Israel - Palestine Discussion | Post Respectfully | Discuss more, tweet less

You ask as if the Arabs were serious about Palestine. Palestinian nationalism reflects the fickleness of Arab nationalist loyalties. It originated out of political calculus that goes back to French rule of Syria, King Faisal and the British. And not least opposition to Zionism.

Why should Israel abid by the Partition Plan when the Arabs rejected it?
Hypocrisy. Ethnic cleansing excused by wordplay. Bad, poor wordplay.
 
Before what? Before they had agreed to anything. Were they ever going to agree to anything? Who knows?

Eh, we know because they made it clear in November 1947 that they rejected partition. The war kicked off after the explicit Arab rejection of the plan. Plan D was formulated months later in the midst of the war - a war that the Arabs fully expected to win.

The rest, you're just reading me up wrong. I fully understand why the Arabs rejected the Zionist project, which aimed, by one means or another, to turn them into a minority on their own land.

Is there any chance you could provide links when you're quoting sources?
 
Eh, we know because they made it clear in November 1947 that they rejected partition. The war kicked off after the explicit Arab rejection of the plan. Plan D was formulated months later in the midst of the war - a war that the Arabs fully expected to win.

The rest, you're just reading me up wrong. I fully understand why the Arabs rejected the Zionist project, which aimed, by one means or another, to turn them into a minority on their own land.

Is there any chance you could provide links when you're quoting sources?

From the quote as just one example you can see that the formation of Plan D was a long time coming and the Palestinians obviously knew it.

I usually do.
 
You can't lament how the status quo today doesn't reflect the Partition Plan of 1947, having attempted to justify Arab rejection of it in the preceding paragraph.

Wait, what? The Palestinians rejecting a disadvantageous solution in 1947 precludes them from complaining about an even worse situation today?

The fact is that throughout the previous century and up to the present day the country of Israel has been facilitated, founded and expanded against the express wishes of the vast majority of the indigenous population. This isn't without reason but it isn't without cost. Placing the rights of a battered and persecuted people ahead of the rights of the ones already there has been brutal and brutalising. It seems particularly callous and one eyed to be able to declare lamentation illegitimate because a people bludgeoned into one corner of a land they used to wholly inhabit haven't previously acquiesced to their own beating.
 
From the quote as just one example you can see that the formation of Plan D was a long time coming and the Palestinians obviously knew it.

This is something that is debated:

Morris, for example, argues that Plan D was a purely military operation (as distinct from a political proposal) whose formulation and execution was contingent on the dynamics of the war as it stood in March 1948, with the planned British withdrawal and imminent Arab invasion of May weighing heavily on the Haganah's calculations. He accepts that the long-mooted idea of 'transfer' impacted upon Zionist thinking in this particular context, but claims (a) that the archival records show no evidence that the plan was formulated with the aim of cleansing the entire Arab population, and (b) that the execution of Plan D was too haphazard and random to reflect any such grand plan of expulsion. Rather, he argues, the plan proposed the clearing of any Arab population centres that would pose a threat to the immediate aims of the Haganah - namely, protecting the frontiers of the territories granted the Jewish State in the partition plan, securing all the Jewish settlements beyond (such as West Jerusalem, which was surrounded and under siege by Arab militias at the time), and securing all roads and other lines of communication which may be expected to be targets of the incoming Arab forces.

In opposition to these claims, Morris's opponents such as Pappe and Finkelstein argue, like yourself, that the Zionists took advantage of the context of the war in order to execute a long-held plan to expel the Arabs, the idea of 'transfer' having been increasingly turned to by Zionists as first British-imposed restrictions on Jewish immigration in the 30s and then the Holocaust put an end to any chances they had of creating a Jewish majority in Palestine through an influx of European Jews. They typically cite quotes from figures such as Ben-Gurion, Herzl and others to argue that the Zionists knew well in advance of 1948 that expulsion would be the only means available to them to achieve their goal of a Jewish majority state in Palestine.

Opponents of this thesis argue back that, in fact, partition itself provided an alternative means to 'transfer' in securing a Jewish-majority state (and hence the reluctant and rather ambiguous Zionist acceptance of the two partition plans). They also argue that 'transfer' never necessarily signified 'ethnic cleansing' as we understand it today, but rather an 'agreement' along the lines of the Turkish-Greek population 'exchange', which was cited by the Peel Commission as a model of how to resolve such conflicts involving intermixed populations. It's worth noting that the architect of that 'exchange', Fridtjof Nansen, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts, which perhaps illustrates how such policies were regarded as a normal or expected element in conflict resolution in those years. At the same time, it should be noted that that 'agreement' was formulated after the bulk of the 'exchange' had already taken place by coercion. The main point they make is that, for over a century before 1948, the movement of populations was regarded as an often necessary requirement of the 'sorting out' of populations that was taking place across the territories of the declining Russian, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman Empires in the age of national self-determination. These were the same lands the Zionists and Arabs hailed from themselves, and so such talk of 'transfer' was absolutely normal and to be expected.

It's unclear what effect any of this had on Arab thinking, however. The idea of transferring the Jewish populations of Iraq and Egypt had been previously raised by their respective leaders.* They were quite confident of winning the war, especially once the surrounding states got involved, and it is extremely likely that, in the event they triumphed in the war, they would have expelled the majority of the Jewish population (this is what they did in the few areas which ultimately came under their control that had a Jewish population). That is, unfortunately, the type of zero-sum mentality held by both sides as they entered the conflict in November 1947.

*(Edit): this is wrong - it was the idea of transferring Arabs out of a proposed Jewish state which these leaders discussed and in some cases supported. Proposals to transfer their Jewish populations were only raised during and after the 48 war.
 
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This is something that is debated:

Morris, for example, argues that Plan D was a purely military operation (as distinct from a political proposal) whose formulation and execution was contingent on the dynamics of the war as it stood in March 1948, with the planned British withdrawal and imminent Arab invasion of May weighing heavily on the Haganah's calculations. He accepts that the long-mooted idea of 'transfer' impacted upon Zionist thinking in this particular context, but claims (a) that the archival records show no evidence that the plan was formulated with the aim of cleansing the entire Arab population, and (b) that the execution of Plan D was too haphazard and random to reflect any such grand plan of expulsion. Rather, he argues, the plan proposed the clearing of any Arab population centres that would pose a threat to the immediate aims of the Haganah - namely, protecting the frontiers of the territories granted the Jewish State in the partition plan, securing all the Jewish settlements beyond (such as West Jerusalem, which was surrounded and under siege by Arab militias at the time), and securing all roads and other lines of communication which may be expected to be targets of the incoming Arab forces.

In opposition to these claims, Morris's opponents such as Pappe and Finkelstein argue, like yourself, that the Zionists took advantage of the context of the war in order to execute a long-held plan to expel the Arabs, the idea of 'transfer' having been increasingly turned to by Zionists as first British-imposed restrictions on Jewish immigration in the 30s and then the Holocaust put an end to any chances they had of creating a Jewish majority in Palestine through an influx of European Jews. They typically cite quotes from figures such as Ben-Gurion, Herzl and others to argue that the Zionists knew well in advance of 1948 that expulsion would be the only means available to them to achieve their goal of a Jewish majority state in Palestine.

Opponents of this thesis argue back that, in fact, partition itself provided an alternative means to 'transfer' in securing a Jewish-majority state (and hence the reluctant and rather ambiguous Zionist acceptance of the two partition plans). They also argue that 'transfer' never necessarily signified 'ethnic cleansing' as we understand it today, but rather an 'agreement' along the lines of the Turkish-Greek population 'exchange', which was cited by the Peel Commission as a model of how to resolve such conflicts involving intermixed populations. It's worth noting that the architect of that 'exchange', Fridtjof Nansen, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts, which perhaps illustrates how such policies were regarded as a normal or expected element in conflict resolution in those years. At the same time, it should be noted that that 'agreement' was formulated after the bulk of the 'exchange' had already taken place by coercion. The main point they make is that, for over a century before 1948, the movement of populations was regarded as an often necessary requirement of the 'sorting out' of populations that was taking place across the territories of the declining Russian, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman Empires in the age of national self-determination. These were the same lands the Zionists and Arabs hailed from themselves, and so such talk of 'transfer' was absolutely normal and to be expected.

It's unclear what effect any of this had on Arab thinking, however. The idea of transferring the Jewish populations of Iraq and Egypt had been previously raised by their respective leaders.* They were quite confident of winning the war, especially once the surrounding states got involved, and it is extremely likely that, in the event they triumphed in the war, they would have expelled the majority of the Jewish population (this is what they did in the few areas which ultimately came under their control that had a Jewish population). That is, unfortunately, the type of zero-sum mentality held by both sides as they entered the conflict in November 1947.

*(Edit): this is wrong - it was the idea of transferring Arabs out of a proposed Jewish state which these leaders discussed and in some cases supported. Proposals to transfer their Jewish populations were only raised during and after the 48 war.

531 villages and 750,000 people moved out plus 13,000 killed was a lot of strategic protection.

“Under present circumstances Zionism cannot be realized without a transition period during which the Jewish minority would exercise revolutionary rule … during which the state apparatus, the administration, and the military establishment would be in the hands of the minority.” ~ Chaim Arlosoroff, director of the Political Department of the Jewish Agency, 1932.
https://www.ampalestine.org/palestine-101/history/al-nakba/nakba-what-really-happened - again..



We need to see how this began really rather then justify the negotiations of any Partition Plan.

The Balfour Declaration in effect led to the mass emigration of jews between the wars, the Balfour Declaration while promising the jews a homeland never promised them a country, nation or state. The Arabs protested it because they weren't a part of the debate and it cut right across their rights. The intent of the declaration was that the Jews would live with the Arabs but of course a different intent and opportunity was taken by the Zionists.
 
The Balfour Declaration in effect led to the mass emigration of jews between the wars

Jewish migration was happening for decades before Balfour, and continued after, but it was only with the coming to power of Hitler in the early 30s that it could really be described as "mass" migration., and then it was cut short by the British just as the Holocaust approached. (I believe there were even years in the late 20s when Jewish migration out of Palestine outnumbers Jewish inward migration).

the Balfour Declaration while promising the jews a homeland never promised them a country, nation or state. The Arabs protested it because they weren't a part of the debate and it cut right across their rights. The intent of the declaration was that the Jews would live with the Arabs but of course a different intent and opportunity was taken by the Zionists.

The "intent" of the Balfour declaration was to be as ambiguous as possible so as to allow the British to interpret it in any such way that suited their interests at any given time. The same is true of the other negotiations they conducted with the Hashimites and French at the same time, and this is the reason why, to this day, scholars are still arguing over what the British intent was. They were at that moment (1917) focused on one thing - winning the war - and were happy to worry about the details of any agreements once that had been achieved. Only after the war did they explicitly decide that something less than a an independent state was meant by "national homeland". I agree with you on the reason for Arab opposition to it.
 
Jewish migration was happening for decades before Balfour, and continued after, but it was only with the coming to power of Hitler in the early 30s that it could really be described as "mass" migration., and then it was cut short by the British just as the Holocaust approached. (I believe there were even years in the late 20s when Jewish migration out of Palestine outnumbers Jewish inward migration).



The "intent" of the Balfour declaration was to be as ambiguous as possible so as to allow the British to interpret it in any such way that suited their interests at any given time. The same is true of the other negotiations they conducted with the Hashimites and French at the same time, and this is the reason why, to this day, scholars are still arguing over what the British intent was. They were at that moment (1917) focused on one thing - winning the war - and were happy to worry about the details of any agreements once that had been achieved. Only after the war did they explicitly decide that something less than a an independent state was meant by "national homeland". I agree with you on the reason for Arab opposition to it.

It did though very clearly state that the Jewish people should not impinge on the rights of peoples already living there I believe.
 
It did though very clearly state that the Jewish people should not impinge on the rights of peoples already living there I believe.
I think the wars gave the Israelis the implicit justification (in their minds) to proceed in whatever way they see fit, and the expectation that the rest of the world would recognise that. Which, sadly, is effectively done by the most powerful nations.
 
The "intent" of the Balfour declaration was to be as ambiguous as possible so as to allow the British to interpret it in any such way that suited their interests at any given time. The same is true of the other negotiations they conducted with the Hashimites and French at the same time, and this is the reason why, to this day, scholars are still arguing over what the British intent was. They were at that moment (1917) focused on one thing - winning the war - and were happy to worry about the details of any agreements once that had been achieved. Only after the war did they explicitly decide that something less than a an independent state was meant by "national homeland". I agree with you on the reason for Arab opposition to it.

Balfour (1919):
In Palestine we do not propose even to go through the form of consulting the wishes of the present inhabitants of the country, though the American Commission has been going through the form of asking what they are. The four Great Powers are committed to Zionism. And Zionism, be it right or wrong, good or bad, is rooted in age-long traditions, in present needs, in future hopes, of far profounder import than the desires and prejudices of the 700,000 Arabs who now inhabit that ancient land.
 
It did though very clearly state that the Jewish people should not impinge on the rights of peoples already living there I believe.

Not in the crucial sense - the declaration states "nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine". It very deliberately did not mention "political" or "sovereign" rights, and the reference to "non-Jewish communities" fell well short of recognizing the Arabs of Palestine (nobody referred to them as Palestinians back then) as a distinct national community, with all the rights of self-determination that such as designation would imply. This was all very deliberate, and was the major bone of contention for Arabs at the time.

Balfour (1919):

I'm not sure how this contradicts anything I've written?
 
I think the wars gave the Israelis the implicit justification (in their minds) to proceed in whatever way they see fit, and the expectation that the rest of the world would recognise that. Which, sadly, is effectively done by the most powerful nations.
Yes, it's not hard to empathise with the Jewish people but their Mindset is what has led them to the acts they perpetrate now as well as along the way.

Bret Stephens, quoted as blaming the Palestinians for the deaths during the protests, in this thread, famously called the Palestinians pathologically diseased. The Israeli Defence Force's unofficial motto allegedly is 'Death to the Arabs'. The Zionists continue to push more colonies into the West Bank.
 
It was not in opposition but it does provide a degree of clarity regarding sentiment and intent.

Oh right, sure, at that particular moment. British sentiments changed quickly thereafter though.
 
Oh right, sure, at that particular moment. British sentiments changed quickly thereafter though.
Did the British move to protect the indigenous Arabs?
 
In what sense?
In the sense that you highlighted how vaguely the Balfour Declaration protected the people already living there - the Arabs but then say that British sentiments changed quickly, so did their intended protections change or improve or continue to be ignored?
 
In the sense that you highlighted how vaguely the Balfour Declaration protected the people already living there - the Arabs but then say that British sentiments changed quickly, so did their intended protections change or improve or continue to be ignored?

I'd say the sense in which they understood both clauses - the "national home" and protection of "non-Jewish communities" - shifted in accordance with British interests in the interwar years. Throughout the first half of the mandate, they attempted, unsuccessfully, to balance the two conflicting implications of the declaration. Throughout the period the sentiments of the British administration on the ground were more sympathetic to the Arabs, while back in Britain while the politicians to a certain extent maintained their sympathy with Zionism, opposition to the idea that Britain should be the custodian of a Jewish state grew. So in order to appease Arab sentiment (especially at times of violence such as in 1920, 1921 and 1929), and dampen Jewish enthusiasm somewhat, they tended to openly dismiss the idea that the declaration had committed them to an actual Jewish state, while privately admitting that should Jewish migration continue under their auspices, such a thing would inevitably come about eventually. At the same time, they came up with various proposals for some kind of joint representative council which never came to fruition due to a lack of interest from both sides. Then following the major Arab revolt which began in 1936, they toyed with partition before effectively nullifying Balfour (or fulfilling it as the British argued) by issuing the 1939 White Paper which promised that the Arabs would remain a majority (by limiting Jewish immigration to 75,000 per year for five years) and would assume independence after - this final shift was due to the calculation that Arab rather than Zionist sympathy was the more important as they headed to war with Germany.
 
On one hand you are trying your best to justify the Arabs rejecting Partition. On the other hand, without referencing the opportunities for statehood since rejecting Partition, you think Israel should be bending over backwards for the Palestinians. Israel is not responsible for the failure of Palestinian leaders. You can't excuse the failure of Palestinian leaders with the attitude of "what's done is done" while placing the onus on Israel to bend over backwards.

On the underlined point, the Arabs did not reject Partition because of the proposals made by UNSCOP. Rather the Arabs rejected Partition in any form, declining to compromise on a matter of principle. They boycotted the Committee.

Don't expect Arabs to ever take responsibility for their actions. They will always blame the West, Israel and anyone else they can find for whatever problems they face. They will never blame themselves, their civil society, their leadership or their institutions. I'm sure the Arabs blame Israel, the West or the Persians for Saddam invading Kuwait and for all the wars he started with Iran.

It's almost as if Arabs are happy that the Israel-Palestine conflict is ongoing. It helps deflect from problems that ail the Arab world. No need for them to ever own up to their shortcomings. The same mentality is seen in South Asia on a lesser level.
 
Don't expect Arabs to ever take responsibility for their actions. They will always blame the West, Israel and anyone else they can find for whatever problems they face. They will never blame themselves, their civil society, their leadership or their institutions. I'm sure the Arabs blame Israel, the West or the Persians for Saddam invading Kuwait and for all the wars he started with Iran.

It's almost as if Arabs are happy that the Israel-Palestine conflict is ongoing. It helps deflect from problems that ail the Arab world. No need for them to ever own up to their shortcomings. The same mentality is seen in South Asia on a lesser level.

It's almost as if Europe didn't invade, conquer, colonize, divide, undermine, and leave completely fecked up regions in their wake, that prevented any sort of political/religious reforms to occur, and allowed authoritarian regimes to sprout up. Then the US didn't come along and topple any democratic governments that emerged in the aftermath, that were not aligned with the US?!

Imagine if all of that happened. It might almost go to explaining why people hate us, and blame us for the state of their systems, and then blame us for keeping those systems in place through coups, assassinations, and military aid. I'm so glad that never happened.
 
Don't expect Arabs to ever take responsibility for their actions. They will always blame the West, Israel and anyone else they can find for whatever problems they face. They will never blame themselves, their civil society, their leadership or their institutions. I'm sure the Arabs blame Israel, the West or the Persians for Saddam invading Kuwait and for all the wars he started with Iran.

It's almost as if Arabs are happy that the Israel-Palestine conflict is ongoing. It helps deflect from problems that ail the Arab world. No need for them to ever own up to their shortcomings. The same mentality is seen in South Asia on a lesser level.

Take your agenda somewhere else.
 
Don't expect Arabs to ever take responsibility for their actions. They will always blame the West, Israel and anyone else they can find for whatever problems they face. They will never blame themselves, their civil society, their leadership or their institutions. I'm sure the Arabs blame Israel, the West or the Persians for Saddam invading Kuwait and for all the wars he started with Iran.

It's almost as if Arabs are happy that the Israel-Palestine conflict is ongoing. It helps deflect from problems that ail the Arab world. No need for them to ever own up to their shortcomings. The same mentality is seen in South Asia on a lesser level.

Have you heard of this thing called the Arab spring? Revolutions right across the arab world as a direct result of them blaming thier leadership. Do you think at all before you post?
 
Don't expect Arabs to ever take responsibility for their actions. They will always blame the West, Israel and anyone else they can find for whatever problems they face. They will never blame themselves, their civil society, their leadership or their institutions. I'm sure the Arabs blame Israel, the West or the Persians for Saddam invading Kuwait and for all the wars he started with Iran.

It's almost as if Arabs are happy that the Israel-Palestine conflict is ongoing. It helps deflect from problems that ail the Arab world. No need for them to ever own up to their shortcomings. The same mentality is seen in South Asia on a lesser level.
You make it sound like the Arabs are one country.
 
On one hand you are trying your best to justify the Arabs rejecting Partition. On the other hand, without referencing the opportunities for statehood since rejecting Partition, you think Israel should be bending over backwards for the Palestinians. Israel is not responsible for the failure of Palestinian leaders. You can't excuse the failure of Palestinian leaders with the attitude of "what's done is done" while placing the onus on Israel to bend over backwards.

On the underlined point, the Arabs did not reject Partition because of the proposals made by UNSCOP. Rather the Arabs rejected Partition in any form, declining to compromise on a matter of principle. They boycotted the Committee.
I accept the point that yourself and @2cents have made about the Arabs not rejecting the terms of the partition but rather rejected any partition in principle. What I don't understand is your apparent insistence that Arab leaders should be blamed for a position which remained unchanged for decades and which, in the opinion of @2cents, was "understandable". For what it's worth, I also view the Zionist desire for a state and safe haven from European/Russian anti-semitism to be completely understandable. But ultimately, in order to realise this desire they became colonisers, backed up by a superpower, and therefore the aggressors.

Would you lay blame at the feet of Mandela had his rejection of Botha's offer of release in 1985 on the condition that he renounce violence not ultimately led to the end of apartheid? Would you blame him for the ANC's initial decision to resort to violence? Whatever decision the colonised party makes, they are still the victim of colonial aggression.

You also referred to more recent "opportunities for statehood". Are you talking about the great peacemaker Rabin's vision of "less than a state"? Or the generous offer at Camp David which Israeli Foreign Minister and negotiator Shlomo Ben Ami said he would have rejected as well? Or Annapolis which the US team recommended that Abbas not accept? The point is that there is no glaring missed opportunity. Simply decisions which may or may not have worked in the colonised party's favour.

So I say again. Israel should apologise. Not in 100 or 200 years when the Palestinians are all gone or living like Native Americans on their little reservations, but now. It may seem silly to some, but it could be a profound step towards mutual understanding and a lasting peace.
 
Don't expect Arabs to ever take responsibility for their actions. They will always blame the West, Israel and anyone else they can find for whatever problems they face. They will never blame themselves, their civil society, their leadership or their institutions. I'm sure the Arabs blame Israel, the West or the Persians for Saddam invading Kuwait and for all the wars he started with Iran.

It's almost as if Arabs are happy that the Israel-Palestine conflict is ongoing. It helps deflect from problems that ail the Arab world. No need for them to ever own up to their shortcomings. The same mentality is seen in South Asia on a lesser level.

I understand your point.

I think there is a failure in the Arab world to take a self-critical look at their values. I am not saying that individual Arabs are necessarily an exact copy of their culture. But there is a tendancy to demonstrate an overall narrative of victimisation and blaming others. If it's not blaming Israel, the United States, the British, or the West, it manifests itself in the form of conspiracy theories. It's like there is an aversion to self-reflection and criticism. Although living in closed regimes would also be a factor.

In contrast, the Israelis [can] the complete opposite. At times taking their self-reflection and self-directed criticism too far.
 
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I understand your point.

I think there is a failure in the Arab world to take a self-critical look at their values. I am not saying that individual Arabs are necessarily an exact copy of their culture. But there is a tendancy to demonstrate an overall narrative of victimisation and blaming others. If it's not blaming Israel, the United States, the British, or the West, it manifests itself in the form of conspiracy theories. It's like there is an aversion to self-reflection and criticism. Although living in closed regimes would also be a factor.

In contrast, the Israelis are the complete opposite. At times taking their self-reflection and self-directed criticism too far.
I hope the Israelis don't take their self-criticism for slaughtering 60 unarmed civilians too far this time.
 
In contrast, the Israelis are the complete opposite. At times taking their self-reflection and self-directed criticism too far.

Not anymore

Then there is Israeli public opinion, in which the shift to the authoritarian and racist right has been remarkable in recent decades. According to polling by Pew, nearly half (48 percent) of Israeli Jews now support expelling Arabs from Israel, while the vast majority of them (79 percent) believe that they are entitled to deserve “preferential treatment” over non-Jewish minorities in Israel.

https://theintercept.com/newsletter/?campaign=Article-In
 
I've read very very few original writings of actual Zionists - this is the only one that seems to have understood the situation
(1923)
Every native population, civilised or not, regards its lands as its national home, of which it is the sole master, and it wants to retain that mastery always; it will refuse to admit not only new masters but, even new partners or collaborators.

This is equally true of the Arabs. Our Peace-mongers are trying to persuade us that the Arabs are either fools, whom we can deceive by masking our real aims, or that they are corrupt and can be bribed to abandon to us their claim to priority in Palestine , in return for cultural and economic advantages. I repudiate this conception of the Palestinian Arabs. Culturally they are five hundred years behind us, they have neither our endurance nor our determination; but they are just as good psychologists as we are, and their minds have been sharpened like ours by centuries of fine-spun logomachy. We may tell them whatever we like about the innocence of our aims, watering them down and sweetening them with honeyed words to make them palatable, but they know what we want, as well as we know what they do not want. They feel at least the same instinctive jealous love of Palestine, as the old Aztecs felt for ancient Mexico, and the Sioux for their rolling Prairies.
...

This Arab editor was actually willing to agree that Palestine has a very large potential absorptive capacity, meaning that there is room for a great many Jews in the country without displacing a single Arab. There is only one thing the Zionists want, and it is that one thing that the Arabs do not want, for that is the way by which the Jews would gradually become the majority, and then a Jewish Government would follow automatically, and the future of the Arab minority would depend on the goodwill of the Jews; and a minority status is not a good thing, as the Jews themselves are never tired of pointing out. So there is no "misunderstanding".

The Zionists want only one thing, Jewish immigration; and this Jewish immigration is what the Arabs do not want.

This statement of the position by the Arab editor is so logical, so obvious, so indisputable, that everyone ought to know it by heart, and it should be made the basis of all our future discussions on the Arab question. It does not matter at all which phraseology we employ in explaining our colonising aims, Herzl's or Sir Herbert Samuel's.

Colonisation carries its own explanation, the only possible explanation, unalterable and as clear as daylight to every ordinary Jew and every ordinary Arab.

Colonisation can have only one aim, and Palestine Arabs cannot accept this aim. It lies in the very nature of things, and in this particular regard nature cannot be changed.

The Iron Wall

We cannot offer any adequate compensation to the Palestinian Arabs in return for Palestine. And therefore, there is no likelihood of any voluntary agreement being reached. So that all those who regard such an agreement as a condition sine qua non for Zionism may as well say "non" and withdraw from Zionism.

Zionist colonisation must either stop, or else pive population. Which means that it can proceed and develop only under the protection of a power that is independent of the native population – behind an iron wall, which the native population cannot breach.

That is our Arab policy; not what we should be, but what it actually is, whether we admit it or not. What need, otherwise, of the Balfour Declaration? Or of the Mandate? Their value to us is that outside Power has undertaken to create in the country such conditions of administration and security that if the native population should desire to hinder our work, they will find it impossible.
--Ze'ev Jabotinsky
 
I've read very very few original writings of actual Zionists - this is the only one that seems to have understood the situation
(1923)

--Ze'ev Jabotinsky

I quoted this earlier. He’s the spiritual father of Likud, Netanyahu’s father Benzion was his personal secretary. I think he called this exactly right, with the exception of his moral elevation of Zionism (but I can understand why he and other Zionists came to that conclusion).

If the following quotes are to be accepted as representative of his thought (Morris claims he supported transfer at some stage), he seemingly had a sense of equality and fairness that perhaps his Likudist successors lack in some ways:

"If we were to have a Jewish majority in Eretz Israel, then first of all, we would create here a situation of total, absolute, and complete equal rights, with no exceptions: whether Jew, Arab, Armenian, or German, there is no difference before the law; all paths are open before him. . . . Complete equal rights would be granted not only to citizens as individuals but also to languages and nations."

"All of us, all Jews and Zionists of all schools of thought, want the best for the Arabs of Eretz Israel. We do not want to eject even one Arab from either the left or the right bank of the Jordan River. We want them to prosper both economically and culturally. We envision the regime of Jewish Palestine [Eretz Israel ha-Ivri] as follows: most of the population will be Jewish, but equal rights for all Arab citizens will not only be guaranteed, they will also be fulfilled."

"[Even] after the formation of a Jewish majority, a considerable Arab population will always remain in Palestine. If things fare badly for this group of inhabitants then things will fare badly for the entire country. The political, economic and cultural welfare of the Arabs will thus always remain one of the main conditions for the well-being of the Land of Israel."


https://en.idi.org.il/media/5103/jabotinsky-idi-2013.pdf

As with any quotes ripped out of context, however, it’s difficult to judge exactly how sincerely these sentiments were held.
 
Don't expect Arabs to ever take responsibility for their actions. They will always blame the West, Israel and anyone else they can find for whatever problems they face. They will never blame themselves, their civil society, their leadership or their institutions. I'm sure the Arabs blame Israel, the West or the Persians for Saddam invading Kuwait and for all the wars he started with Iran.

It's almost as if Arabs are happy that the Israel-Palestine conflict is ongoing. It helps deflect from problems that ail the Arab world. No need for them to ever own up to their shortcomings. The same mentality is seen in South Asia on a lesser level.
Don't hold back! say what you think.

It's basically Arabs in ME and the Muslims in SE India = Muslims. This post is hardly surprising coming from you...
 
Don't hold back! say what you think.

It's basically Arabs in ME and the Muslims in SE India = Muslims. This post is hardly surprising coming from you...

That is not at all what I meant. I don't know if you've been following Indian news lately, but there's been a huge dip in industrial production and massive agrarian distress the past couple of years. Combine that with the lack of basic necessities in large parts of the country, you come to the realisation of the amount of work that is still to be done. Inspite of it all, look at the mudslinging that politicians indulge in before any state polls, it is pure garbage. It is all meant to distract people and protect elected officials from their performance coming under scrutiny.

It might be a surprise to you mate, but South Asia doesn't mean just Muslims. No need for searching for any sectarian meaning in what genuinely was an honest post from me about the similarities in how leaders in the ME and South Asia think.