Re: Dresden
Historians and commentators who consider Dresden revenge bombing ought to take a trip to the Soviet Archives and US/UK archives to read the documents and sources pertaining to the decision making before and during the bombing of Dresden.
A few points to consider anyhow:
1) By 1945 the Germans knew they were losing, (despite internal propaganda to the contrary) and their strategy revolved around the concept of 'Verteidigungsbereich', a series of military chokepoints on strategic locations along the Eastern front that were to be held at all costs. All expenses were not to be spared in making sure that the Germans held on to these positions because if they fell then that entire section of the front would fall. Heinz Guderian was responsible for designation of these defensive chokepoints along the Southern sector of the Eastern Front, and he personally chose Dresden. Dresden was vital strategically because it was a) relatively untouched by Western bombing as it was in the far south eastern corner of Germany and therefore had the vast majority of its infrastructure, both civilian and military, in tact. b) It sat on the border between the east and western banks of the Elbe. The closest crossing of the Elbe was +-150 miles from Dresden. If Dresden could be held, the Elbe provided a natural barrier against Soviet forces in the Southern sector of the Eastern Front.
2) As a follow up to the first point, The soviets by early 1945 were launching the Vistula-Oder offensive, which was some of the most brutal segments of the Eastern front. If you look at maps of the offensive, after a month of fighting, there were huge gains in the North/Center, but the Soviets were suffering huge casualties in the South. Why? Because German logistics infrastructure was practically intact. The railway intersection in Dresden could transport two entire German divisions a day to the front and back, allowing for much easier troop rotation, delivery of munitions and supplies as well as reinforcements to plug any gaps in the line. On a side note, it was averaged that 2150 Jews were being ferried to Auschwitz via Dresden per day, but that information only became available post war. Between January 15th and February the 9th, the Soviets request three separate occasions for the Western Allies to bomb Dresden. These requests were initially denied, because running Strategic bombing missions to that corner of Germany was deemed too much of a risk, as it would severely stretch the range of even the most capable escort-fighters at the time (P-51 Mustangs). However, as it looked like the Soviets were loosing momentum on the Southern Front by mid-February, the western allies decided it was the best thing to do. There was a genuine fear that the Soviet offensive had stalled in that region, so the decision was made to flatten it.
3) Two separate recommendations had been made for bombing attacks on Dresden before 1945, one being in December 1944, where Allied intelligence reported that there were 127 Military factories, housing 62,000 German Workers in the war effort. In these factories, production entailed ball bearings, tungsten rods, military telephones, shell munitions and aircraft spare parts. It was estimated around 19% of all German ball bearing production was handled in Dresden by December 1944.
4) As a direct result of the bombing, Military infrastructure around Dresden was flattened and ultimately this led to the great success of the Lower-Silesia Offensive and the Vienna Offensive launched by the Soviets in the following months, due to the inability of OKW to meaningfully get supplies, munitions and men to the front and to rotate cleanly. It also completely removed Dresden as a chokepoint on the Elbe.
You can argue that without the bombing of Dresden, the allies would have still won, which is obviously true. But the same can be said for many bombing campaigns of late 44 and 45. The question you have to ask therefore is, how many lives did the deaths of 25,000 Germans in Dresden, save? The answer is, with a good degree of certainty, multiple orders of magnitude more. Compare the loss ratios on that sector of front in the Vistula-Oder offensive compared to the Lower-Silesia and Vienna offensives to see the difference it made to the casualties on the Soviet side of the Eastern front. It also wasn't a one off bombing raid either, after the city was flattened, the Allies kept coming back to it to make sure that the railways were not being repaired, and the factories were not being rebuilt or re set up. It was a huge strategic objective.
Now comes the question: Why is there so much fuss around Dresden?
and the answer ties in with many of the myths of WWII, which is Nazi propoganda mixed in with post-war revisionism. After Dresden, the Germans released media coverage that up to 490,000 Germans had been butchered at Dresden (the real number was around the 25,000 mark). Then, in the post war memories of many notable nazi's/Wehrmacht commanders, many desperately downplayed the importance of Dresden as a useful strategic location. For example, Eric Von Manstein spent almost a year in 1944 recovering from surgery in Dresden, and wrote in his memoirs that it was a peaceful city with no military significance. Guderian, likewise in his memoirs, said the same thing (Which is hilarious because in documented minutes of OKH high command, Guderian personally recommend Dresden to be a Verteidigungsbereich. During the cold war, Eastern sources were not available, so historians genuinely took and believed the provenance of Wehrmacht memoirs as accurate sources. This is also how the "clean wehrmacht" myth stems from, if you read Franz Halder/Rundstedt/Manstein's memoirs, you'd think the Wehrmacht were true professional soldiers with no ties to Nazism, which was far from the case.
Like the Clean Wehrmacht tales, when the Soviet archives were finally opened up alongside the Western equivalents post Cold war, much of the truth of Dresden came into light.