Let's start with the possible but highly improbably scenario in which there is a clear winner. Netanyahu, say, or Herzog, finishes the elections with a list of 45 MKs from his own party, and one or two of his natural allies have another 16. Everyone troops off to visit President Rivlin (tho not before late next week as I explained), who hears recommendations from delegates representing 61 MKs or more that he task Netanyahu (or Herzog) with creating a coalition. He invites the fellow to his office, they stand before the cameras and make solemn-but-festive declarations, and all that's left to do is negotiate with the party (or two) that have the 16 MKs, and then turn to an additional list or two to join the emerging coalition. A coalition with 61 is viable, but a coalition with 70, or 78, is even better, since in a coalition of 61 all it takes is for one or two individuals to be cross and the government is in trouble. With 70, or 78, it takes 10 or 18 disgruntled folks to make trouble.
It used to work like this, from the first elections in 1949 until the 1980s, and often also later. Even in those days the haggling and horse-trading - between the natural allies, mind you - often took the entire 5 weeks allowed by law. One can haggle about high principles (how many funds will be diverted to the institutions we really care about), or lowly calculations (which ministries will we hold, and who controls the few really crucial Knesset committees).
This time it won't be that simple, however. First, because there's no party remotely close to 45 seats. Second, because there's no group of natural allies which will easily bring the large(ish) party over the 61-line at the stage of recommendations to the president. Third, because in any likely constellation, there are some potential coalition partners who detest other potential coalition partners in the same group and really-really don’t want to share power with them or even be seen in the same room with them. At times of unusually serious crises, most Israelis come together in a unity many other societies can only dream of – but the day after an election, as well as most years after the election, are not times like that.
Then there’s the small matter of recommendations vs. coalition partnerships. There is no strong correlation between a party recommending someone to the president and then joining his collation. There are parties which will recommend Herzog or Netanyahu but won’t join his coalition, and there are other parties who will recommend Herzog or Netanyahu but will join the other guy’s coalition with alacrity. (Well, alacrity after the necessary 4.5-week negotiating posturing).
I don’t see how I can fully unravel this for those of you who haven’t been practicing the art of Israeli politics for the past 50 years or if you’re not that old then at least from 6 months before conception. I’ll try, however, by describing each party and how it relates to the puzzle, or at least, how I perceive it as relating, which isn’t the same.
I’ll start from the nominal Left and move Right, since when writing in English we move from left to right. (Were I writing this blogpost in Hebrew or Arabic or Yiddish I’d do the opposite).
At the far left we’ve got the United Arab List (UAL), which itself is made up of four lists. There’s the double list of Raam-Taal, who are Islamists. (Yes, they are). Next to them are the Pan-Arab nationalists of Balad. And largest among them are the Communists; the fellow at the top of their list, Ayman Odeh, is a communist. The reason they’re universally categorized as Left, in spite of containing elements that are anything but, is that while they really don’t like the other parties of the left, they like the parties of the right even less.
A few weeks ago the UAL had the opportunity to sign an agreement with Meretz which would have improved the chances of at least one of them gaining a seat by divvying up their spare votes. This didn’t happen, reportedly because some of the Arabs refused to sign any agreement of any sort with any Zionist party, even if it be the solidly peace-camp Meretz. With principles like that, you begin to see why it’s unlikely the UAL will join anyone’s coalition. Nor is it even clear they’ll recommend Herzog to the president. What is likely, however, is that Herzog can count on their votes on his way to prove to the president that Netanyahu has fewer than 61 recommendations, so therefore Herzog should be given first shot.
I suppose there’s a small chance the UAL might split after the elections, and the Communists might in some scenario join a Herzog coalition. Lots of “if”s in that sentence, most of them unlikely, but I’m putting it out there for the intellectual fun. On the other hand, there’s also a possibility, even if not probable, that UAL will end up the third largest party and the two big ones join each other in a coalition, and Ayman Odeh will end up the Leader of the Opposition. This is an official position with various perks, and would be an interesting development.
Next comes Meretz. There are Arabs who vote Meretz and they’ve got an Arab candidate on their list, but they’re a Zionist party. They’re the only party of the old so-called “peace camp” which still puts peace negotiations high on their list of priorities. Their position in matters of coalitions is clear. They’ll recommend Herzog to the president, and they’ll be eager to participate in his coalition if he invites them. I’m not certain if they’ll veto any other potential partners. (They would veto the non-potential ones). They won’t join a Netanyahu coalition in any (currently) foreseeable scenario. (I’m not saying anything about the non-foreseeable scenarios). Should it come to Herzog trying to set up a unity coalition with Likud, Meretz would be unlikely to join. They have a long tradition of being purists, not pragmatic, and seem generally resigned to being in almost permanent opposition.
Zionist Camp. This is the current (and ephemeral) moniker of Labor, which itself is an offspring of Mapai, the legendary party of Ben Gurion when he wasn’t leading other parties. Zipi Livni brought a number of her own people with her into the ZC list, but it’s Labor nonetheless.
ZC will of course recommend Herzog to the president. Should he give Herzog the chance, there are many parties which might join, but not all of them would join together. Meretz is obvious but might well be vetoed by other parties and left out. Yair Lapid would be easy to bring in, but he’d probably be vetoed by the ultraorthodox parties. Kahlon will join any coalition. Liberman probably also, but he’d veto Meretz. Herzog has good personal relations with the leaders of the ultraorthodox parties, which means that they won’t recommend him to the president unless he’s the only show in town, but they’ll be eager to join his coalition if it’s going to happen, but they’ll veto Lapid and will be sniffy about Meretz. On the other hand, sniffy isn’t hard currency in coalition negotiations. Even vetos aren’t always.
Would Likud join a Herzog-led coalition? Who knows. They say Not. But lots of politicians say lots of things. Would they join on terms of parity, perhaps even a rotating sharing of the prime minister’s office? No idea. Probably Yes, if the alternative were to sit in the opposition, unless they decided otherwise. I apologize for being a bit vague here.
By way of demonstrating how complicated things are, imagine you’re undecided between Meretz and Labor. You prefer Meretz for their clear and non-pragmatic positions, but you want to make certain Labor will be significantly ahead of Likud, so as to make it easier for Rivlin to tap Herzog (and also easier for Kahlon to recommend Herzog). Then again, you’re fearful that if too many people like you go from Meretz to labor, Meretz might not even pass the 3.25% threshold, and the 100,000 votes it did get will be lost to the benefit of the Right. Then again, a larger Meretz but a smaller labor will mean Netanyahu gets first chance at forming the coalition, which Meretz certainly won’t be in and Labor probably not. Oy oy oy.
Read the rest here -
http://yaacovlozowick.blogspot.it/2015/03/building-israeli-coalition-and-why.html