The explosion in whataboutism accusations is both interesting and weird. Whataboutism is a conscious tactic where you attempt to deflect criticism without dealing with it. Comparisons are not inherently whataboutist.
It's not whataboutism to compare the Russian invasion of Ukriane with the Coalition invasion of Iraq. It's not whataboutism to compare European countries's attitude towards Ukranian refugees with their attitudes to non-European refugees. It's not whataboutism to compare the swiftness, severity and magnitude of both sanctions against Russia and military help to Ukraine with the lack of response to other conflicts. There is a lot of actual whataboutism going around as well, of course, and the topics I mentioned can be utilized as such ("we shouldn't help Ukranians because we're not helping Yemenites", "sanctioning Russia is wrong because we invaded Iraq", "why do you care about this when Vietnam happened?", these could be construed as examples of whataboutism).
What's going on? Do people not know what whataboutism is, just using the term because everyone else is, or is it inself a tactic to avoid criticism?
The whole point is that we don't hold ourselves to the standard we insist others must conform to.
What is the ultimate goal of a liberal society? In a civic sense, it must surely be the attainment of the best possible balance for the greatest possible number of people. Insofar as such is the case, a liberal society will not shy away from critiquing its own hypocrisy (its own inconsistencies). You can not reach the first without confronting the second. The irony of "whataboutism" is that it is used to narrow the second and so must undermine the first. What is news? It is all whataboutism: the broadcast does not say "What about Russia's invasion of Ukraine" or "What about Putin's inherent evilness", but the effect is the same. You are being asked to respond to a question which is given in denotational form (and so the heuristic value is weakened so much that it doesn't even appear to be a "question"). "Russia invades Ukraine" = "[What about] Russia's invasion of Ukraine?" or "Russia has invaded Ukraine[,and what about it?]". So, what about it? The "whatabout" which exists in all media coverage can be understood rather simply.
Imagine a news-caster opening the segment with "Russia has invaded Ukraine, for more we are joined by X. So, X, why has this happened and what does it mean?" The entire premise is "what about Russia's invasion of Ukraine?". The extent to which other events are introduced then becomes a secondary narrative embedded within the primary frame. The event, as is made clear by the erasure of the question, is the Russain invasion of Ukraine. If anyone should stray too far from this event, it can easily be called "whataboutism" ("hang on, what does the expansion of NATO or the Maidan have to do with Russia's invasion of Ukraine?"). Well, for one, if your goal is to really understand why an event happens, you must try and understand the motive(s) of all relevant actors. But this conflates understanding with propaganda: the news, especially the corporate news, does not exist to give you an understanding if that understanding might expose inconsistencies in their overall narrative framework (the very real work they put into framing events from a certain perspective). The news rather exists to tell you things and elicit reactions favourable to the interests they wish to promote. Use Russia Today as an example. Their contributors are vetted well in advance so that the program can, with varying degrees of accuracy, be predicted in terms of its likely semantic value (journalists who lean left, right, or whatever direction, but whose sentiment will overlap with that of the editorial line in certian important particulars). That is manufacturing consent where consent is consistent with Russia's interests. The mistake is to assume that Western media does not do the same exact thing (dissenting voices are either a rarity, excluded, or when entertained are framed in such a way as to elicit ridicule).
The problem that is never addressed is, what is the media's overriding interest? Might be too broad a question to easily answer, except you can keep certain things in mind. For instance, just because a Western dissident's dislike of NATO corresponds to Russian state (or corporate) media's primary narrative framework does not mean that said dissident is an agent of the Kremlin. To draw that conclusion you have to suppose that these people have no "agency" (no agenda of their own which might overlap with another's in some respects but diverge in others). Ironically, you also have to maintain that notion while raising "agency" as the key issue in other contexts. Another example, to maintain that NATO expansionism has nothing to do with Russia's invasion of Ukraine is not to promote Ukrainian agency, but rather to diminish it.
For example, to use "great power politics" as derogatory phrase which diminishes Ukrainian agency is to conclude that Ukrainians have no understanding of their position within great power politics (is to rid the Ukrainians of "agency"). That doesn't square with the fact. The Ukrainians know that they will almsot surely never be admitted to NATO (this comes from Zelensky's own statements). On the other hand, the Ukrainians want to accept NATO weaponry because, given the circumstances post-2014, why would they not? With more and more military aid being given to Ukraine by NATO countries, Ukraine was being "NATOfied" de facto in a way that would never happen by treaty, or de jure. If you're Ukrainian, and fighting a civil war/invasion, you will not say no to NATO weapons even if you know these weapons will not lead to NATO membership. If you're NATO, you will willingly supply them with weapons because it seems a strategic win/win (in one scenario, NATO secures a de facto sphere of influence; in another, NATO supplies Ukraine with the weapons needed to maintain a prolonged insurgency). Zelensky is well aware of Ukraine's role as proxy within a larger sphere of overlapping interests (he said it himself, after all, "You will not be able to pay us off with liters of fuel for the liters of our blood, shed for our common Europe", in his criticism of NATO, and has also conceded that Ukraine will not formally join NATO, as have NATO [must find link]) so to say that raising this issue as being somehow irrelevant (or whataboutism) is nonsensical if your goal is to understand an event rather than justify it according to any given actor's primary framework. Zelensky understands the dynamics of great power politics better than those who would dismiss it as irrelevant (he expertly raised the possibility of negotiating with Russia in the same speech where he criticised NATO's weakness, understanding that NATO would appear weak if it didn't respond while also signalling that he was ready to pursue a diplomatic track that NATO does not want to pursue; and nor does he, either, but in the absence of proper weaponry [unless NATO makes the requisite concessions] he is saying that he will be forced to go in a different direction). Basically, Zelensky absolutely has agency, and you can see it when he plays NATO by condemning their weakness whilst also saying that he not "afraid to talk to Russia", in effect, playing both sides to achieve what he wants.
They have to deal with the Russian military right next door in Syria, and require a good relationship with Moscow to maintain their freedom of action there. That’ll be Jerusalem’s number one immediate priority.
The above is a geopolitical understanding which makes sense and it makes sense because of the "what about" mechanism not despite it (what about Israel's broader positions elsewhere).