We dealt with four failing investment non-banks before getting the TARP legislation from Congress: Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch, Lehman, and AIG. One of them, Merrill Lynch, didn’t take government support because it found a buyer. With Bear we were fortunate to have a well-capitalized buyer in
JPMorgan that, importantly, was willing to guarantee the Bear liabilities during the pendency of the shareholder vote.
For Lehman, we had no buyer and we needed one with the willingness and capacity to guarantee its liabilities. Without one, a permissible Fed loan would not have been sufficient or effective to stop a run. To do that, the Fed would have had to inject capital or guarantee liabilities and they had no power to do so. Now, here’s the point that I think a lot of people miss: In the midst of a panic, market participants make their own judgments and a Fed loan to meet a liquidity shortfall wouldn’t prevent a failure if they believed Lehman wasn’t viable or solvent. And no one believed they were.
But a Fed loan was able to prevent
an AIG failure and avoid catastrophe because AIG had a portfolio of insurance companies, and these were insurance companies with independent credit ratings, which both the Fed and the market believed had sufficient value to secure a loan and ensure that AIG was viable after receiving a loan to cover a huge liquidity shortfall at the holding company.
Then a couple of months later, after AIG’s losses mounted, it took government capital to restructure and to satisfy the rating agencies that the company was viable and fortunately at the time we had capital.
At the end of the day we got lucky with AIG. If it had failed it would have been an order of magnitude worse than Lehman and the government funds that were put in AIG all came back with a big profit. So it worked out well, but it is really an ugly story.