Its perfectly fine to bring it up, but not fine to derail the thread with a multiple page discussion. Secondly, don't worry about the mod duties here, I'll handle them.
ISIS in Iraq and Syria
- Thread starter Suli
- Start date
Its perfectly fine to bring it up, but not fine to derail the thread with a multiple page discussion. Secondly, don't worry about the mod duties here, I'll handle them.
One page=multiple pages? Am starting to see how 75% of the world female population is religious now.
That's an assumption. I personally think Iraq's invasion was the trigger for Syria, Libya and Egypt to be in turmoil. Western analysts are now portraying this as an ancient ethnic or religious conflict. The facts show these communities have co-existed in relative peace for over a thousand years.
The first and second world wars prove this would not be the case.
In a telephone call with KRP Massoud Barzani, Italian foreign minister vows to support KRG with military and humanitarian assistance to confront IS threat.
Biji Italy!
Biji Italy!I could be wrong but I think that was due to the sunni/shia issue. Just look at Syria.
Not sure about that Sults - the Syrian war is widely viewed as a direct domino effect of Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, and other movements. Only difference is that the movement wasn't able to topple Assad, nor was Assad able to completely crush the movement, which quickly spiralled from being domestically Syrian to one of outside groups coming into Syria. So its a bit hard to link it to Iraq in that respect, in fact I'm inclined to wonder whether the current instability in Iraq has been influenced by the unchecked growth of militant groups in Syria.
True.
How many ISIS fighters are there in total? I am astonished a few thousand men can take over such a big region.
Also although I know the general background. I am confused as to what actually is the motive and aim of IS? Why are muslims around the world willing to leave everything and join them? How did the group originate?
Who are they against exactly? They kills muslims too so what exactly do they want?
Also although I know the general background. I am confused as to what actually is the motive and aim of IS? Why are muslims around the world willing to leave everything and join them? How did the group originate?
Who are they against exactly? They kills muslims too so what exactly do they want?
Is this actually happening outside of a small number?
100s of fighters are joining them everyday according to some of their members.
Its a relatively small number obviously. But very very worrying.
I think you can put it down to weirdos and people having mental problem rather than due to faith.
Surprised they didnt say it was 1000s.
When you joining then pal?
Actually they did
My beard hasn't fully grown so I cant yet. I have to look good for the camera, none of that scarf shit covering my face.
Actually they did
Typical. Grow your hair out as well, its the new in look.
Indian Muslims mostly follow the Sufi code of Islam. They would be the least likely to be radicalised.
Yeah, quite a few people in the south asian region follow the sufi order so Im kind of surprised that they are venturing out to join ISIS.
Can you post a link to this claim, please. I'm surprised this to be the case outside of a few loons.
Rather than join them in battle, you should be their social media coordinator.
But then I wont get any virgins in heaven so whats the point
I read it in the local newspaper. But it was a unpopular news doing rounds on all platforms. I am sure you will find if you search for it on the internet,
Religion is used as a justification for humans killing other humans.
If religion was removed we would just find another excuse.
If religion was removed we would just find another excuse.
Its one of several that need to be done away with.
Is no religion in North Korea
True.
Christians start really good in Rome but then they realized they had an enormous power and they act like humans normally act, angry for power at all cost.
No but it is run as a theocratic state where the top dog and his pops before him are seen as Gods.
Or as the Hitch would put it, necrocracy.
"A Divine North Korea", as Hitch used to say.
there are about 7000-15000 ISIS fighter in Iraq. They are actual religious loons, who want to establish a caliphate in this area.
The problem is that they are getting support from the local sunni tribes (about 40k people in arms); they dont really support the religious extremism, but oppose the Shiite prime minister Al Maliki. Classic struggle between groups that compete for central power. These sunni tribes use ISIS as battering ramp against the central government (might backfire if they get out of control). If al-Maliki would be replaced by a new guy, who promises to include these sunni tribes, they might kick ISIS out of their territory. Its hard to beat ISIS as long as they got this kind of local support.
They originated in 2003/04 as resistance against the USA (Zarqawi was the "founder") and for a religious state. At the beginning they cooperated with al-Quaida. In 2006 Zarqawi died. The group started to act more autonomic. They recruited most of their fighters from the local sunni tribes. In 2010 their two leaders (omar al-baghdadi and al-masri) were killed by us/iraqi military. A guy called Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi became their new leader and took the whole thing to a "new" level. His tactic is to be so violent and brutal that none dares to resist. At this point the organisation is completely autonomous from the "classic" al-qaida, whos leadership is somewhere in Pakistan. They were so violent that other terror organisations (e.g. Al-Qaida or Hamas) distanced themselves. There are ideological differences, but its also fight for control/power of muslim extremism. That leads to really weird situations and a spectrum of different terror organisations who partly fight each other or cooperate in ad-hoc alliances (e.g. al-nusra or the FSA is not really in good terms with them).
In context of the syrian civil war, they got a lot of funding from some gulf Arabic states so they were able to expand in numbers. They are fairly attractive for foreign fighters, because of their brutal and strict way to deal with things.
Miss that man.
I dont disagree with you, but humans are just a bunch of shits when it comes down to it.
I swear that press officer is just Dappy with a fake beard and stupid hat...
Thanks, mate.
Thats what I was thinking. Without local support, it is impossible for a few thousand men to take over a country. Why did Arabic states fund them?
Kurdish crescent on the horizon
After decades of struggle, the diffused aspirations of the Kurds have acquired a ‘national’ character. As Iraq is thrown into a convulsion, it has made the dream of a Kurdish nation a possibility
A book on the Kurds, published in 1978, has on its cover a photograph of a Kurd soldier in his distinctive national dress, a weapon on his back; all around him is a limitless, barren plain, while far in the background are massive snow-capped mountains. The title of the book is as bleak as the photograph: People Without a Country. Now, this could change: as Iraq is breaking apart and is convulsed in sectarian conflict, the Kurds in Iraq have moved towards independence, a dramatic culmination of long-held aspirations.
The Kurds are a culturally distinct people, with their own ethnicity, language and dialects, who reside in the mountains of northeast Iraq, northwest Iran and much of eastern Turkey, with a small community in Syria at the Turkish border. Racially, the community has kinship with the Iranians; its language is also closely related to Persian. The 25 million Kurds worldwide are Muslim, and most of them are Sunni. The mountains that made them hardy and warlike also divided them into fiercely independent tribes and clans. Hence, they have never had a homeland of their own. Till the end of the last century, the Kurdish story consisted of persistent uprisings, consistently crushed; of short advances and harsh retreats; of small victories and major setbacks; of promises made and quickly forgotten, a narrative of defeat, exile, betrayal and bloodshed.
Kurdish politics
However, the decades of struggle did have some positive implications. One, over time, the diffused Kurdish aspirations and sporadic uprisings acquired a “national” character that transcended tribe, clan and interpersonal differences among the chiefs. Two, the struggle imparted a clarity to Kurdish aspirations, defining their collective security, economic and cultural interests. Above all, the assaults upon these people, particularly the genocidal violence of the 1980s and the use of chemical weapons in 1988, were sufficiently dramatic and heart-rending as to place Kurdish aspirations at the top of the allied agenda after the 1991 war, leading to the setting up of no fly-zones and safe-havens that consolidated into territorial autonomy after the 2003 conflict.
The Iraqi Constitution of 2005 recognised Kurdistan as a part of the Iraqi federation, with three of Iraq’s provinces — Arbil, Dohuk and Sulemaniya — which together have an area of 40,643 sq.km. and a population of a little over four million. But, the Iraqi Kurds have much larger claims, which would boost their territory to over 78,000 sq.km. and population to well over eight million. The two traditional Kurdish leaders — Massoud Barzani, son of the legendary Kurdish leader Mulla¯ Mustafa¯ Barzani, and the great rival of the Barzanis, Jalal Talabani — now hold major positions in the new political arrangements: Mr. Talabani is the president of the Iraqi Republic, while Mr. Barzani is the President of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).
Mr. Barzani and Mr. Talabani represent rival parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The third principal Kurdish party is the Turkey-based Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) which has been in conflict with successive Turkish governments; it has been declared a “terrorist” grouping by Turkey’s western allies and its leader, Abdullah Öcalan, has been in a Turkish prison since 1999. Iraq’s Kurdish scenario has been complicated by the emergence of a new party, the Gorran (Change) Movement that emerged in 2009 to challenge what it saw as the nepotism and corruption of the two traditional parties.
For the last 10 years or so, Mr. Massoud Barzani has been a central figure in Kurdish affairs across the region. He has engaged closely with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdog˘an, helping the latter to reach out to the Kurds in Turkey. In return, Mr. Erdog˘an has boosted political and economic ties with the KRG, achieving bilateral trade of $8 billion in 2013. More importantly, Turkey is central to KRG’s oil exports, with the old Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline now being supplemented by a new pipeline that goes directly from Kurdish territory to Turkey. Mr. Barzani is also active among Syrian Kurds, seeking to wean the popular Democratic Union Party (PYD) away from the PKK.
Towards a sovereign state
Following the ISIS’ successes, the Kurds took advantage of the collapse of the Iraqi armed forces and seized the “disputed” territories in the neighbouring provinces of Nineweh, Diyala and Kirkuk, including the oil-rich town of Kirkuk itself. Mr. Barzani explained that Iraq was already partitioned and the Kurds “can no longer experiment with their fate indefinitely.” He then announced that a referendum would be held among the Kurds in a few months to decide whether to seek full “independence”. These Kurdish aspirations pose new challenges to regional players.
As of now, Turkey seems to be relatively comfortable with the emerging scenario. It believes that the KRG will be able to effectively balance ISIS and will also be able to restrict PKK influence at its Syrian border. Turkey would like to see a unity government in Baghdad, but failing that, would support Kurdish independence in Iraq as a buffer against ISIS.
Iran’s position is more complex. While it would prefer a Shia-dominated administration in Baghdad, it recognises that its sectarian approach is no longer viable. It may, therefore, back a “unity” government in Baghdad. Iran would however not like to see a sovereign Kurdish state on its border since a truncated Iraq would dilute its influence in Baghdad and possibly encourage its own Kurds to pursue aspirations for freedom. Again, Israel has maintained close links with the Kurds in Iraq for the last few decades, building up their security forces. Its leaders have welcomed an independent Kurdistan, viewing it as an ally in a hostile environment. This has further alarmed Iran, encouraging it to use the PUK, which it has cultivated over several years, to oppose independence.
This seems to be paying off; Mr. Barzani’s call for full independence has created divisions among Kurdish parties. The PUK has raised constitutional, political and economic issues to oppose full sovereignty, backing a united Iraq against an independent Kurdistan that in its view would be a Turkish puppet. Gorran has argued that independence should go beyond mere rhetoric and should be based on strong institutions that provide for transparency and accountability in the polity.
Domestic and regional concerns
The immediate concern relating to independence is linked to the borders of this new entity. Kirkuk and other territories captured recently by the Kurds are mixed in ethnic and sectarian terms. Thus, a united Iraq would provide a much more congenial a place to accommodate such mixed communities than a new state whose origins lie in ethnic exclusiveness.
Independent Kurdistan would also face the serious challenge of economic viability. It is at present crucially dependent on budgetary support from Baghdad; with cash transfers from Baghdad having been recently curtailed, the KRG already finds itself in difficulties, given its serious refugee problem and the need to fund its armed forces and pay for imported gasoline. The state, being landlocked, would always be subject to the vagaries of its ties with its neighbours.
Again, the KRG has found it difficult to sell its oil in foreign markets; in the absence of international recognition, such difficulties would continue, particularly since the United States, Russia and China are firmly opposed to the division of Iraq. While Russia and China are against the break-up of states in principle, the U.S. fears that a rump Shia state in southern Iraq would be under Iranian influence and hence an abiding threat to Saudi Arabia with which it would have a long border.
Mr. Barzani understands these difficulties. It is possible he has played the independence card to obtain Baghdad’s recognition of the Kurds’ capture of Kirkuk and other “disputed” territories. He is also upset with the Al-Maliki government, which he blames for the ongoing violence. In a recent interview, Mr. Barzani has affirmed his commitment to a united Iraq, saying he is “keen to protect the country against collapse”; he has also spoken of the need for a new vision, a new administration, and joint action to maintain Iraq’s unity.
Mr. Barzani can be expected to make every effort to maintain a united Iraq. However, this is an unprecedented historic movement for the Kurds. The de facto foreign minister of the KRG, Falah Bakir, has reminded us: “The border has changed. The political reality has changed. The power balance has changed. And … Baghdad is far away.” It is just possible that the Kurds may reject caution
Kurdish leadership calls for better India ties and seize their destiny with both hands.
(Talmiz Ahmad was India’s Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Oman and the United Arab Emirates.)
http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/kurdish-crescent-on-the-horizon/article6288533.ece
After decades of struggle, the diffused aspirations of the Kurds have acquired a ‘national’ character. As Iraq is thrown into a convulsion, it has made the dream of a Kurdish nation a possibility
A book on the Kurds, published in 1978, has on its cover a photograph of a Kurd soldier in his distinctive national dress, a weapon on his back; all around him is a limitless, barren plain, while far in the background are massive snow-capped mountains. The title of the book is as bleak as the photograph: People Without a Country. Now, this could change: as Iraq is breaking apart and is convulsed in sectarian conflict, the Kurds in Iraq have moved towards independence, a dramatic culmination of long-held aspirations.
The Kurds are a culturally distinct people, with their own ethnicity, language and dialects, who reside in the mountains of northeast Iraq, northwest Iran and much of eastern Turkey, with a small community in Syria at the Turkish border. Racially, the community has kinship with the Iranians; its language is also closely related to Persian. The 25 million Kurds worldwide are Muslim, and most of them are Sunni. The mountains that made them hardy and warlike also divided them into fiercely independent tribes and clans. Hence, they have never had a homeland of their own. Till the end of the last century, the Kurdish story consisted of persistent uprisings, consistently crushed; of short advances and harsh retreats; of small victories and major setbacks; of promises made and quickly forgotten, a narrative of defeat, exile, betrayal and bloodshed.
Kurdish politics
However, the decades of struggle did have some positive implications. One, over time, the diffused Kurdish aspirations and sporadic uprisings acquired a “national” character that transcended tribe, clan and interpersonal differences among the chiefs. Two, the struggle imparted a clarity to Kurdish aspirations, defining their collective security, economic and cultural interests. Above all, the assaults upon these people, particularly the genocidal violence of the 1980s and the use of chemical weapons in 1988, were sufficiently dramatic and heart-rending as to place Kurdish aspirations at the top of the allied agenda after the 1991 war, leading to the setting up of no fly-zones and safe-havens that consolidated into territorial autonomy after the 2003 conflict.
The Iraqi Constitution of 2005 recognised Kurdistan as a part of the Iraqi federation, with three of Iraq’s provinces — Arbil, Dohuk and Sulemaniya — which together have an area of 40,643 sq.km. and a population of a little over four million. But, the Iraqi Kurds have much larger claims, which would boost their territory to over 78,000 sq.km. and population to well over eight million. The two traditional Kurdish leaders — Massoud Barzani, son of the legendary Kurdish leader Mulla¯ Mustafa¯ Barzani, and the great rival of the Barzanis, Jalal Talabani — now hold major positions in the new political arrangements: Mr. Talabani is the president of the Iraqi Republic, while Mr. Barzani is the President of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).
Mr. Barzani and Mr. Talabani represent rival parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The third principal Kurdish party is the Turkey-based Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) which has been in conflict with successive Turkish governments; it has been declared a “terrorist” grouping by Turkey’s western allies and its leader, Abdullah Öcalan, has been in a Turkish prison since 1999. Iraq’s Kurdish scenario has been complicated by the emergence of a new party, the Gorran (Change) Movement that emerged in 2009 to challenge what it saw as the nepotism and corruption of the two traditional parties.
For the last 10 years or so, Mr. Massoud Barzani has been a central figure in Kurdish affairs across the region. He has engaged closely with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdog˘an, helping the latter to reach out to the Kurds in Turkey. In return, Mr. Erdog˘an has boosted political and economic ties with the KRG, achieving bilateral trade of $8 billion in 2013. More importantly, Turkey is central to KRG’s oil exports, with the old Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline now being supplemented by a new pipeline that goes directly from Kurdish territory to Turkey. Mr. Barzani is also active among Syrian Kurds, seeking to wean the popular Democratic Union Party (PYD) away from the PKK.
Towards a sovereign state
Following the ISIS’ successes, the Kurds took advantage of the collapse of the Iraqi armed forces and seized the “disputed” territories in the neighbouring provinces of Nineweh, Diyala and Kirkuk, including the oil-rich town of Kirkuk itself. Mr. Barzani explained that Iraq was already partitioned and the Kurds “can no longer experiment with their fate indefinitely.” He then announced that a referendum would be held among the Kurds in a few months to decide whether to seek full “independence”. These Kurdish aspirations pose new challenges to regional players.
As of now, Turkey seems to be relatively comfortable with the emerging scenario. It believes that the KRG will be able to effectively balance ISIS and will also be able to restrict PKK influence at its Syrian border. Turkey would like to see a unity government in Baghdad, but failing that, would support Kurdish independence in Iraq as a buffer against ISIS.
Iran’s position is more complex. While it would prefer a Shia-dominated administration in Baghdad, it recognises that its sectarian approach is no longer viable. It may, therefore, back a “unity” government in Baghdad. Iran would however not like to see a sovereign Kurdish state on its border since a truncated Iraq would dilute its influence in Baghdad and possibly encourage its own Kurds to pursue aspirations for freedom. Again, Israel has maintained close links with the Kurds in Iraq for the last few decades, building up their security forces. Its leaders have welcomed an independent Kurdistan, viewing it as an ally in a hostile environment. This has further alarmed Iran, encouraging it to use the PUK, which it has cultivated over several years, to oppose independence.
This seems to be paying off; Mr. Barzani’s call for full independence has created divisions among Kurdish parties. The PUK has raised constitutional, political and economic issues to oppose full sovereignty, backing a united Iraq against an independent Kurdistan that in its view would be a Turkish puppet. Gorran has argued that independence should go beyond mere rhetoric and should be based on strong institutions that provide for transparency and accountability in the polity.
Domestic and regional concerns
The immediate concern relating to independence is linked to the borders of this new entity. Kirkuk and other territories captured recently by the Kurds are mixed in ethnic and sectarian terms. Thus, a united Iraq would provide a much more congenial a place to accommodate such mixed communities than a new state whose origins lie in ethnic exclusiveness.
Independent Kurdistan would also face the serious challenge of economic viability. It is at present crucially dependent on budgetary support from Baghdad; with cash transfers from Baghdad having been recently curtailed, the KRG already finds itself in difficulties, given its serious refugee problem and the need to fund its armed forces and pay for imported gasoline. The state, being landlocked, would always be subject to the vagaries of its ties with its neighbours.
Again, the KRG has found it difficult to sell its oil in foreign markets; in the absence of international recognition, such difficulties would continue, particularly since the United States, Russia and China are firmly opposed to the division of Iraq. While Russia and China are against the break-up of states in principle, the U.S. fears that a rump Shia state in southern Iraq would be under Iranian influence and hence an abiding threat to Saudi Arabia with which it would have a long border.
Mr. Barzani understands these difficulties. It is possible he has played the independence card to obtain Baghdad’s recognition of the Kurds’ capture of Kirkuk and other “disputed” territories. He is also upset with the Al-Maliki government, which he blames for the ongoing violence. In a recent interview, Mr. Barzani has affirmed his commitment to a united Iraq, saying he is “keen to protect the country against collapse”; he has also spoken of the need for a new vision, a new administration, and joint action to maintain Iraq’s unity.
Mr. Barzani can be expected to make every effort to maintain a united Iraq. However, this is an unprecedented historic movement for the Kurds. The de facto foreign minister of the KRG, Falah Bakir, has reminded us: “The border has changed. The political reality has changed. The power balance has changed. And … Baghdad is far away.” It is just possible that the Kurds may reject caution
Kurdish leadership calls for better India ties and seize their destiny with both hands.
(Talmiz Ahmad was India’s Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Oman and the United Arab Emirates.)
http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/kurdish-crescent-on-the-horizon/article6288533.ece
Becuase they have been brainwashed, when will the govt ban saudi funding mosques in India ?
tbh i prefer they get killed over there instead of here, but they are the exception not the norm. good thing there families promptly reported it to the police.
The primary source of recruits for these types of organisation (Al-Qaeda, Al-Jihad etc) has seemingly always been people of a young, cosmopolitan and educated background. It is not often the poor, illiterate or rural that become violently radicalised and fly across the world to get involved.
There is also seemingly a propensity for displaced youths to join - it was often the case that those travelling to the training camps in Afghanistan were young people who were living in a country outside their homeland. It seems that these young people can feel isolated in their new countries and turn to radical Wahhabi Mosques (funded by Saudi Arabia) for a sense of community.
This is a good book that charts the rise of Al-Qaeda and the related organisations, I'd recommend giving it a read. http://www.amazon.co.uk/Looming-Tower-Al-Qaedas-Road/dp/0141029358
I can only speculate why they get funds. SaudiArabia and Iran compete for hegemony power in this region. This conflict is partly fueled by sectarianism (Sunnism/wahhabism vs Shiism). Assad is Irans most important ally, so the Saudis funded these guys to fight against him. Getting Assad kicked out of office would be a huge blow for Iran. Its a bit like proxy wars during the cold-war era. Furthermore Saudi Arabia is the biggest funder for extremist terror in general. Its a very contradicting regime and its hard to tell if they support terrorism primarily for ideological reasons or if they just try to extend their power with this kind of policy.
In recent years things changed a bit. The saudi gouvernement almost stopped/cut their support of ISIS. Many of the fighters and the military leadership of ISIS are from SA. The Saudis are aware of the risk, that one day parts of ISIS might return to their home country. Even in a totalitarian policy state like SA, these guys could create some serious instability. The problem is, that abu Bakr al-Baghdadi seems to be incredible well connected to parts of the elite from SA/the arabic gulf nations, who continue to fund him privately. ISIS also robbed about $425million from the central bank in Mosul. I doubt that they will run out of money anytime soon.
So is the US going to go "shock and awe" or will it be more restrained?