'It's a footballing philosophy more than a system,' Van Gaal explained. 'A system depends on the players you have. I have played with a 4-3-3 with Ajax, 2-3-2-3 with Barcelona and I can play 4-4-2 with Z. I'm flexible. The philosophy stays the same, though. The coach is the team's focal point, so preparing the tactical formation is essential. Every player must know where he has to be and support his teammates. You need the right mindset, and it depends on how the players see the coach and viceversa. The coach is the focal point of the team but you need to have an open mind, and so do all the players. everyone needs to work together to achieve a common goal. Preparing your tactical formation is essential. This is a sport played by 22 men, and there are 11 opponents out there playing as a team. Each individual needs to know who has to beat and be there to support his teammates.'
One of the things van Gaal did at AZ was to dramatically expand his management team - its size nearly doubled during his tenure. Not only was the medical contingent increased, but significant attention was also paid to the technological side of things: 'I am always working on knowledge management, and I want people in my staff who complement me. I consider measurement very, very important, but I cannot do everything myself. That's why I use a physical trainer. What I see in those boys, he confirms. The same thing applies to my PowerPoint presentations and game analyses. Those are made by a computer guru and my assistants'.
In van Gaal's training, the primary objective is education, the learning process by which players improve. This was of particular importance at AZ because the club was in no position to buy expensive players, people at their peak. Instead,the club acquired players at the level below - good players with good learning potential. From 2008, the video-analysis computer specialist Max Reckers worked with cameraman Kees Verver to support the learning process. Verver filmed by special camera - one that produced images notably larger than those that are common presented to TV viewers and hence provide a much clearer overview of the positioning of each player. While Verver filmed, Reckers codified hundreds of game situations into dozens of categories on laptop. In the post-game processing, the images were dissected into some 2,000 'events'. Individual players received a video digest of relevant images - incidents in which they were personally involved. Van Gaal would then provide further feedback, based on his interpretation of the footage.
Video analysis also played a significant role in the game preparation. Recent games by the upcoming opponent were taken apart, analysed and categorised in the same manner that AZ games were treated. Thus a wealth of information was generated that van Gaal could use as a basis for training for the forthcoming match. This became the basis for game simulation where 11 AZ reserves were instructed to play in the style of the opponent, countered by AZ's basic 11. The training was likewise filmed and would become the foundation for a follow-up 11-versus-11 training. The result was that an upcoming match was already 'played' twice before it actually took place.
Van Gaal's video team used sophisticated systems for game-tracking: SportsCode to register ball contact per player, and Sportvu to determine the real-time position of every player - their average playing position throughout the match (curiously, the latter was developed by the Israeli army to track the movement of tanks on the battlefield). Van Gaal gave his pre-match instructions to his team, and team performance was then evaluated based on whether players followed instructions. Compliance was sometimes valued even more than actual scoreline. Thus, paradoxically, van Gaal considered the performance of his team in that early 2008-2009 defeat against ADO Den Haag 'very good'.
