Suedesi
Full Member
Stephen Kotkin makes a lot of sense to me - start ~ 12-13 minutes in
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I wasn't involved in this thread (my post from the Ukraine thread was posted in here) and don't really plan to argue about James Mearsheimer. I've read enough of his work (and Walt) and about offensive realism to think it's a simplistic and flawed lens to interpret all of international relations through. It fails to account for far too many inputs and attributes a fantastical unitary structure to states that doesn't exist in reality. Mearsheimer's realism posits that Ukraine and other former Soviet states must be either within Russia's sphere of influence or permanently at risk or victim of Russian domination. I didn't waste a further 45 minutes of my life on listening to him. He's being trotted out by the Russians and Tankies to justify Putin's actions and to vilify NATO because it suits their agenda.
Here's the interview I referenced.
I spent 7 years in both countries and trust me, there was no fleeing at all. The US could've stayed in either if it wanted to. The Afghanistan withdrawal was admittedly bungled due to a miscalculation of how quickly the Taliban would return, which was a result of Trump's timeline to leave and Biden not being adequately prepared to deal with the suddenness of what happened. The US could've of course opted to stay and obliterate the Taliban advances yet again, but decided not to.
The goal in Iraq had been met - Saddam out and the Iraqis are running their own democratic government. At that point there was no reason to stay, although that changed a couple of years later when ISIS rolled in. Those residual troops are mostly gone now as well.
On Afghanistan, Americans had largely forgotten about it and didn't know why troops were still there. Once Trump took office, he saw a chance to score an easy win by removing troops, and in the process, also potentially shackle Biden with the responsibility of their departure. There was also a certain futility to endlessly fighting a group who could scamper back and forth across the Pakistani border to regroup and launch new attacks. The US could've obviously opted to stick around and continue doing that indefinitely, but why bother when the original strategic goal of getting rid of Al-Qaeda and Bin Laden had already been achieved. There is obviously not sufficient political will in Afghanistan to become a democracy at the moment as there was in Iraq, so if a milder, less medieval version of the Taliban who don't allow the country to be used to plot attacks in the west (such as the earlier iteration of the Taliban with Bin Laden), then that's something the US can live with.
The mistake was Biden Admin sticking to Trump's timeline and not conducting a more measured withdrawal.
I wasn't involved in this thread (my post from the Ukraine thread was posted in here) and don't really plan to argue about James Mearsheimer. I've read enough of his work (and Walt) and about offensive realism to think it's a simplistic and flawed lens to interpret all of international relations through. It fails to account for far too many inputs and attributes a fantastical unitary structure to states that doesn't exist in reality. Mearsheimer's realism posits that Ukraine and other former Soviet states must be either within Russia's sphere of influence or permanently at risk or victim of Russian domination. I didn't waste a further 45 minutes of my life on listening to him. He's being trotted out by the Russians and Tankies to justify Putin's actions and to vilify NATO because it suits their agenda.
Here's the interview I referenced.
To be fair despite the Minsk agreement, Ukraine and Russia have been essentially in conflict since 2014. Azov is a big part of that. They might not fade away but I can't see them growing in prominence like black and brown shirts in the 1930s moving from paramilitary groups to political parties to forming governments and consolidating power in a dictator.
I think it's hard to predict what war will do (more resentment and hatred than before and less concern about being Nazis or being called Nazis if it promises revenge).
Yep, agreed.On reflection, Putin is playing a dangerous game and any success that Ukraine or Azov have in this war could feasibly translate to political success in the immediate aftermath, if Ukraine survives in anything resembling its current form.
Very trueOn reflection, Putin is playing a dangerous game and any success that Ukraine or Azov have in this war could feasibly translate to political success in the immediate aftermath, if Ukraine survives in anything resembling its current form.
Thanks for an explanation. I am no historical or geopolitical scholar, so I have no expertise to offer in this area. I am not sure that the fact his theories are simplistic are good grounds to dismiss them though. We are often drawn to simple theories that offer good explanations and predictions, this is more or less a staple underpinning of how physics progresses for example. But I appreciate he could be wrong and that states can be argued to be complex groups of stakeholders rather than single power hungry units that act uniformly in the interests of expansion and domination.
This should be the case but in reality it isn't. Take a look at the map and you will find scores of countries that have no right to self-determination or maintain that right at a terrible cost (Cuba is the easiest example). The Cubans had a right to self-determination insofar as they were happy to determine themselves along the lines set out by Batista, a US-backed fascist (the same was true of the Iranians under the Shah and the Iraqis under Saddam until Saddam went rogue). They lost that right as soon as they overturned the Batista regime and attempted to shrug off American proxy status. That is how the world works and it's been that way in the Western hemisphere since the Monroe doctrine (before it, too, except it was European states which dominated).especially the one that people have a right to self-determination.
Well I was thinking more along the lines of Relativity than Creationism, but point taken.First, the fact that people, especially the uninformed, are drawn to simple explanations is not a good or positive thing. It's a horrible thing that makes it easier for conspiracy theorists or hucksters to peddle their wares. Just look at that the ridiculous explanation an American football star gave to counter evolution theory in the US politics thread. That type of simple explanation might appeal to some people but that's 100% a bad thing, nothing positive about it.
On Mearsheimer himself, his outlook ("blame the US for the crisis") doesn't appeal to me because its conclusion ignores a lot of basic principles, both moral and functional, especially the one that people have a right to self-determination. Being in Russia's so-called sphere of influence should mean nothing in regards to whether Latvia or Estonia wishes to increase their ties with the west and eventually want to join NATO or the EU. That's not some out-of-control "NATO expansion", it's people having the right to decide the own fate of their country. They should have the right to shape their own nation free of the influence of an authoritarian dictator for a neighbor. That's the major thing but there are lots of other details I think he gets wrong.
On an analytical level, his work is far too reductionist and IMO, lazy at best. @Raoul already listed a handful of other analytical frameworks that offer better lenses to analyze and view situations like this, especially when taken in conjunction with other frameworks.
This should be the case but in reality it isn't. Take a look at the map and you will find scores of countries that have no right to self-determination or maintain that right at a terrible cost (Cuba is the easiest example). The Cubans had a right to self-determination insofar as they were happy to determine themselves along the lines set out by Batista, a US-backed fascist (the same was true of the Iranians under the Shah and the Iraqis under Saddam until Saddam went rogue). They lost that right as soon as they overturned the Batista regime and attempted to shrug off American proxy status. That is how the world works and it's been that way in the Western hemisphere since the Monroe doctrine (before it, too, except it was European states which dominated).
None of which three factors can be isolated from the reality of NATO expansion. If it's A, then he has to take control by pushing back against the de facto NATOfication in the West. If it's B, he has to secure those resources by pushing back against the de facto NATOfictation in the West. If it's C (and you get the point).A) his desire for a legacy for Russian Empire, B) control of Ukraine's natural resources, and C) he doesn't want a liberal democracy next door irrespective of whether it's in NATO/EU or not. The NATO expansion is just cover for PR.
Ukraine juggled between West and Russia for 23 years or so before Maidan (which was supported by the US). There were tensions from 2000-2010 but no hint of war or annexation.It's why I see the Mearsheimer view as less than convincing. Mearsheimer suggests if Ukraine were a liberal democracy, modernizing with close ties to the US and western Europe but not flirting with the idea of being in NATO/EU then Putin would not have invaded. I think the evidence at hand disproves that notion.
None of which three factors can be isolated from the reality of NATO expansion. If it's A, then he has to take control by pushing back against the de facto NATOfication in the West. If it's B, he has to secure those resources by pushing back against the de facto NATOfictation in the West. If it's C (and you get the point).
Ukraine juggled between West and Russia for 23 years or so before Maidan (which was supported by the US). There were tensions from 2000-2010 but no hint of war or annexation.
Someone said above "Mearsheimer may have been wrong". How exactly? He made a prediction in line with academic consensus which turned out to be entirely correct. Constructivism has to take structuralism into account before it gives its individual view of the world. Also, the point regarding Cuba, Iran, Iraq, and the entirety of Latin and South America at various stages has not been addressed. From those case studies (forecast in the Monroe doctrine with respect to the Western hemisphere) we know that a state's desire to choose its own kind of international relationship is the ideal scenario but not the reality. It isn't the reality in Cuba and it isn't the reality in Ukraine.. I'd say each should be condemned but Mearsheimer simply accepts it as the way of the world within his calculus (though he doesn't justify it, he simply sees no point in moralizing).
People say Ukraine should be allowed to choose its own military and bloc alliances. I agree. But so should every state bound within the orbit of greater states and such is not the case. Mearsheimer's view is validated by US actions in the Western hemisphere and around the world, where it has denied smaller states the right of autonomy and "agency" for nearly two hundred years, before you even take Russia into account.
The thing is, without NATO expansion he most likely would not have had to invade (if Maidan didn't happen). Assume a mercantilist view of Putin. OK, but you only invade (in the respective positions of Ukraine and Russia) if you are losing what you already have, de facto (this was Crimea in 2014; in 2022, it arguably had more to do with the extent to which NATO had solidified its position in the West without committing to rule out Ukrainian entrance, and, in an individual sense, Putin's reaffirmation of his own position within the Kremlin: you can add constructivist points upon a structuralist base).To counter that I would say all of Putin's actions are rooted in a mercantilist economic view. With that as a foundation of Putin's worldview (which I think his actions bear out as accurate), Putin would have invaded Ukraine with or without any "NATO expansion" because he is taking the actions that benefit him the most. He is not solely reacting to any perceived or imagined threat from NATO, he is acting under his own worldview in a way he thinks advances what matters to him the most. Just look at his false flags about Donesk and Luhansk. I don't think its compelling to say without "NATO expansion" he never would have invaded.
You can always improve on methodology but it would be disingenuous to state that Mearsheimer was a kind of soothsayer without methodological substance. It wasn't just Mearsheimer, either. Heads of intelligence agencies, military figures, foreign policy experts, and social commentators from left to right predicted the exact same scenario as early as the 1990s.Tons of people make predictions that turn out correct but these isolated incidents don't prove their methodology is the best methodology
OK, rent a truck and go and bring a few back and see what happens. They're entering the UK illegally and anybody who transports them is guilty of an offence and liable for up to 14 years in prison.
The thing is, without NATO expansion he most likely would not have had to invade (if Maidan didn't happen). Assume a mercantilist view of Putin. OK, but you only invade (in the respective positions of Ukraine and Russia) if you are losing what you already have, de facto (this was Crimea in 2014; in 2022, it arguably had more to do with the extent to which NATO had solidified its position in the West without committing to rule out Ukrainian entrance, and, in an individual sense, Putin's reaffirmation of his own position within the Kremlin: you can add constructivist points upon a structuralist base).
I think it is compelling because it's a rerun of what happened in Georgia with Putin's response in 2008. That's where Mearsheimer begins his argument. Putin invades to retain Russia's sphere of influence and because of territorial disputes it also renders said countries' capacity to join blocs null and void.
You can always improve on methodology but it would be disingenuous to state that Mearsheimer was a kind of soothsayer without methodological substance. It wasn't just Mearsheimer, either. Heads of intelligence agencies, military figures, foreign policy experts, and social commentators from left to right predicted the exact same scenario as early as the 1990s.
The larger critique of realism that Applebaum and Maçães are speaking for goes something like this: Yes, realists like Mearsheimer predicted some kind of conflict over Ukraine. But realism’s predictions still did not describe reality, for three reasons. First, the predictions imagined a defensive logic to Russian strategic conduct, oriented around the protection of a sphere of influence, a fear of encirclement by NATO. But the decision to invade seems to have been motivated more by Putin’s professed and very personal desire to restore a mystical vision of greater Russia — a grand ideological idea that the mere Western pledge not to admit Ukraine to NATO was unlikely to appease.
Second, the realist predictions underestimated the agency and strength of Ukrainians themselves, treating Russia’s near abroad as a landscape where only great-power force projection really mattered, ignoring Ukraine’s potential capacity
...
But then when it comes to Putin’s aggressive war, Mearsheimer seems to assume that the Russian president thinks like him, the realist, rather than like the utopian politicians of the West. Putin, he says, “understands that he cannot conquer Ukraine and integrate it into a greater Russia or into a reincarnation of the former Soviet Union.” And if the United States only worked harder “to create friendly relations” with Moscow, Mearsheimer argues, there could be a tacit American-Russian “balancing coalition” against the rising power of China.
But why should Putin necessarily be immune from the hubris and delusions of Western leaders? Why should we assume that he doesn’t dream of reintegrating Ukraine and Belarus into a greater Russia? Why should we take for granted that the right diplomatic strategy will bring him into an American coalition against China, when he might instead be committed to a sweeping ideological vision of Eurasian power aligned against the decadent West?
Why should we assume, in other words, that structural and schematic explanations of Putin’s war are more important than personal and ideological explanations? After all, as the historian Adam Tooze points out, it appears that very few members of the Russian foreign policy elite — all presumably opponents of NATO expansion, all “devotees to Russia’s future as a great power” — actually believed that Putin would invade. And if so many participants in Putin’s regime, all good servants of the national interest as realists define it, wouldn’t have made his fateful choice, then did realist premises actually predict the war itself?
Just as important, did they predict the way the war has played out so far? I myself did not: My assumption was that Ukraine might mount a strong resistance in the western part of its territory, but that Russia would sweep pretty easily to the Dnieper and probably put Volodymyr Zelensky’s government to flight. (Some version of this assumption was shared by U.S. intelligence, which was predicting the quick fall of Kyiv two days into the war.) After almost two weeks of stalled-out offensives and mounting Russian casualties, that faulty assumption does look a bit like a Risk-board view of the world, where all that matters is positioning and pieces, not patriotism, morale, leadership and luck.
And there are a lot of ways that this kind of Risk-board mentality can deceive.
The thing is, without NATO expansion he most likely would not have had to invade (if Maidan didn't happen). Assume a mercantilist view of Putin. OK, but you only invade (in the respective positions of Ukraine and Russia) if you are losing what you already have, de facto (this was Crimea in 2014; in 2022, it arguably had more to do with the extent to which NATO had solidified its position in the West without committing to rule out Ukrainian entrance, and, in an individual sense, Putin's reaffirmation of his own position within the Kremlin: you can add constructivist points upon a structuralist base).
I think it is compelling because it's a rerun of what happened in Georgia with Putin's response in 2008. That's where Mearsheimer begins his argument. Putin invades to retain Russia's sphere of influence and because of territorial disputes it also renders said countries' capacity to join blocs null and void.
You can always improve on methodology but it would be disingenuous to state that Mearsheimer was a kind of soothsayer without methodological substance. It wasn't just Mearsheimer, either. Heads of intelligence agencies, military figures, foreign policy experts, and social commentators from left to right predicted the exact same scenario as early as the 1990s.
I think it's hard to predict what war will do (more resentment and hatred than before and less concern about being Nazis or being called Nazis if it promises revenge).
I see what you're saying. We live in the world that exists and we can't 100% divorce different potential realities to test theories the way you can in a science experiment. But I think Mearsheimer's assertion that in an thought experiment world where Ukraine modernizes, becomes a liberal democracy, establishes close ties to the west but just doesn't take the step to join NATO or EU that Putin would not have invaded is just asinine. There is no evidence that his counter-factual example to prove his rational is the correct analysis.
I don't agree with that at all. I think he 100% would have invaded because of the three reasons I mentioned and even without countries like Estonia and Latvia joining NATO and Ukraine contemplating it, he wouldn't be able to get what he wants without invading Ukraine. It provided a pretext sure, but as Donesk and Luhansk show, he would have invented a pretext to get what he wants anyway. None of the three reasons I mentioned are reliant on NATO expansion. NATO expansion is a not a necessary condition of Putin's actions. Mercantilist imperialists certainly did not only invade countries for reactionary reasons, they did because they saw resource acquisition as directly related to increasing their power projection. They did it because they can, and so is Putin, at least in his view before it happened he believed he can.
It's disingenuous to validate his point of view simply because he got one prediction sort of correct. It's not even like he fully foresaw the way things are playing out either.
I certainly don't always agree with Douthat but I think he has this one spot on:
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/09/opinion/ukraine-russia-invasion-west.html
I don't think he had to prior to Maidan because he had de facto control of all the things he wanted (all three options listed above). He also has to know that Russia's economic base is far too small to build an empire and sustain the kind of military action that would require.He would've invaded Ukraine at some point because he's seeking to build an empire. The only reason the invasion didn't happen earlier is because he didn't think the circumstances were right for him to realistically pull it off.
Yeah, it was a dumb move on the Ukrainians' part, it just feeds into Putin's genuinely false pretext.Quality material for Russian propaganda right here. Would be like if Iraq started making wmds during the US invasion.
Sanctioning China as Russia has been sanctioned is not a credible option. It would make previous market depressions look like a dip in comparison. The only reason 2008 wasn't as bad as it could have been is because China largely offset the worst case scenario with its rising middle class and cheap source of labour. Europe gets raw materials and energy from Russia, it gets everything else (exports and imports) from China.Firewalled, how is that possible?
Edit: got around it. Sanctions would be more of a double sword, all our supply chains have some linkages in China.
He's been playing with neutral colors. Not representing Russia.Daniil Medvedev told he will be banned from Wimbledon unless he denounces Vladimir Putin
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/tennis/...-told-will-banned-wimbledon-unless-denounces/
Getting a bit silly now.
What evidence exists that he would have still invaded a neutral Ukraine? Isn’t it just opinions based on guesswork about how the Kremlin thinks and operates? I think it’s only logical to believe that removing a key trigger for the invasion would reduce the likelihood of an invasion.
It's hypothetical but I think NATO played a part however big or small that part was in the thinking of Putin. Kennan was warning about the inevitability of a conflict prior to Putin if NATO continued its current path. I don't think NATO was a pure pretext, or Donesk/Luhansk as each is home to a significant Russian majority that has been funded by the Kremlin but also has organic dislike of Ukraine post-Maidan.
Yea it’s more him having to make some public denouncement to be eligible to play. Seems a bit silly and over the top.He's been playing with neutral colors. Not representing Russia.
A poly sci like Mearsheimer can sit back and say Ukraine doesn't have the right to self-determination because they are in Russia's sphere of influence
Anyone that says this about a nation of people can feck right off, they are at best a imbecile and at worst a complete and utter piece of shit.
Mearshimmer is a dinosaur in the age of mammals. Realism itself is on the rocks because it is increasingly limited as an explanatory tool in IR.
I agree with a lot of the points you make (especially self-fulfilling prophecy) but Mearsheimer isn't saying that Ukraine should have no right to self-determination vis-à-vis choosing a military or political bloc, but that they do not have unfettered rights to self-determination. He's dealing with the reality, not the ideal. Ideally, Cuba would not be under an embargo, Venezuela would not be under sanctions. What's the difference exactly? One is that neither Cuba nor Venezuela are associated with a foreign military bloc but the sanctions/embargo persists because the US sees them as existing within the American sphere of influence. You have to meet the reality of these situations before you talk about the ideal (no one would disagree with the ideal, whether it relates to Cuba, Ukraine, or Venezuela)A poly sci like Mearsheimer can sit back and say Ukraine doesn't have the right to self-determination because they are in Russia's sphere of influence but the reality on the ground is that Ukrainians are willing to fight like mad to defend their right to self-determination.
I know you have all discussed this in further detail in the meantime, but I wanted to get back to this point since it's been repeated quite often in this thread. My point is that Mearsheimer predicting the event is not all that interesting in and of itself; he may have happened to have gotten it right for entirely the wrong reasons. And I do think that's the case here to some extent, cause I think Mearsheimer's projections are based on very incomplete arguments, and that e.g. @oneniltothearsenal's complementary reasoning is much more comprehensive.Someone said above "Mearsheimer may have been wrong". How exactly? He made a prediction in line with academic consensus which turned out to be entirely correct.
Until someone can answer the Latin/South American case studies (which are current), Mearsheimer's 19th century conceptual style convinces me (what's the difference between Cuba and Venezuela today, Chile in 1971, and Ukraine?). Ukraine was being NATOfied de facto, Cuba and Venezuela have no allegiance to foreign military blocs hostile to the US. The only difference is that Cuba/Venezuela are considered by the US to be within the US sphere of influence under the logic expressed as far back as the Monroe doctine and carried forward to the present day.I know you have all discussed this in further detail in the meantime, but I wanted to get back to this point since it's been repeated quite often in this thread. My point is that Mearsheimer predicting the event is not all that interesting in and of itself; he may have happened to have gotten it right for entirely the wrong reasons. And I do think that's the case here to some extent, cause I think Mearsheimer's projections are based on very incomplete arguments, and that e.g. @oneniltothearsenal's complementary reasoning is much more comprehensive.
Until someone can answer the Latin/South American case studies (which are current), Mearsheimer's 19th century conceptual style convinces me (what's the difference between Cuba and Venezuela today, Chile in 1971, and Ukraine?). Ukraine was being NATOfied de facto, Cuba and Venezuela have no allegiance to foreign military blocs hostile to the US. The only difference is that Cuba/Venezuela are considered by the US to be within the US sphere of influence under the logic expressed as far back as the Monroe doctine and carried forward to the present day.