Grenfell Tower Fire | 14th June 2017

Jesus. I remember my nans house had polystyrene tiling on the living room ceiling and my dad who used to be a builder had removed it because of the fire safety aspect of the material. This was 20 years ago. Why the feck would anyone use polystyrene cladding

Because as long as they've met the shitty UK safety regulations they've done nothing wrong. This is what you get after decades of Tory Governments who choose the interests of the contractors over the civilians they govern.
 
I can see it in the pictures. That bubbly burnt black stuff on the burnt out facade is polystyrene.

You've got me intrigued now (partly because my house is externally insulated!)

Buzzfeed have an article on the cladding. They say it was ACM panels i.e. Aluminium panels with a polyethylene core. Which has a bad reputation for tower block fires. Apparently the orginally submitted plans was for a more fire resistant/expensive version.
 
Oh joy, 3-4 years they did the downstairs extension roof here, looking almost exactly like this, before they covered it over with a some thin layers of that rolled 'felt stuff'. It's legal I presume... (he asks anybody who might know)

12_inches_XPS_032_LoRes1.jpg
 
You've got me intrigued now (partly because my house is externally insulated!)

Buzzfeed have an article on the cladding. They say it was ACM panels i.e. Aluminium panels with a polyethylene core. Which has a bad reputation for tower block fires. Apparently the orginally submitted plans was for a more fire resistant/expensive version.

Polyethylene and polystyrene are more ot less the same. Ones hard the other a foam. They're both the same family and have identical fire characteristics
 
You've got me intrigued now (partly because my house is externally insulated!)

Buzzfeed have an article on the cladding. They say it was ACM panels i.e. Aluminium panels with a polyethylene core. Which has a bad reputation for tower block fires. Apparently the orginally submitted plans was for a more fire resistant/expensive version.
I read this yesterday on a construction industry web site:
The building is believed to have been over-clad with Aluminium Composite Material cassette rainscreen. This allows a moisture ventilating void between the metal composite and structural envelope. An intumescent strip is installed at regular intervals to seal the void in the event of fire.
Also:
Cladding contractor Harley Curtain Wall fell into administration shortly after completing the £3m Grenfell Tower project.
http://www.constructionenquirer.com/2017/06/14/blaze-engulfs-refurbished-london-tower-block/
 
Polyethylene and polystyrene are more ot less the same. Ones hard the other a foam. They're both the same family and have identical fire characteristics

Not quite Rams, PS does not have to be expanded, that's just a manufacturing process that I'm assuming you could also do with polyeth but just wouldn't bother because it's more expensive. There are significant differences to the burn rates though as well as the smoke type, soot and flame colour.

You've got me intrigued now (partly because my house is externally insulated!)

Buzzfeed have an article on the cladding. They say it was ACM panels i.e. Aluminium panels with a polyethylene core. Which has a bad reputation for tower block fires. Apparently the orginally submitted plans was for a more fire resistant/expensive version.
I'd have suspected that but the speed of the fire spread suggests PS rather than PE, PET or PP as does the absence of a blue tinge to the flames since all the latter three burn blue whilst PS burns yellow. The smoke didn't necessarily look dense enough to have been PS though as that produces a very thick acrid black smoke and drops streamers of soot like black snowflakes which I can't say I saw in any of the footage.
 
Oh joy, 3-4 years they did the downstairs extension roof here, looking almost exactly like this, before they covered it over with a some thin layers of that rolled 'felt stuff'. It's legal I presume... (he asks anybody who might know)

12_inches_XPS_032_LoRes1.jpg

What was the name of the panels? Was it 'FM approved' do you recall?
 
Not quite Rams, PS does not have to be expanded, that's just a manufacturing process that I'm assuming you could also do with polyeth but just wouldn't bother because it's more expensive. There are significant differences to the burn rates though as well as the smoke type, soot and flame colour.


I'd have suspected that but the speed of the fire spread suggests PS rather than PE, PET or PP as does the absence of a blue tinge to the flames since all the latter three burn blue whilst PS burns yellow. The smoke didn't necessarily look dense enough to have been PS though as that produces a very thick acrid black smoke and drops streamers of soot like black snowflakes which I can't say I saw in any of the footage.

The are both Polymers and have the same highly combustible characteristics! It's all plastic.
 
The are both Polymers and have the same highly combustible characteristics! It's all plastic.
Many things are polymers, it just means a chain of multiple molecular units so the term can include DNA, cellulose and a million other non petro chemical things.

The ones we are talking about are all petrochemicals but they are all extracted at different levels of the cracking process which gives them very different physical properties like density, tensile strength, elongation, creep and particularly melting points, burning points, the ability to sustain fire and more subtle points like flame colour, dripping, smoke type, smell etc and also determines the cost.
 
Obviously you can't create something on the spot but there are rescue cushions out there that are rated for up to a height 20 stories. Whether it can be deployed properly in this case is a different matter.

Aye, fair enough. I think the idea was more about some sort of permanent structure though. Which is obviously a non-starter. To be fair to @Livvie , she didn't suggest that. I was mainly thinking back to the original comment she referred to, from @Striker10.

I was thinking about this last night, and then landed on it just being a bit of a logistical nightmare. For one, if the building is on fire like it is last night, how would you get such equipment close enough to the building without it setting on fire itself? Then of course, the thing would have to be gigantic both in width and in height - so to 'inflate' it or set-it up on the spot when there's a fire raging would be a big time consumer, and i doubt there is actually space for such a thing in most instances anyway.

Finally, say if both the above issues were solved somehow, there's the fact that you'd be asking firefighters or whoever to ask people to jump out of a building which, although is an attempt to save their lives, could go wrong in a whole bunch of ways, and could then lead to instances where you're blaming the emergency services for deaths, even though they're just trying to save lives.
 
It's either EPS (expandable polystyrene) or polyurethane.
 
Why on earth would it be OK to use a flammable substance to basically connect multiple dwellings? That is insane. We just had some work done and for code every hole that was drilled for wiring etc had to be filled in with fireproof foam to prevent fire spreading.

Like other organic compounds, polystyrene is flammable. Polystyrene is classified according to DIN4102 as a "B3" product, meaning highly flammable or "Easily Ignited." As a consequence, although it is an efficient insulator at low temperatures, its use is prohibited in any exposed installations in building construction if the material is not flame-retardant.[citation needed] It must be concealed behind drywall, sheet metal, or concrete.[citation needed] Foamed polystyrene plastic materials have been accidentally ignited and caused huge fires and losses, for example at the Düsseldorf International Airport and the Channel tunnel (where polystyrene was inside a railcar that caught fire).[citation needed]


Is form used at least...

The boards containing a flame retardant when tested in a tunnel using test method UL 723 or ASTM E84 will have a flame spread index of less than 25 and a smoke-developed index of less than 450. ICC-ES requires the use of a 15-minute thermal barrier when EPS boards are used inside of a building.
 
Heads should roll for this it's an absolute disgrace.

What will probably happen is nothing as usual.
 
does anyone know much about these TMO things?

(Tenancy Management Organisation)

Suspect ours is one (old housing association) but that they keep it quiet

I could not tell how you how cheatingly incompetent they are, bordering on to wholesale crooked at times - they have total disregard for tenants, couldn't give a flying feck, just plough on with whatever they want to do, complaints are filed in the bin usually.

You, as a resident have to know about the existence of a TMO. Their management is usually elected by the residents. If so, there will have to be notes in the communal areas like for cleaning, social activities, meeting etc.

If you have any complaints about the TMO, just revert to the council directly.
 
https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199899/cmselect/cmenvtra/741/9072004.htm

Some might find it interesting, a committee talking about cladding on buildings back in 1999...

That is quite interesting. Knowsley is Knowsley Heights Fire 1991 - didn't see much on that from a very quick google. But then got to a pdf which features this

In 2002, Crook carried out a review of international practices related to external fire spread via windows (and ways to mitigate such
spread), but concluded that ‘very few people are killed or injured from fire who are elsewhere than on the fire floor’ and ‘most deaths
or injuries on floors other than the fire floor are as a result of smoke’.

(paragraph says that current measures are sufficient) then goes on...

Fires can spread up buildings even without the involvement of the exterior materials of the cladding system. There are numerous
examples of fire spread from the flat of origin to the flat above via the windows, but most cause only property damage to the flat (or
flats) above. However, more innovative ways to insulate buildings to improve their sustainability and energy efficiency are changing the external surfaces of buildings with an increase in the volume of potentially combustible materials being applied.

You weren't telling people to 'stay put' back then though were you? (I don't actually know this). Combined with access routes during refurbishments being limited even more - if you're not really bothering about the possible need to evacuate because policy is different now.
 
does anyone know much about these TMO things?

(Tenancy Management Organisation)

Suspect ours is one (old housing association) but that they keep it quiet

I could not tell how you how cheatingly incompetent they are, bordering on to wholesale crooked at times - they have total disregard for tenants, couldn't give a flying feck, just plough on with whatever they want to do, complaints are filed in the bin usually.
TMOs are generally significantly smaller than Housing Associations so in theory give tennants more of a say in how things are done on their estate. That said, the small size might be a hindrance on the level of professionalism of management.
 
They come down quite strong on that, you lose your property if they find out

Don't think so. There're thousands of council tenants who sublet their flats. The first two flats I've rented when I came to London where from council tenants. We've had to move out from the second flat because the council found out that he is renting it, he is still there one year after.
 
Residents from the flats in the New Lodge area of Belfast are shittin themselves, because two of the 7 tower blocks were recently renovated and covered in the cladding. The Housing Executive is 'looking into it' and assures people that the cladding has met with all the relevant fire safety protocols, but one resident has told Beltel this morning that the layer underneath the cladding is plywood!
 
You, as a resident have to know about the existence of a TMO. Their management is usually elected by the residents. If so, there will have to be notes in the communal areas like for cleaning, social activities, meeting etc.

If you have any complaints about the TMO, just revert to the council directly.

we're on the ALMO side from what I can tell now, council may still be the destination I think - as for them, but y'see how well that went, :(
 
TMOs are generally significantly smaller than Housing Associations so in theory give tennants more of a say in how things are done on their estate. That said, the small size might be a hindrance on the level of professionalism of management.

again, it didn't go well for them did it? valid concerns just binned off because their 'input' was regarded as having no value - & probably 'unhelpful'
 
Theresa Maybot visited the site this morning but didn't speak to a single resident :rolleyes:
Don't you dare politicise her political visit.

(resident tories, am I doing it right?)
 
Just been emailed by a friend of mine who lives right beside Grenfell. They're currently putting up 15 kids/babies with their families (fair fecking play!). Apparently all the support centres are overrun with food/clothes but what these people will really need to get their lives back on track is money. This is the Justgiving page they said we should be using.

As you can see, there's been a phenomenal response already. When it wants to be, London is an incredible city. Obviously, the closer they can get to that target the better. So more donations needed.
 
Residents from the flats in the New Lodge area of Belfast are shittin themselves, because two of the 7 tower blocks were recently renovated and covered in the cladding. The Housing Executive is 'looking into it' and assures people that the cladding has met with all the relevant fire safety protocols, but one resident has told Beltel this morning that the layer underneath the cladding is plywood!
If this stuff really is used everywhere, how many vulnerable buildings are there?

Quite possibly the internal structure of the building and not having active fire supression was the final reason these people had no chance of escaping, but it really could be that there are hundred of similar buildings. Makes me sick
 
Just been emailed by a friend of mine who lives right beside Grenfell. They're currently putting up 15 kids/babies with their families (fair fecking play!). Apparently all the support centres are overrun with food/clothes but what these people will really need to get their lives back on track is money. This is the Justgiving page they said we should be using.

As you can see, there's been a phenomenal response already. When it wants to be, London is an incredible city. Obviously, the closer they can get to that target the better. So more donations needed.

There are a few of these up and running so i understand, and i am trying to decide which one is best. Often with crowdfunding you are giving to an individual or something relatively specific, whereas in this instance there are 100s of likely recipients, with contrasting needs.

As for London, or Londoners rather, i think we are like most other people despite the reputation. Not always the most chatty during rush hour perhaps, but as compassionate as people elsewhere.
 
https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199899/cmselect/cmenvtra/741/9072004.htm

Some might find it interesting, a committee talking about cladding on buildings back in 1999...
What risks are posed by such cladding with regard to fire safety? said:
(Mr Evans) The main risk is the problem of vertical envelopment of a building in fire—that is the real problem. Cladding systems in the round are not going to burst into flames spontaneously, or without an ignition source. However, being as they are put on the outside of a building, if a fire occurs within a building it leaves the building through a window opening in an external wall, and the strong probability is that the cladding will be involved. If the cladding cannot resist the spread of flame across the surface then it will vertically envelop the building; in other words, the fire will spread to the outside of the building and it will go vertically. The problem we have to a certain extent, touching on one of the later questions, is that we do not currently consider vertical envelopment in fires. To a certain extent we are hoisted by the petard of what happened here in 1666, the Great Fire of London, and we look at fire as a horizontal problem, with a fire in one building affecting the exterior of another building, and that is how the Building Regulations work. The problem with cladding is that it will, if it is able, spread fire and it will spread it vertically. The other problem is that we do not really recognise the problem of vertical envelopment. If you get multistorey buildings you will get fire spread up the outside if the cladding will permit it.
Do you think it is right that should be allowed to be the case? said:
(Mr Evans) No.
6. What is wrong with the Regulations? said:
(Mr Evans) Basically the problem is, first of all, the Regulations do not really cater for vertical envelopment; they deal with a fire in another building affecting the exterior face of that building. They also deal, in the case of roofs, with burning brands falling on the roof. The problem that then develops is we use space separation to determine the combustibility of the cladding. The further the building is away from another building then the cladding can be of limited combustibility; that means it does not burn very well. The problem we as fire fighters have is if you get a high-rise building, which is over, say, 25-30 metres in height and the fire spreads up the outside of the building—all the fire fighting facilities in multistorey buildings are inside the building. They are there to allow fire fighters to fight the fire within the building; they are not there to allow fire fighters to fight a fire on the external face of the building. Our aerial appliances will go up to 25-30 metres (that is a hydraulic platform or a turntable ladder); above that height, if the fire is on the external face of the building, we cannot get to it. Our people have either got to hang out of windows, above, below or to the side of the fire, and try to reach it. That in itself is extremely difficult and is dangerous, as you will appreciate. That really is the problem we perceive there.
(they go on talking about firefighting)
8. You mentioned all these risks and as I understand your answer to Mr Donohoe you are not satisfied that the Regulations governing the fire safety of cladding is adequate? said:
(Mr Evans) That is true.
9. Could you perhaps tell the Committee so we can get a feel of it just how rapidly does this fire spread? How many incidents are we talking about? Are we talking about a minimal risk or are we talking about something that does occur or may occur regularly? said:
(Dr Moore) There are not a great number of fires, as I understand it, with this type of product. There are a large number of fires in what are called "composite sandwich panels"; these are well known and there have been a large number of these throughout the country. These are composite materials with foam insulation between metal. I do not think this overcladding is quite the same situation as that. I think the problem is relatively small in the number of fires that do occur by this fashion. There have been one or two others, which have meant the Fire Regulations[1] in England and Wales have been modified. There was a fire in this sort of system at Knowsley Heights about eight years ago and, as a result, the Regulations[2] were changed in order to ensure that that problem did not occur.
11. What would you be recommending to us as to what should be done to minimise the risks you have indicated? said:
(Dr Moore) There is a certain amount of lack of clarity as to whether an overcladding system is covered by the Regulations[3], or whether it is a refurbishment activity which is outside the Regulations[4]. I think this is unclear to us as experts. There may be a difference in what goes on between the Scottish situation and that in England and Wales. Again, I think there is insufficient clarity. Our colleague from the Fire Brigades Union did not mention there may be a need for cavity barriers to stop fire going behind an overcladding system; because that is one of the areas which is a very common method of fire to spread, where the fire travels up the inside of the cavity; you should put in some form of barrier to stop this, and I think that should be clarified. The other area, which is perhaps pertinent to this particular fire, was the fact that the window frames I believe actually melted and allowed the fire to go in via that route. I think it should be made abundantly clear that window frames should be protected from the fire going up through the cavity or from the outside. I think there is not sufficient, as I see it, in the Regulations[5] specifying how you should fire-protect the window areas.
13. Are you happy with them? said:
(Dr Moore) Not really, no. The actual test methods, as such, are not really the full-scale tests we would like to see. We are particularly unhappy with what we call this Class `0' rating. Particularly with plastic products, you can obtain this rating by putting chemicals in; you can cover up plastic foam or a combustible material with a metal sheet or a foil which, in effect, still allows the fire to burn and destroy the plastic material underneath; and in effect you may even meet the requirements for a Class `0' material, but the actual product can still contribute to the fire, can still cause problems and can still give off fumes, toxic chemicals when they burn and, if they are the right sort of plastic, can drip plastics on people who are trying to fight the fire. Overall there are a number of reasons why our Group is unhappy with the Regulations[6], particularly in relation to this Class `0' rating which is actually used both in Scotland and in England and Wales.
14. In aircraft now because of the toxic fumes that killed so many people in Manchester within a very short period of time there are very strict Regulations on the internal as well as the external materials. Are you really saying to us that in buildings said:
(Dr Moore) I do not think there is anything in any of the United Kingdom Regulations[7] regarding smoke and toxic fumes given off. It is of concern that it is not covered. It is very difficult perhaps to legislate for this, because obviously you have got these sorts of fumes being given off by the content but, nevertheless, one does not want added fumes being given off by the materials used in the building.
15. Yet there is a wealth of evidence in aviation alone of the effect of toxic fumes. People started to die in Manchester within six seconds. said:
(Dr Moore) Yes, indeed. There have been other fires where it has been the fumes and the toxic fumes being given off by some of the products which have led to more deaths than perhaps for other reasons, so I think this should be looked at.
16. They do know the properties of the materials being used? said:
(Dr Moore) Yes, and there are British Standards Working Parties trying to work on this but have not actually reached a conclusion yet.
(Mr Evans) I would like to support what Dr Moore says. The situation is that the current test for cladding is a small-scale laboratory test, which is not particularly relevant, we would argue, to the system that is used. What has happened, and since you have set up this inquiry, Chair, is that the British Standards Institution have now published a draft BSI for tests for external cladding systems, which is a far more relevant test; it is a large-scale test because some of these systems can be 10-20 metre panels,4"-6" thick. To test them in a laboratory, we would argue, is not relevant to how they are used in real life. The other problem, as Mrs Dunwoody quite rightly points out, is that there is no requirement for smoke or toxicity testing and that worries us. You have the potential for products being defined as fire-resisting (which they are) which smoke, and which are capable of smoke-logging a building. That is the problem, and it is something we the FBU have been arguing about for some time. There ought to be a smoke and toxicity test for building materials, particularly those which are going to be used to line walls, ceilings and escape routes.
17. If that draft becomes a reality what does it mean in real terms? said:
(Mr Evans) What it means in real terms is that for a product which was an external cladding system, if this standard becomes a full standard and is then called up by the Building Regulations as a standard to be achieved by external cladding systems, then they would have to meet that standard before they could be fitted or used in buildings.
 
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Residents from the flats in the New Lodge area of Belfast are shittin themselves, because two of the 7 tower blocks were recently renovated and covered in the cladding. The Housing Executive is 'looking into it' and assures people that the cladding has met with all the relevant fire safety protocols, but one resident has told Beltel this morning that the layer underneath the cladding is plywood!
Plywood was used in the cladding for the Shepherd's Bush fire last year and, unsurprisingly, contributed to its spread once the foam covering had melted away.