For the last time, UKR should have avoided fighting Wagner's prisoners in that city because they were not coming back to another battle (most likely). I did add some more info on my previous post. If you still don't get what I wanted to say, I agree to disagree.Wagner was already present in Ukraine before Bakhmut: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Popasna
And Russia is using prisoners now, without the Wagner umbrella. Again, what is the argument here? Ukraine should avoid every area where Russia deploys prisoners?
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-67175566
But what is your central argument? Whether it's prisoners or professional soldiers from Wagner or the Russian MoD, the fact is there is an enemy on Ukraine's territory that Ukraine has to deal with.Well, I give up. I did add some more info on my previous post. If you still don't get what I wanted to say, I agree to disagree.
To certain extend, they do. In fact that's necessary to win the war. Not every battle has to be won, especially in this situation.And Russia continues to use mercenary-like groups anyway: https://www.kyivpost.com/post/23007
Ukraine doesn't exactly have the luxury here to choose whom they fight. Russia will use everything they have to throw at Ukraine. That doesn't absolve Ukrainian general command from its blunders or mistakes, but this is the enemy they're facing. An enemy that will continue to throw cannon fodder at Ukraine while Ukraine loses its best.
Now you're saying something else. If Bakhmut as a city in itself had no strategic value, that's a fine discussion to have and many had been saying exactly that.To certain extend, they do. In fact that's necessary to win the war. Not every battle has to be won, especially in this situation.
Now you're saying something else. If Bakhmut as a city in itself had no strategic value, that's a fine discussion to have and many had been saying exactly that.
But you can't seem to give me a satisfying answer on how Ukraine can avoid fighting prisoners. Whether it's Bakhmut, whether it's in the south, whether it's the Russian MoD recruiting them or Wagner-like groups.
And that's a valid question (on preserving resources for the southern offensive). But your posts kept switching between that argument and "prisoners have little impact". I disagree with the latter argument.My central argument if you went back a few days was that UKR wasted a lot of manpower/equipment/time fighting those Wagner's prisoners and achieved NOTHING. If they didn't do it for as long as they did, they probably could have diverted some of their resources to the Southern front early which may have given them a better chance to succeed there.
Because my central argument is also based on the fact that the UKR wasted a lot of their resources on the Wagner's prisoners, whom they would not fight again later. If they were doing it against the RU's regular forces or even the prisoners under them, it would be much more beneficial to them because the RU's regular forces would be equally exhausted, but they were not, and it gave them a massive advantage to fight the exhausted UKR troops in the later battles.And that's a valid question (on preserving resources for the southern offensive). But your posts kept switching between that argument and "prisoners have little impact". I disagree with the latter argument.
What does it matter whether the prisoners serve under Wagner or the Russian MoD? It's cannon fodder nevertheless.Because my central argument is also based on the fact that UKR wasted a lot of their resources on the Wagner's prisoners who they would not fight again later. If they were doing it against RU's regular forces or even the prisoner under them, the RU's regular forces would be equally exhausted but they were not and it gave them massive advantage to fight the exhausted UKR troops in the later battles.
What does it matter whether the prisoners serve under Wagner or the Russian MoD? It's cannon fodder nevertheless. And what makes you believe Russia wouldn't use Wagners prisoners?
Let's say Ukraine withdraws from Bakhmut much earlier. Wagner leaves. Russia absorbs the prisoners and deploys them in the south instead. What exactly changes here in this scenario? In this scenario Ukraine still has to fight prisoners and they will still lose good soldiers against these prisoners.Scenario one: The city fell quickly, and the baldie left the city for the regular troops. He may not have to talk sh*t about RU DOD and, therefore, is alive. He said he would stay out of the city, and he probably would. Which probably means UKR won't have to face Wagner's prisoners again.
Scenario two: The city didn't fall easily. Shit stirred between RU DOD and the baldie due to that. The rest is history, and now RU DOD has absorbed the prisoners from Wagner, and they may use them later or already now.
Obviously, here I am talking about scenario one being preferred. But scenario two did happen.
What made me sure of anything that will happen? Nothing. I am trying to analyze what has happened.
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-67647379Russia is trying to recruit foreign migrants, detained in a recent sweep at its border with Finland, for its war in Ukraine.
The BBC has seen evidence of several cases in which foreigners were rushed into a military camp on the border with Ukraine, days after they were picked up for breaching immigration laws. The practice of coercing people in pre-deportation detention centres to sign contracts for army service in Ukraine is not new, but the numbers swelled as foreign migrants arrived at Russia's 1,340-km (833-mile) border with Finland.
My question back to you is, what made you sure that RU's DoD would absorb them from the Wagner group if scenario one happened? The baldie did not want to go under DoD at all, and the scenario would give him a chance to stay away from DoD.Let's say Ukraine withdraws from Bakhmut much earlier. Wagner leaves. Russia absorbs the prisoners and deploys them in the south instead. What exactly changes here in this scenario? In this scenario Ukraine still has to fight prisoners and they will still lose good soldiers against these prisoners.
Or is it your belief that Ukraine wouldn't have had to fight prisoners somewhere else than Bakhmut if they withdrew earlier from Bakhmut?
I'm getting the impression that you are overly fixated on Wagner. What does it matter in the grand scheme of things whether prisoners are recruited by Wagner or the Russian MoD? How does it change the total manpower that Ukraine has to fight against?My question back to you is, what made you sure that RU's DoD would absorb them from the Wagner group if scenario one happened? The baldie did not want to go under DoD at all, and the scenario would give him a chance to stay away from DoD.
Remember, we are talking about Wagner's prisoners. They were promised that they would be released after, like, six months (?) of combat. The only reason DoD was able to absorb some of them is because scenario two happened.
That does not say anything though. I mean UKR did lose the city and still can not retake it. The main point of debate is that if it was worth for UKR to lose some of its best troop against Wagner prisoners who always had plan to leave the city once taken it and the time that it probably gave the RU to prepare their Southern front.
The result probably says no, it did not seem to worth it for UKR. There is nothing much to argue. It is not like UKR held the city. They did NOT.
How pathetic when the powerful west cannot at least consistently send aid to a prevent the 2nd largest country being annexed by Russisa.
This is basically not far off from the original objective, which shows how delusional Putinists are.
Give it another year of weakening western support, and it may no longer be that delusional.
It will always be delusional as Putin doesn't have the resources to make any meaningful gains. The name of the game for him is to not lose existing ground and hope Trump bails him out in 2025.
Isn't Russia outproducing NATO(if we rule out the US) when it comes to ammunition, and by a significant amount?
Russians are now annexing Canada or China? Not sure if you are talking about area or population.
He'll still have more resources than Ukraine if Western support dries up. Kyiv will still likely be out of reach but frontlines may move back to Odesa & Kharkiv if Ukraine can't counter Russia's firepower.It will always be delusional as Putin doesn't have the resources to make any meaningful gains. The name of the game for him is to not lose existing ground and hope Trump bails him out in 2025.
He'll still have more resources than Ukraine if Western support dries up. Kyiv will still likely be out of reach but frontlines may move back to Odesa & Kharkiv if Ukraine can't counter Russia's firepower.
Reminds me of Croatian situation, I'm not sure about Navy capabilites (wouldn't be surprised if its in a similar state as Irish) but our air power consisted Mig 21s of which one or 2 were in function until recently when we bought used French Rafale planes.https://www.irishexaminer.com/news/...rQZa-i5Se4Ed3N6pLM5KOt1qw3SrBOp5e6FQWxwihzeTw
Russians chased off from Cork harbour area by U.K. navy
You didn't have some 29s?Reminds me of Croatian situation, I'm not sure about Navy capabilites (wouldn't be surprised if its in a similar state as Irish) but our air power consisted Mig 21s of which one or 2 were in function until recently when we bought used French Rafale planes.
This would be Putin's worst nightmare. Basically enough funding to keep the war going for another decade.
With what army ?
Give it another year of weakening western support, and it may no longer be that delusional.
I guess things like installing a Russia-friendly regime in Kyiv won't happen, but the rest of the objectives appear less and less crazy by the day.
