Yes, because this is how politics actually works. Always by official papers and agreements rather than implicit and explicit understandings which can or cannot be broadcast relative to the sensitivity of the content.If there was nothing in paper there wasn’t an agreement or promise.
Not within the parameters of this very limited debate which centered around whether such documents even existed. They do. End of. That's the only criteria required to end this argument for me because it is logically given as fact, not as "you are this" or "I am that". Which is just emotional nonsense.Then you've not really proven much. What matters is what flows from an agreement.
No an agreement in diplomatic terms is officially documented. I don’t think you’re an idiot and you actually know this.Not within the parameters of this very limited debate which centered around whether such documents even existed. They do. End of. That's the only criteria required to end this argument for me because it is logically given as fact, not as "you are this" or "I am that". Which is just emotional nonsense.
Or the, after the documents are given, "haha what is an agreement anyway [existentialism]".
Find that - signed by both parties - in any of my comments and I'll concede the entire debate. Nor do I think you are an idiot, I just believe we are misunderstanding each other. I said the documentation existed which proved that the agreement/understanding always existed (as a non-binding agreement). I never said it was a binding agreement in the most officious sense of that argumentation. I merely said what I have given in proof, here. I'm really not well at the moment so apologies if it comes across as over the top. But the criteria was simple - did the press reports align with the official record ("not an inch") and the answer is yes. Contextually nuanced, but that's the way it is.You led to believe you had seen that document, signed by both parties, rather than minutes of a meeting between a Secretary of State.
This is not always the case. In the context of the negotiation there's not an awful lot you can do with official treaties. The USSR is falling apart and the stability of Europe and what would become Russia within that framework is the entire, official, discussion. For the record, I know exactly what you mean. You mean binding and even non-binding in some circumstances. But the context is absolutely everything.No an agreement in diplomatic terms is officially documented.
But... I would only feel betrayed if they broke a binding treaty commitment! The promises contained within those treaties are the things grown ups get upset about, not the discussions that lead up to them (or not).It was told to them that nato simply would not expand. And that's all I have ever said. My argument is no broader than that. Imagine if it had gone the other way and instead of NATO we were dealing with a Warsaw Pact in this context. We - the West - would also feel betrayed. I think it's disingenuous to say otherwise.
Sure, but the expansion of NATO - whatever one's stance - all the way to potentially Ukraine (de facto, not de jure: the nuance concerning what is and is not binding only in a different context) is the primary reason Putin cited when he invaded Ukraine. It was also a long-running discussion going back at least 18 years (discussions I almost know by rote memory) that there were obvious limits to what NATO expansion could and would do in the context of perceived Russian responses.are the things grown ups get upset about
Sure, but the expansion of NATO - whatever one's stance - all the way to potentially Ukraine (de facto, not de jure: the nuance concerning what is and is not binding only in a different context) is the primary reason Putin cited when he invaded Ukraine. It was also a long-running discussion going back at least 18 years (discussions I almost know by rote memory) that there were obvious limits to what NATO expansion could and would do in the context of perceived Russian responses.
Not justifying the invasion, more an excavation of the historical landscape. That is, when the "agreement/understanding" was mentioned in these conversations, many of them "high up" (officials on news channels or radio shows or whatever engaged in serious debates) there was never any denial of the "one inch..." controversy. That only became a controversy, properly of late. The Russians stating that this is their cassus belli and the West stating that no such BINDING agreement was made. That's the history which interests me here.
Nor do I think Russia invaded Ukraine entirely because of this NATO thing. It is broader than that. Syrian positions, the various countering (to Russia) of Western influence in what they perceive to be their direct spheres of influence and control (the Russian led coups which basically stalemated places like Georgia or Transintria).
I think this is nonsense.If it happens, the Russian public will see their relatives in Ukraine living a better life than they are and begin demanding the same freedoms, which could l lead to revolution and Putin’s own death
I think this is nonsense.
Norway, Finland, Estonia, Lithuania. Russia borders all of them.
Ukraine, before war frenzy set in, was, I think, either the most corrupt or second most corrupt state in Europe. I honestly cannot remember. But this idea that Ukraine as the beacon of democracy will destroy Russia is a fiction. If that's the case, why isn't Norway and Finland having this effect? Lack of Russian speakers?
Also, there have been genuine fascist rules implemented across these "great democratic states" with respect to protest and lawful gatherings over the past y number of years. You see it most clearly with the Palestinian issue and the actual fascist style clamp down, in some European states, far more "democratic" than ever Ukraine was or will be. Which is just to say that whilst Putin is indeed a dictator, doesn't he enjoy something like 70% approval rating (this is not even fixed as far as I can tell, but a rating which comes not from Moscow or even St Petersbrug but from all over Russia). Happy for a Russian poster, like @harms to call bullshit on all of this of course.
There's a dictatorship in Israel right now which is carrying out genocide and ethnic cleansing which the great "democracies" of the West are literally profiting upon and silencing dissent both online and in the street. A complete load of shite, in all honesty, considering democracy has never felt less democratic or free in Europe throughout my entire lifetime. Closer to a slow totalitarian creep is what I'm witnessing.
It is broader indeed - it is more that they refuse to recognise Ukraine as having genuine agency and statehood, which is why Ukraine’s attempt to pivot away from Russia and towards the EU (not NATO) post-2014 created such a violent reaction. Bur framing it as “the West broke a gentleman’s agreement” from 30 years ago is obviously better framing for its regrettably successful disinformation campaign.Sure, but the expansion of NATO - whatever one's stance - all the way to potentially Ukraine (de facto, not de jure: the nuance concerning what is and is not binding only in a different context) is the primary reason Putin cited when he invaded Ukraine. It was also a long-running discussion going back at least 18 years (discussions I almost know by rote memory) that there were obvious limits to what NATO expansion could and would do in the context of perceived Russian responses.
Not justifying the invasion, more an excavation of the historical landscape. That is, when the "agreement/understanding" was mentioned in these conversations, many of them "high up" (officials on news channels or radio shows or whatever engaged in serious debates) there was never any denial of the "one inch..." controversy. That only became a controversy, properly of late. The Russians stating that this is their cassus belli and the West stating that no such BINDING agreement was made. That's the history which interests me here.
Nor do I think Russia invaded Ukraine entirely because of this NATO thing. It is broader than that. Syrian positions, the various countering (to Russia) of Western influence in what they perceive to be their direct spheres of influence and control (the Russian led coups which basically stalemated places like Georgia or Transintria).
Assume you're right.Putin doesn't want to go down and the biggest threat of democracy reaching Russia is for it to become entrenched in a very large state on its borders
They want their Ukraine rather than any other version of it. I do not disagree. That's exactly why I think this war happened. But I also know that all actors - and we can cite agency until the cows come home - were aware of this. That Russia would react this way. Is it legitimate? Not to me. But it's not hard to understand after the dust has settled. I've seen the Soviet Union do it and the United States (and smaller nations than that). It happened in the Arab Spring. (Still ongoing - not the democratic part, which was always a facade [the people of those nations do want it but the actors who spout the democratic mantras are entirely comfortable for them not to have it], but turmoil).it is more that they refuse to recognise Ukraine as having genuine agency and statehood
Surely the other point is that the next largest party in Russia, if the ruling regime were to fall, is the communist party. How will that, if all you think could happen, happens, result in democracy reaching Russia?
Read the book I linked, honestly it paints the exact picture you said. The outcomes are grim, theres so much to lose, and yet time after time again when nation states have been in this situation, its gone hot in one way or another. Whether directly (WWI) or indirectly via proxies (Cold war).
If China believed there was a low probability of the US defending Taiwan, or that they could successfully deter more than a token US response, because the US interest in maintaining the status quo was in reality quite low, then you aren't dealing with two players with equal stakes in the game. Ultimately, do they believe, in their bones, that the US public would want to sacrifice a large chunk of its navy to defend Taiwan? When you can't even persuade the US to continue sacrificing some old equipment to defend Ukraine?
To be frank, I don't think buying that book and reading it will happen soon as I have too many other books queued up, but I'll happily read a long form article if you have a link to one making the same arguments. For my view, I'd say historical examples WWI or prior aren't very relevant because decision makers didn't have game theory available to them at the time. Since WWII, game theory has been hugely influential in nation states' decision making even with an irrational actor like Trump. I simply don't see US-China going hot as a realistic scenario as both sides would just end up overall losers. If its a game of chicken, the US swerves first.
I think that's a good point and I generally agree with this. But it was Afonso that views the US viewing Taiwan, for example, as absolutely vital to US interests that it would be worth sacrificing the navy to defend Taiwan. I tend to disagree with that and agree with you on the calculations that the US would likely ultimately decide its not worth a hot war to defend Taiwan and would probably negotiate some sort of deal there most likely involving semiconductor production.
If we view everything from purely geopolitical interests POV:
US not defending Ukraine results in...well, the 2008 status-quo with Russia. There's still the European allies to help stem back Russian expansion.
China takes Taiwan results in the first island chain collapsing, the 2nd island chain being completely vulnerable, the Northern Pacific (Japan and SK) being isolated from its Southern Pacific and Oceanic Allies (AUKUS and Phillippines) and within two decades will see Gunboat diplomacy by the Chinese against Hawaii and the US West Coast.
The threat of Taiwan falling results in consequences that are literally existential and poses a threat to the existence of the USA that it hasn't faced in its entire history as an independent state.
A much better phrased appraisal of how I, too, also see it. It's in neither economic interest for a hot war.I see such mutually detrimental economic choices as highly unlikely in the 21st century since it goes against both sides maximizing their utility.
I find Cuba to be a peculiar example. This is not directly aimed at you but to my observation many of the same people who criticize the US for Cuba are not consistent on Russia-Ukraine. The level of energy isn't the same.I follow what the Obama consensus (his officials) was/is prior to this war. Russia will not lose a war on its border with Ukraine and it is magical thinking to assume that it will. It was always known they would invade under such circumstances where Ukraine became more and more into the NATO (de facto) fold. It was official intel literature. There's no point in going over all of it again.
I believe, fundamentally, that Russia sees Ukraine as the US sees Cuba. And, following that, old or new mind-state as it is, they treat the Ukrainian mass as the US would and has treated the Cuban mass. "part of our sphere of influence and we'll use war as a weapon to keep it so". That's what history tells me. That's the only rationale I can find for Russia's actions. As for baited. Leave it open then. I think what the US/N did amounts to baiting. Doesn't mean you have to take the bait. But that's that I believe based on facts and other people find that ridiculous based on their own facts. I don't see the point in us discussing it because I'm not going to change my mind here and I don't expect others are either. This is why I don't go near the Ukrainian thread because it irritates people and I'm trying to avoid that.
But the Chinese thing is almost entirely the US' fault and anyone pretending otherwise is ridiculous to me. It began more than a decade ago and has been a concerted effort to limit the rise of China (by the US).
So I just don't accept that assumption at all. It feels like a prime example of the slippery slope fallacy. I just don't believe in this existential threat of hot war with China that you seem to believe in. Possibly its due to differences in backgrounds. You have a military career so like the hammer thinking everything is a nail, that's how you see things. I have an economics background, so I see such mutually detrimental economic choices as highly unlikely in the 21st century since it goes against both sides maximizing their utility.
If you don't have an article, I'll mark that book and eventually look at it but I doubt it's going to say anything to change my mind if its just looking at pre-WWII history to prove its point which lacks institutional understanding of game theory and also how the cold war never went hot despite some people constantly stoking that fear.
To sum up your post, which is quite good, my line of thinking is that "spheres of influence" ought to be consigned to the abyss when it comes to statecraft.It's usually "the US is imperialist" and the "US does not deserve a sphere of influence"
Unfortunately wars are as much a matter of the heart than the head.A much better phrased appraisal of how I, too, also see it. It's in neither economic interest for a hot war.
From a purely military perspective, the first and second island chains are a sitting duck if Taiwan becomes part of PRC.
There's nothing at that point, bar miracle technological developments or Wunderwaffe that can prevent the fall of the island chains. Or if US scraps every other federal budget and chucks it all into defense spending, which obviously won't happen.
Then the soft underbelly of the US west coast is revealed.
So then the question remains, what stops China from expanding out? The answer is...nothing.
The next question is, in the thousands of years history of China being in a similar situation, what has happened? The answer is they exploited it to their max and went in and crushed their enemies, or atleast tried to. The last attempt being 1996 and the time before that 1979.
Even now, gunboat diplomacy is being conducted in the South China Sea.
That's the "head", not the heart. The heart would say no war, regardless.Unfortunately wars are as much a matter of the heart than the head.
Is it rational for Russia to have torched their economy for Ukraine? Or Britain to have destroyed its economy for Poland in WW2?
Was it rational for Germany to have gone to war with its two biggest trading partners, Britain and Russia, in WW1?
That's the "head", not the heart. The heart would say no war, regardless.
The head is that which plays all these unnecessary games and considers war as just another game which can be played.
There has never, in history, been such a thing a justified war. That's sanity because it's actually true. To justify war you have to divide (go to that which is "unjust") and say "the allies were justified because Hitler was not". That is, you have a logical inconsistency. War is always unjust and then it becomes a matter of "who was better or worse" (after the fact usually). Of course Hitler was not "just" (in any respect) but the second world war was, as one person once said, the second 30 years war. It - scholarship - really has to go back to about 1870 to even try and "frame" it with the kind of nuance it requires.
They all played the "game". Russia doesn't think its economy will be torched (if you look at only GDP metrics, which isn't enough, admittedly, the Russian economy has not been torched at all).
Britain didn't do it for Poland, it did it for itself. This is just historical fact. The British, over centuries, wanted to keep any single European state becoming dominant in Europe. From Napoleon to the "Great Game" with the Russian Empire to hedging and leveraging the French, Germans, and Russians against themselves (particularly the French and the Germans). When Britain, which was assumed hegemonic power of the day, said it would not tolerate a Polish invasion they were really saying "we will not tolerate Hitler's regime as that Napoleonic aspirant". They made it a red line and then acted on it.
Assume the Germans did not go around the Maginot line (as they did) but instead came up against it. Then the British and the French are in a great (in war terms) position with respect to the German army. No one saw the Ardennes thing coming.
Anyway, it's a mistake to divide the head and the heart (classical dualist philosophy which is all the way wrong) but I get where you're coming from.
In historical terms, I'm confident enough. As to what is going to unfold I have absolutely no confidence in any of the world's nation states. 0. In my lifetime I do not believe the world has ever been worse.You're very confident.
But it’s not slippery slope fallacy.Again, this just reeks of the slippery slope fallacy. Even if the US isn't ultimately willing to go to a hot war over Taiwan, that hardly means the US would just let China steamroll itself all the way to the US West Coast. Despite what pacifists (a politically powerless minority) want, the US is not stopping military investment in the coming decades no matter who the President is and the US is still more advanced than China and will continue to remain ahead of China on the curve. No way is China going to sail its "gunboats" all the way to the Hawaii let alone the US West Coast. This just sounds like fear mongering that takes no account of game theory.
Hasn't this been wargamed to death? That is, in a US intervention, should China invade Taiwan, I remember reading a military article which ran this war-game more times that I can count and the result was that unless it goes nuclear, where everyone loses anyway, the Chinese win the wargame.But it’s not slippery slope fallacy.
Imagine the pacific is a 15th century fortress and the USA is the civilian settlements in the middle. Taiwan is the gate. If the gate is lost, the walls, watchtowers and such will soon fall.
What I’m saying is this isn’t slippery slope it’s reality. If Taiwan falls, the island chains fall with it.
At the point of Taiwan falling, the Us navy cannnot operate to capacity without being intercepted and the same goes for the air force. It cuts the chain in two. It puts the US + allies in such a strategic disadvantage that the everything you say is redundant.
Investing in military doesn’t change the fact that the US position without Taiwan is extreme disadvantage
In historical terms, I'm confident enough. As to what is going to unfold I have absolutely no confidence in any of the world's nation states. 0. In my lifetime I do not believe the world has ever been worse.
Look at the state of the fecking place.Why is that?
But it’s not slippery slope fallacy.
Imagine the pacific is a 15th century fortress and the USA is the civilian settlements in the middle. Taiwan is the gate. If the gate is lost, the walls, watchtowers and such will soon fall.
What I’m saying is this isn’t slippery slope it’s reality. If Taiwan falls, the island chains fall with it.
At the point of Taiwan falling, the Us navy cannnot operate to capacity without being intercepted and the same goes for the air force. It cuts the chain in two. It puts the US + allies in such a strategic disadvantage that the everything you say is redundant.
Investing in military doesn’t change the fact that the US position without Taiwan is extreme disadvantage
Look at the state of the fecking place.
I'm older than 24, but go back 24 years. It was far from perfect (when has it ever been that?) but it wasn't this fecked up. I see a slow totalitarian creep in the form/guise of liberalism around Europe and a more open fascistic such creep (which tolerates and proselytizes sometimes in liberal form) in the United States. From a Western perspective, that is, I really do not think it has ever been worse (not in modern times). As for the rest of the world, we cannot go to the most fecked up places, or most of the most fecked up places, without finding fingerprints of Western complicity.
Then you have global warming.
This is a very big misunderstanding and French British strategy in 1940.That's the "head", not the heart. The heart would say no war, regardless.
The head is that which plays all these unnecessary games and considers war as just another game which can be played.
There has never, in history, been such a thing a justified war. That's sanity because it's actually true. To justify war you have to divide (go to that which is "unjust") and say "the allies were justified because Hitler was not". That is, you have a logical inconsistency. War is always unjust and then it becomes a matter of "who was better or worse" (after the fact usually). Of course Hitler was not "just" (in any respect) but the second world war was, as one person once said, the second 30 years war. It - scholarship - really has to go back to about 1870 to even try and "frame" it with the kind of nuance it requires.
They all played the "game". Russia doesn't think its economy will be torched (if you look at only GDP metrics, which isn't enough, admittedly, the Russian economy has not been torched at all).
Britain didn't do it for Poland, it did it for itself. This is just historical fact. The British, over centuries, wanted to keep any single European state becoming dominant in Europe. From Napoleon to the "Great Game" with the Russian Empire to hedging and leveraging the French, Germans, and Russians against themselves (particularly the French and the Germans). When Britain, which was assumed hegemonic power of the day, said it would not tolerate a Polish invasion they were really saying "we will not tolerate Hitler's regime as that Napoleonic aspirant". They made it a red line and then acted on it.
Assume the Germans did not go around the Maginot line (as they did) but instead came up against it. Then the British and the French are in a great (in war terms) position with respect to the German army. No one saw the Ardennes thing coming. As it happened, the Americans waited for Europe to basically destroy itself again and intervened only (directly) when they were attacked by a Japan which thought American intervention was a matter of "when" and not "if" (more Pacific than European for the Japanese as these two were contesting supremacy in the pacific really, and it has been going on longer than 1939. Anyway, the colonial powers were absolutely destroyed and the USSR and US emerged. The USSR became that Napoleonic power (Churchill's speech to the congress after the war basically confirming this point: rousing the US to hostility against the Soviets) and that's basically what the Cold War was about. In a very much tl;dr summary (of course there's infinitely much more to it).
Anyway, it's a mistake to divide the head and the heart (classical dualist philosophy which is all the way wrong) but I get where you're coming from.
All of those things were fecked up. But there was a kind of optimism in the 90s across most of the world (not all of it) including the "third world" (then) or "global south" (now). That optimism died a death with globalization 1.0. And now it's just dreary reactionary politics wherever you look. There was, or the intifada (after it, because it started in late 80s iirc) at least the 1990s idea of a two state solution. And the Israelis blame the Palestinians and the same the other way around but at least attempts, somewhat serious, were being made.I don't know about that mate, the 90s were pretty nasty with the Yugoslav wars, Rwanda genocide, First Intifada and so on.
I agree with your take on things nonetheless
But presumably you do get my point: four days is a surprise when you're facing a complete and total invasion. Otherwise I'm grateful to you for adding nuance and context. I take all your micro-historical expertise gratefully - my outlook has always been, in scholarship and elsewhere, more general. But that's a very good post.The French knew it was coming about 4 days in advance.
The bit in bold is, I think, what your nuanced post refers to (that the French had some idea of it).The idea that the French did not expect the Germans to come through the Ardennes is supported by several historical analyses of the German invasion of France in 1940, particularly the German strategy during the Battle of France.Hugh Sebag-Montefiore, in Dunkirk: Fight to the Last Man (2006), explains that the French military leadership considered the Ardennes impassable for a large-scale mechanized invasion. This belief led to the focus on defending the Maginot Line, which left the Ardennes poorly defended.Anthony Beevor, in The Second World War (2012), notes that the Germans exploited the French misconception about the Ardennes and launched a rapid attack through the region, catching the French by surprise and bypassing their main defensive positions.Alan F. Wilt in The French Army and the Doctrine of Surprise: The German Attack through the Ardennes (1940) (1983) also discusses how the French underestimated the possibility of a German breakthrough in the Ardennes, which contributed to the initial success of the German invasion.These sources emphasize that the French strategic focus on the Maginot Line and their assumption that the Ardennes was impassable for modern armies were key factors in their failure to anticipate the German attack through this region.
The Dyle Plan (implemented in 1940) aimed to deploy French forces along the Dyle River in Belgium to counter a German attack through Belgium. However, this plan was based on the assumption that Germany would repeat its World War I strategy by attacking through Belgium. The French believed that a major German push would occur through the lowlands (Belgium and Luxembourg), and their forces were positioned to counter this.
What the French did not anticipate was that the Germans would bypass the heavily defended Maginot Line by launching a rapid, large-scale attack through the Ardennes, a region they believed was impassable for modern mechanized armies. This unexpected strategy allowed the Germans to outflank the French and British forces, cutting off their supply lines and leading to the collapse of the French defenses.
I don't think you'll see a Chinese invasion of Taiwan unless the US baits China into doing it (controversial to many here that the US would even be that "unethical") and even then I'm not certain. Why would the Chinese risk everything they've gained, over nearly a century, for an invasion where they themselves cannot be certain of any victory.
Potential NATO invasion of Russia would not be incorrect either. Poor one-sided reporting from Western outlets.
NATO has expanded to circumscribe Russia and Russia is weary of it. Nothing else to it. Russia won't invade the Ukraine.
Russia doesn't want to invade Ukraine because it would cause enormous losses. But if Ukraine attacks Russian areas, there might be a response.
Not sure you understand that I've never once pretended to be anything other than wrong when I said Russia wouldn't invade Ukraine. It made 0 sense to me then and makes 0 sense to me now. I was wrong and admitted as such immediately. I don't place any value on these attempted "got-cha" posts. If you can predict what will happen tomorrow, in any given nation, then good for because I cannot and do not pretend to. I just go by what seems to make sense from a series of different perspectives and if that is wrong then it is wrong.Not so sure your worldview has the real world predictive ability you think it does.
All of those things were fecked up. But there was a kind of optimism in the 90s across most of the world (not all of it) including the "third world" (then) or "global south" (now). That optimism died a death with globalization 1.0. And now it's just dreary reactionary politics wherever you look. There was, or the intifada (after it, because it started in late 80s iirc) at least the 1990s idea of a two state solution. And the Israelis blame the Palestinians and the same the other way around but at least attempts, somewhat serious, were being made.
But presumably you do get my point: four days is a surprise when you're facing a complete and total invasion. Otherwise I'm grateful to you for adding nuance and context. I take all your micro-historical expertise gratefully - my outlook has always been, in scholarship and elsewhere, more general. But that's a very good post.
Can you cite me some articles or open (public) documents about the Ardennes qua the Maginot line? Because the French did concentrate their forces along the Maginot Line.
I'm using CHATGPT to help me with some logical stuff for a thesis (programming it basically) but I opened a new dialogue and got this:
The bit in bold is, I think, what your nuanced post refers to (that the French had some idea of it).
What you say in your post sort of makes sense: fortify the ML and expect the battle elsewhere because Hitler basically re-ran the WW1 plan except by Blitz. It is, if you watch/read/listen to the history, almost a copycat. Knock out France as fast as possible and then head north to Russia. Not being able to fight each simultaneously.
Also, this illuminates your post a bit better I think:
In historical terms, I'm confident enough. As to what is going to unfold I have absolutely no confidence in any of the world's nation states. 0. In my lifetime I do not believe the world has ever been worse.
Well, you're wrong. Because I cannot understand a word of this. You need to expand for it to make any actual sense. Or not, if "expand to make actual sense" is a logical understanding of your view or something.I just mean you're confident you understand everyone's point of view in terms of what's logical. You absolutely don't but it must be nice to think you do.
Well, you're wrong. Because I cannot understand a word of this. You need to expand for it to make any actual sense. Or not, if "expand to make actual sense" is a logical understanding of your view or something.
Also, I'm exactly the opposite to that in my "logic". Completely non-positivist. I do not say I can understand anyone's point of view as it actually is to them. That is literally my thesis. The proof of necessary fallibility.
Edit: you mean in terms of what is logical in the sense that I apply a logical framework to people's point of view and assume it has to share the same rationale? I get now what your critique might be, I think, but it's wrong. Again, I maintain that it is literally impossible to understand someone else's point of view in any 100% sense of that meaning. Also, I understand that not everything - indeed most things - are not logical at all. When you analyze state structures, however, you must present some coherent logical framework or else you surely have no analysis to present. In terms of individual understanding along the same lines, I don't believe that for a second. I.e., history, philosophy, and structures of state is one thing - individuals are another. And again, let me stress it clearly, my entire life's work, in academia, strives toward the overwhelming conclusion that human beings are entirely (and necessarily) fallible. Myself, obviously, included. It is from that point of view that I reject positivist dialectics for example whether it be fascist or socialist (in a very categorically precise way). I reject all positivism as it goes. That, to me is what "certainty" of other people's views, without any actual merit, really is. And history bears that out - I think that's safe enough to state.
