It was a modest sized bungalow. A fresh extension had been added to the side of the house and the occupant, a woman in her late 60s to early 70s, beckoned us across the astroturf lawn to her patio doors. "I'll be voting Tory this time", she said. "We need to get Brexit done." Picking at her reasoning, it was the bickering of politicians that annoyed her the most. And when we moved on to policy issues her eyes glazed over and spoke the following remarkable words: "the country has never been so prosperous." At that point we decided time was best spent on someone else's doorstep and we moved off. This brief chat typified two things: it underlined Labour's old people problem and speaks to the single political success of the Cameron government's time in power - the insulation of retirees from the pressures facing the rest of the population.
Naturally, we're not talking about
all older people. But poll after poll, election after election, and country after country shows a pronounced bias among the old to right wing parties. And this is especially acute when we talk about hard right populist insurgencies,
like the Brexit Party here, the AfD in Germany, FN in France and so on. Why? Is this simply an expression of the old adage that you tend to get more conservative as you grow older? No.
As this blog has discussed
many times, the age split in voting intentions across the Western world is an expression of a class cohort effect. The fact the younger you are, the more socially liberal you're more likely to be is less a consequence of "multicultural lefty crap", as the thankfully former Tory MP Aidan Burley once put it, but a cultural mutation in the class composition of the advanced capitalist societies. Without going too far down this particular rabbit hole (much more
here and
here), it will suffice to say that as the state expanded in the post-war years millions of workers were drawn into employment whose object was the reproduction of capitalist social relations themselves. Education, health, social services, the civil service generally, local government were the main areas of growth. The
character of this work centred on the engineering of human beings, the combination of socialising them and patching them up. As deindustrialisation started taking hold and
neoliberal capitalismemerged from the rubble of the class battles of the 1980s, not only were these services contracted out, the market also started intervening more directly in the engineering of subjectivities. Consumer capitalism was already well practised at
selling lifestyles, but as the service sector expanded and industry upped sticks the provision of services became increasingly central to the accumulation of capital. What mattered less was the brute physicality of the human body and more the subtle intricacies of our competencies as
social beings, but not just any way of being: the kind of agreeable personality able to get on with and relate to people from a diversity of backgrounds. There are two consequences that flow from this. Social liberalism is less a matter of "propaganda" as the far right maintains, but a tolerance arising spontaneously from the everyday existence of tens of millions of people. And secondly, the younger someone is the more likely their career is or will be characterised by the immaterial, social labour. Therefore it stands to reason younger people are going to relate better to parties that embody those values, while the reverse is true of those coming to the end of their working lives or are retired. This is something the so-called
Blue Labour tendency recognises, but thinks we should tail the prejudices and fading peccadilloes of the old and abandoning social liberalism for, at best, a studied neutrality with respect to their propensity to conservatism. A position that would destroy the Labour Party in less than a generation.
The second issue is the problem of property. Value congruence is only one part of the explanation for the polarisation of politics along age lines. The apparent conservatising effect of age is not some essentialist feature of the life course, but a consequence of acquiring property. It used to go something like this. You start off in life after school with a job. And as you get older, you and your partner acquire a house, cars, kids, has a modest sum saved in the bank for a rainy day, and by retirement you're set with a liveable pension combining occupational and state schemes, and a few assets acquired over a life time of graft. If you're under 50, you know this fiction is not the case. One of the biggest problems the Tories are facing is how property acquisition is eroding, which is one of the processes driving
the party's long-term decline. The Tories are visibly and obviously
a barrier to the modest aspirations of increasing numbers of working people. And one of the reasons they cannot address this is because high property prices and the proliferation of renting is very much in the interests of their coalition of older voters. For among the ranks of retirees are a not inconsiderable number of petty landlords who rent out their old family homes or other properties. Therefore keeping them sweet and onside means screwing younger workers, even if the price the party will pay is their decreasing political viability in the medium to long-term. And it also means this constituency are not about to support Labour who are pledged, perversely, to getting the cycle of property acquisition moving again alongside curbs on private renting and the building of good quality council housing.
Not unrelated to property is the declassing experience of retirement itself, which is simultaneously individuating, disempowering, and lumpenising. Going from arranging your life around the need to earn a wage a salary to not can be wrenching, and leaves the retired to find purpose in other things. For some it might be the near full-time pursuit of hobbies, but often the consequences can be social withdrawal and isolation. No wonder old age loneliness is at epidemic levels. Whatever the case the freedom from work, or at least working full-time, affords a certain freedom and the inclination to do as one pleases. In a society such as ours where the individual is formally sovereign, independent, and therefore the arbiter of what is right and what is wrong, retirement approaches this neoliberal ego ideal. This declassing is something David Cameron understood at an instinctive level. "Protecting" older people from his government's cuts programme wasn't a charitable move but an astute political one. Dave knew that ensuring pensions rose while exempting older people in public housing from the bedroom tax, cuts to council tax and changes to income support insulated them (to a degree) from his attack on government spending, and therefore the pressures borne from the rest of the population. Further, because pensioners are on fixed incomes and atomised, they - like small business people - are prone to social anxieties. The reason the right wing press pump out the most ludicrous scare stories and are happy to abet the Tories
in doing so is because it speaks to a structurally anxious social location, and they lap it up. Hence also the tendency to the punitive and the scapegoat. The right are past masters in condensing intangible fears around groups of undesirables, and and satisfying them by being seen to give them a good kicking and making their lives a misery. The hostile environment, for example, is part and parcel of this formula. Labour, especially under Jeremy Corbyn, is also a bogeyman that fits this political typing to a tee. The spending plans conjure up the mythologised Winter of Discontent, the foreign policy an Operation Sea Lion rerun with Jihadists and bolshevised Brussels bureaucrats, and any hint of making life better for working people a concession to snowflakery and idleness.
This situation, of the old effectively turning against the young, is not natural. It is a situation arrived at by policy decisions, and cynically sustained by the Tories and
the powerful forcesthey act for. The question is how to turn this around? And the answer is ... not before election day. Strong campaigning by Labour and using all means, such as getting younger relatives to lean on the old, can make a small difference. As could targeted anti-Tory campaigning aimed at suppressing their vote. But we're talking about sustained effort over years
in government. To turn the situation around for the old takes more than just banging on about saving the NHS, they have to see tangible improvements when they visit. The restoration of public transport (particularly buses) and a rebooted Post Office network can be parts of a strategy to break down isolation and dislocation. Opening FE and HE to lifelong education can encourage retirees to enter education, sometimes for the first time, would also build social cohesion and make the world appear less threatening and strange. And Labour's plan to break up private media monopolies would stymie the pipeline of poison that keeps pensioners frightened, weary, and anxious.
Again, it's worth reiterating that this can't be short circuited. Labour's old people problem does not go away if we pander to the concerns articulated by the right wing press, nor allow the Tories to set the terms of debate, nor water down while half-apologising for our programme. The only way to win over the old and disrupt the grip the Tories have on pensioners is by explicitly saying we are the party for everyone, and with the policies to match. And they know, the right know that if we get in and start removing the bases of pensioner anxiety, their long-term decline will speed up.