turkey for them to succeed they need at least some of the high rank officers with some weight and then they need to arrest/kill the president right in the beginning.
 
The perspective of a proper Turkey expert:

One of the most consistent themes coming out of all of this is the accusation--at least from Erdogan's critics on social media--that the coup attempt was an inside job, a false-flag operation designed to justify a crackdown on opposition.

I'm not one to rule anything out categorically, but this idea frankly sounds crazy to me, even given the standards of Mr. Erdogan's tumultuous rule. The reason I feel this way is because of the Ergenekon trials, the series of investigations which began as an examination into alleged crimes by the state against its citizens and somehow ended up getting transformed into--you guessed it--a trial of supposed coup-plotters. Thousands of people were detained for years without ever going to trial, and the defendants were not only military officers (there were many of them) but also university professors, journalists, NGO types, and even university rectors who didn't allow headscarves on their campuses.

When you have something like Ergenekon--which for years was taken seriously by journalists and US-based Turkey experts--why do you need an actual false-flag operation? I think that if Erdogan and his people really wanted to create a crisis in Turkey and then use it as an excuse to crack down on politics, they wouldn't need to create an actual coup in which people are shooting at each other and dying. Something like that, after all, would have the potential to spin out of control. Instead, all Erdogan would have to do is publicly state that there was a coup plot against him and that the security forces were taking care of it. This is what happened with Ergenekon, and it went on so gradually that--at least internationally-- nobody even started calling it a witch-hunt until it was almost over.

So, the idea that Erdogan would risk everything by staging a coup just doesn't make sense to me, although I do understand why people who don't like Erdogan would prefer to believe this. For years, I think a lot of people in Turkey--again, I'm talking about Erdogan's critics here--have been secretly hoping that a coup would take him out. When this failed to happen yesterday, the reaction on social media was incredulous. What kind of coup is this, people asked? It must have been fake, they reason, because if the military had really wanted to overthrow Erdogan they would have.

These are the views coming from otherwise well-educated Turks who consider themselves Kemalist opponents of an Islamist politician--the profile that many of my friends from Turkey fit into. They're smart people but they've been left somewhat deranged by more than ten years of Erdogan. Like birthers in the United States who look for any reason to undermine President Obama's legitimacy, they still cannot believe that a majority--or at least a sizeable plurality--of their fellow citizens could actually support that man!

But in attributing every development--the coup attempt, the recent attack at the Istanbul airport, the other attacks that have occurred over the last year--to Erdogan, the president's critics are assigning him a power that is well beyond even his means. Nothing, they think, happens in Turkey without Erdogan and his backers having a hand behind it.

Frankly, I think it kills Erdogan's detractors that the world media is being saturated right now with images of Turks taking to the streets in defiance of military tanks--and in support of Recep Tayyip Erdogan. After all, it was just three years ago that the Gezi kids were the darlings of the world media, fighting the good fight against their autocratic oppressor. And now, to have your heroic-victim-in-the-face-of-power status appropriated by the great unwashed of AKP voters must be particularly galling to them.

Who knows? The conspiracy theorists might be right, but I doubt it. Why take such a risk when you've already proven that you have the power to jail thousands of people on trumped-up charges without even firing a shot? Moreover, the Turkish government has been trying hard lately to bring a bit of stability to their country. Their recent deals with Israel and Russia were designed to mend fences and give Turkey a bit of breathing room. It would seem totally idiotic to throw gasoline on the fire by setting up a "fake" coup. Especially--and it's worth repeating this--when you already basically have autocratic powers.

Pennsylvania?

Now this is something that makes me suspicious, and puts just enough doubt in my mind to make me qualify some of my comments above. During his bizarre and hastily-organized press conference at Istanbul airport President Erdogan--flanked by sketchy-looking dudes in civilian clothes brandishing machine guns--already seemed to have a pretty clear idea about who was behind all of this. "Turkey will not be run from Pennsylvania?" said Erdogan.

Pennsylvania? Huh? Some of my American friends were a little perplexed by this. What grudge could the president of Turkey possibly have against the Keystone State?

The "Pennsylvania" comment was a reference, of course, to Fethullah Gulen, someone that I've written about a few times on these pages. Gulen--a preacher with an army of supporters in business and education in Turkey--was a former ally of Erdogan who was chased out of Turkey in 1998 after a military intervention the previous year. For years, the Gulenists--who controlled a number of media outlets and businesses in Turkey--were important backers of Erdogan's AKP government. Indeed, the Gulen-controlled English-language newspaper Today's Zaman was a reliable cheerleader for the Ergenekon trials while thousands of innocent people were rotting behind bars. This didn't stop a parade of American academics and journalists from lending their names and talents to this newspaper's masthead.

Indeed, it was the rotten international coverage of Ergenekon that spurred me to begin writing more frequently on this blog. Throughout the course of Ergenekon, Today's Zaman uncritically re-transmitted the Turkish government's claims that all of those jailed in Ergenekon were vicious coup-plotters, and the fact that a number of Turkey specialists from the US and Europe were willing to write for this paper probably had something to do with this narrative proving so stubbornly resilient. It was only once the trials were basically over that most American commentators finally got around to viewing these trials with a more critical eye.

For reasons that are still not entirely clear, but which most likely have to do with money, the Gulenists and Erdogan's AKP developed an increasingly acrimonious relationship in recent years, culminating in the arrest of several government ministers in December of 2013. The Gulenists, you see, were largely in charge of Turkey's national (based within the Ministry of Internal Affairs) police force by then--the common estimate was that about 90% of the cops were Gulenists.

Why do you think Erdogan relied so heavily on police back during the Gezi Park protests of June-July 2013? Don't you think he would have used the military if he'd felt he could trust them? But after the police bailed him out during the summer of Gezi, they apparently wanted a large piece of the pie--in terms of jobs and other benefits which come from having friends in high places. From what I've been able to understand, it was mainly a result of the inability of Erdogan's AKP and the still-somewhat underground Gulenists to agree upon how to divide the pie that led to their confrontation in the fall of 2013.

The AKP responded by closing the cram-schools that had been a lucrative source of income for many of the Gulenists, and ever since that time the "parallel state" of the Gulenists has been one of Erdogan's favorite bogeymen. Just like the so-called "Ergenekon gang" was supposedly behind everything that was wrong in Turkey prior to the AKP-Gulenist split, and since the beginning of 2014 their ranks within the police force have been thinned considerably.

We'll see what happens with the investigation into the coup, but here's a spoiler alert: the blowback on this is going to be very big and very wide, and will eventually provide, in all probability, some support for those who claim that this was all staged to begin with. Why? Because I have no doubt that large numbers of people who probably had nothing to do with the coup will end up getting blamed for it.

More here - http://blog2.jhmeyer.net/2016/07/turkish-coup-attempt-my-hot-take.html#more
 
Whilst it is true that Ataturk was no angel to religious Anatolians, the bolded part there is utter, utter bullshit. I apologise for being rude but I do know what I'm talking about. My master's dissertation was about Kemalist reforms; and girlfriend is Turkish!
:lol:

What you and @Synco are seeing as a benefit, I see as a negative. I respect that we have a difference of opinion on the issue, and am happy to agree to disagree. Ataturk's legacy is one that is very much tainted by suppression of Islamic thought and allowing a military to have an undue influence upon the political system. His reforms were all well and good, but my point wasn't about them, it was his suppression of religious thought in the country.
As a Muslim, I see Ataturk as a suppressor and a dictator, who targeted the religious poor and was almost pathologic in his crusade against the role of Islam in public life in Turkey. He succeeded in his aims during his lifetime, and his legacy was intact for many years after it but it must surely grate all these Kemalists that the one leader to come up and really put Turkey on the map after Ataturk, was an Islamist.

And it's probably safe to say that you hold similar views vis-a-vis Erdogan, and that's fine. We e have different priorities and beliefs, and at the end of the day we'rsat on our arses from the comforts of our own home discussing what close to 80m people are living through right now. So, there's no need to get worked up, it's just the internet mate :)
 
Actually he's basically correct. It didn't matter who was present at the Porte, since Kemal made Ankara the new capital. Kemal didn't take direction from any outsiders. Here's a basic outline of what happened.

At the end of 1918, Istanbul and the Ottoman government, including the Sultan, were controlled by the allies (basically, the British), who seemed to have the destiny of the whole of Anatolia in their hands to do with as they pleased (as they would do in the Levant and Iraq). In the Treaty of Sevres (see the big map I posted a page or two back) the allies decided to grant self-determination in Anatolia to the Armenians, Greeks, and Kurds (the latter to be under some kind of European protectorate), leaving 'Turkey' as a rump state in central Anatolia with Istanbul and the Staits under international control. Other zones in Anatolia were to be given to Italy and French. Essentially, it was a 'victor(s) take the spoils' arrangement.

While all this was happening (1918-1920), Kemal had fled Istanbul to eastern Anatolia to organize Turkish resistance to all this. The sultan, under British pressure, dismissed him from the armed forces, but most Turks recognized the sultan was no better than a British puppet at this stage and they rallied to Kemal's cause, and the movement eventually organized the Grand National Assembly and National Pact, where they designated Turkey's frontiers to be those non-Arab regions of the what was left of the empire with a Turkish majority - regions which were now occupied by European, Greek, and Armenian forces, with the Greeks (with allied support) pushing inland from the west coast to occupy more and more of Anatolia. Kemal invaded the Armenian state, and split it with the Bolsheviks, before ousting the French and Italians, and eventually expelling the Greek forces (along with over a million Turkish-speaking Christians).

Kemal made Ankara the capital of the new Turkey, and he won recognition from the European powers (formalized in the Treaty of Lausanne), forcing the British out of Istanbul and fulfilling the territorial claims of the National Pact, with the exception of Iskenderun (modern-day Hatay Province which the Turks took from Syria in 1939) and Mosul (which the Turks still claim to this day).

So Kemal's establishment of the Turkish Republic was carried out in defiance of the powers, and he won due to his military expertise, the powers' post-war fatigue, and his pragmatism (he made no claims to the Arab lands or the Turkish lands east of Anatolia). His ideological orientation was pro-Western, but that was the result of trends that had been taking place in the Ottoman Empire for over half a century, it was never due to the pressure of foreign powers.

I'm aware of everything you've stated 2cent, I'm not denying Kemals military expertise nor the events of the war but the treaty of Lausanne wasn't a unilateral declaration with one signatory, rather negotiations took place with a consensus reached by all the parties. Kemal obviously had The upper hand in negotiations but to deny any influence from the great powers on his decsions is being being naive. A lot of things happened in the 1920s but the Great Nations giving up influence in the lands of Byzantium while gaining it after 700 years isn't one if them.
 
I'm aware of everything you've stated 2cent, I'm not denying Kemals military expertise nor the events of the war but the treaty of Lausanne wasn't a unilateral declaration with one signatory, rather negotiations took place with a consensus reached by all the parties. Kemal obviously had The upper hand in negotiations but to deny any influence from the great powers on his decsions is being being naive. A lot of things happened in the 1920s but the Great Nations giving up influence in the lands of Byzantium while gaining it after 700 years isn't one if them.

So what did Kemal give up in the negotiations?
 
I don't think he gave up anything mate, he got what he wanted but his reformation of the state was influenced by other powers, don't take that to mean at the barrel of a gun though because influence can be soft as well as hard.

I agree it was influenced by other powers, though not in the same way you seem to. Take his abolition of the caliphate - one of the factors that persuaded him to finally go through with it (he might have been willing to leave the caliph as a figure-head, a kind of Muslim pope but under the thumb of the government) was that leading members of the Khilafat Movement kept pestering him to restore the caliph to his former power. In December 1923 Agha Khan and Syed Ameer Ali even wrote him an open letter basically demanding it - Kemal took this as foreign (British) interference in strictly Turkish affairs, and abolished the caliphate altogether as a kind of f/u to Indian Muslims for, as he saw it, trying to undermine Turkish sovereignty in the interests of Britain.

But I believe Kemal's pro-Western convictions were built up over the course of his life training in the Ottoman military, in the age of Ottoman reform and military defeat. They were his own genuine convictions.

@2cents I like you bro and I know that you know what you're talking about so do you agree that the dissolution of the Caliphate was a massive feck up in regards to the current vacuum in today's religious authority?

Not really. The caliphate was practically dead anyway since the Young Turk revolution in 1908. During the war it was just a symbol for the Turks to try and win Muslim support, and for non-Turkish Muslims to hang on to a sense of identity during a period of upheaval and uncertainty. After the war it became an albatross around Kemal's neck as he attempted to build a country out of the ruins of Anatolia, and the Arabs wasted lots of time arguing among themselves over who should be the next caliph when they should have been organizing together against the imperialists.

On the question of religious authority today, I get that the fall of the caliphate has become a symbol for Muslims of their political weakness on the international stage. But I think the caliphate that modern Muslims hanker after is a nostalgic myth, one that never really existed in history, and the pan-Islamic yearning for it today is a substitute for real political engagement. The idea that Muslims need to be politically united to be strong doesn't hold up in history, and I think that formally tying Islam to the modern state with all its cynical politics is potentially extremely damaging for Islam as a faith, as it would suggest the idea that The Caliphate = Islam, meaning anything that benefits the state benefits Islam, even if it goes against Islamic doctrine! This is something the Iranians have debated since their revolution, Khamenei even questioned Khomeini on it after the Iran-Iraq war, and Khomeini confirmed the primacy of state interests (see http://irandataportal.syr.edu/admon...faqihs-authority-and-the-course-of-its-stages).

I think that, in history, Islamic civilization was strong when Muslims had a secure and confident sense of what exactly it meant to be a Muslim, with all its complexities and even contradictions, and that while at times political unity resulted (in part) from this sense, it was never a precondition for it (of course, Muslims haven't been politically united under one state since 750 AD). This sense wasn't tied to the fortunes of the caliphate, or to the shari'a, but from a higher notion of God and belief in the common destiny of the umma. Ibn Battuta for example traveled the world of Islam through a dozen or more different political entities while always feeling, at some level, at home.

The one glaring hole in my theory is that the Mongols conquered the Islamic world at a moment of political fragmentation, but even or especially here we see that the strength of Islam is not dependent on politics, since the Mongols ultimately converted and laid the basis for the great Ottoman, Safavid and Mughal Empires, a period when Islamic civilization was never stronger, but had no caliphate (the Ottomans only started making serious claims to the caliphate in the late 1700s - before that, both them and the Mughals had embraced it as a legitimating title, but didn't invest it with any political significance).

I think the impact of Western military, economic and especially cultural dominance caused Muslims to question the very basis of what it meant to be a Muslim, and has produced the free-for-all and lack of central authority we see today - this all happened well in advance of the abolition of the caliphate. This is not unique to Muslims, the rise of the West posed the same questions for the Chinese, Russians, Hindus, and everyone else, and everyone has struggled to come to terms with it in one way or another. The resurrection of the caliphate today won't solve the problem for Muslims, it will only come about after they have resolved the questions among themselves.
 
Last edited:
I agree it was influenced by other powers, though not in the same way you seem to. Take his abolition of the caliphate - one of the factors that persuaded him to finally go through with it (he might have been willing to leave the caliph as a figure-head, a kind of Muslim pope but under the thumb of the government) was that leading members of the Khilafat Movement kept pestering him to restore the caliph to his former power. In December 1923 Agha Khan and Syed Ameer Ali even wrote him an open letter basically demanding it - Kemal took this as foreign (British) interference in strictly Turkish affairs, and abolished the caliphate altogether as a kind of f/u to Indian Muslims for, as he saw it, trying to undermine Turkish sovereignty in the interests of Britain.

But I believe Kemal's pro-Western convictions were built up over the course of his life training in the Ottoman military, in the age of Ottoman reform and military defeat. They were his own genuine convictions.



Not really. The caliphate was practically dead anyway since the Young Turk revolution in 1908. During the war it was just a symbol for the Turks to try and win Muslim support, and for non-Turkish Muslims to hang on to a sense of identity during a period of upheaval and uncertainty. After the war it became an albatross around Kemal's neck as he attempted to build a country out of the ruins of Anatolia, and the Arabs wasted lots of time arguing among themselves over who should be the next caliph when they should have been organizing together against the imperialists.

On the question of religious authority today, I get that the fall of the caliphate has become a symbol for Muslims of their political weakness on the international stage. But I think the caliphate that modern Muslims hanker after is a nostalgic myth, one that never really existed in history, and the pan-Islamic yearning for it today is a substitute for real political engagement. The idea that Muslims need to be politically united to be strong doesn't hold up in history, and I think that formally tying Islam to the modern state with all its cynical politics is potentially extremely damaging for Islam as a faith, as it would suggest the idea that The Caliphate = Islam, meaning anything that benefits the state benefits Islam, even if it goes against Islamic doctrine! This is something the Iranians have debated since their revolution, Khamenei even questioned Khomeini on it after the Iran-Iraq war, and Khomeini confirmed the primacy of state interests (see http://irandataportal.syr.edu/admon...faqihs-authority-and-the-course-of-its-stages).

I think that, in history, Islamic civilization was strong when Muslims had a secure and confident sense of what exactly it meant to be a Muslim, with all its complexities and even contradictions, and that while at times political unity resulted (in part) from this sense, it was never a precondition for it (of course, Muslims haven't been politically united under one state since 750 AD). This sense wasn't tied to the fortunes of the caliphate, or to the shari'a, but from a higher notion of God and belief in the common destiny of the umma. Ibn Battuta for example traveled the world of Islam through a dozen or more different political entities while always feeling, at some level, at home.

The one glaring hole in my theory is that the Mongols conquered the Islamic world at a moment of political fragmentation, but even or especially here we see that the strength of Islam is not dependent on politics, since the Mongols ultimately converted and laid the basis for the great Ottoman, Safavid and Mughal Empires, a period when Islamic civilization was never stronger, but had no caliphate (the Ottoman only started making serious claims to the caliphate in the late 1700s - before that, both them and the Mughals had embraced it as a legitimating title, but didn't invest it with any political significance).

I think the impact of Western military, economic and especially cultural dominance caused Muslims to question the very basis of what it meant to be a Muslim, and has produced the free-for-all and lack of central authority we see today - this all happened when in advance of the abolition of the caliphate. This is not unique to Muslims, the rise of the West posed the same questions for the Chinese, Russians, Hindus, and everyone else, and everyone has struggled to come to terms with it in one way or another. The resurrection of the caliphate today won't solve the problem for Muslims, it will only come about after they have resolved the questions among themselves.
Quality answer.

I think that there was still a chance to create a figurehead caliph though, I mean the Roman question was answered pretty well was it not?
 
Last edited:
:lol:

What you and @Synco are seeing as a benefit, I see as a negative. I respect that we have a difference of opinion on the issue, and am happy to agree to disagree. Ataturk's legacy is one that is very much tainted by suppression of Islamic thought and allowing a military to have an undue influence upon the political system. His reforms were all well and good, but my point wasn't about them, it was his suppression of religious thought in the country.
As a Muslim, I see Ataturk as a suppressor and a dictator, who targeted the religious poor and was almost pathologic in his crusade against the role of Islam in public life in Turkey. He succeeded in his aims during his lifetime, and his legacy was intact for many years after it but it must surely grate all these Kemalists that the one leader to come up and really put Turkey on the map after Ataturk, was an Islamist.

And it's probably safe to say that you hold similar views vis-a-vis Erdogan, and that's fine. We e have different priorities and beliefs, and at the end of the day we'rsat on our arses from the comforts of our own home discussing what close to 80m people are living through right now. So, there's no need to get worked up, it's just the internet mate :)

:lol:

Fair enough but I think you're missing the point. Unlike many in Turkey who basically worship Ataturk, I'm of the opinion that he was indeed an oppressive leader in many respects; but to say that his reforms did not bring about any positive changes in Turkey, or in your words 'no tangible benefits for the people', is beyond ridiculous.

On the bolded part: no, I don't hold similar views towards Erdogan. Despite the norm, it's a lazy assumption to say anyone who thinks of Ataturk's reforms as being overall a positive is automatically anti-Erdogan. If anything, his descend towards authoritarianism is reminiscent to that of Ataturk. Still, that doesn't change the fact that Erdogan has brought about many positive changes - the same way Ataturk did with his reforms.

It's no use painting the whole secularist/Islamist power struggle in Turkey as a black and white issue. There are many, many nuances that need to be considered.
 
Last edited:
So it now turns out only a couple of thousand soldiers took part. Not even 1% of the Turkey army.

Media really did hype it up a lot, considering how they were making out what a momentous attempted coup this was during the first few hours.
 
So it now turns out only a couple of thousand soldiers took part. Not even a 1% of the Turkey army.

Media really did hype it up a lot, considering how they were making out what a momentous coup this was during the first few hours.

I think that might be the way a lot of coups actually play out, with the idea that the rank-and-file will fall into line once they suss which way the wind is blowing. But this looks more like a desperate act by a faction which felt like it had little to lose. There's a lot of stuff going to come out, but we might never known the important details.
 
There are reports of 2,700 judges being 'purged'. Were the judges part of the coup, or is Erdogon just taking advantage of the situation to justify a preconceived political move?
 
I think that might be the way a lot of coups actually play out, with the idea that the rank-and-file will fall into line once they suss which way the wind is blowing. But this looks more like a desperate act by a faction which felt like it had little to lose. There's a lot of stuff going to come out, but we might never known the important details.
Yeah, I guess so.

If the coup had managed to arrest Erdogan, PM and other leaders while at the same time keeping the situation calmer, then I guess that many other army fractions might have joined the coup. As it was, the coup failed by not managing to do so, and ironically, because of Erdogan's use of social media.

I think that the coup was doomed to fail regardless. It is a decade too late for any coup in Turkey to be successful, and I guess that now, Erdogan controls a large part of army which essentially makes impossible for a coup to be successful (and at the same time to not start a civil war). Turkey will change their leader when Erdogan dies or in an extreme case if they go into a big economical recession (and if that happens, people might have less love for Erdogan).

I think that as long as he can keep the economy strong, he'll lead. Sure, he is an evil dictator, but at the end of the day economy rules. And he has the rural religious people regardless, so all he needs to do now is keep economy ok, not go full Wahhabi, and arrest whoever he wants which might threaten him.
 
There are reports of 2,700 judges being 'purged'. Were the judges part of the coup, or is Erdogon just taking advantage of the situation to justify a preconceived political move?
Likely the second. After all, how 35% of the judges in the entire country can be involved in a military-based coup, and how did the government found it that fast.
 
You don't need a mass of the army for a succesful coup. South Koreas fourth republic fell because the ranking member of the secret service decided to assassinate the president and instigate a coup, and the ranking general soon saw an opportunity to rise to power. The army just fell in line when the general told them to.

There are reports of 2,700 judges being 'purged'. Were the judges part of the coup, or is Erdogon just taking advantage of the situation to justify a preconceived political move?
The latter.
 
There are reports of 2,700 judges being 'purged'. Were the judges part of the coup, or is Erdogon just taking advantage of the situation to justify a preconceived political move?

There are some credible reports that the government had a planned purge of Gulenists in the military and other areas (such as the judiciary) lined up, and that this 'coup' attempt was a desperate attempt to pre-empt it. That would explain the government's apparent readiness with these lists of names, not to mention the farcical planning of the rebels.
 
You don't need a mass of the army for a succesful coup. Koreas fourth republic fell because the ranking member of the secret service decided to assassinate the president and instigate a coup, and the ranking general soon saw an opportunity to rise to power.
.
Indeed, but at the same time, you probably need more than what they had yesterday (especially when it comes to removing a highly popular president like Erdogan).

As far as it is understood, the highest profile officer, was a four star ex-commander of Air Force, and in addition have been another 4 generals/admirals and 30 or so colonels. Turkish army has around 350 generals/admirals, and many of them were higher ranked than the coup leader. I guess, that at the very worst case, you need to have some of the army leaders there.

Yesterday, all main leaders of army bar one were on Erdogan's side. It was doomed to fail before it started.
 
Indeed, but at the same time, you probably need more than what they had yesterday (especially when it comes to removing a highly popular president like Erdogan).

As far as it is understood, the highest profile officer, was a four star ex-commander of Air Force, and in addition have been another 4 generals/admirals and 30 or so colonels. Turkish army has around 350 generals/admirals, and many of them were higher ranked than the coup leader. I guess, that at the very worst case, you need to have some of the army leaders there.

Yesterday, all main leaders of army bar one were on Erdogan's side. It was doomed to fail before it started.
Park was also highly popular, but it still only took a single person with a gun to bring him down. If the first thing this coup had done was assassinate Erdogan it would have given the ranking generals something to think about.
 
Park was also highly popular, but it still only took a single person with a gun to bring him down. If the first thing this coup had done was assassinate Erdogan it would have given the ranking generals something to think about.
Probably. With Davotoglu out of the scene, and with the prime minister being essentially a yes-man who can't think of itself, with some luck it might have been the end of that party.

On the other side, military coups aren't something to be exited about.
 
On the other side, military coups aren't something to be exited about.

Very true. And one of the worst things imaginable was a failed military coup, as we will likely see.

It's one of those inevitable dilemmas concerning political change in today's Middle East (I for once include Turkey here). With the possible exception of Kurdish self-governance, I simply can't see any half-decent (let alone progressive) faction powerful enough to have a decent say in how things go in the foreseeable future. The outcome of the "Arab Spring" and the Gezi protests was a definitive proof of that, sadly.

So now it mostly boils down to the question of the lesser evil. Erdogan/AKP or the Turkish military? Mursi or el-Sisi in Egypt? Al-Nusra and similar rebel groups or Assad/Hizbollah/Iran in Syria? NATO airstrikes to weaken ISIS or not? Ugly choices all over, although sometimes they have to be made regardless.
 
There are reports of 2,700 judges being 'purged'. Were the judges part of the coup, or is Erdogon just taking advantage of the situation to justify a preconceived political move?

And if that doesn't concern the public there then they're a bunch of idiots. In no sane country are 2700 judges purged overnight.
 
You don't need a mass of the army for a succesful coup. South Koreas fourth republic fell because the ranking member of the secret service decided to assassinate the president and instigate a coup, and the ranking general soon saw an opportunity to rise to power. The army just fell in line when the general told them to.


The latter.

Agreed. Many coups were instigated and organized by a minority of the army (some not even senior officers). In all of the successful coups, the reigning president was captured and imprisoned or executed. Once the head is secured, the rest of the army and country follows, barring severe schisms in the population. fecking amateurs here though.
 
Quality answer.

I think that there was still a chance to create a figurehead caliph though, I mean the Roman question was answered pretty well was it not?

Yeah there were a few candidates at the time, but they were all tainted by association with the European powers, with the possible exception of the Amir of Afghanistan (even the Nizam of Hyderabad touted himself around a bit). Hard to know how it might have worked, since it wouldn't have had a firm basis in tradition. In any case, it was exactly what the British were pushing for, since they thought they could control it and so maintain a level of authority over their own Muslim population, Britain being the greatest Muslim power in the world at the time (and perhaps in history) in terms of population. This is why they basically offered the caliphate to the Sharif of Mecca. He, however, understood the caliphate in the traditional sense to mean an empire of some sorts, which is why the British soon abandoned him. He formally announced himself caliph anyway in 1924, right after Ataturk's abolition, but the Saudis ousted him not long after. An interesting and forgotten episode.
 
Yeah there were a few candidates at the time, but they were all tainted by association with the European powers, with the possible exception of the Amir of Afghanistan (even the Nizam of Hyderabad touted himself around a bit). Hard to know how it might have worked, since it wouldn't have had a firm basis in tradition. In any case, it was exactly what the British were pushing for, since they thought they could control it and so maintain a level of authority over their own Muslim population, Britain being the greatest Muslim power in the world at the time (and perhaps in history) in terms of population. This is why they basically offered the caliphate to the Sharif of Mecca. He, however, understood the caliphate in the traditional sense to mean an empire of some sorts, which is why the British soon abandoned him. He formally announced himself caliph anyway in 1924, right after Ataturk's abolition, but the Saudis ousted him not long after. An interesting and forgotten episode.
Not forgotten by all.
 
http://abcnews.go.com/International...se-highest-force-protection/story?id=40634670

U.S. troops at Turkey’s Incirlik air base were at the highest force protection level, known as "condition Delta," after power was cut off at the base and the Turkish government closed the airspace around the site in the hours following a foiled military coup attempt, a U.S. official told ABC News today.

Turkish officials told ABC News they believe Turkish planes docked at Incirlik Air Base took part in Friday night's coup attempt, which is why the airspace is locked down.
[...]

That's quite a ballsy move cutting power and surrounding a base that houses nuclear devices belonging to an ally of yours.
 
http://abcnews.go.com/International...se-highest-force-protection/story?id=40634670

U.S. troops at Turkey’s Incirlik air base were at the highest force protection level, known as "condition Delta," after power was cut off at the base and the Turkish government closed the airspace around the site in the hours following a foiled military coup attempt, a U.S. official told ABC News today.

Turkish officials told ABC News they believe Turkish planes docked at Incirlik Air Base took part in Friday night's coup attempt, which is why the airspace is locked down.
[...]

That's quite a ballsy move cutting power and surrounding a base that houses nuclear devices belonging to an ally of yours.

They wouldn't dare go anywhere near those nukes.
 
All this democracy crap Western politicians are spouting...what's democratic about imprisoning journalists? What's democratic about purging judges?
 
All this democracy crap Western politicians are spouting...what's democratic about imprisoning journalists? What's democratic about purging judges?

Precisely. The media seems to make out that before all this Erdogan was this democratic beacon of hope in the Middle East.

Yet its conveniently forgotten he has:
  • Shut down opposition media outlets
  • Imprisoned and magically made diseapper dissenting journalists
  • Has given himself executive powers in the ceremonial role of President and disregarded political neutrality
  • Built himself a feckin Palace
  • Aligned himself with extremist elements in Syria
  • Ran a brutal campaign that has killed scores of Kurds
And thats not even going into his recent purging of judges.

The man has is an egomaniac with a sultan complex who's been slowly chipping away at the democratic fabric of his country, couple that to his Islamist roots and its not hard to see why he's a disaster waiting to happen. Not saying a coup would have been the solution to this, but to make out he's Turkey's democratic champion is nonsense.