Stars and Reserves Draft R1: GodShaveTheQueen vs Gio - Finished 9 : 11

Who will win this match based on all the players at their peaks?


  • Total voters
    22
  • Poll closed .
GIANNI RIVERA - TOO GIFTED AND INFLUENTIAL TO LET LOOSE AGAINST YOUR TEAM?



GIANNI RIVERA: THE GREATEST PLAYMAKER IN AC MILAN HISTORY

Edd Norval said:
Football fans support the team they do for various reasons, although most usually rely on family or geography to dictate the colours that will run through their blood for the rest of their lives. For Milanese actor Diego Abatantuono, his team came to him through some divine intervention.

With true thespian verve he recants the story, one that formed a pillar of his life. He was a young boy and was spending time with his grandfather when he found the old man’s wallet lying on the ground. Curious, as young boys tend to be, he opened it up to find a worn photograph of two men. One he recognised to be a priest. The other man was clearly a footballer, although Abatantuono was none the wiser to who. He asked his grandfather, who explained that one worked miracles and the other one was a popular priest from Puglia.

The miracle worker was Giovanni Rivera, better known as Gianni. The man with thick, dark, parted hair was magnetic to the young actor, who immediately swore his allegiance to the red and black side of Milan. Rivera’s enduring appeal has many sources. That’s why he’s not only a far-reaching hero in football, but one who transcended the changing faces of Italy, Milan and the global game.

The Archetype
Gianni Rivera’s name rarely crops up in a sentence that isn’t packed with superlatives. Because of the reverence that others hold for him and his pioneering style, he is best viewed as the archetype of a certain kind of player – the one that we would now refer to as a classic number 10.
The midfielder had a shamanistic prescience of his teammates’ and opponents’ whereabouts on the pitch. Akin to the greats of chess, it seems entirely possible that he would be able to reel off where players were across multiple games. His positional play and ability to locate and exploit space, with a jagged run or smooth pass, was unparalleled at the time.

Although he had traits lending to several positions, spanning from a deep-lying playmaker to an inside forward, Rivera was a player who could make something appear from nothing. It’s possible to view him as a support act, someone who utilised his laser-like precision of pass and superior tactical overview to provide his teammates with opportunities to best deploy their talents for the betterment of the team.

Saying that, his average of one goal every four games for Milan shatters the image that he was only a player who brought out the best in others. Instead, these abilities are parts of the mosaic that creates the full picture of Gianni Rivera. His multi-faceted influence on each game meant that a myriad of possibilities and outcomes were channelled. With a light flick of his foot or a misleading feint, he’d contribute innumerably to a previously veiled attacking move.

As a result of the way he encapsulated a hitherto rarely seen style, he is held up like The Beatles as a benchmark where others will be readily compared. In people like Marco van Basten, Johan Cruyff and Roberto Baggio, those old enough saw flashes of Rivera. For me, the aptest comparison is Zinedine Zidane.

The chaotic ballet of Rivera is mimicked in a slightly more controlled version by the French icon. Granted, boots, pitch quality and balls used contribute to their movements, but beyond their pirouettes and unpredictable changes of flow and pace, their IQ as men of the middle reign supreme.

Combining this vision, creativity and intelligence for Milan and Italy led to Rivera becoming one of the most revered players in calcio history. Long-term coach and friend Nereo Rocco once said of him: “Yes, he doesn’t run a lot, but if I want good football, creativity, the art of turning around a situation from the first to the 90th minute, only Rivera can give me all of this. I wouldn’t want to exaggerate, because in the end it’s only football, but Rivera in all of this is a genius.”

Rossoneri
Italians use many football-specific words. A trequartista is the player who operates just behind the attackers; a fantasista is the creative spark summoning something from nothing; while the regista is the director. If those three were circles on a Venn diagram, then Gianni Rivera would be in the dead centre.

In this sense, Rivera was a complicated player. From a young age he had a noteworthy playing style, debuting for his hometown Alessandria aged only 15 in 1959 – the third-youngest in Serie A history; one of many records he holds, alongside being the second-youngest goalscorer, which occurred later that year. Although it was a brief spell, it was enough to attract the attention of his larger northern neighbours, AC Milan.

He joined on a co-ownership deal with a view to replacing Uruguayan World Cup hero Juan Schiaffino, a gifted inside-forward who left an indelible mark for his club and country. Replacing one of the greatest players in the world at the time was going to be quite the task for the young Italian.
Journalist Gianni Brera called him L’Abatino – The Little Abbot – referring to his perceived physical fragility. Despite this being something to overcome in his early Milan days, he did so under the tutelage of Schiaffino and the guidance of his fellow players Nils Liedholm, Dino Sani and José Altafini. Their combined influence on the young Rivera gave him a holistic understanding of the game, overriding any perceived physical shortcomings.

Internazionale legend Giuseppe Meazza was even moved to praise Rivera: “He’s an elegant player with a remarkable touch.” These attributes – elegance and touch – went a long way to defining his presence at the club. His haul there was illustrious, helping the team to three Scudetti, four Coppa Italia, two European Cups and, individually, the 1969 Ballon d’Or.

During his first stint as manager at the club between 1961 and 1963, Nereo Rocco built his famous catenaccio system around the young Rivera, depending on his creativity and predilection for attacking moves to counter-balance his largely defensive approach.

Returning in 1967, the pair once again gelled and Rocco’s team lifted a double in the maiden season of his second tenure. It was a winning formula that helped Rivera both grow and lead. Rocco’s reliance and trust of the player as captain made them one of football’s most noteworthy duos. It was a perfect illustration of a relationship built on respect and understanding where knowledge of the game travelled symbiotically. Coach and captain had found their soul-mate.

Naturally, fans of i Rossoneri loved Rivera. He was not only captain fantastic, but a thoroughly likeable person. The beautiful thing was that the relationship was reciprocal. He loved the city, its people and its most famous club. For Rivera, AC Milan was not simply a club, but an idea. Thus, there were ways that things should be done and ways that they shouldn’t.

Rivera was dubbed Milan’s golden boy. This nickname not only entails his footballing endeavours but also the idea that he is somewhat perfect, a shining example. Rivera could do or say no wrong; when he did say something, his words carried undeniable weight.
An attitude of relentless perseverance – the same one that allowed the fragile youngster to become a man of beguiling grace and power – meant that he was willing to fight whoever he saw as treating Milan without due respect. He endured fierce and controversial disputes with referees, including the now infamous chapter with Concetto Lo Bello, where the referee publicly conceded an erroneous penalty decision against Rivera’s Milan.

It wasn’t only referees – it was anyone Rivera deemed “non degni del Milan” – not worthy of Milan. Worth is the level at which something or someone deserves to be valued. There was a standard that Rivera set for anyone associated with the club. It seems rather anachronistic to imagine a captain acting a the flag-bearer in today’s game. This, to the people of Milan, made him an enduring legend at club level, yet as mutual respect for a fellow Italian, Rivera was also highly rated and readily embraced at international level.

Azzurri
Despite studying at the catenaccio school of Nereo Rocco, Rivera was a rare breed of Italian player at the time – a skilful attacking midfielder, comparable to anyone in the world. Although his career for the Azzurri offered fewer trophies to his collection, it no doubt serves to strengthen the mythology and importance of the man.

In similar fashion to his debut in Serie A, his international one was memorable. The rising star was given an unexpected call-up for his country’s 1962 World Cup campaign and his competitive debut came in Chile against West Germany in a 0-0 draw. An underperforming Italian side exited the competition in the first round and Rivera came under fire from Brera for his poor work rate and positioning defensively.

Despite this, he became a crucial player for Italy and made it to his second World Cup in 1966, where his side would once again exit early. This time, having age and reputation on his side, he was vocal about manager Edmondo Fadbri’s defensive approach.

In a twist-of-fate, Fabbri was replaced by the king of catenaccio Helenio Herrera, the chieftain of the famous Grande Inter side – Rivera’s rivals. Unimpressed with the star’s performance at the previous competition, Rivera was dropped by ruthless Argentine. Not many people had the clout to make a rebuttal against Herrera’s choice, but one man came to Rivera’s rescue. It was his reformed critic, Gianni Brera.

Herrera’s short-lived tenure ushered in a new era of success for the national team, with Rivera its brightest star. Italy hosted Euro 1968 and with Ferruccio Valcareggi taking over as manager, the side went on to win with the help of a coin-toss in the semi-final. Rivera had been injured early on yet continued the match, putting in a notable performance. Although he missed the final of the tournament against Yugoslavia, he finally had some international silverware.

It was at the next tournament, the 1970 World Cup, that his international career reached its curious peak, when Valcareggi introduced one of the most bizarre tactics in football’s storied history – one that somehow helped guide his side to the tournament’s final, despite the controversial idea that inspired it.

Rivera was guile and vision, all feline grace. But Italy had someone else in his position that brought everything he didn’t have. Sandro Mazzola was a creative attacking player, but with the speed and defensive prowess that Rivera lacked. He was also city rival Inter’s biggest star.
In a balanced Italian set-up, the scales between defence and attack could be tipped by either man. Fielding them together seemed sacrilege. Both players were icons, intense and bright – they needed their own space to shine. Valcareggi’s solution was unprecedented. In his staffetta system, he’d play each man for one half of the game.

Mazzola, the older of the two by a year, would start. He’d allow the Italians the chance to subdue their opposition and work their game of attrition. In the second half, Rivera would burst onto the field of play, dazzling the opposition and utilising his vision to offer the strikers a myriad of attacking options.

It worked – until Valcareggi changed his mind. His squad made it to the final and went in level at the break. The Brazilians, with Pelé, Gérson, Rivellino and Jairzinho, had strength, speed and intelligence in abundance. Consequently, Valcareggi deemed it best to stick with Mazzola and retain their defensive approach, only giving the Milan star six minutes. Italy went on to lose the game 4-1 in a legendary final and one of football’s most prominent entries into the ‘What If?’ chapter.

To make matters worse, the error, although logical on paper, was obvious to everyone. Pelé stated: “I was worried that Rivera would come on, I thought that with Rivera Italy would be more dangerous.” Although not an inherently risk-taking player, he was seen as a risk that the manager was unwilling to gamble on, despite having shown his ability to impact games time and again.

Rivera would represent his country in another World Cup tournament in 1974, although by this point he was passed his best. The final of 1970 had been cruel to him. He was stripped of an opportunity to reach the stratospheric heights that so many others had managed, yet with a substantially lesser impact on the history of the game.

Gentleman
Gianni Rivera was revered for his life as a footballer, but also his personality off the pitch. A charismatic and affable figure, he stayed with Milan well after his last kick of the ball, working with the club and eventually becoming the vice-president.

In 1986, Silvio Berlusconi bought Milan and as majority shareholder appointed himself as president. The Italian business tycoon’s centre-right political views clashed with Rivera’s left-of-centre ideas. A man of principle, he left the San Siro following the takeover.

His contributions, however, were duly noted. In 2011 he was awarded the UEFA President’s Award, which recognises outstanding achievements, professional excellence and exemplary personal qualities. This puts him amongst noteworthy luminaries like Franz Beckenbauer, Johan Cruyff, Eusébio and Alfredo Di Stéfano.

On handing him the award, Michel Platini stated: “Gianni Rivera is surely one of the great ambassadors for football at both club and country level, having worn the AC Milan jersey over 500 times and represented his country at four World Cups. He was a true gentleman, both on and off the field of play, and he has remained so to this day.”

Rivera was seemingly from another planet when he emerged. Now his style of play isn’t uncommon. Football in the 1960s and 70s was a different beast, though, bereft of the technical standards that are commonplace now. In that era of calcio, players had more linear functions. Rivera was amongst the first to zig in a world that zagged.

He knew his strengths and played to them. But he also knew his weaknesses and countered those by pioneering the role we now think of simply as the playmaker. To see the imperial rise of the position in contemporary football makes it difficult to imagine what came before. At one point it simply didn’t exist.

Words like mercenary are often thrown at players, where prestige and opportunity matter just as much as money. Fans understand that a career is short-lived and that players need to feed their families – but we still long for the kind of stars that genuinely play for the badge. Football crests represent more than a name – they represent a history of family and friendship, of highs and lows, and of victory and defeat.
When someone kisses the badge in front of a roaring crowd and dedicates their life to the meandering journey of a football club, we respect them for it. That’s why the people of Milan love Gianni Rivera, and that’s ultimately why we should love him too.
 
The problem is you expect both Sivori/Hidegkuti to sit up top like your average 4-2-4. I cant force you to give them their due credit.

I'm not sure this is a fair argument. You placed them in a 424 which comes with the implication that they are more advanced on and off the ball, and neither of them are part of the midfield battle. If you'd placed them in a 4231 people would have assumed that one of them was in the midfield battle. Other than mentioning the players will move around a lot, there's not a lot of info on what exactly Sivori and Hidegkuti will do off the ball. So people are left with their initial assumption based primarily from the graphic.

Can you provide more info on the Sivori / Puskás comparison? From what I've seen Sivori was closer to a #10, and Puskás was closer to a #9. Similar style on the ball but very different mentalities and priorities. If I've got that wrong then I think the setup would be more analogous to Madrid's late 50s team than Hungary's early 50s team. You can't ignore the fact that Kocsis was a constant focal point of that attack, which allowed Puskás to burst forward from deep and Hidegkuti to drop into midfield. Without that focal point it's really difficult to imagine how it would've worked. On the other hand, Madrid played with only Puskás and di Stéfano as the (centre) forwards and I can easily see Hidegkuti occupying a similar role to di Stéfano. I'm less sure that Sivori can play the #9 role Puskás occupied by then...
 
I'm not sure this is a fair argument. You placed them in a 424 which comes with the implication that they are more advanced on and off the ball, and neither of them are part of the midfield battle. If you'd placed them in a 4231 people would have assumed that one of them was in the midfield battle. Other than mentioning the players will move around a lot, there's not a lot of info on what exactly Sivori and Hidegkuti will do off the ball. So people are left with their initial assumption based primarily from the graphic.

Well in a 2D static image and from a novice at editing like me, it was the best I could present in the picture.

Placing them in a 4231 would have been incorrect as well and I feel the 4-2-4 was more near to what I wanted the team's shape to look like in attack (hence most of my writeup is from an attack POV). The arrows of course were meant to do the job of both players dropping deep if required considered both my wingers were wing forwards and good scorers as well. This is mentioned in the OP.

Regarding the movement part, I have mentioned in the OP which all zones each player can impact. Dzajic pulling his marker out for Sivori to drift into that space is just one example.

Off the ball movement is tough to explain and one would explain it to be a little obvious. Mentioned they are not going to sit on the top.

Shared insights from the videos of Sivori actually working hard, putting tackles in, getting physical to retain the ball etc.

I am sure there would be people who could put this in a better way, but I did try to cover all aspects and phases. Cheers.
Dont expect everyone to read every comment, but that is okay.
 
Can you provide more info on the Sivori / Puskás comparison? From what I've seen Sivori was closer to a #10, and Puskás was closer to a #9

I have written about this a fair bit too in my posts and there are videos presented too. Just to summarize:

1. He was a quick pass and move player. Had amazing dribbling skills and could take the ball alone too, but more often than not it was the former from what I have seen.
2. The amount of times he entered the box was way more than a normal number 10. His scoring numbers are a testament to that too.
3. The pass and move is important here as after he moved the ball along, his first instinct was to always enter the box to be at the receiving end.
4. In so many attacks, you'd see him as the furthest man forward.
5. He played in a 4-2-4 for the national team in the same role.

There is enough footage available. As I said before, if footage is available, you cant change someone's mind on how they perceive a player :)
 
Well in a 2D static image and from a novice at editing like me, it was the best I could present in the picture.

Placing them in a 4231 would have been incorrect as well and I feel the 4-2-4 was more near to what I wanted the team's shape to look like in attack (hence most of my writeup is from an attack POV). The arrows of course were meant to do the job of both players dropping deep if required considered both my wingers were wing forwards and good scorers as well. This is mentioned in the OP.

Regarding the movement part, I have mentioned in the OP which all zones each player can impact. Dzajic pulling his marker out for Sivori to drift into that space is just one example.

Off the ball movement is tough to explain and one would explain it to be a little obvious. Mentioned they are not going to sit on the top.

Shared insights from the videos of Sivori actually working hard, putting tackles in, getting physical to retain the ball etc.

I am sure there would be people who could put this in a better way, but I did try to cover all aspects and phases. Cheers.
Dont expect everyone to read every comment, but that is okay.

If you think that a 4231 would be a misrepresentation of the setup than that's largely the point Gio was making. They are both playing as strikers so not involved in the midfield battle in the same way his comparable player is. It's not about not giving credit but about acknowledging how you've set up, and what the implications of that are.

I've read all the comments and watched all of the videos, for what it's worth.

I have written about this a fair bit too in my posts and there are videos presented too. Just to summarize:

1. He was a quick pass and move player. Had amazing dribbling skills and could take the ball alone too, but more often than not it was the former from what I have seen.
2. The amount of times he entered the box was way more than a normal number 10. His scoring numbers are a testament to that too.
3. The pass and move is important here as after he moved the ball along, his first instinct was to always enter the box to be at the receiving end.
4. In so many attacks, you'd see him as the furthest man forward.
5. He played in a 4-2-4 for the national team in the same role.

There is enough footage available. As I said before, if footage is available, you cant change someone's mind on how they perceive a player :)

Your perception fits well with mine, and that is a notably different player to Puskas.
 
If you think that a 4231 would be a misrepresentation of the setup than that's largely the point Gio was making. They are both playing as strikers so not involved in the midfield battle in the same way his comparable player is.

I disagree on that. You can't classify it as a pure 4-4-2 or pure 4-2-3-1. The players have very different versatile roles.

Besides, a picture/formation should be the start of the discussion and general representation of the team. Not the whole tactic. At least that is how I see it.
 
For what its worth, I haven't heard anything from Gio as to who is tracking whom and are they actually going to stick to man marking as mentioned in the OP?
Which midfielders pick whom when the strikers drop deep?

As I said earlier, only the non obvious formation gets questioned. You have a voter actually voting because its 4231 and not 424 FFS :lol:

Anyways, that is my case for my team. Probably couldn't add much more than all I have already posted.

Thanks for the comments today @Brwned . Was looking like a drab today.
 
As I said earlier, only the non obvious formation gets questioned.

To be fair it has always been like this. More complex formations are rarely appreciated in drafts and it's usually the 5-3-2, 4-3-3 and 4-2-3-1 that wins it.

That and strikerless(designated #9) formations always spur some controversy unless it's a false 9..
 
To be fair it has always been like this. More complex formations are rarely appreciated in drafts and it's usually the 5-3-2, 4-3-3 and 4-2-3-1 that wins it.

That and strikerless(designated #9) formations always spur some controversy unless it's a false 9..

No, I mean more discussion about the different/complex one is fine, but I havent seen a single person question Gio on how he plans to address the tactic in place. Whether its through man marking or some other way. And if man marking (like his OP says), then what about the spaces.

Doesn't have to be equal but no one asking that basically gives a free pass to the opposition through the most important feature of my team.
 
To be fair I think that Maradona would've probably play closer to the goal if he was Sivori's contemporary — and he would score significantly more if he wasn't playing in uber-defensive Serie A. And no, this comparison was not based on Sivori's nickname.

Then our perception of Puskas probably is different :)
Add me to @Brwned here. I believe that we see Sivori similarly, but our views on Puskas seriously differ.
 
I disagree on that. You can't classify it as a pure 4-4-2 or pure 4-2-3-1. The players have very different versatile roles.

Besides, a picture/formation should be the start of the discussion and general representation of the team. Not the whole tactic. At least that is how I see it.

Agreed. The last draft I was in, I went for an unconventional setup with unconventional choices for the roles, and the graphic became a focus of the conversation rather than the tactics. It is annoying but that's just the reality. If you want to try something unfamiliar, you need to put in more effort to break down the familiarity gap. It's a choice we make.

The problem with tactics are they're situational, complex, and wordy - so people interpret them differently. So the formation is a constant reference point to understand the complex tactics. That doesn't mean your tactics are reduced to an image but it's the easiest thing to discuss and acts as a proxy for the broader discussion.

No one is saying that Sivori or Hidegkuti are one dimensional or limited - almost all players in this draft will do more than their basic role. But the basic role you've outlined is that neither of them are playing as #10s, primarily, so neither are in the midfield battle by default, so it's reasonable to suggest that the numbers in midfield and the numbers in the defensive phase favour Gio. I think that's a reasonable point on his part.
 
No, I mean more discussion about the different one is fine, but I havent seen a single person question Gio on how he plans to address the tactic in place. Whether its through man marking or some other way. And if man marking (like his OP says), then what about the spaces.

He answered it?

The great west German sweeper Shulz will marshall the defensive line, ensuring there is no space in behind and acting as a premium insurance policy. If Hidegkuti starts high, Rosato will be tasked to deal with him. Rosato played for some time in his career in defensive midfield and is well versed in tracking runners from this area going back or to his goal. His effective and efficient man-marking as shown by his performances at the 1970 World Cup are what is required here to limit GSTQ's attack.

Knowing our opponent has allowed me to recruit the right men for the job in mitigating GSTQ's threat out wide. On the right is Dzodzuashvili who has been cherry-picked for this assignment to face up his old foe Dzajic.

No I didn't say that. I said that Rosato would track Hidegkuti - if he was up top - because he has experience of (a) being a world-class man marker, and (b) is experienced in midfield. Same for Dzodzuashvili on Dzajic - his track record of shutting out the winger is first class. Dzajic was always quite fluid in his positioning for Yugoslavia around that time but it didn't prevent Dzodzuashvili from keeping him under tabs.

I'm a big believer in zonal marking and passing players on when they switch. It's how any elite modern defence operates.
 
No, I mean more discussion about the different/complex one is fine, but I havent seen a single person question Gio on how he plans to address the tactic in place. Whether its through man marking or some other way. And if man marking (like his OP says), then what about the spaces.

Doesn't have to be equal but no one asking that basically gives a free pass to the opposition through the most important feature of my team.
Yeah that also happens all the time. From what I see most of the discussion has revolved around Hidegkuti and Sivori and who they resemble in their playing style rather than how both teams will fare off the ball, the midfield battle, who will get advantage on the flanks and the actual match ups.
 
But the basic role you've outlined is that neither of them are playing as #10s, primarily, so neither are in the midfield battle by default, so it's reasonable to suggest that the numbers in midfield and the numbers in the defensive phase favour Gio. I think that's a reasonable point on his part.

Rivera isn't going to be anything significant in the midfield battle as well. His dropping deep and being available to the odd mistake or interception or a quick pass out is where he can contribute to the defensive phase.

If the outline makes it seem like Sivori/Hidegkuti will be sitting pretty up top while the opposition attacks and not be available deep expecting a quick pass or mistake deep in the field, its very unfair to the setup.

Not all 4-2-4's have to be the extreme versions. Hybrids are tough to sell with pictures involved I guess as our mind immediately sees them the same way
 
He answered it?

Not really, I had follow up questions on that which had no response.

And the Yugoslavia match in question, he did run with Dzajic all over the place. That is not consistent with what he means why passing players on.

Leaving a point midway is not exactly answering it. Like your gem about 'Dzajic's crossing going to a waste' probably because you assumed Hidegkuti couldn't head.
 
Last edited:
Rivers isn't going to be anything significant in the midfield battle as well. His dropping deep and being available to the odd mistake or interception or a quick pass out is where he can contribute to the defensive phase.

If the outline makes it seem like Sivori/Hidegkuti will be sitting pretty up top while the opposition attacks and not be available deep expecting a quick pass or mistake deep in the field, its very unfair to the setup.

Not all 4-2-4's have to be the extreme versions. Hybrids are tough to sell with pictures involved I guess as our mind immediately sees them the same way

My interpretation is not based off the graphic but what you've said. You said a 4231 would not the right way to characterise it, and 424 fits better. That's what implies that they'll have a smaller role in midfield play, on and off the ball. Your reasoning behind the graphic is what led to me to that view, not the graphic itself. There's nothing more I can do than read and interpret what you've said.
 
No one is saying that Sivori or Hidegkuti are one dimensional or limited - almost all players in this draft will do more than their basic role. But the basic role you've outlined is that neither of them are playing as #10s, primarily, so neither are in the midfield battle by default, so it's reasonable to suggest that the numbers in midfield and the numbers in the defensive phase favour Gio. I think that's a reasonable point on his part.

Think GSTQ has tried to present the movement of Sivori and Hidegkuti when off the ball and that they will be engaging opposition midfielders dropping in the hole. It's hard to imagine Rivera putting more into the midfield battle than Sivori given their styles, hence I'd rather read the participants in those proceedings than nominal formation graphic.
 
Yeah that also happens all the time. From what I see most of the discussion has revolved around Hidegkuti and Sivori and who they resemble in their playing style rather than how both teams will fare off the ball, the midfield battle, who will get advantage on the flanks and the actual match ups.

Yea, which is what got me bored of the discussion and call it a day discussions wise. Gets boring beyond a point if the actual match ups is not being discussed and one team gets a free pass through most of the discussions.
 
You said a 4231 would not the right way to characterise it, and 424 fits better.

Yes, that is because both of them could end up anywhere from the front to middle in different times in a very attack minded team. I dont think it was possible to show that except for arrows.

The rationale behind the 4-2-4 was to show the attacking movement (on and off the ball) when my team is attacking which is where most of my tactic (and OP) lies.

Obviously, when the opposition has the ball, it wont look the same. But showing that in one picture is not possible.
 
Think GSTQ has tried to present the movement of Sivori and Hidegkuti when off the ball and that they will be engaging opposition midfielders dropping in the hole. It's hard to imagine Rivera putting more into the midfield battle than Sivori given their styles, hence I'd rather read the participants in those proceedings than nominal formation graphic.

Either they are or they aren't in the midfield battle - Gio has made his view clear that Rivera is, which necessarily limits his attacking contribution and the spaces he occupies. I'm not sure about GTSQ, having read everything written I've seen mixed messages. Hence why I enquired. I've not asked Gio because I don't need any clarification - it's simple.

If they are in the midfield battle then there would need to be some explanation why a 424 is a better description of the setup than a 4231, given the implications. Otherwise it is having your cake and eating it - saying you have two forwards, but not being outnumbered in midfield.
 
Either they are or they aren't in the midfield battle - Gio has made his view clear that Rivera is, which necessarily limits his attacking contribution and the spaces he occupies. I'm not sure about GTSQ, having read everything written I've seen mixed messages. Hence why I enquired. I've not asked Gio because I don't need any clarification - it's simple.

If they are in the midfield battle then there would need to be some explanation why a 424 is a better description of the setup than a 4231, given the implications. Otherwise it is having your cake and eating it - saying you have two forwards, but not being outnumbered in midfield.

Usually we always put up formations how the team will shape in possession rather than off the ball. 4-2-4 is easily 4-3-3 or 4-2-3-1 off the ball.

Take Brazil 70' for example - it has always been depicted as a 4-2-4, yet if you read how Santana and also Pele described their movement off the ball - all but Jairzinho or Tostao(depending on circumstances) were actively involved in the midfield battle, reshaping the formation off the ball.

Players like Rivera, Riquelme are #10 as you get, but that doesn't mean you will get a numerical advantage in the middle just because they are positioned in the hole. Either of them will probably have no impact whatsoever (or at least the same impact like Sivori standing near the half way line) as their style doesn't really impact them tilting the advantage in midfield.

I mean last draft people were saying that Zidane won't really be a factor in midfield, yet he was usually twice more involved, at the very least, than someone like Rivera.

For example one of the more accurate description of his style:

Rivera was capable of playing anywhere in midfield or along the front line, but he was usually used in a free role, either as a central midfielder, or as a classic number 10 behind the forwards. Although he was not known for his defensive abilities, and lacked both stamina and pace, as well as notable physical and athletic attributes, he was an extremely talented player, and was renowned for his skilful yet effective style of play, despite his poor work-rate. Rivera was highly regarded for his ball control, quick feet, acceleration, agility, balance, dribbling skills, and technique, which allowed him to change direction quickly, and dribble past players with ease; despite his technical ability, skill, and elegance on the ball, he would often avoid undertaking individual dribbling runs or challenging defenders one on one unless he deemed them necessary, preferring to create space through his precise passing game.
 
Last edited:
Usually we always put up formations how the team will shape in possession rather than off the ball. 4-2-4 is easily 4-3-3 or 4-2-3-1 off the ball.

Take Brazil 70' for example - it has always been depicted as a 4-2-4, yet if you read how Santana and also Pele described their movement off the ball - all but Jairzinho or Tostao were actively involved in the midfield battle, reshaping the formation off the ball.

Players like Rivera, Riquelme are #10 as you get, but that doesn't mean you will get a numerical advantage in the middle just because they are positioned in the hole. Either of them will probably have no impact whatsoever (or at least the same impact like Sivori standing near the half way line) as their style doesn't really impact them tilting the advantage in midfield.

I mean last draft people were saying that Zidane won't really be a factor in midfield, yet he was usually twice more involved than someone like Rivera.

Yes of course, all formations are fluid, all players are unique, etc. We could turn it into a meta argument but my one is specific to this game. What people thought about Zidane was not how I see it.

The way Brazil setup in 1970 looked nothing like the formation graphic, nor how this team has been described. It was just how the team was described at the time. It clearly had Pele in the hole, in the midfield battle - a role that neither Hidegkuti or Sivori have been given. One player had to play out of position - Tostao - to allow that to happen. So it was a sacrifice of individual quality for team balance.

There's no sign of that here. Sivori and Hidegkuti are not described as having to sacrifice their natural instincts for the team - the narrative has been they're playing their natural roles, and the focus is on attack. That makes sense to me but that has negative implications as well as positive ones. You can't ignore the negatives and celebrate the positives, while criticising the opposition manager for doing the same thing.
 
You can't ignore the negatives and celebrate the positives

The positives were in attack. The negatives you speak off are when the opposition attacks

When the opposition attacks, I don't expect them to sit up top.

The transition from winning the ball to building the attack is where the 4-2-4 comes into shape. It wont be the same for the entire game in all phases.

I am not sure if you'd still disagree with that, but that is probably the best explanation I could put forward :)
 
Yes of course, all formations are fluid, all players are unique, etc. We could turn it into a meta argument but my one is specific to this game. What people thought about Zidane was not how I see it.

The way Brazil setup in 1970 looked nothing like the formation graphic, nor how this team has been described. It was just how the team was described at the time. It clearly had Pele in the hole, in the midfield battle - a role that neither Hidegkuti or Sivori have been given. One player had to play out of position - Tostao - to allow that to happen. So it was a sacrifice of individual quality for team balance.

There's no sign of that here. Sivori and Hidegkuti are not described as having to sacrifice their natural instincts for the team - the narrative has been they're playing their natural roles, and the focus is on attack. That makes sense to me but that has negative implications as well as positive ones. You can't ignore the negatives and celebrate the positives, while criticising the opposition manager for doing the same thing.

Agreed mate, but you have to factor the playing styles really. Just because Rivera is positioned in a deeper role that doesn't mean he will contribute to the midfield battle, as for everyone who is familiar with his playing style he lacked the energy, pace, stamina in the defensive phase and avoided physical contact.

So it's the same for all managers that use a more "luxury" player in the #10 spot. You get his fantastic passing, vision and technique, but you need to create the midfield base for him and basically throw him off the equation in the defensive phase, because he was never a player that would put a shift in.

If you are playing 3 man midfield with Rivera in advanced role and a single forward how is that different to a 4-2-4 with two of the strikers dropping back when off the ball? Both Hidegkuti and Sivori had much more teamwork than him and likely to put up effort in regaining possession. If anything Rivera's role here will be more highlighted in possession - playing a deeper role and linking the midfield and attack, rather than defensive position as he would more likely occupy the same zone when they lose the ball and not bother tracking back.
 
@GodShaveTheQueen

What’s your issue? There’s obviously more behind my decision to vote based on formation but in essence I think it’s a perfectly valid reason to side with someone.
 
@GodShaveTheQueen

What’s your issue? There’s obviously more behind my decision to vote based on formation but in essence I think it’s a perfectly valid reason to side with someone.

I guess if I found it to be that close, I would rather call it a draw rather than give one team an advantage simply because of the formation they chose and nothing else (at least as per your comment).

But that's just me. One man's reasonable can always be another man's ridiculous. Don't worry about it. Cheers

because I think a well drilled 4231 beats a well drilled 424
 
If you are playing 3 man midfield with Rivera in advanced role and a single forward how is that different to a 4-2-4 with two of the strikers dropping back when off the ball? Both Hidegkuti and Sivori had much more teamwork than him and likely to put up effort in regaining possession. If anything Rivera's role here will be more highlighted in possession - playing a deeper role and linking the midfield and attack, rather than defensive position as he would more likely occupy the same zone when they lose the ball and not bother tracking back.
I addressed that already lad. Your starting position is key as the ball travels faster than a pair of forwards running back into the midfield zone. Transitions are fundamental in football and if you have too many men the wrong side of the ball when they happen, you're stuffed.
 
Agreed mate, but you have to factor the playing styles really. Just because Rivera is positioned in a deeper role that doesn't mean he will contribute to the midfield battle, as for everyone who is familiar with his playing style he lacked the energy, pace, stamina in the defensive phase and avoided physical contact.

So it's the same for all managers that use a more "luxury" player in the #10 spot. You get his fantastic passing, vision and technique, but you need to create the midfield base for him and basically throw him off the equation in the defensive phase, because he was never a player that would put a shift in.

If you are playing 3 man midfield with Rivera in advanced role and a single forward how is that different to a 4-2-4 with two of the strikers dropping back when off the ball? Both Hidegkuti and Sivori had much more teamwork than him and likely to put up effort in regaining possession. If anything Rivera's role here will be more highlighted in possession - playing a deeper role and linking the midfield and attack, rather than defensive position as he would more likely occupy the same zone when they lose the ball and not bother tracking back.

Agreed, for the most part. I don't think a lazy #10 is a non entity in midfield, and I don't think Rivera is comparably lazy to Riquelme, but I don't expect that to play a decisive role. I was just looking for clarity on the team set up and used that point in the conversation to jump in. I'm mostly clear on it now!

Anyway, I'll leave it here.
 
I guess if I found it to be that close, I would rather call it a draw rather than give one team an advantage simply because of the formation they chose and nothing else (at least as per your comment).

But that's just me. One man's reasonable can always be another man's ridiculous. Don't worry about it. Cheers

I’ll go more in depth, there’s specifics to it, I Try to justify my reasons for voting one way or the other without getting too involved in a thread so the managers know, as it can be annoying when you get so many people who vote against you but don’t tell you why.
 
Players like Rivera, Riquelme are #10 as you get, but that doesn't mean you will get a numerical advantage in the middle just because they are positioned in the hole. Either of them will probably have no impact whatsoever (or at least the same impact like Sivori standing near the half way line) as their style doesn't really impact them tilting the advantage in midfield.

I mean last draft people were saying that Zidane won't really be a factor in midfield, yet he was usually twice more involved, at the very least, than someone like Rivera.

Initially I had the same impression on Rivera. But some of the all-touches videos, like the one against Ajax in the European Cup, show him contributing all over the park. Not to the extent where he'd be some sort of trojan workhorse off the ball, but enough to give us another body to help supplement the graft of Bremner and Ardiles in the middle. Some good examples of his covering in the video below. That's a long way from Riquelme, frankly.

 
I addressed that already lad. Your starting position is key as the ball travels faster than a pair of forwards running back into the midfield zone. Transitions are fundamental in football and if you have too many men the wrong side of the ball when they happen, you're stuffed.
I disagree there. Having passengers in midfield is one of the biggest issue we had in recent years for United as well. Not enough energy, effort put in makes no difference even if you are behind the ball.

Lazy #10 make literally no impact in modern game, and one of the very reason ( even much better in that regard to Rivera, especially when we consider ground covered) players like Ozil get a lot of stick in the defensive phase and are seen as liability when trying to get control in midfield.

You don't always transition with long ball played out from the back, and usually having 6 players behind the ball is enough when you are in possession if you are more attacking side.

Disagree with the notion that you have to have 8-10 players behind the ball in modern game also. You have attacking minded full backs that push up, and usually around 5-6 man behind the ball when you aren't doing a counter but rather a build up from the back.
 
Initially I had the same impression on Rivera. But some of the all-touches videos, like the one against Ajax in the European Cup, show him contributing all over the park. Not to the extent where he'd be some sort of trojan workhorse off the ball, but enough to give us another body to help supplement the graft of Bremner and Ardiles in the middle. Some good examples of his covering in the video below. That's a long way from Riquelme, frankly.




Any highlights of that game ? Milan played with 3 CB's - Trapattoni, Rosato and Malatrasi and very industrious Lodetti behind him, to do the running and covering.
 
Like your gem about 'Dzajic's crossing going to a waste' probably because you assumed Hidegkuti couldn't head.
I doubt that anyone aside from you would call him a great header of the ball like Kocsis or Charles. Plus he is moving all over the place and drops deep a lot, so he isn’t exactly providing a consistent aerial threat up front.

Yes, he scored against Uruguay... and Messi scored against United in the final, and I wouldn’t want him on the end of Dzajic crosses.

“Mammoth book of the World Cup” said:
He also had a centreforward, Nándor Hidegkuti, whose gifts were dribbling and passing, not barging the goalkeeper or thumping headers
 
I doubt that anyone aside from you would call him a great header of the ball like Kocsis or Charles. Plus he is moving all over the place and drops deep a lot, so he isn’t exactly providing a consistent aerial threat up front.

Right because the level of heading abilities is :

1. Kocsis level
2. Charles level
3. Messi level

Someone else in this thread already called him a good header of the ball, so the 'doubt anyone else' part is equally wrong.
 
I doubt that anyone aside from you would call him a great header of the ball like Kocsis or Charles. Plus he is moving all over the place and drops deep a lot, so he isn’t exactly providing a consistent aerial threat up front.

Yes, he scored against Uruguay... and Messi scored against United in the final, and I wouldn’t want him on the end of Dzajic crosses.

Isn't Sivori considered better header of the ball than Hidegkuti? Think he wad a good leap on him.
 
Isn't Sivori considered better header of the ball than Hidegkuti? Think he wad a good leap on him.

I am not sure about him being better than Hdegkuti, but when I watched videos of Sivori, I was surprised by his headed goals and physicality in general. Changed my perception of him a lot from what it was long before.
 
I am not sure about him being better than Hdegkuti, but when I watched videos of Sivori, I was surprised by his headed goals and physicality in general. Changed my perception of him a lot from what it was long before.

Yeah that's why I asked:



you can see connecting headers, solid leap, good positioning and some headed goals in there. To be honest I haven't seen Hidegkuti being raved about his heading ability, mostly it was about Kocsis and naturally so.