— Excerpt: ”Idriss and his Free Syrian Army command about 50,000 more fighters, rebel sources say.”
Rebel sources being Idriss and his Free Syrian Army command, I imagine. But OK. There’s a lot of people who claim to be part of that alliance, although it’s not true that the leaders ”command” most of them in any way at all (which I discussed with Koert Debeuf
here; for context, first see
here). Brig. Gen. Salim Idriss seems to be a nice guy, and he currently also seems to enjoys a degree of moral authority over parts of the revolutionary movement. But as far as I can tell, he has yet to issue a direct order to armed groups that will be obeyed out of earshot.
In fact, can anyone recall when rebels last captured
anything inside Syria, and gave credit to Idriss and the FSA? Meanwhile, the SILF, SIF and Jabhat al-Nosra have been racking up garrison kills and village captures by the dozens every month since late 2012. That lack of raw power on the ground doesn’t make Idriss an unimportant figure, since he sits at the top of a major trickle-down mechanism for international sponsorship and now also enjoys a measure of political recognition, but lets keep things in perspective.
For those interested in this faction, Elizabeth O’Bagy just published a
very interesting report. I think it’s maybe a bit on the optimistic side, but it’s still a must-read.
DON’T DO THIS
— Excerpt: ”Realistically, the best hope for U.S. policy is to press the Saudi-backed coalition and its 37,000 fighters, to work under the command of Idriss and the Free Syrian Army. That would bring a measure of order and would open the way for Idriss to negotiate a military transition government that would include reconcilable elements of Assad’s army.”
Here’s where it gets really weird. See, most of the ”Saudi-backed coalition” (SILF) is already part of Idriss’s (rather nominal) FSA command structure. All their main leaders are there. Abdulqader Saleh of the Tawhid Brigade and Osama el-Joneidi of the Farouq Battalions are members of the ”General Staff Advisory Council” under Idriss, Ahmed Eissa of Suqour el-Sham is part of the ”Northern Front Command”, and Zahran Alloush of the Islam Brigade sits on the ”Southern Front Command”. So, to indulge Mr. Ignatius by presuming that such an FSA structure actually operates on the ground, these two groups already overlap. Idriss does the talking, but out of the 50,000 FSA fighters, a full 37,000 come from the Islamist militias of the SILF. (No, I have no idea whether these numbers are accurate, but let’s accept them for the sake of discussion.)
To add to the confusion, at least one SIF faction (the
Haqq Brigade of Homs) is also part of Idriss’s FSA command structure. It’s military commander, Abderrahman el-Soweiss – an ex-Hezb al-Tahrir prisoner who now runs a sizeable chunk of the Homs insurgency – has been named by Idriss as one of five commanders on the Homs front. That brings the number of Islamist fighters in the “secular” FSA to about 40,000 out of 50,000, and I’m still curious about who exactly makes up the remaining 20 percent.
Bottom line, Ignatius’s proposed strategy is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of these groups. The Idriss network,
pace Debeuf, is not so much a functioning command hierarchy as it is a symbolic ”flag” to rally rebels amenable to Western and GCC support, and a distribution channel for guns, ammo and money from Saudi and other sources.
Many of the other groups mentioned here work in a similar fashion. They are not cohesive alliances, they are political planks and coordinating bodies for largely autonomous rebel factions, who have banded together to increase their military weight, acquire political representation, and gain access to foreign funds (state and non-state). The main exceptions are Jabhat el-Nosra and maybe the SIF, which seem to be reasonably cohesive and well delineated from the others.
BUT THEN AGAIN
From a self-interested US perspective, it might still be a good strategy for Washington to back the Idriss group, which unlike previous FSA incarnations has the significant advantage of existing outside of Twitter. The way to do it would be to make sure it receives abundant resources, and to help solidify the Islamist mainstream insurgency around it – i.e., the SILF, some of the SIF, and various unaffiliated strays.
That would of course require a level of cold-blooded realism not currently apparent in US policy circles, which have been making shrill little cries of shock and terror about talking to Islamists for over a decade – never mind arming them. But if the US is not prepared to deal with Islamist actors in Syria because they are theocratic and anti-semitic, or whatever, it should just excuse itself from Syrian insurgent politics entirely. Islamism is now the name of the game among Syria’s armed factions, so let’s not pretend that this conflict is something it’s not.
Anyway, political sensitivites aside, the
American deep state already seems to be on the case. And I imagine that the purpose of the US backing such an armed coalition is to make it the platform on which a not-too-wobbly political leadership (of the Ghassan Hitto/Ahmed Moadh al-Khatib variety) could stand, and from there negotiate along the Geneva parameters with what’s left of the Assad regime. Or if that doesn’t work, the US & its allies will at least have built up a powerful client militia for future use. You can imagine it as kind of a Syrian
Sahwa, like the one in Anbar, except this plays out while the Baath regime is still crumbling and with no US forces nearby. Or, with a little less optimism, think of it as the next
TFG.
It does have a whiff of Dr. Strangelove to it, and the results won’t be a pretty sight, whatever happens, but I guess that’s just politics: you always work with all you got, and you never get all you want.
— Aron Lund
Correction, April 8, 2012: Thomas Pierret kindly pointed out that I’d mistakenly included Shuhada Souriya in my list of SILF members. That’s wrong, and I’ve now removed it from the text. It’s leader Jamal Maarouf is a member of the “Northern Region Command” in Salim Idriss’s FSA network, but they’re not
in the SILF. Not that it would necessarily be a bad fit ideologically – the reason is more likely that the SILF was co-founded by Maarouf’s local rival in the Jebel Zawiya region, Ahmed Eissa of Suqour el-Sham.