Geopolitics

[Mciahel Goodman]

Don’t you admire Castro for his defiance of the US though? Yet you seem to think Zelensky should capitulate.

No.

And I don't think Zelenskyy should capitulate, I think he should sign a peace deal before the Russians shell the Ukrainian city-scape to rubble (and then only because I don't see any outcome except a prolonged insurgency where Ukraine gains little to nothing more than it is already being offered).

But let's take the example anyway and say Castro was right to defy the US (he was, ideally). Why did he have to defy them? Because it was their sphere of influence. I can concede that point if people are willing to then concede the SoI point regarding Russia. It's a good comparison to raise.

 

[Fearless]

No.

And I don't think Zelenskyy should capitulate, I think he should sign a peace deal before the Russians shell the Ukrainian city-scape to rubble (and then only because I don't see any outcome except a prolonged insurgency where Ukraine gains little to nothing more than it is already being offered).

Agreed. Tens of thousands will die needlessly until the same agreement is reached today or in ten years time. Everybody knows it, and the only issue is how idiot Biden is going to sell this as a big win for NATO under his 'leadership' by pretending Putins real aim was to take over the entire universe.

 

[2cents]

No.

I must have got the wrong impression from this thread so.

 

[Mciahel Goodman]

I must have got the wrong impression from this thread so.

Thought you'd raise that. I could go back to the Iraq War thread of 2003 and pull similar quotations. People change their views.

Yeah, both were terrible murderers, I'd agree. It's only relevant if people condemning Castro also fail to condemn these same people for doing a lot worse.

It isn't so black and white as people are making it. Or, if it is, then a lot of world leaders become war criminals very fast.

Having said that, I conceded (even then) that Castro was a tyrant and that people didn't judge their side by the standard they hold others to.

 

[2cents]

Thought you'd raise that. I could go back to the Iraq War thread of 2003 and pull similar quotations. People change their views.

That’s fair.

 

[oneniltothearsenal]

I agree with a lot of the points you make (especially self-fulfilling prophecy) but Mearsheimer isn't saying that Ukraine should have no right to self-determination vis-à-vis choosing a military or political bloc, but that they do not have unfettered rights to self-determination. He's dealing with the reality, not the ideal. Ideally, Cuba would not be under an embargo, Venezuela would not be under sanctions. What's the difference exactly? One is that neither Cuba nor Venezuela are associated with a foreign military bloc but the sanctions/embargo persists because the US sees them as existing within the American sphere of influence. You have to meet the reality of these situations before you talk about the ideal (no one would disagree with the ideal, whether it relates to Cuba, Ukraine, or Venezuela)

I'm not talking about the ideal. I am talking about reality. This is where old-school realists aren't talking about the reality, they are talking about their theoretical. It's a "the map is not the road" type of thing.

The reality is that Ukraine is willing and capable of fighting Russia for its right to self-determination against an invasion. That's the point. As the NY Times article acknowledges, "that faulty assumption does look a bit like a Risk-board view of the world, where all that matters is positioning and pieces, not patriotism, morale, leadership, and luck." It's not just "NATO expansion", it's Ukraine making a choice based on a variety of factors (not the least of which is Putin's own actions pushing nations closers to NATO and the EU) and being capable and willing to fight to defend their choice.

 

[Mastadon]

I'm not talking about the ideal. I am talking about reality. This is where old-school realists aren't talking about the reality, they are talking about their theoretical. It's a "the map is not the road" type of thing.

The reality is that Ukraine is willing and capable of fighting Russia for its right to self-determination against an invasion. That's the point. As the NY Times article acknowledges, "that faulty assumption does look a bit like a Risk-board view of the world, where all that matters is positioning and pieces, not patriotism, morale, leadership, and luck." It's not just "NATO expansion", it's Ukraine making a choice based on a variety of factors (not the least of which is Putin's own actions pushing nations closers to NATO and the EU) and being capable and willing to fight to defend their choice.

What do you think the outcome of this whole conflict is going to be? Is the Ukraine going to end up in NATO or is It going to end up neutral? Then we can see what the reality is.

 

[VorZakone]

Reading Mearsheimer's wiki article, he seems to have a good grasp of the world, no? I don't know how much predictive ability realism has and whether Mearsheimer attributes all his analysis to realism or if he sometimes is willing to abandon realism.

With regards to Ukraine: I follow this thread but I'm conflicted and there's some confusion here it seems. Does Mearsheimer specifically say that Ukraine should have no agency of their own? Or only that Ukraine's behavior (encouraged by the West) would lead to Russia invading them, irregardless of morality? In other words, what does Mearsheimer specifically say?

Some examples of his wiki:

• Accurately assessed how the first Gulf War would go (quick and decisive US victory).
• Foresaw Israel turning into an apartheid state more and more.
• Foresaw increasingly aggressive Chinese-American competition.
• Foresaw Russian aggression towards Ukraine.

By the way, great contributions to this thread by many posters.

 

[Dr. Dwayne]

What do you think the outcome of this whole conflict is going to be? Is the Ukraine going to end up in NATO or is It going to end up neutral? Then we can see what the reality is.

If Ukraine survives I see a little from column A and a little from column B.

They will say yes we'll be neutral in order to achieve an end to the hostilities. Then they will secretly join NATO and present Russia with a fait accompli: "attack us and it's article 5 for you guys."

 

[Dr. Dwayne]

Reading Mearsheimer's wiki article, he seems to have a good grasp of the world, no? I don't know how much predictive ability realism has and whether Mearsheimer attributes all his analysis to realism or if he sometimes is willing to abandon realism.

With regards to Ukraine: I follow this thread but I'm conflicted and there's some confusion here it seems. Does Mearsheimer specifically say that Ukraine should have no agency of their own? Or only that Ukraine's behavior (encouraged by the West) would lead to Russia invading them, irregardless of morality? In other words, what does Mearsheimer specifically say?

Some examples of his wiki:

• Accurately assessed how the first Gulf War would go (quick and decisive US victory).
• Foresaw Israel turning into an apartheid state more and more.
• Foresaw increasingly aggressive Chinese-American competition.
• Foresaw Russian aggression towards Ukraine.

By the way, great contributions to this thread by many posters.

None of the scenarios in those points were mysterious in any way shape or form. It's like me saying before every United match for the last four years that we'll be largely shite and lucky to win.

 

[VorZakone]

None of the scenarios in those points were mysterious in any way shape or form. It's like me saying before every United match for the last four years that we'll be largely shite and lucky to win.

I don't think this is true. There were predictions of much more US casualties for the first Gulf War than there were in reality, no?

 

[Raoul]

Reading Mearsheimer's wiki article, he seems to have a good grasp of the world, no? I don't know how much predictive ability realism has and whether Mearsheimer attributes all his analysis to realism or if he sometimes is willing to abandon realism.

With regards to Ukraine: I follow this thread but I'm conflicted and there's some confusion here it seems. Does Mearsheimer specifically say that Ukraine should have no agency of their own? Or only that Ukraine's behavior (encouraged by the West) would lead to Russia invading them, irregardless of morality? In other words, what does Mearsheimer specifically say?

Some examples of his wiki:

• Accurately assessed how the first Gulf War would go (quick and decisive US victory).
• Foresaw Israel turning into an apartheid state more and more.
• Foresaw increasingly aggressive Chinese-American competition.
• Foresaw Russian aggression towards Ukraine.

By the way, great contributions to this thread by many posters.

The above examples are just basic common sense imo. There is a problem with realism in that it is limited in explaining things below the systemic level. Mearsheimer himself is generally viewed as somewhat archaic within IR circles.

 

[Dr. Dwayne]

I don't think this is true. There were predictions of much more US casualties for the first Gulf War than there were in reality, no?

I think we all knew it was going to be a cakewalk. The coalition got some luck from a sandstorm when they crossed into Iraq and it turned out even more lopsided.

 

[VorZakone]

I think we all knew it was going to be a cakewalk. The coalition got some luck from a sandstorm when they crossed into Iraq and it turned out even more lopsided.

Was "cakewalk" conventional wisdom?

In January and early February 1991, Mearsheimer published two op-eds in the Chicago Tribune and the New York Times and argued that the war to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi forces would be quick and lead to a decisive US victory, with less than 1,000 American casualties.

That view countered the conventional wisdom at the start of the war, which predicted a conflict lasting for months and costing thousands of American lives.

 

[Dr. Dwayne]

Was "cakewalk" conventional wisdom?

Well I don't want to go around tooting my own horn but perhaps my wisdom is exceptional.

 

[Mastadon]

Reading Mearsheimer's wiki article, he seems to have a good grasp of the world, no? I don't know how much predictive ability realism has and whether Mearsheimer attributes all his analysis to realism or if he sometimes is willing to abandon realism.

With regards to Ukraine: I follow this thread but I'm conflicted and there's some confusion here it seems. Does Mearsheimer specifically say that Ukraine should have no agency of their own? Or only that Ukraine's behavior (encouraged by the West) would lead to Russia invading them, irregardless of morality? In other words, what does Mearsheimer specifically say?

Some examples of his wiki:

• Accurately assessed how the first Gulf War would go (quick and decisive US victory).
• Foresaw Israel turning into an apartheid state more and more.
• Foresaw increasingly aggressive Chinese-American competition.
• Foresaw Russian aggression towards Ukraine.

By the way, great contributions to this thread by many posters.

His specific words:

"What's going on here is that the West is leading Ukraine down the primrose path. And the end result is that Ukraine is going to get wrecked. And I believe that the policy that I'm advocating, which is neutralising Ukraine, and then building it up economically, and getting it out of the competition between Russia on one side, NATO on the other side is the best thing that could happen to the Ukrainians. What we're doing is encouraging the Ukrainians to play tough with the Russians. We're encouraging, the Ukrainians to think that they will ultimately become part of the West, because we will ultimately defeat Putin, and we will ultimately get our way, time is on our side. And of course, the Ukrainians are playing along with this."

"And Ukrainians are almost completely unwilling to compromise with the Russians and instead want to pursue a hardline policy. Well, as I said to you before, if they do that, the end result is that their country is going to be wrecked. And what we're doing is in effect, encouraging that outcome. I think it would make much more sense for us to neutral to, to work to create a neutral Ukraine, it would be in our interest to bury this crisis as quickly as possible. It certainly would be in Russia's interest to do so. And most importantly, it would be in Ukraine's interest to put an end to the crisis."

 

[Mciahel Goodman]

I'm not talking about the ideal. I am talking about reality. This is where old-school realists aren't talking about the reality, they are talking about their theoretical. It's a "the map is not the road" type of thing.

The reality is that Ukraine is willing and capable of fighting Russia for its right to self-determination against an invasion. That's the point. As the NY Times article acknowledges, "that faulty assumption does look a bit like a Risk-board view of the world, where all that matters is positioning and pieces, not patriotism, morale, leadership, and luck." It's not just "NATO expansion", it's Ukraine making a choice based on a variety of factors (not the least of which is Putin's own actions pushing nations closers to NATO and the EU) and being capable and willing to fight to defend their choice.

OK, but what are the Ukrainians fighting Russia for? Because Russia views Ukraine to be within its direct sphere of influence and is anxious to cut off NATO encroachment. The choice Ukrainians are making, to want to move away from Russia, is one which involves moving from one sphere to another. They have every right to contest that and no one says otherwise. On the other hand, part of the reason Ukrainians are so capable of fighting Russia is because they have been receiving direct military aid from the US/NATO for eight years (also, US involvement in Maidan). Again, the Ukrainians have every right to try and go the way of NATO, but you cannot then isolate NATO from Russia's invasion (if the Ukrainians had decided to face toward Russia, this wouldn't be happening). Russia invaded, whether partly or you weigh it higher, because they didn't want the Ukrainians to be subsumed within/under NATO (because of basic state self-interest). The US invaded Cuba because it didn't want the Cubans to become embedded within the Soviet sphere. They maintain the embargo today because they do not like the precedent Cuba sets for other countries in the region (that is admitted in an internal document).

The point being that whatever Ukraine's reasons to move away from Russia and toward NATO, the fact of one sphere coming into conflict with another remains in tact. The separatists in the Donbas, too, have every right to want to move toward/remain within the Russian sphere if they choose (that would be their choice). They made that choice and came into conflict with those in the East who disagreed with their right to self-determination. Many would call one group (of millions) Kremlin stooges but fiercely reject the idea that those in the West could be NATO stooges. Perhaps reject the idea of "stooge" altogether and say instead that bloc interests overlap and coincide with differences in regional interests (which again, has to do with two spheres and the choice each makes with regard to those spheres).

The other point is, I don't see Ukraine being admitted to NATO whatever the outcome (something that has been admitted despite a refusal to rule it out in treaty form). Mearsheimer's point is that NATO cultivated an interest which may have preexisted that cultivation but that in providing military support to Ukraine, and making the West a de facto NATO territory, it made a Russian response inevitable. That doesn't detract from Ukrainians' right to choose one over the other, or from the idea that that choice was also enabled by Putin's mistreatment of Ukrainians, but is rather a comment upon the macrological reality of bloc interests (NATO/Russia) which overlay an almost infinite series of micrological/individual reasons for deciding one bloc over another.

 

[VorZakone]

The above examples are just basic common sense imo. There is a problem with realism in that it is limited in explaining things below the systemic level. Mearsheimer himself is generally viewed as somewhat archaic within IR circles.

Which IR scholars would you say have had a 'better' career?

(as in, better analysis/predictions/interpretations of geopolitical events and such)

 

[Raoul]

Which IR scholars would you say have had a 'better' career?

(as in, better analysis/predictions/interpretations of geopolitical events and such)

Better career is completely subjective. You have to study all of them to realize that you can generally draw small bits of wisdom from each of their respective theoretical lenses, while also acknowledging that each have their drawbacks as well. Realism in general, which was very popular in decades past, is increasingly problematic in the present because states aren't the only actors in the international system. It contains non-state actors, international organizations, collective security pacts etc. and realism of course doesn't take into consideration the human interactions among elites who drive policy in both democracies, autocracies, and everything in between.

 

[VorZakone]

Better career is completely subjective. You have to study all of them to realize that you can generally draw small bits of wisdom from each of their respective theoretical lenses, while also acknowledging that each have their drawbacks as well. Realism in general, which was very popular in decades past, is increasingly problematic in the present because states aren't the only actors in the international system. It contains non-state actors, international organizations, collective security pacts etc. and realism of course doesn't take into consideration the human interactions among elites who drive policy in both democracies, autocracies, and everything in between.

But since the IR circles deem Mearsheimer somewhat archaic, I'd be interested in which scholars are held in higher regard by these circles.

 

[Raoul]

But since the IR circles deem Mearsheimer somewhat archaic, I'd be interested in which scholars are held in higher regard by these circles.

There aren't really many recent ones. All the olds are dead (or close to it) and IR has been suffering from the fundamental problem that its generally useless to practitioners of International Relations (as in, diplomats, policy makers, heads of state etc). This is why its important for people to study all the theories and create their own scorecards for each individual conflict. This is important because you can see a conflict through many different theoretical lenses and then decide which of the many lenses makes the most sense. None of this is reducible to one individual who has all or most of the answers.

The most useful IR over the past 25 years from a practitioners perspective has been Joe Nye's Smart Power doctrine, which posits states should use multiple instruments of national power (soft/military, economic etc) to advance their interests. This was generally institutionalized in the 2000s and remains in play today since the US are using their diplomatic power to create a broad anti-Putin coalition through NATO, EU, and Pacific nations, and are leveraging their economic power (and that of the coalition) to slowly squeeze the life out of Putin from within.

 

[Beans]

OK, but what are the Ukrainians fighting Russia for? Because Russia views Ukraine to be within its direct sphere of influence and is anxious to cut off NATO encroachment. The choice Ukrainians are making, to want to move away from Russia, is one which involves moving from one sphere to another. They have every right to contest that and no one says otherwise. On the other hand, part of the reason Ukrainians are so capable of fighting Russia is because they have been receiving direct military aid from the US/NATO for eight years (also, US involvement in Maidan). Again, the Ukrainians have every right to try and go the way of NATO, but you cannot then isolate NATO from Russia's invasion (if the Ukrainians had decided to face toward Russia, this wouldn't be happening). Russia invaded, whether partly or you weigh it higher, because they didn't want the Ukrainians to be subsumed within/under NATO (because of basic state self-interest). The US invaded Cuba because it didn't want the Cubans to become embedded within the Soviet sphere. They maintain the embargo today because they do not like the precedent Cuba sets for other countries in the region (that is admitted in an internal document).

The point being that whatever Ukraine's reasons to move away from Russia and toward NATO, the fact of one sphere coming into conflict with another remains in tact. The separatists in the Donbas, too, have every right to want to move toward/remain within the Russian sphere if they choose (that would be their choice). They made that choice and came into conflict with those in the East who disagreed with their right to self-determination. Many would call one group (of millions) Kremlin stooges but fiercely reject the idea that those in the West could be NATO stooges. Perhaps reject the idea of "stooge" altogether and say instead that bloc interests overlap and coincide with differences in regional interests (which again, has to do with two spheres and the choice each makes with regard to those spheres).

The other point is, I don't see Ukraine being admitted to NATO whatever the outcome (something that has been admitted despite a refusal to rule it out in treaty form). Mearsheimer's point is that NATO cultivated an interest which may have preexisted that cultivation but that in providing military support to Ukraine, and making the West a de facto NATO territory, it made a Russian response inevitable. That doesn't detract from Ukrainians' right to choose one over the other, or from the idea that that choice was also enabled by Putin's mistreatment of Ukrainians, but is rather a comment upon the macrological reality of bloc interests (NATO/Russia) which overlay an almost infinite series of micrological/individual reasons for deciding one bloc over another.

Sorry to jump in what is probably a long discussion, i just wanted to propose that Russia may have intended to invade Ukraine regardless of what position Ukraine took, ever since their puppet leader was run out of the country.

If that's the case, Ukraine was smart to arm itself the best of could, I would think. I think Putin is deploying his "reasons" for purely propaganda purposes, I think his real reason is to use the wealth and manpower of Ukraine to increase the wealth and manpower of Russia. I expect this has been planned for a long time, considering he using the 2008 Georgia roadmap.

He's using what he thinks is the best argument at his disposal to get Russians onside.

 

[Mciahel Goodman]

Sorry to jump in what is probably a long discussion, i just wanted to propose that Russia may have intended to invade Ukraine regardless of what position Ukraine took, ever since their puppet leader was run out of the country.

If that's the case, Ukraine was smart to arm itself the best of could, I would think. I think Putin is deploying his "reasons" for purely propaganda purposes, I think his real reason is to use the wealth and manpower of Ukraine to increase the wealth and manpower of Russia. I expect this has been planned for a long time, considering he using the 2008 Georgia roadmap.

He's using what he thinks is the best argument at his disposal to get Russians onside.

The Georgia roadmap involved making that territory a quagmire because it wanted to join NATO. So if you mean creating a conflict and territorial dispute to invalidate Ukraine's ambitions to join other blocs, I agree. You also can't isolate the Maidan coup from US/NATO involvement in that coup. It was a popular movement, which no one doubts, but it was funded covertly by the CIA among others (another instance of bloc interests coinciding with regional interests; each being anti-Russian). I'm not sure that's his reason because Crimea is secured in perpetuity and the two separatists regions don't seem likely to return to Ukraine proper after eight years of civil war (and this invasion on top of it). Aside from that, Russia cannot hold Ukraine. It isn't militarily or economically strong enough to do so (also why I never thought, post-invasion, their ambitions extended beyond exacting a formal no-NATO treaty, neutral status, and recognition for those parts already held by Russian aligned parties). As it can't hold Ukraine, it cannot use its resources and manpower beyond those three areas it already controls (de facto).

Maybe Putin thought he could hold Ukraine (I doubt it, but who knows) prior to the war starting but I take the "two day" claim with a healthy dose of skepticism as Russia had to know the extent to which Ukraine had been armed by NATO because they have been funding the Eastern separatists for eight years.

 

[Raoul]

Sorry to jump in what is probably a long discussion, i just wanted to propose that Russia may have intended to invade Ukraine regardless of what position Ukraine took, ever since their puppet leader was run out of the country.

If that's the case, Ukraine was smart to arm itself the best of could, I would think. I think Putin is deploying his "reasons" for purely propaganda purposes, I think his real reason is to use the wealth and manpower of Ukraine to increase the wealth and manpower of Russia. I expect this has been planned for a long time, considering he using the 2008 Georgia roadmap.

He's using what he thinks is the best argument at his disposal to get Russians onside.

If you go back and look at Putin's view of Ukraine all the way back to the early to mid 2000s, you'd know that your first sentence is spot on. He doesn't view Ukraine as a country, but rather a part of Russia. All arguments of his current intent end there.

 

[VorZakone]

There aren't really many recent ones. All the olds are dead (or close to it) and IR has been suffering from the fundamental problem that its generally useless to practitioners of International Relations (as in, diplomats, policy makers, heads of state etc). This is why its important for people who to study all the theories and create their own scorecards for each individual conflict. This is important because you can see a conflict through many different theoretical lenses and then decide which of the many lenses makes the most sense. None of this is reducible to one individual who has all or most of the answers.

The most useful IR over the past 25 years from a practitioners perspective has been Joe Nye's Smart Power doctrine, which posits states should use multiple instruments of national power (soft/military, economic etc) to advance their interests. This was generally institutionalized in the 2000s and remains in play today since the US are using their diplomatic power to create a broad anti-Putin coalition through NATO, EU, and Pacific nations, and are leveraging their economic power (and that of the coalition) to slowly squeeze the life out of Putin from within.

Thanks, I'll check out Joe Nye's smart power doctrine.

 

[nickm]

Sorry to jump in what is probably a long discussion, i just wanted to propose that Russia may have intended to invade Ukraine regardless of what position Ukraine took, ever since their puppet leader was run out of the country.

If that's the case, Ukraine was smart to arm itself the best of could, I would think. I think Putin is deploying his "reasons" for purely propaganda purposes, I think his real reason is to use the wealth and manpower of Ukraine to increase the wealth and manpower of Russia. I expect this has been planned for a long time, considering he using the 2008 Georgia roadmap.

He's using what he thinks is the best argument at his disposal to get Russians onside.

The right answer IMO.

This was written 8 years ago as a rebuttal to the Mearsheimer position and it's hard not to say the author got it completely right. This was written a couple of days ago based on an interview with Stephen Kotkin and I think it is spot on. In a nutshell:

"The problem with their [Mearsheimer's] argument is that it assumes that, had nato not expanded, Russia wouldn’t be the same or very likely close to what it is today. What we have today in Russia is not some kind of surprise. It’s not some kind of deviation from a historical pattern. Way before nato existed—in the nineteenth century—Russia looked like this: it had an autocrat. It had repression. It had militarism. It had suspicion of foreigners and the West. This is a Russia that we know, and it’s not a Russia that arrived yesterday or in the nineteen-nineties. It’s not a response to the actions of the West. There are internal processes in Russia that account for where we are today.

"I would even go further. I would say that nato expansion has put us in a better place to deal with this historical pattern in Russia that we’re seeing again today. Where would we be now if Poland or the Baltic states were not in nato? They would be in the same limbo, in the same world that Ukraine is in."

Well worth a full read. (edit - I see a video with Stephen Kotkin was posted on this thread the other day and a few posts have been made that clearly bear his influence! ).

 

[Mciahel Goodman]

The right answer IMO.

This was written 8 years ago as a rebuttal to the Mearsheimer position and it's hard not to say the author got it completely right. This was written a couple of days ago by a top Russian scholar, and I think it is spot on. In a nutshell:

"The problem with their [Mearsheimer's] argument is that it assumes that, had nato not expanded, Russia wouldn’t be the same or very likely close to what it is today. What we have today in Russia is not some kind of surprise. It’s not some kind of deviation from a historical pattern. Way before nato existed—in the nineteenth century—Russia looked like this: it had an autocrat. It had repression. It had militarism. It had suspicion of foreigners and the West. This is a Russia that we know, and it’s not a Russia that arrived yesterday or in the nineteen-nineties. It’s not a response to the actions of the West. There are internal processes in Russia that account for where we are today.

"I would even go further. I would say that nato expansion has put us in a better place to deal with this historical pattern in Russia that we’re seeing again today. Where would we be now if Poland or the Baltic states were not in nato? They would be in the same limbo, in the same world that Ukraine is in."

Well worth a full read. (edit - I see a video with the author was posted on this thread the other day).

People who oppose Mearsheimer deal entirely in hypothetical scenarios "what ifs". Would the US have invaded if Cuba didn't overthrow Batista? I doubt it because they would have had no reason to (their interests being fully served by Batista's regime). The same principle holds with Russia. Why invade if Ukraine is not breaking with you and courting a different military bloc (with that bloc also making advances)? It doesn't invade Belarus except to prop up the dictator who serves their interests.

Also, it's been mentioned in this thread already but the entire premise for the continuation of NATO post-USSR became Russia. So Ukraine wanted to join a military bloc whose sole existence is predicated upon opposing/containing Russia. To say that has no effect whatsoever (not even a little) upon Russia's invasion makes little sense to me.

 

[nickm]

People who oppose Mearsheimer deal entirely in hypothetical scenarios "what ifs".

They are saying it doesn't matter how Ukraine "behaved" Putin was always going to come for it. History and Putin's own words and actions are the evidence. They rebut the realist position because Putin isn't a realist. He's not driven by spheres of influence etc ad nauseam, he's driven by other motivations - nostalgia, imperialism, personal control, not external ones caused by the West. Putin was always going to want Ukraine for his Novorussiyain empire, no matter how Ukraine behaved.

Would the US have invaded if Cuba didn't overthrow Batista? I doubt it because they would have had no reason to (their interests being fully served by Batista's regime). The same principle holds with Russia. Why invade if Ukraine is not breaking with you and courting a different military bloc (with that bloc also making advances)? It doesn't invade Belarus except to prop up the dictator who serves their interests.

I think you are in danger of having a hammer so everything looks like a nail. Putin is a dictatorial expansionist. And he has as good as invaded Belarus - the constitution was changed just a few days ago to enable the permanent stationing of Russian troops and nukes there, one might call that an invasion of sorts.

Also, it's been mentioned in this thread already but the entire premise for the continuation of NATO post-USSR became Russia. So Ukraine wanted to join a military bloc whose sole existence is predicated upon opposing/containing Russia. To say that has no effect whatsoever (not even a little) upon Russia's invasion makes little sense to me.

But Ukraine wasn't on a realistic track to membership. I think it's a red herring. Putin wasn't invading to stop NATO. He is invading because he wants territory and power.

 

[Mciahel Goodman]

They are saying it doesn't matter how Ukraine "behaved" Putin was always going to come for it. and Putin's own words and actions are the evidence. They rebut the realist position because Putin isn't a realist. He's not driven by spheres of influence etc ad nauseam, he's driven by other motivations - nostalgia, imperialism, personal control, not external ones caused by the West. Putin was always going to want Ukraine for his Novorussiyain empire, no matter how Ukraine behaved.

And that makes no sense. What was the reason for the popular Maidan movement? To counter Russian influence after the EU deal was compromised. If Ukraine was as pro-Russia as Belarus (its dictator, at least) why would Russia invade it? It would have no need as it would control it de facto. So its behavior is not irrelevant (in reality or in thought-experiments).

I think you are in danger of having a hammer so everything looks like a nail. Putin is an dictatorial expansionist.

The Cuban example is a perfect analogue if we're dealing with hypotheticals. Would the US have invaded if there was no popular overthrow of the Batista dictatorship? Obviously not, as they invaded precisely because of that popular revolt in an attempt to restore the Batista regime which they had backed.

But Ukraine wasn't on a realistic track to membership. I think it's a red herring. Putin wasn't invading to stop NATO. He is invading because he wants territory and power.

Not by treaty, but by fact of military aid and covert/overt NATO support within West Ukraine pre- and post-Maidan.

If you blame Putin entirely because he wants an empire or to restore the USSR, then you have to concede that he invaded to bring Ukraine back into Russia's sphere of influence, to make it another kind of subservient Belarus (that's what an empire or USSR type collection of Soviet republics entails). And, if you concede that much, you cannot then say that Ukrainian behavior had no impact (it's their agency he wants to counter, more or less).

 

[MTF]

The Cuban example is a perfect analogue if we're dealing with hypotheticals. Would the US have invaded if there was no popular overthrow of the Batista dictatorship? Obviously not, as they invaded precisely because of that popular revolt in an attempt to restore the Batista regime which they had backed.

Not quite. If the Russians had organized 6 battalions of Donetsk fighters, provided them with 16 bombers and 5 tanks, and then had them do an amphibious landing outside of Odessa... I'd be a lot less concerned by all of this.

 

[Mciahel Goodman]

Not quite. If the Russians had organized 6 battalions of Donetsk fighters, provided them with 16 bombers and 5 tanks, and then had them do an amphibious landing outside of Odessa... I'd be a lot less concerned by all of this.

Going by some early feckups, it's not a sure thing that they didn't.

 

[groovyalbert]

People who oppose Mearsheimer deal entirely in hypothetical scenarios "what ifs". Would the US have invaded if Cuba didn't overthrow Batista? I doubt it because they would have had no reason to (their interests being fully served by Batista's regime). The same principle holds with Russia. Why invade if Ukraine is not breaking with you and courting a different military bloc (with that bloc also making advances)? It doesn't invade Belarus except to prop up the dictator who serves their interests.

Also, it's been mentioned in this thread already but the entire premise for the continuation of NATO post-USSR became Russia. So Ukraine wanted to join a military bloc whose sole existence is predicated upon opposing/containing Russia. To say that has no effect whatsoever (not even a little) upon Russia's invasion makes little sense to me.

Not the same thing. a state wanting to join NATO for its own sovereign protection does not equate to NATO actively "making advances", and if NATO wanted to do so then Ukraine would have been accepted after 2014. Also, I'm not sure if the contrast with Cuba entirely holds true. To my knowledge, there was never the view within the US government that the state of Cuba simply ought not exist/its people a cultural stain on what it is to be American in the same fashion that many influential officials hold in the Kremlin towards Ukraine. It's what they are going to justify their atrocities against civilians with (as hinted by Putin today).

Also to still perceive NATO through the lens it was established is pretty limited and outdated. What was once a means of containing the USSR has become a diverse alliance of democracies that don't always see eye-to-eye, but who will put their alliances ahead of these in instances where common goals tump differences. It's not simply a tool to contain Russia, although thank feck it's around right now, and those who have argued against it/for its disbanding in recent years are probably feeling a little foolish right about now. (Not suggesting that this is what you are arguing by the way by the way, but I know many people who have and are suddenly rather quiet on the matter).

 

[VorZakone]

They are saying it doesn't matter how Ukraine "behaved" Putin was always going to come for it. History and Putin's own words and actions are the evidence. They rebut the realist position because Putin isn't a realist. He's not driven by spheres of influence etc ad nauseam, he's driven by other motivations - nostalgia, imperialism, personal control, not external ones caused by the West. Putin was always going to want Ukraine for his Novorussiyain empire, no matter how Ukraine behaved.



I think you are in danger of having a hammer so everything looks like a nail. Putin is a dictatorial expansionist. And he has as good as invaded Belarus - the constitution was changed just a few days ago to enable the permanent stationing of Russian troops and nukes there, one might call that an invasion of sorts.



But Ukraine wasn't on a realistic track to membership. I think it's a red herring. Putin wasn't invading to stop NATO. He is invading because he wants territory and power.

At this moment I'm not yet convinced by the Novorussiya stuff and such. It may very well turn out later that that was Putin's goal but the analysis by Michael Kofman and Rob Lee seem more realistic to me. Both didn't say a word about nostalgia or some grand idea of greater Russia, if I recall correctly.

Their analysis concluded mainly that Russia felt it was drastically losing influence over Ukraine and previous methods failed so that's why they switched to compellence. And that the Russians felt inaction was going to cost more in the future than action now, as Ukraine's military was improving and improving.


Putin's denazification rhetoric and such seems mostly aimed for domestic consumption I reckon. And whatever he personally feels about Ukraine's history and such...it remains to be seen whether that truly drove his decision-making for this invasion.

 

[Mciahel Goodman]

Not the same thing. a state wanting to join NATO for its own sovereign protection does not equate to NATO actively "making advances", and if NATO wanted to do so then Ukraine would have been accepted after 2014. Also, I'm not sure if the contrast with Cuba entirely holds true. To my knowledge, there was never the view within the US government that the state of Cuba simply ought not exist/its people a cultural stain on what it is to be American in the same fashion that many influential officials hold in the Kremlin towards Ukraine. It's what they are going to justify their atrocities against civilians with (as hinted by Putin today).

It would have been near impossible, even if NATO was willing, to accept Ukraine post-2014 because Russia had just annexed Crimea and the separatist dispute was kicking off. They didn't say that Cuba ought not exist, that is true, but they did say that a non-US aligned Cuba ought not exist (that they would bring "the terrors of the earth" down upon it, which they did). But as for making advances, NATO did do that. It funded operations in Ukraine prior to Maidan and obviously more overtly post-Maidan.

Also to still perceive NATO through the lens it was established is pretty limited and outdated. What was once a means of containing the USSR has become a diverse alliance of democracies that don't always see eye-to-eye, but who will put their alliances ahead of these in instances where common goals tump differences. It's not simply a tool to contain Russia, although thank feck it's around right now, and those who have argued against it/for its disbanding in recent years are probably feeling a little foolish right about now. (Not suggesting that this is what you are arguing by the way by the way, but I know many people who have and are suddenly rather quiet on the matter).

I think it would have made sense to disband in 1991 as the reason for the alliance's existence had disappeared. Russia was in talks to join NATO under Yeltsin but these were not taken seriously. Part of why they were not taken seriously likely has to do with Russia assuming the role of the former USSR in individual nation states' justification of the alliance (why else did ex-Soviet states join in 1999, before Putin, if not because of security concerns which had to do with Russia?). After 2008, it made increasingly little sense to disband NATO as the dye had already been cast. And since then, too, it has evolved to mean other things (like the Libyan operation or whatever other operation you want to name where some NATO members acted in concert).

 

[Dr. Dwayne]

little sense to disband NATO as the dye had already been cast.

@Raoul, care to explain your duplicate account?

 

[Mciahel Goodman]

@Raoul, care to explain your duplicate account?

*die.

 

[TMDaines]

I think it's hard to predict what war will do (more resentment and hatred than before and less concern about being Nazis or being called Nazis if it promises revenge).

Christ, are you really wanting to suggest endorsement of this guy’s content? Take a look at his feed. He’s an absolute pro-Russia, Putin apologist. Literally everything on there for days is trying to construct an image of the Ukrainian government and people as far right fascists wanting to destroy Russia.

Some of the shit you share on here is getting concerning.

 

[Mciahel Goodman]

Christ, are you really wanting to suggest endorsement of this guy’s content? Take a look at his feed. He’s an absolute pro-Russia, Putin apologist. Literally everything on there for days is trying to construct an image of the Ukrainian government and people as far right fascists wanting to destroy Russia.

Some of the shit you share on here is getting concerning.

No, I'm suggesting that you consider the fact contained within the tweet. Source it elsewhere if the publisher is against your principles. People's inability to take proven facts on their own merit is concerning (the same people who claim "whataboutism" is a legitimate means of shutting down a debate, usually: "what about the person, forget about the claim [which is entirely factual and uncontroversial]"). Surprisingly, I don't endorse the private opinions of every twitter user whose tweets I share.

 

[RedTiger]

Christ, are you really wanting to suggest endorsement of this guy’s content? Take a look at his feed. He’s an absolute pro-Russia, Putin apologist. Literally everything on there for days is trying to construct an image of the Ukrainian government and people as far right fascists wanting to destroy Russia.

Some of the shit you share on here is getting concerning.

@Mciahel Goodman wasn't endorsing the Twitter guy, rather he was sharing what is being said on Ukrainian television. I mean, that was a genuine Ukrainian broadcast was it not?

 

[TMDaines]

No, I'm suggesting that you consider the fact contained within the tweet. Source it elsewhere if the publisher is against your principles. People's inability to take proven facts on their own merit is concerning (the same people who claim "whataboutism" is a legitimate means of shutting down a debate, usually: "what about the person, forget about the claim [which is entirely factual and uncontroversial]"). Surprisingly, I don't endorse the private opinions of every twitter user whose tweets I share.

What fact? If you take the dregs of TV, especially during wartime when emotions are heightened, you can construct a false narrative? It’s like cherry picking the worst of GB News to paint an overall negative picture of the British people.

You might as well just post the various claims of Russia Today and the various Russian embassies at this point at supposedly face value, and then duck behind “retweets are not endorsements” of either the content or the author when challenged on your agenda.