Geopolitics

[Giggsyking]

Do you have references for that? The no-fly zone over Southern Iraq was only established in August 1992.

All the reports and articles I have is in arabic. But look at this one
https://www.cfr.org/blog/remembering-iraqi-uprising-twenty-five-years-ago

 

[Dr. Dwayne]

No, your interpretations is wrong. Because you are claiming, that I claim Ukraine deserve to be invaded which is false and on top of that is serious accusation of lack of humanity and compassion. My post is to tell even the Ukrainian government has been in path of wrongdoings and not everything they did should be portraited as good. I hope the people of Ukraine in the future stand against any similar scenario of joining the US or UK or Russia or any superpower in invading other countries. I will say it one last time, the Invasion Russia is raging against the Ukrainian people is an imperialistic aggression just like the 2003 Iraq invasion.

No one is saying that everything Ukraine has done is good. What is being said is that they are being wronged by Russia's actions and their actions against Russia are good.

You are saying they have blood on their hands and without the subsequent detail you've provided here it's an easy inference to make.

One can find wrongdoings in the history of almost every country.

 

[DOTA]

Why can't Americans pronounce Kyiv? It's always 'keev' which, like, I get you don't want to say Kiev but there's supposed to be two syllables there right? Kee-yiv.

 

[RedSky]

A nice, sane, rational and calm thread like this, which definitely isn't a clusterfeck of unresolvable opinions, really makes you wonder why people are so determined to keep threads about specific conflicts on topic...

Nailed it.

 

[entropy]

I think it's great. @Mciahel Goodman has accidentally created a 'Is the Ukraine thread safe to go in to yet?' thread.

 

[MTF]

Why can't Americans pronounce Kyiv? It's always 'keev' which, like, I get you don't want to say Kiev but there's supposed to be two syllables there right? Kee-yiv.

Americans don't do vowels in other languages well, or at least that's the impression I have from trying to teach my girlfriend portuguese.

 

[2mufc0]

Probably wrong time and place to express this, but I’m not entirely comfortable with some of the anti-Russian sentiment going round, e.g. “Once Russia has become civilized, they can rejoin civilization.” (@Walrus). Also thinking this current unprecedented wave of isolating a country will certainly help fan those flames.

Agree.

I think the media and western response has pretty much dehumanised Russian people and will only create a bigger siege mentality. The sort of sanctions that are being cheered on will destroy the lives of average innocent Russians.

Imagine in a different scenario where the power balances weren't as they are in 2003 and the UK and US got sanctioned the same way. And the average person couldn't put fuel in the tank or the mortgage they spent years saving for collapses...

Thankfully Russia has enough resources that the people won't starve to death unlike other instances in history where draconian sanctions have killed millions.

And its not like the Russian people can vote their government out.

Despite all the protests during the Iraq war both Bush and Blair were re-elected subsequently.

 

[DOTA]

Americans don't do vowels in other languages well, or at least that's the impression I have from trying to teach my girlfriend portuguese.

Interesting. Better answer than I was expecting to get.

 

[Cheimoon]

That is all true. The conflict is expressed in different binary oppositions (dyads in fact): profile/abstract; qualitative/quantitative; agency/structure. The individual story which typifies propaganda made for mass consumption is almost always rendered in profile and emphasizes agency (or loss thereof) over and above structure. The difficult part is that these two frames are not mutually exclusive, though focus upon one does temporarily decenter or exclude the other. It's a famous linguistic proposition made by Ferdinand de Saussure but which has influenced all varieties of theory ever since (in fact, Saussure just best codified the already extant tension as many others had written on the topic before him).

So, when you take the very complex network of class relationships which comprise an economy into account, you have an equally complex distribution of labour whereby state planners and so forth are trained to view the world within a certain frame (quantitative for the most part, and abstract) whereas politicians are trained (or learn as autodidacts) to translate this technical jargon into another frame of reference (profile, or qualitative). The one is technocratic and emphasizes rationality, the other is populist and seeks to explain a disaggregation of interconnected facts in the simplest, typically emotional, form possible. This doesn't, however, preclude the technocrat from being emotional or the populist (journalist/politician/layperson) from being rational. It's just that certain classes (practice) incubate certain behavioral modes which in turn manifests as habit (both individual and institutional).

The modern industrial state utilizes a wide variety of means (perspectives) to achieve a common goal (state interest). It isn't an infallible machine which always goes according to plan, but nor is it the disordered chaos of "free choice" that it is usually presented to us as being. The point regarding war and (a)morality then resolves around two or three key facts: firstly, every state is typically perceived to be following their own interests and playing the same game; secondly, the game is class-based; thirdly, as class reflects habit (mode of perspective and means of thinking), the habitual means by which we learn of stories via the media (profile or abstract?) always conceals something of the framer's intent which cannot be easily distinguished from their own class interest.

The point of "manufacturing consent" is that people do it without being told or forced into it. They surmise that it is best for their personal career to go with a given line and they promote that line as vociferously as they can. Also, they may not even surmise this fact. It can be entirely subconscious or justified as what they actually believe (they may in fact actually believe it). And here is where it gets murky because you cannot know the motive entirely without constructing a false position within which a neutral observer sits (there are no such people). What I have grasped, however, and it seems pretty factual, is that the media do not want you to have the geopolitical frame of reference unless it coincides with the particular moral frame within a given instance. I.e., you see arbitrary framing mechanisms and people deciding when to begin a story (where does the history of the conflict start?).

But, tl;dr, the primary tension is between structure and agency (between profile, which is personal, and abstract which is typically sociological). Neither is more valid than another, rather each represents one side of the same coin divided by temporal considerations and notions of micro/macro. A dialectic, to put it even more simply, (as historian, you will be aware of this stemming form Marx, Hegel, Nietzsche, Comte, or from whomever). So long story short, I wouldn't diminish the personality behind the state actor (Putin's personal reasons, or the benign dictator, in your other example of the aging ruler), I would simply look to the frame of reference which informs macro strategical moves before trusting or taking any individual narrative as key.

Yeah, that all makes sense to me (after having read it very slowly to make sure I understand all the terminology ), and it's a good way of framing things.

I don't have anything to discuss with that really, but there were two things I was thinking of. On a rather simple level, I am not sure journalists always very consciously or meaningfully choose their framing. Or at least, my impression is that most journalists may not be sufficiently specialized in any particular issue to do so. For more investigative or analytics journalist, and political commentary - sure. There is definitely a lot of massaging going on. But for reporting on the Ukraine crisis, for example, I think a lot of general journalism just goes with what they could quickly grasp and could manage within their deadline.

And the more intersting point: populations have not really come into this, but I think they should. That perspective is also what really made me hate most of what I read in the interview you quoted later on:

Looking at the situation now with Russia and Ukraine, how do you think the world got here?
I think all the trouble in this case really started in April, 2008, at the NATO Summit in Bucharest, where afterward NATO issued a statement that said Ukraine and Georgia would become part of NATO. The Russians made it unequivocally clear at the time that they viewed this as an existential threat, and they drew a line in the sand. Nevertheless, what has happened with the passage of time is that we have moved forward to include Ukraine in the West to make Ukraine a Western bulwark on Russia’s border. Of course, this includes more than just NATO expansion. NATO expansion is the heart of the strategy, but it includes E.U. expansion as well, and it includes turning Ukraine into a pro-American liberal democracy, and, from a Russian perspective, this is an existential threat.

You said that it’s about “turning Ukraine into a pro-American liberal democracy.” I don’t put much trust or much faith in America “turning” places into liberal democracies. What if Ukraine, the people of Ukraine, want to live in a pro-American liberal democracy?
If Ukraine becomes a pro-American liberal democracy, and a member of NATO, and a member of the E.U., the Russians will consider that categorically unacceptable. If there were no NATO expansion and no E.U. expansion, and Ukraine just became a liberal democracy and was friendly with the United States and the West more generally, it could probably get away with that. You want to understand that there is a three-prong strategy at play here: E.U. expansion, NATO expansion, and turning Ukraine into a pro-American liberal democracy.

You keep saying “turning Ukraine into a liberal democracy,” and it seems like that’s an issue for the Ukrainians to decide. NATO can decide whom it admits, but we saw in 2014 that it appeared as if many Ukrainians wanted to be considered part of Europe. It would seem like almost some sort of imperialism to tell them that they can’t be a liberal democracy.
It’s not imperialism; this is great-power politics. When you’re a country like Ukraine and you live next door to a great power like Russia, you have to pay careful attention to what the Russians think, because if you take a stick and you poke them in the eye, they’re going to retaliate. States in the Western hemisphere understand this full well with regard to the United States.
The Monroe Doctrine, essentially.
Of course. There’s no country in the Western hemisphere that we will allow to invite a distant, great power to bring military forces into that country.

Right, but saying that America will not allow countries in the Western hemisphere, most of them democracies, to decide what kind of foreign policy they have—you can say that’s good or bad, but that is imperialism, right? We’re essentially saying that we have some sort of say over how democratic countries run their business.
We do have that say, and, in fact, we overthrew democratically elected leaders in the Western hemisphere during the Cold War because we were unhappy with their policies. This is the way great powers behave.

Of course we did, but I’m wondering if we should be behaving that way. When we’re thinking about foreign policies, should we be thinking about trying to create a world where neither the U.S. nor Russia is behaving that way?
That’s not the way the world works. When you try to create a world that looks like that, you end up with the disastrous policies that the United States pursued during the unipolar moment. We went around the world trying to create liberal democracies. Our main focus, of course, was in the greater Middle East, and you know how well that worked out. Not very well.

I think it would be difficult to say that America’s policy in the Middle East in the past seventy-five years since the end of the Second World War, or in the past thirty years since the end of the Cold War, has been to create liberal democracies in the Middle East.
I think that’s what the Bush Doctrine was about during the unipolar moment.

In Iraq. But not in the Palestinian territories, or Saudi Arabia, or Egypt, or anywhere else, right?
No—well, not in Saudi Arabia and not in Egypt. To start with, the Bush Doctrine basically said that if we could create a liberal democracy in Iraq, it would have a domino effect, and countries such as Syria, Iran, and eventually Saudi Arabia and Egypt would turn into democracies. That was the basic philosophy behind the Bush Doctrine. The Bush Doctrine was not just designed to turn Iraq into a democracy. We had a much grander scheme in mind.

We can debate how much the people who were in charge in the Bush Administration really wanted to turn the Middle East into a bunch of democracies, and really thought that was going to happen. My sense was that there was not a lot of actual enthusiasm about turning Saudi Arabia into a democracy.
Well, I think focusing on Saudi Arabia is taking the easy case from your perspective. That was the most difficult case from America’s perspective, because Saudi Arabia has so much leverage over us because of oil, and it’s certainly not a democracy. But the Bush Doctrine, if you go look at what we said at the time, was predicated on the belief that we could democratize the greater Middle East. It might not happen overnight, but it would eventually happen.

I guess my point would be actions speak louder than words, and, whatever Bush’s flowery speeches said, I don’t feel like the policy of the United States at any point in its recent history has been to try and insure liberal democracies around the world.
There’s a big difference between how the United States behaved during the unipolar moment and how it’s behaved in the course of its history. I agree with you when you talk about American foreign policy in the course of its broader history, but the unipolar moment was a very special time. I believe that during the unipolar moment, we were deeply committed to spreading democracy.

With Ukraine, it’s very important to understand that, up until 2014, we did not envision NATO expansion and E.U. expansion as a policy that was aimed at containing Russia. Nobody seriously thought that Russia was a threat before February 22, 2014. NATO expansion, E.U. expansion, and turning Ukraine and Georgia and other countries into liberal democracies were all about creating a giant zone of peace that spread all over Europe and included Eastern Europe and Western Europe. It was not aimed at containing Russia. What happened is that this major crisis broke out, and we had to assign blame, and of course we were never going to blame ourselves. We were going to blame the Russians. So we invented this story that Russia was bent on aggression in Eastern Europe. Putin is interested in creating a greater Russia, or maybe even re-creating the Soviet Union.

Let’s turn to that time and the annexation of Crimea. I was reading an old article where you wrote, “According to the prevailing wisdom in the West, the Ukraine Crisis can be blamed almost entirely on Russian aggression. Russian president Vladimir Putin, the argument goes, annexed Crimea out of a longstanding desire to resuscitate the Soviet Empire, and he may eventually go after the rest of Ukraine as well as other countries in Eastern Europe.” And then you say, “But this account is wrong.” Does anything that’s happened in the last couple weeks make you think that account was closer to the truth than you might have thought?
Oh, I think I was right. I think the evidence is clear that we did not think he was an aggressor before February 22, 2014. This is a story that we invented so that we could blame him. My argument is that the West, especially the United States, is principally responsible for this disaster. But no American policymaker, and hardly anywhere in the American foreign-policy establishment, is going to want to acknowledge that line of argument, and they will say that the Russians are responsible.

You mean because the Russians did the annexation and the invasion?
Yes.

I was interested in that article because you say the idea that Putin may eventually go after the rest of Ukraine, as well as other countries in Eastern Europe, is wrong. Given that he seems to be going after the rest of Ukraine now, do you think in hindsight that that argument is perhaps more true, even if we didn’t know it at the time?
It’s hard to say whether he’s going to go after the rest of Ukraine because—I don’t mean to nitpick here but—that implies that he wants to conquer all of Ukraine, and then he will turn to the Baltic states, and his aim is to create a greater Russia or the reincarnation of the Soviet Union. I don’t see evidence at this point that that is true. It’s difficult to tell, looking at the maps of the ongoing conflict, exactly what he’s up to. It seems quite clear to me that he is going to take the Donbass and that the Donbass is going to be either two independent states or one big independent state, but beyond that it’s not clear what he’s going to do. I mean, it does seem apparent that he’s not touching western Ukraine.

His bombs are touching it, right?
But that’s not the key issue. The key issue is: What territory do you conquer, and what territory do you hold onto? I was talking to somebody the other day about what’s going to happen with these forces that are coming out of Crimea, and the person told me that he thought they would turn west and take Odessa. I was talking to somebody else more recently who said that that’s not going to happen. Do I know what’s going to happen? No, none of us know what’s going to happen.

You don’t think he has designs on Kyiv?
No, I don’t think he has designs on Kyiv. I think he’s interested in taking at least the Donbass, and maybe some more territory and eastern Ukraine, and, number two, he wants to install in Kyiv a pro-Russian government, a government that is attuned to Moscow’s interests.

I thought you said that he was not interested in taking Kyiv.
No, he’s interested in taking Kyiv for the purpose of regime change. O.K.?

As opposed to what?
As opposed to permanently conquering Kyiv.

It would be a Russian-friendly government that he would presumably have some say over, right?
Yes, exactly. But it’s important to understand that it is fundamentally different from conquering and holding onto Kyiv. Do you understand what I’m saying?

We could all think of imperial possessions whereby a sort of figurehead was put on the throne, even if the homeland was actually controlling what was going on there, right? We’d still say that those places had been conquered, right?
I have problems with your use of the word “imperial.” I don’t know anybody who talks about this whole problem in terms of imperialism. This is great-power politics, and what the Russians want is a regime in Kyiv that is attuned to Russian interests. It may be ultimately that the Russians would be willing to live with a neutral Ukraine, and that it won’t be necessary for Moscow to have any meaningful control over the government in Kyiv. It may be that they just want a regime that is neutral and not pro-American.

When you said that no one’s talking about this as imperialism, in Putin’s speeches he specifically refers to the “territory of the former Russian Empire,” which he laments losing. So it seems like he’s talking about it.
I think that’s wrong, because I think you’re quoting the first half of the sentence, as most people in the West do. He said, “Whoever does not miss the Soviet Union has no heart.” And then he said, “Whoever wants it back has no brain.”

He’s also saying that Ukraine is essentially a made-up nation, while he seems to be invading it, no?
O.K., but put those two things together and tell me what that means. I’m just not too sure. He does believe it’s a made-up nation. I would note to him, all nations are made up. Any student of nationalism can tell you that. We invent these concepts of national identity. They’re filled with all sorts of myths. So he’s correct about Ukraine, just like he’s correct about the United States or Germany. The much more important point is: he understands that he cannot conquer Ukraine and integrate it into a greater Russia or into a reincarnation of the former Soviet Union. He can’t do that. What he’s doing in Ukraine is fundamentally different. He is obviously lopping off some territory. He’s going to take some territory away from Ukraine, in addition to what happened with Crimea, in 2014. Furthermore, he is definitely interested in regime change. Beyond that, it’s hard to say exactly what this will all lead to, except for the fact that he is not going to conquer all of Ukraine. It would be a blunder of colossal proportions to try to do that.

I assume that you think if he were to try to do that, that would change your analysis of what we’ve witnessed.
Absolutely. My argument is that he’s not going to re-create the Soviet Union or try to build a greater Russia, that he’s not interested in conquering and integrating Ukraine into Russia. It’s very important to understand that we invented this story that Putin is highly aggressive and he’s principally responsible for this crisis in Ukraine. The argument that the foreign-policy establishment in the United States, and in the West more generally, has invented revolves around the claim that he is interested in creating a greater Russia or a reincarnation of the former Soviet Union. There are people who believe that when he is finished conquering Ukraine, he will turn to the Baltic states. He’s not going to turn to the Baltic states. First of all, the Baltic states are members of NATO and—

Is that a good thing?
No.

You’re saying that he’s not going to invade them in part because they’re part of NATO, but they shouldn’t be part of NATO.
Yes, but those are two very different issues. I’m not sure why you’re connecting them. Whether I think they should be part of NATO is independent of whether they are part of NATO. They are part of NATO. They have an Article 5 guarantee—that’s all that matters. Furthermore, he’s never shown any evidence that he’s interested in conquering the Baltic states. Indeed, he’s never shown any evidence that he’s interested in conquering Ukraine.

It seems to me that if he wants to bring back anything, it’s the Russian Empire that predates the Soviet Union. He seems very critical of the Soviet Union, correct?
Well, I don’t know if he’s critical.

He said it in his big essay that he wrote last year, and he said in a recent speech that he essentially blames Soviet policies for allowing a degree of autonomy for Soviet Republics, such as Ukraine.
But he also said, as I read to you before, “Whoever does not miss the Soviet Union has no heart.” That’s somewhat at odds with what you just said. I mean, he’s in effect saying that he misses the Soviet Union, right? That’s what he’s saying. What we’re talking about here is his foreign policy. The question you have to ask yourself is whether or not you think that this is a country that has the capability to do that. You realize that this is a country that has a G.N.P. that’s smaller than Texas.

Countries try to do things that they don’t have the capabilities for all the time. You could have said to me, “Who thinks that America could get the Iraqi power system working quickly? We have all these problems in America.” And you would’ve been correct. But we still thought we could do it, and we still tried to do it, and we failed, right? America couldn’t do what it wanted during Vietnam, which I’m sure you would say is a reason not to fight these various wars—and I would agree—but that doesn’t mean that we were correct or rational about our capabilities.
I’m talking about the raw-power potential of Russia—the amount of economic might it has. Military might is built on economic might. You need an economic foundation to build a really powerful military. To go out and conquer countries like Ukraine and the Baltic states and to re-create the former Soviet Union or re-create the former Soviet Empire in Eastern Europe would require a massive army, and that would require an economic foundation that contemporary Russia does not come close to having. There is no reason to fear that Russia is going to be a regional hegemony in Europe. Russia is not a serious threat to the United States. We do face a serious threat in the international system. We face a pure competitor. And that’s China. Our policy in Eastern Europe is undermining our ability to deal with the most dangerous threat that we face today.

What do you think our policy should be in Ukraine right now, and what do you worry that we’re doing that’s going to undermine our China policy?
We should be pivoting out of Europe to deal with China in a laser-like fashion, number one. And, number two, we should be working overtime to create friendly relations with the Russians. The Russians are part of our balancing coalition against China. If you live in a world where there are three great powers—China, Russia, and the United States—and one of those great powers, China, is a pure competitor, what you want to do if you’re the United States is have Russia on your side of the ledger. Instead, what we have done with our foolish policies in Eastern Europe is drive the Russians into the arms of the Chinese. This is a violation of Balance of Power Politics 101.

I went back and I reread your article about the Israel lobby in the London Review of Books, from 2006. You were talking about the Palestinian issue, and you said something that I very much agree with, which is: “There is a moral dimension here as well. Thanks to the lobby of the United States it has become the de facto enabler of Israeli occupation in the occupied territories, making it complicit in the crimes perpetrated against the Palestinians.” I was cheered to read that because I know you think of yourself as a tough, crusty old guy who doesn’t talk about morality, but it seemed to me you were suggesting that there was a moral dimension here. I’m curious what you think, if any, of the moral dimension to what’s going on in Ukraine right now.
I think there is a strategic and a moral dimension involved with almost every issue in international politics. I think that sometimes those moral and strategic dimensions line up with each other. In other words, if you’re fighting against Nazi Germany from 1941 to 1945, you know the rest of the story. There are other occasions where those arrows point in opposite directions, where doing what is strategically right is morally wrong. I think if you join an alliance with the Soviet Union to fight against Nazi Germany, it is a strategically wise policy, but it is a morally wrong policy. But you do it because you have no choice for strategic reasons. In other words, what I’m saying to you, Isaac, is that when push comes to shove, strategic considerations overwhelm moral considerations. In an ideal world, it would be wonderful if the Ukrainians were free to choose their own political system and to choose their own foreign policy.
But in the real world, that is not feasible. The Ukrainians have a vested interest in paying serious attention to what the Russians want from them. They run a grave risk if they alienate the Russians in a fundamental way. If Russia thinks that Ukraine presents an existential threat to Russia because it is aligning with the United States and its West European allies, this is going to cause an enormous amount of damage to Ukraine. That of course is exactly what’s happening now. So my argument is: the strategically wise strategy for Ukraine is to break off its close relations with the West, especially with the United States, and try to accommodate the Russians. If there had been no decision to move NATO eastward to include Ukraine, Crimea and the Donbass would be part of Ukraine today, and there would be no war in Ukraine.

That advice seems a bit implausible now. Is there still time, despite what we’re seeing from the ground, for Ukraine to appease Russia somehow?
I think there’s a serious possibility that the Ukrainians can work out some sort of modus vivendi with the Russians. And the reason is that the Russians are now discovering that occupying Ukraine and trying to run Ukraine’s politics is asking for big trouble.

So you are saying occupying Ukraine is going to be a tough slog?
Absolutely, and that’s why I said to you that I did not think the Russians would occupy Ukraine in the long term. But, just to be very clear, I did say they’re going to take at least the Donbass, and hopefully not more of the easternmost part of Ukraine. I think the Russians are too smart to get involved in an occupation of Ukraine.

https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/why-john-mearsheimer-blames-the-us-for-the-crisis-in-ukraine

Complementing my OP, Great Power politics and morality are not mutually exclusive but to view the first in the frame of the latter runs against the grain of those whose job it is to study such things.

All of this represents the perspective (or rather: a perspective) of 'those who know what's best for us', and yes, I can understand this line of thought. So those people think that Ukraine should probably remain a neutral state (or should have done so), and should act accordingly and never turn west (or east, or wherever). But in a society with free elections, that can only be guaranteed to work if this philosophy is at all times out in the open and on the agenda during election time - and then you still guarantee that things go 'as they should'.

Case in point: Ukraine was probably doing fairly OK from Mearsheimer's perspective, until the events of 2014 and the ouster of Yanukovych. So, what would he have wanted to have happened there? In what non-violent and non-dictatorial way could the popular anger of that time have been redirected towards a resolution that does not involve a Ukrainian turn torwards the west? Cause from what I'm seeing, the ultimate consequence of his argument would be that countries should be ruled by benign dictatorships (or at least: limited political choice for the electorate) to ensure that the 'correct' geopolitical decisions is taken at all times. And that's both unrealistic from an amoral point of view and moral repugnant.

Further, this perspective also means that some places will have to accept to be forever held back in terms of economic progress just because they belong to a certain sphere of influence. (Cause the Russian sphere of influence arguably does not lead to prosperity - see inside Russia itself.) Again: so these populations just have to pay the price for happening to be located in certain areas? Again, also amorally, it's unrealistic to expect populations to accept that forever.

In case this reminds anyone of Finland: yes, Finland was firmly in Russia's sphere of influence after WWII, but while paying lip-service to that status, it did gradually turn further and further towards the west (certainly philosophically and structurally) in the course of the Cold War, to the point where it could really not be seen as a USSR vassal or ally anymore by the late 80s. Would Mearsheimer have been against that? How should it have been avoided?

I'm probably not phrasing this very well; this interview really pissed me off, and that doesn't help. Either way, what I'm trying to say is that I think the interview does in important ways highlight a major issue with seeing developments (or desired geopolitical direction) primarily in terms of the amoral thinking of leaders (with a moral component) - cause that really ignores public agency. I know that's influenced in many ways by the leaders' perspectives, but not entirely, and it's a perspective Mearsheimer completely ignores.

I’m also watching this rush to sanction, boycott, isolate, etc. and wondering who exactly it’s going to end up hurting the most - not just materially but also in terms of the type of shit ordinary Russians will inevitably be putting up with from now on. And to what end? My understanding was that these types of actions are most effective when specifically targeted. Can’t help thinking we’ll come to regret this orgy of demonization.

I agree with this. My understanding is also that these sanctions are meant to hurt the Russian population to the point where they (or their leaders) decide to get rid of Putin, cause Putin himself won't suffer much from them. But certainly for the population to get there, that sort of moment would likely be many months away (as an optimistic timeline), and recovery won't follow soon after. Is the plan, then, really to send ordinary Russians into abject poverty for years? That's quite the price for a regime change that is being imposed upon them. Even worse, there is no guarantee that the outcome will be an improvement for them. And as you say, these sanctions might lead to the kind of bitterness that makes it rather likely that any next government will again harbour a lot of resentment towards 'the west'.

I don't know what sanctions or other measures would work better, but I agree that this doesn't seem very tailored to the situation.

 

[MTF]

All the reports and articles I have is in arabic. But look at this one
https://www.cfr.org/blog/remembering-iraqi-uprising-twenty-five-years-ago

Thanks. So yeah, not exactly the lifting of the no-fly zone that wasn't even defined yet, but allowed the helicopters to fly and also as I said before, after calling for the uprising they then got cold feet and didn't provide any support.

But also goes with what I was arguing before, that the US didn't quite ever know what to do with Iraq. They fought and defeated his army, then decided they didn't want to overthrow him (to counter Iran), then later seemed to think that maybe they could get someone in the Iraqi army to overthrow him but keep the country intact, and finally came back around to the idea of taking him out themselves with the invasion.

 

[Giggsyking]

Thanks. So yeah, not exactly the lifting of the no-fly zone that wasn't even defined yet, but allowed the helicopters to fly and also as I said before, after calling for the uprising they then got cold feet and didn't provide any support.

But also goes with what I was arguing before, that the US didn't quite ever know what to do with Iraq. They fought and defeated his army, then decided they didn't want to overthrow him (to counter Iran), then later seemed to think that maybe they could get someone in the Iraqi army to overthrow him but keep the country intact, and finally came back around to the idea of taking him out themselves with the invasion.

Exactly, mistake after mistake that cost the region so much. But I think the Saudis played the major role in him staying and convinced the US about it. They knew letting him fly helicopters would put that uprise down in few weeks. It helped him in the south as well as in the north in Kurdistan.

 

[Winrar]

The sanctions against Russia are understandable, but I worry that they're just gonna become reliant on China and aid it further in becoming a superstate.

 

[Zlatattack]

So I've tried very hard to not talk about anything other than Ukraine in the thread dedicated to the conflict there, but I have an unpopular opinion I want to express.

I want to caveat first, that I do not endorse the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

What bothers me is how the reaction to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, has been so different to;
- Other occupations
- Other invasions (including those done by Russia)

It's not the wrong reaction. To condemn Russia and sanction it and isolate it for it's actions is exactly the right reaction, BUT what really gets on my tits, is where has all this sympathy and empathy been for so many other conflicts, in particular those waged against Muslim nations.

Russia destroyed Chechnya twice and nobody batted an eye lid. They lay siege to Grozny and killed at least 8000 people.

America and it's allies destroyed Iraq in 2003 on a false pretence. There is a universal defence of that along the lines of "yeah but Saddam was this and that". Saddam was all that when he was utilised to attack Iran too, he didn't change, America's use for Saddam changed, and his eye on Saudi oil changed their perspective on Saddam.

Libya is another example of a dictatorship, which was destroyed by America and it's allies. There was no legal justification for any of it. The "yeah but Gaddafi was a bad man" bullshit won't work. The Americans were talking to both Gaddafi and the rebels, trying to see who would be the best horse to bet on even whilst the conflict raged on.

Saudi Arabia is a perfect example of this hypocrisy. They are a vile dictatorship (who's money i would happily take to play fantasy football), they are responsible for the utter destruction of Yemen (and Iran tbh who has been backing the Houthis). Meanwhile nobody has condemned them, nobody has stopped buying their oil, or sanctioned them. They get a free ride because it benefits the economic interests of America and it's European allies.

Israel - the worst of them all. There isn't a law written they haven't broken. They've pushed the frontiers of inhumanity in their treatment of the Palestinian people and instead of condemning them, Western governments and Western corparations are busy trying to muzzle any political opposition to them. The BDS movement has been deemed anti semitic in some places. It's like Black Mirror come to life.

India is one close to my heart. I'm a Pakistani or Kashmiri origin. My family were refugees of ethnic cleansing. In the last 40 years, India has violently oppressed the Kashmiri people, they are competing with the Israeli's in terms of human rights abuses, especially in the last few years. Mass graves, rape as a weapon of war, civillians as human shields, enforced disaparances, blinding protestors, destroying farms, toruture - you name it, it is happening in Kashmir today. Yet people go on about India like it's some beacon of democracy. I'm not even going to start on the extremist hindu groups targeting Muslims across India. You only have to visit the India thread to read how fellow Indian members are disenfranchised by what is happening there. Yet no sanctions, no condemnation, most countries now actually ignore the UN resolutions on the matter and ask "India and Pakistan" to resolve it bilaterally. If India and Pakistan faced 50% of the sanctions Russia faces today, the matter would be resolved in months, if not weeks.

India is also a victim in this. China has taken Indian territory twice in the last few years. They only took a break because of COVID. Who stood by India? Who stopped buying stuff from China or moved their factories elsewhere?

China is a huge culprit in terms of human rights violations. They shut down the HK protests violently. They've been doing all sorts of abusive stuff in Xinjiang province against their uighurs muslim population. Re-education camps, rape, demolishing places of worship - it's like North Korea there. Yet everyone went to the Winter Olympics, everyone still makes stuff there, buys from there.

There are loads of other conflicts I've not mentioned. The Rohingya genocide in Burma, Sudan's war on South Sudan, the regular bombing of Somalia by the US, the shitshow that started off as the Syrian civil war and is now the battlefield for a Proxy war of about 5 different countries. The list goes on.

Just to circle back to where I started, the people of Ukraine deserve our support unconditionally. It just makes me sick how everyone can be so concerned for them, and not give a shit about the suffering elsewhere.

 

[MTF]

@Cheimoon , good post. I especially agree with the part about how countries and their people have agency, they won't conform to their assigned spheres of influence just because other countries say it is so.

 

[Dr. Dwayne]

@Zlatattack

To be fair plenty of people do give a shit, it's the governments that don't.

And some of these other conflicts are more complex on the surface when compared to Russia's blatant invasion and occupation of Ukraine, as well as their motivations. Yemen, for instance, as I understand it, is a civil conflict with one side supportd by the Saudis, who are indirectly supported by Western governments who purchase oil from them and sell them arms. We should instead try to mediate the conflict because it's a genuine humanitarian crisis.

We can hope that the events in Ukraine hitting a lot of westerners hard can help change how we react when similar crises occur in other places and what we demand from our own nations in response. As individuals, it's about all we can do, short of taking up arms ourselves and joining the fight of those oppressed.

 

[Zlatattack]

@Zlatattack

To be fair plenty of people do give a shit, it's the governments that don't.

And some of these other conflicts are more complex on the surface when compared to Russia's blatant invasion and occupation of Ukraine, as well as their motivations. Yemen, for instance, as I understand it, is a civil conflict with one side supportd by the Saudis, who are indirectly supported by Western governments who purchase oil from them and sell them arms. We should instead try to mediate the conflict because it's a genuine humanitarian crisis.

We can hope that the events in Ukraine hitting a lot of westerners hard can help change how we react when similar crises occur in other places and what we demand from our own nations in response. As individuals, it's about all we can do, short of taking up arms ourselves and joining the fight of those oppressed.

I agree. Its not people I'm annoyed it, its government, media and big business.

You take 10 people from any part of the world and put them in a room - they're pretty much the same, with the same problems and the same desires.

People are rarely the problem.

 

[VorZakone]

I agree. Its not people I'm annoyed it, its government, media and big business.

You take 10 people from any part of the world and put them in a room - they're pretty much the same, with the same problems and the same desires.

People are rarely the problem.

Same in the sense that ultimately any human wants basic needs met such as shelter and food. But culturally, we're not all the same.

 

[MoskvaRed]

you’re the one who mentioned corbyn out of nowhere

He’s part of Stop the War and obviously high profile. What is the alternative to the current situation? For my part, I honestly don’t know.

 

[RedDevil@84]

And some of these other conflicts are more complex on the surface when compared to Russia's blatant invasion and occupation of Ukraine, as well as their motivations. Yemen, for instance, as I understand it, is a civil conflict with one side supportd by the Saudis, who are indirectly supported by Western governments who purchase oil from them and sell them arms.

Not specifically talking about Yemen, but many countries will have a bunch of people who are wanting to topple govt. And the govts in those countries keep such people at bay successfully. But if powerful countries suddenly decide to fund/arm a small group to the teeth, then it is not much different from a blatant invasion. The idea is the same, to topple the current regime and install a puppet regime that will listen to the big powers. Direct invasion or indirect funding of separatists to achieve the same goals.

 

[2cents]

My understanding is also that these sanctions are meant to hurt the Russian population to the point where they (or their leaders) decide to get rid of Putin, cause Putin himself won't suffer much from them. But certainly for the population to get there, that sort of moment would likely be many months away (as an optimistic timeline), and recovery won't follow soon after. Is the plan, then, really to send ordinary Russians into abject poverty for years? That's quite the price for a regime change that is being imposed upon them. Even worse, there is no guarantee that the outcome will be an improvement for them. And as you say, these sanctions might lead to the kind of bitterness that makes it rather likely that any next government will again harbour a lot of resentment towards 'the west'.

I don't know what sanctions or other measures would work better, but I agree that this doesn't seem very tailored to the situation.

Just came across this from a historian of economics sanctions at Cornell (I know absolutely nothing about the first two examples):

 

[Zlatattack]

Same in the sense that ultimately any human wants basic needs met such as shelter and food. But culturally, we're not all the same.

Yeah?

It doesn't really matter - to each thier own.

 

[entropy]

He’s part of Stop the War and obviously high profile. What is the alternative to the current situation? For my part, I honestly don’t know.

what did you mean by RT regular? like he is a russian agent or something like that?

 

[The Corinthian]

Same in the sense that ultimately any human wants basic needs met such as shelter and food. But culturally, we're not all the same.

Culturally is such a broad ambiguous term though. What do you mean specifically?

The basics of the human condition are the same regardless of cultural differences.

 

[MoskvaRed]

what did you mean by RT regular? like he is a russian agent or something like that?

He’s at best extremely naive by appearing on that channel. Anyway, back to the question - what is your proposed solution?

 

[entropy]

He’s at best extremely naive by appearing on that channel. Anyway, back to the question - what is your proposed solution?

why is he naive for advocating for peace? anyways, a great place to start would be to not listen to the same countries which are responsible for countless deaths and have spent a vast majority of the last few decades making a mockery of international law.

 

[MoskvaRed]

why is he naive for advocating for peace? anyways, a great place to start would be to not listen to the same countries which are responsible for countless deaths and have spent a vast majority of the last few decades making a mockery of international law.

We all want peace but solutions have to be grounded in reality. In what way is peace currently attainable without Ukraine surrendering and accepting its role as Russian little brother number 2 (Belarus being number 1)? It’s as though Ukrainians’ wishes don’t really count.

 

[entropy]

We all want peace but solutions have to be grounded in reality. In what way is peace currently attainable without Ukraine surrendering and accepting its role as Russian little brother number 2 (Belarus being number 1)? It’s as though Ukrainians’ wishes don’t really count.

how is cheering some poor soul into taking up arms and sacrificing his life going to achieve peace? there are already hundreds of lives lost and many suffering through the traumatic event.

 

[PedroMendez]

Case in point: Ukraine was probably doing fairly OK from Mearsheimer's perspective, until the events of 2014 and the ouster of Yanukovych. So, what would he have wanted to have happened there? In what non-violent and non-dictatorial way could the popular anger of that time have been redirected towards a resolution that does not involve a Ukrainian turn torwards the west? Cause from what I'm seeing, the ultimate consequence of his argument would be that countries should be ruled by benign dictatorships (or at least: limited political choice for the electorate) to ensure that the 'correct' geopolitical decisions is taken at all times. And that's both unrealistic from an amoral point of view and moral repugnant.

Further, this perspective also means that some places will have to accept to be forever held back in terms of economic progress just because they belong to a certain sphere of influence. (Cause the Russian sphere of influence arguably does not lead to prosperity - see inside Russia itself.) Again: so these populations just have to pay the price for happening to be located in certain areas? Again, also amorally, it's unrealistic to expect populations to accept that forever.

In case this reminds anyone of Finland: yes, Finland was firmly in Russia's sphere of influence after WWII, but while paying lip-service to that status, it did gradually turn further and further towards the west (certainly philosophically and structurally) in the course of the Cold War, to the point where it could really not be seen as a USSR vassal or ally anymore by the late 80s. Would Mearsheimer have been against that? How should it have been avoided?

I'm probably not phrasing this very well; this interview really pissed me off, and that doesn't help. Either way, what I'm trying to say is that I think the interview does in important ways highlight a major issue with seeing developments (or desired geopolitical direction) primarily in terms of the amoral thinking of leaders (with a moral component) - cause that really ignores public agency. I know that's influenced in many ways by the leaders' perspectives, but not entirely, and it's a perspective Mearsheimer completely ignores.

part of the argument of realism ist, that being motivated by moral ideals leads to bad and potentially even catastrophic outcomes. Consequently good leaders aren't following morals. Having the moral high-ground doesn't help you, when your country is getting destroyed and your population is dying.
The Ukraine should have known, that Russia can and will seriously hurt them when they cross certain red lines. The Ukraine should have known, that "supportive" western actors won't stand next to them in the trenches, when Russia invades. Good leaders wouldn't have been motivated by idealistic follies, but would have accommodated Russia's interests sufficiently, even if that means giving up on some things. That's still much better than getting bombed, occupied and/or annexed.
Russia is too weak to be a competitor for the USA, while China is a gigantic problem. The USA should have shifted their policy towards Asia and if possible, should have tried to get Russia on their side in the conflict with China. Caring about a country like Ukraine might be morally "right", but as initially stated, leads to really bad policies and really bad outcomes. The USA should have told Ukraine a long time ago "you have to accomodate Russia to some extend or you get wrecked" and than turned away, because the USA has different interest/problems (China).The USA shouldn't have encouraged the Ukraine to piss off Russia and it shouldn't have made promises (implicitly), that won't be kept when push comes to shove. Yet, thats what happens when "21st century leaders", that are motivated by morals, fumble around not knowing what they are doing. They feck things up.

Finnland is exactly what he would recommend (I don't know anything about that and just follow your description): if countries are smart and careful, they can get away with it, but you can't be to bold/aggressive. Russia told the Ukraine that they are overstepping and Ukraine should have taken this seriously.

He doesn't say anything about dictatorship or that Ukraine has to be exclusively in the Russian sphere of influence. One of his core assumptions is, that Russia is primarily motivated by classical "high politics". He assumes that they are mostly concerned about NATO, to some extend about the EU. Ukraine has to accept that they are (militarily) a buffer state. Good Ukrainian leaders give Russia enough to keep them quite and use the resulting political space to develop the country (incl. more cooperation with the EU). He assumes that this is possible, if leaders are realistic and not misguided by moral/idealistic positions.****

I think his arguments are fairly compelling if you accept his assumption(s). Imo. the big one is, that Russia is primarily motivated by high politics (=balance of power politics) and in this regard a fairly rational/predictable actor.
If one assumes that the Russian government has at also other motives, Mearsheimer's gets into some trouble. He would still argue, that this shouldn't concern the USA, but he wouldn't have much to say to the Ukraine (or Europe), other than "not our problem". In a world like this, his prescriptions wouldn't lead to a stable system, which is kind of the point. Still, Mearsheimer simply denies that Russia might also have imperialistic/ideological goals or that Putin might be motivated by personal interests.

If I'd be on the left I'd be cautious to cheer on Mearsheimer. He called himself (but also the Chinese or Russian leadership) 19th century men, because they understand that its all about balance of power/strategic interests. His strategic non-interventionism in some cases (that he considers irrelevant), doesn't mean his prescription are always like this.

****Edit: I should be clearer on his views about the Ukraine and have to qualify what I wrote. He argues, that once the USA and Ukraine accept the "balance of power" situation, accept Russia's strategic interest and accepts that Ukraine is a buffer state, Russia won't be confrontational. He argues that under these circumstances, the USA should and could help to build up the country economically and invest in the region. He assumes that this would be beneficial for Ukraine and probably the best realistic outcome. He is to some extend a consequentialist.

 

[Mciahel Goodman]

Yeah, that all makes sense to me (after having read it very slowly to make sure I understand all the terminology ), and it's a good way of framing things.

I don't have anything to discuss with that really, but there were two things I was thinking of. On a rather simple level, I am not sure journalists always very consciously or meaningfully choose their framing. Or at least, my impression is that most journalists may not be sufficiently specialized in any particular issue to do so. For more investigative or analytics journalist, and political commentary - sure. There is definitely a lot of massaging going on. But for reporting on the Ukraine crisis, for example, I think a lot of general journalism just goes with what they could quickly grasp and could manage within their deadline.

And the more intersting point: populations have not really come into this, but I think they should. That perspective is also what really made me hate most of what I read in the interview you quoted later on:

All of this represents the perspective (or rather: a perspective) of 'those who know what's best for us', and yes, I can understand this line of thought. So those people think that Ukraine should probably remain a neutral state (or should have done so), and should act accordingly and never turn west (or east, or wherever). But in a society with free elections, that can only be guaranteed to work if this philosophy is at all times out in the open and on the agenda during election time - and then you still guarantee that things go 'as they should'.

It's a massive problem. Do you try to approximate the view of the protestor on the street, or the view of those who direct armies across borders? I would argue both (the mutual frame premise of my entire argument from the start). On the other hand, geopolitical thinkers do take each of these frames into account. For example, many of the tropes you see being circulated in the primary response thread were strategized by various planners in advance (talking points). Directing the conversation in ways you want it to go is a means of factoring agency into the equation: you prepare a top-down media/diplomatic assault on the public consciousness. Read "Global Strategy 2022: Thwarting Kremlin aggression today for constructive relations tomorrow" and study the parts regarding the kinds of desired media responses the government ought to foster, then study memes and replies across the board, and note the similarities. This isn't to say that they control it seamlessly, they don't. But they do anticipate it in advance and with varying levels of success (measured by consensus over dissent). Parts of that document made it into Biden's State of the Union address. The argument it makes, geopolitically, is also grim. One whereby Ukraine is a kind of lever (or proxy) which the US uses to bring about a more favourable (liberal) regime in Russia in the long-term.

Case in point: Ukraine was probably doing fairly OK from Mearsheimer's perspective, until the events of 2014 and the ouster of Yanukovych. So, what would he have wanted to have happened there? In what non-violent and non-dictatorial way could the popular anger of that time have been redirected towards a resolution that does not involve a Ukrainian turn torwards the west? Cause from what I'm seeing, the ultimate consequence of his argument would be that countries should be ruled by benign dictatorships (or at least: limited political choice for the electorate) to ensure that the 'correct' geopolitical decisions is taken at all times. And that's both unrealistic from an amoral point of view and moral repugnant.

Further, this perspective also means that some places will have to accept to be forever held back in terms of economic progress just because they belong to a certain sphere of influence. (Cause the Russian sphere of influence arguably does not lead to prosperity - see inside Russia itself.) Again: so these populations just have to pay the price for happening to be located in certain areas? Again, also amorally, it's unrealistic to expect populations to accept that forever.

In case this reminds anyone of Finland: yes, Finland was firmly in Russia's sphere of influence after WWII, but while paying lip-service to that status, it did gradually turn further and further towards the west (certainly philosophically and structurally) in the course of the Cold War, to the point where it could really not be seen as a USSR vassal or ally anymore by the late 80s. Would Mearsheimer have been against that? How should it have been avoided?

I'm probably not phrasing this very well; this interview really pissed me off, and that doesn't help. Either way, what I'm trying to say is that I think the interview does in important ways highlight a major issue with seeing developments (or desired geopolitical direction) primarily in terms of the amoral thinking of leaders (with a moral component) - cause that really ignores public agency. I know that's influenced in many ways by the leaders' perspectives, but not entirely, and it's a perspective Mearsheimer completely ignores.

He traces it back to 2008 but he also states that Ukraine turning toward the West isn't the problem. The problem, as Mearsheimer sees it, is Ukraine turning toward NATO and NATO not rejecting the possibility of entrance out of hand. The interview only scratches the surface of a much larger argument. Ukraine could hold the freest elections known to history and its neutrality could be guaranteed if Russia/Nato agree tomorrow that Ukraine will not enter NATO, and Russia will not militarize the eastern part (with the exception of Crimea, which is basically a military naval base, and to the south). The reality is that Russia will not accept a Ukraine which exists within NATO. It might, feasibly, accept a (western) Ukraine which exists within the EU but which has neutrality hardwired into its makeup (to the extent that it would be beyond their choice: if NATO does not want to admit Ukraine, Ukraine cannot be admitted and in that reality neutrality is the only logical outcome, and this is a point which Mearsheimer makes in extended writing).

As for being forever held back. Mearsheimer is part of the "realist" school. So Cuba has to accept an embargo which has been in place for over half century. Weaker EU member states accept the dictates of the Franco-German hegemony (this is probably about as benign as "dictatorships" get). France and Germany accept the dictates of the US. He does go on to argue that "forever" is not the case. The world changes frequently. But in what near-future world do you perceive the US lifting the embargo against Cuba or Russia withdrawing from its invasion of the Ukraine, or Israel ceasing to occupy the West Bank/lift siege of Gaza? The Israeli case might be the most promising of the lot (at least with the West Bank), which tells you something.

Taking his overall argument into account, which the interview does not provide, in fairness, Finland rather proves Mearsheimer's reading of events. Nationalistic resistance over and above "secondary" ideological factors. His entire doctrine revolves around the notion that nationalism is the most potent political ideology in the world (the breakup of the USSR where republics wanted to become autonomous nation-states, including Ukraine). What he is saying is that the reality for Ukraine, given its geographical and cultural position (its contiguity with Russia as well as its large Russian demographic in the east) is what it is. Not ideal, good, nor moral, but real(ist).

The second major distinction concerns the different kinds of international orders that great powers can organize: realist, agnostic, or ideological (to include liberal). Which order takes hold depends primarily on the distribution of power among the great powers. The key issue is whether the system is bipolar, multipolar, or unipolar. If it is unipolar, the political ideology of the dominant state also matters for determining the kind of international order that forms. In bipolarity and multipolarity, however, the political ideology of the great powers is largely irrelevant.

Realist Orders

The international order—and the institutions that make it up—will be realist if the system is either bipolar or multipolar. The reason is simple: if there are two or more great powers in the world, they have little choice but to act according to realist dictates and engage in security competition with each other. Their aim is to gain power at the expense of their adversaries, but if that is not possible, to make sure that the balance of power does not shift against them. Ideological considerations are subordinated to security considerations in these circumstances. That would be true even if all the great powers were liberal states. Nevertheless, rival great powers sometimes have an incentive to cooperate. After all, they operate in a highly interdependent world, where they are sure to have some common interests. Bounded and international orders, which operate side by side in a realist world, help opposing great powers compete and cooperate among themselves. Specifically, the great powers establish their own bounded orders to help wage security competition with each other. In contrast, they organize international orders to facilitate cooperation between themselves and often with other countries as well. The institutions that make up an international order are well suited for helping great powers reach agreements when those states have common interests. This concern with cooperation notwithstanding, the great powers are still rivals whose relationship is competitive at its core. Balance of power considerations are always at play, even when great powers work through international institutions to cooperate with each other. In particular, no great power is going to sign an agreement that diminishes its power. The institutions that make up these realist orders—be they international or bounded—might sometimes have features that are consistent with liberal values, but this is not evidence that the order is liberal. Those features just happen to also make sense from a balance of power perspective. For example, the key economic institutions inside a bounded order might be oriented to facilitate free trade among the member states, not because of liberal calculations, but because economic openness is considered the best way to generate economic and military power inside that order. Indeed, if abandoning free trade and moving toward a more closed economic system made good strategic sense, that would happen in a realist order.

Agnostic and Ideological Orders

If the world is unipolar, the international order cannot be realist. Unipolarity has only one great power, and thus by definition there can be no security competition between great powers, which is a sine qua non of any realist world order. Consequently, the sole pole has little reason to create a bounded order. After all, bounded orders are mainly designed for waging security competition with other great powers, which is irrelevant in unipolarity. Nevertheless, some of the institutions in that nonrealist international order might be regional in scope, whereas others will be truly global in terms of their membership. None of those regional institutions, however, would be bundled together to form a bounded order; they would instead be either loosely or tightly linked with the other institutions in the prevailing international order.

…

Agnostic orders also tend to have substantial staying power, because the unipole accepts the heterogeneity that is inherent in political and social life and does not try to micromanage the politics of nearly every country on the planet. That kind of pragmatic behavior helps preserve, if not augment, the hegemon’s power. An agnostic order is likely to meet its end when unipolarity gives way to either bipolarity or multipolarity, making the order realist; or if the sole pole experiences a revolution at home and adopts a universalistic ideology, which would surely lead it to forge an ideological order. By contrast, any ideological international order based on a universalistic ideology, such as liberalism or communism, is destined to have a short life span, mainly because of the domestic and global difficulties that arise when the unipole seeks to remake the world in its own image. Nationalism and balance of power politics work to undermine the requisite social engineering in countries targeted for regime change, while nationalism also creates significant problems on the home front for the sole pole and its ideological allies.

He has synonyms for "agency" and "social engineering" is close. You have to get it in context but all the while understand that he's looking from the a(moral) macro frame which minimises the individual in most instances (unless it is an individual state).

 

[Mciahel Goodman]

part of the argument of realism ist, that being motivated by moral ideals leads to bad and potentially even catastrophic outcomes. Consequently good leaders aren't following morals. Having the moral high-ground doesn't help you, when your country is getting destroyed and your population is dying.
The Ukraine should have known, that Russia can and will seriously hurt them when they cross certain red lines. The Ukraine should have known, that "supportive" western actors won't stand next to them in the trenches, when Russia invades. Good leaders wouldn't have been motivated by idealistic follies, but would have accommodated Russia's interests sufficiently, even if that means giving up on some things. That's still much better than getting bombed, occupied and/or annexed.
Russia is too weak to be a competitor for the USA, while China is a gigantic problem. The USA should have shifted their policy towards Asia and if possible, should have tried to get Russia on their side in the conflict with China. Caring about a country like Ukraine might be morally "right", but as initially stated, leads to really bad policies and really bad outcomes. The USA should have told Ukraine a long time ago "you have to accomodate Russia to some extend or you get wrecked" and than turned away, because the USA has different interest/problems (China).The USA shouldn't have encouraged the Ukraine to piss off Russia and it shouldn't have made promises (implicitly), that won't be kept when push comes to shove. Yet, thats what happens when "21st century leaders", that are motivated by morals, fumble around not knowing what they are doing. They feck things up.

Finnland is exactly what he would recommend (I don't know anything about that and just follow your description): if countries are smart and careful, they can get away with it, but you can't be to bold/aggressive. Russia told the Ukraine that they are overstepping and Ukraine should have taken this seriously.

He doesn't say anything about dictatorship or that Ukraine has to be exclusively in the Russian sphere of influence. One of his core assumptions is, that Russia is primarily motivated by classical "high politics". He assumes that they are mostly concerned about NATO, to some extend about the EU. Ukraine has to accept that they are (militarily) a buffer state. Good Ukrainian leaders give Russia enough to keep them quite and use the resulting political space to develop the country (incl. more cooperation with the EU). He assumes that this is possible, if leaders are realistic and not misguided by moral/idealistic positions.****

I think his arguments are fairly compelling if you accept his assumption(s). Imo. the big one is, that Russia is primarily motivated by high politics (=balance of power politics) and in this regard a fairly rational/predictable actor.
If one assumes that the Russian government has at also other motives, Mearsheimer's gets into some trouble. He would still argue, that this shouldn't concern the USA, but he wouldn't have much to say to the Ukraine (or Europe), other than "not our problem". In a world like this, his prescriptions wouldn't lead to a stable system, which is kind of the point. Still, Mearsheimer simply denies that Russia might also have imperialistic/ideological goals or that Putin might be motivated by personal interests.

If I'd be on the left I'd be cautious to cheer on Mearsheimer. He called himself (but also the Chinese or Russian leadership) 19th century men, because they understand that its all about balance of power/strategic interests. His strategic non-interventionism in some cases (that he considers irrelevant), doesn't mean his prescription are always like this.

****Edit: I should be clearer on his views about the Ukraine and have to qualify what I wrote. He argues, that once the USA and Ukraine accept the "balance of power" situation, accept Russia's strategic interest and accepts that Ukraine is a buffer state, Russia won't be confrontational. He argues that under these circumstances, the USA should and could help to build up the country economically and invest in the region. He assumes that this would be beneficial for Ukraine and probably the best realistic outcome. He is to some extend a consequentialist.

Exactly this. Mearsheimer is also far to the right of me (but the amazing thing about the geopolitical view of this event is that all across the spectrum from left through right you have many people who usually disagree on everything agreeing on the same core set of assumptions). Kissinger, Mearsheimer, Kennan, and Chomsky all unanimously in agreement regarding NATO expansionism being a bad idea insofar as it goes for Ukraine. And yeah, Mearsheimer isn't without flaws. He does minimize agency and rather intentionally which can lead to a whitewashing of people's actions (look at how he discusses the Iraq War, he does it from the point of view that the US really wanted to install a liberal democracy which is questionable, and you can extend that same level of doubt to Russia's invasion of Ukraine in various respects).

 

[Mciahel Goodman]

At times it does seem that people are actually happy to see Europe at war, as if Eastern Europe has been at fault for anything happened in the Middle East etc. and as if we've never gone through hardships ourselves (most of our countries we occupied by Russia just 30 years ago).

Another aspect is "othering" countries like Ukraine. It's like the countries are just clogs in the system of the big boys and we can be used as currency, to be traded and used as levers in some geopolitical powerplays that we don't understand.

Anyway, back to topic, let the numbskulls have their threads.

That explosion heard near the metro station sounds scary, hope everyone covering in the underground are fine.

Might refer to my post, but I'm not expressing my own opinion, I'm referring to this document in which some parts are clearly relevant to the response on the US front:

What is driving the current relationship between Russia and China is Putin’s obsession with what he sees as the threat of the United States—an obsession that has little chance of fading—and deteriorating relations with Europe. Putin’s view, of course, prevails, but others in Moscow understand that China is in fact a danger to Russia’s position in at least the Far East and perhaps even Siberia. Eventually though, when it is clear to Russian policy makers that US intentions do not pose a threat to the integrity of Russia, Moscow will understand the real national security threat facing it—the rising and increasingly assertive great power to its south. The United States will not be the lever that puts an end to this historically anomalous partnership, thereby isolating China as the only major power seeking to undermine the state of the global order. But Washington should both understand the dynamic and publicly pay attention to it. As Dmitri Trenin, the director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, argues, both Russia and China have so many bilateral considerations toward various countries that they prefer to deal with the United States bilaterally and not in an alliance.

The United States should also utilize personal sanctions against both senior officials and their families to magnify the pressure, especially when linked to this corruption. The US sanctions on seven oligarchs close to the Kremlin in April 2018 shocked the Russian financial markets, but since then no more Kremlin-associated oligarchs have been sanctioned.
The Russian elite may weaponize anti-Western rhetoric, but they place their assets in the West and many of their family members live and are educated there.

This is a still an underexploited vulnerability. Western countries should also commit to passing and enforcing strong and transparent laws against money laundering. The United States and the UK are principal places for foreigners to silently stash their ill-gotten gains. Those funds can then be used to build networks in the United States (and
elsewhere) to discredit Western democracies and to promote the Kremlin’s influence.

Assumption six is that geopolitics and history suggest that China is more of a rival than a partner for Russia. The current entente between the two, based on animus against the United States and the international order it helped create—like the one established after Mao seized power in Beijing—will not last long. The United States and Russia will eventually be natural partners in dealing with a rising China.

Setting the stage for eventual cooperation means identifying areas where US and Russian interests overlap today, and could in theory work with the current regime, though cooperation is likely to be limited; and laying out the prospects for a mutually beneficial future in which cooperation could become more profound. This second element requires outreach to the Russian people, support for the opposition in Russia, and countering Russian disinformation about US intentions, but also dialogue with the government and its auxiliaries in the think tank and media world. The success of this second element depends on the first. When the Kremlin realizes that it cannot successfully undermine the international rules of the game or discredit Western values, it will find that its true interests include cooperation with the United States and developing its economy by unleashing its talented people and exploiting its great natural resources to prosper as part of global society. It will also find that Washington is a useful partner in dealing with China’s expanding influence and territorial claims.

Their goal is to confront Russia in the short-term but bring it into a more "natural" alliance in the long-term. Ukraine is where the confrontation is happening (not saying they intend for it to be the lever, but you can infer that quite easily, might be wrong all the same). The document is readily available online and some parts in bold reflect Biden's stance and that of the media more broadly. And yes, these people do seem to view countries as clogs within a system. I'm not saying that's valid, or the only way to view it, I'm simply posting different viewpoints from various people involved in geopolitics.

 

[Raoul]

Exactly this. Mearsheimer is also far to the right of me (but the amazing thing about the geopolitical view of this event is that all across the spectrum from left through right you have many people who usually disagree on everything agreeing on the same core set of assumptions). Kissinger, Mearsheimer, Kennan, and Chomsky all unanimously in agreement regarding NATO expansionism being a bad idea insofar as it goes for Ukraine. And yeah, Mearsheimer isn't without flaws. He does minimize agency and rather intentionally which can lead to a whitewashing of people's actions (look at how he discusses the Iraq War, he does it from the point of view that the US really wanted to install a liberal democracy which is questionable, and you can extend that same level of doubt to Russia's invasion of Ukraine in various respects).

Just to add to this. Structural Realism (or Neo-Realism) is becoming an increasingly outdated way to explain behavior in international relations. It was more explanatory in the past when the state was the referent object in the international system, but over time became less relevant as other more nuanced theories such as the Neo-Liberalism of Nye and Keohane, the Liberal Intergovernmentalism of someone like Andrew Moravcsik (which focused largely on states integrating into larger bodies like the EU) and Constructivism, which focuses on the social construction of ideas to explain the behavior of international actors.

In the case of Russia/Ukraine, realism falls short in answering quite a few things, most notably Putin's own behavior, which is down to Putin's state of mind, his desire to be remembered as a great leader, a sense of running out of time to do so, a desire to not allow democracy to take flight within Russia...leading to a revolution that might get him killed etc. This is one area where Construcitivism is far more powerful. Mearsheimer is using an approach that by definition cannot answer any of these problems and instead defaults to reducing everything to competition among states. It fails to get into Putin's head, which is the very source of this war.

 

[Mciahel Goodman]

Just to add to this. Structural Realism (or Neo-Realism) is becoming an increasingly outdated way to explain behavior in international relations. It was more explanatory in the past when the state was the referent object in the international system, but over time became less relevant as other more nuanced theories such as the Neo-Liberalism of Nye and Keohane, the Liberal Intergovernmentalism of someone like Andrew Moravcsik (which focused largely in states integrating into larger bodies like the EU) and Constructivism, which focuses ideas the social construction of ideas to explain the behavior of international actors.

In the case of Russia/Ukraine, realism falls short in answering quite a few things, most notably Putin's own behavior, which is down to Putin's state of mind, his desire to be remembered as a great leader, a sense of running out of time to do so, a desire to not allow democracy to take flight within Russia...leading to a revolution that might get him killed etc. This is one area where Construcitivism is far more powerful. Mearsheimer is using an approach that by definition cannot answer any of these problems and instead defaults to reducing everything to competition among states. It fails to get into Putin's head, which is the very source of this war.

Yeah I agree. Especially with the part in bold (I defer to your own knowledge regarding the first paragraph). People are driven by personal motives which cannot always or solely be read in terms of structure (or the realist model Mearsheimer promotes). Another (much more benign) example is John Kerry as Secretary of State. He and Obama apparently conflicted over many issues on the Russian front where Kerry seemed to be going gonzo, but when Iran came around (and Kerry's tenure as SoS was nearing its end), the two got along very well and most put that down to Kerry's personal motives in respect of wanting to leave a legacy. Structuralism/realism is definitely only one part of the equation and may not even be optimal. How does someone who doesn't focus upon the individual actor account for individual motives? as you say. For example, people might misread the document I cite above as assuming responsibility for Putin's actions when that is not the case. It lays out potential scenarios whereby the US responds if/when Putin decides to escalate. Which is a different order of distinction (the blame stays with Russia for the Russian invasion and the document's usefulness is more in understanding how a response might occur if and when it happens, or as it happened).

 

[Cheimoon]

Very interesting, @Mciahel Goodman, @PedroMendez, and @Raoul. It's nice to see this qualifiers to Mearsheimer's approach and the alternatives, as they respond to some misigivings I was having - even if I do not see them quite so clearly and couldn't have phrased them so well. I still feel the public's agency is a little underrated; but I suppose the response would be that part of good long-term geopolitical policy is to ensure the general public largely embraces or at least accepts the required geopolitical perspective.

I do wonder, though, what someone like Mearsheimer would say if (with wishful thinking) Ukraine would somehow come out of all this 'on top; - i.e., heavily damaged, but free to continue to get closer to NATO and the EU. (Which obviously would also mean that Russia is severely weakened and unable to try to exert its influence in Ukraine again.) That doesn't seem to fit his rather deterministic world view at all; or maybe I misunderstand that.

(I must say, thought, that I found that Global Strategy 2022 document less interesting. It's very straightforward compared to the more theoretical explanations we've been having in this thread.)

Anyway, as much as it's probably correct, it's also quite saddening to have to see the world this way. At least countries to a significant extent can choose their own path internally - although if you look at e.g. US politics, they seem to follow a lot of the same rules of engagement as in Mearsheimer's bipolar power structure scenario. And that's where it gets depressing and I'd rather stop.

 

[Zlatattack]

 

[Giggsyking]

Same in the sense that ultimately any human wants basic needs met such as shelter and food. But culturally, we're not all the same.

Elaborate?

 

[do.ob]

Maybe I'm just missing the bigger picture of his lectures, but how can you take anyone seriously as a "realist", when he bases his assumptions on one quote from Putin, which isn't even entirely clear and sort of borrowed from George Bernard Shaw. And decides to basically ignore everything else that's being said and done in favour of his own personal interpretation of that quote, just so he can stick to his conclusion that Putin/Russia's only ambition is to keep buffers on his current borders.

 

[VorZakone]

Elaborate?

For example: Khabib Nurmagomedov, as far as I can tell, doesn't shake hands with female interviewers. I'll leave it up to others whether that's good or bad, but it's culturally different from the West.

 

[The Corinthian]

For example: Khabib Nurmagomedov, as far as I can tell, doesn't shake hands with female interviewers. I'll leave it up to others whether that's good or bad, but it's culturally different from the West.

That’s not culture. That’s due to his religious beliefs. Its the same as Justin Trudeau not offering to shake hands with women in hijabs. Again, it’s not culture but (his respect for other’s) religion.

 

[PedroMendez]

Maybe I'm just missing the bigger picture of his lectures, but how can you take anyone seriously as a "realist", when he bases his assumptions on one quote from Putin, which isn't even entirely clear and sort of borrowed from George Bernard Shaw. And decides to basically ignore everything else that's being said and done in favour of his own personal interpretation of that quote, just so he can stick to his conclusion that Putin/Russia's only ambition is to keep buffers on his current borders.

I don't think that the previous discussion fully captured what Mearsheimer is saying. He has a surprising amount of depth and nuance to his arguments and its very much worth listening to what he says. His criticism of US foreign policy is pretty brutal and comprehensive. He doesn't base his view of Putin on one quote, but on a large body of literature in IR. There are also many (former) politicians, advisors, academics, commentators and journalists, many of them with great pedigree, who share his view, that this is primarily about NATO/security concerns. This is not a fringe position, despite it getting ignored by active politicians (in the USA). I am not a Neorealist and I am not trying to convince anyone to become one. If you push Neorealists long enough, they'll always end up arguing that its only about balancing/security concerns/high politics. This view is missing important dynamics/motivations. Still, he makes lots of convincing arguments.