ISIS in Iraq and Syria

2cents said:
As usual it's like you're having an argument with someone else here, you have a big habit of ascribing arguments to posters (in this case me) that they've never made, and you're basically having the argument you want to have rather than sticking to what I've actually argued throughout this thread.

So, in the case of number 1 and 2, do a search for Saudi and/or Wahhabi under my name, and come back to me.

In the case of number 3, it is clear I was talking about the initial stages of the protest movement. In my previous post I even acknowledged that the armed extremist element was there from the start.

In the case of number 4 - just do a search for "Alloush" in this thread, see which poster has written by far the most about him, and try and find one example of that poster mourning him.
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I wasn't arguing the poster here, on the contrary, I know your positions very well. In fact I wanted to write this at the end of my post, but didn't because I didn't want to make it personal or talk about the poster instead of the post, but I'm gonna say it now. Don't "try to be neutral". Just try to say what you really believe in, and what you really know.

As for your post, when you subscribe to an opinion, you have to defend it. You can't just throw an idea in a debate without having a solid belief in the consequences of what you said, and then resort to "but I said this too there". I'm not discussing you as a person, or your motives, I'm discussing strictly the ideas you presented. I disagree with them for the reasons I mentioned, and I totally agree with most of your other posts. I don't know where you get the idea that my post was directed at you as a person. (and I didn't say you mourned Alloush by the way)
 
Danny1982 said:
(and I didn't say you mourned Alloush by the way)
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Here's what I'm talking about:

You can't complain when they're released from prison, and then when they're killed
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If this isn't directed at me, then go have that argument with someone else.

As for this

Don't "try to be neutral". Just try to say what you really believe in, and what you really know...You can't just throw an idea in a debate without having a solid belief in the consequences of what you said
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your assumption is that I'm not writing what I actually believe in, which is a really patronizing accusation.

My position is this: Salafi ideology - which has existed at various times and in various parts of the Islamic world (including parts of Syria), often independent of Saudi influence - is extremely problematic, and the Saudi role in propagating its own version of it (Wahhabism) is a major element of the current problems affecting the Islamic world. It should be opposed everywhere it rears its ugly head.

But I view the fact that it appeals to so many not as a cause of these problems but as a symptom. Or to quote the historian Shahab Ahmed, speaking of the Saudi destruction of Mecca and Medina:

"One wonders if the relative indifference to and/or equanimity with which modern Muslims have accepted the physical destruction of the two most symbolically and ritually meaningful cities of Islam suggests the degree to which the vision of Wahhabism is not merely a cause, but also a symptom of the broader condition of the Islamic modern."
​
Much of the Sunni world is ripe for the spread of Salafi ideology for a host of reasons, most unrelated to the policies of the Saudi state - the miserable conditions its people have had to endure for almost a century, the actions of Western powers in helping to discredit secularism, and the broader question of how Muslims retain an authentic sense of identity in a modern world which puts in question the kinds of assumptions which helped sustain Islamic civilization in pre-modern times.

Specifically, to take the Syrian example, the nature of the regime since 1970 was to make violence and coercion the primary means of conflict resolution and relations in society, to turn neighbours against each other via divide-and-rule, and to propagate an ideology (Ba'thist Arab nationalism) which emphasized sacrifice and martrydom for the 'cause' as the highest honour one could strive for in society, all the while pursuing possibly the most cynical foreign policy in the region - the 'cause' was often Palestine, but the Syrian regime never fired a shot in anger on their behalf, and even intervened against the Palestinians in Lebanon in 76. Or sometimes it was the 'Arab nation', yet the regime supported Iran against Iraq during the 80s. And eventually, when the regime did turn its guns on someone, it was on the people themselves.

Do you seriously think these types of conditions have nothing to do with the readiness of Syrians to inflict such deadly violence on each other since 2011? Violence that, yes, thanks in part to the Gulf states has come to be expressed through the medium of Salafi ideology, but which was always going to result from the inevitable desire to settle scores? This is why I've never argued that, other than for a thinly spread and politically irrelevant section of Syrian society, this had anything to do with 'democracy' - how could it when the 'leaders' of the FSA were/are former Ba'thist generals and regime men themselves? When I argue that the Syrians have agency in this conflict, and that it is primarily a Syrian-made conflict, I'm arguing that the violence perpetrated by the regime and the opposition is primarily a reflection of the state of the society which emerged in 2011 itself, and that, as the guardian of that society for the previous 40 years, the regime bears primarily responsibility.

These are the kind of long-term factors which help create a constituency for militant Salafism, which the Saudis and Qataris have sought to use to their advantage where they see their interests at stake. But it's noteworthy that al Qaeda and ISIS (like the Taliban before them - who by the way adhere to the Deobandi school of the Hanafi madhhab, which came to prominence in the subcontinent independent of anything to do with Saudi Arabia) have only been able to flourish in areas where the chaos has already prevailed - nowhere have they been able to actually overthrow a ruling regime.

If my stance appears artificially 'neutral' to you it's because I don't believe any one single factor can explain the phenomenon we're discussing, whereas you're hooked on the idea of Wahhabism as this uniquely influential phenomenon which explains almost everything (or everything of any importance at least). The idea that Wahhabism alone turns ordinary Sunni Muslims into crazed beheaders is to me a cartoon version of how these things play out. It is certainly an element in helping create a broader acceptance for that kind of social conservatism and sectarian bigotry which is unfortunately growing in Muslim societies across the world, but it works in tandem with any number of other issues which, for example, help drive foreign fighters into these conflicts. And it also ignores the political element of the jihadi movement - the obsession with capturing state power - which is provided by Muslim Brotherhood ideology (which has its roots in Egypt and, in its Jamaat-e-Islami manifestation, South Asia), not by Wahhabism (which has never really had much to say about a specific political program, being content in Saudi Arabia with tying its fortunes to a tribal monarchy).
 
2cents said:
Here's what I'm talking about:



If this isn't directed at me, then go have that argument with someone else.

As for this



your assumption is that I'm not writing what I actually believe in, which is a really patronizing accusation.

My position is this: Salafi ideology - which has existed at various times and in various parts of the Islamic world (including parts of Syria), often independent of Saudi influence - is extremely problematic, and the Saudi role in propagating its own version of it (Wahhabism) is a major element of the current problems affecting the Islamic world. It should be opposed everywhere it rears its ugly head.

But I view the fact that it appeals to so many not as a cause of these problems but as a symptom. Or to quote the historian Shahab Ahmed, speaking of the Saudi destruction of Mecca and Medina:

"One wonders if the relative indifference to and/or equanimity with which modern Muslims have accepted the physical destruction of the two most symbolically and ritually meaningful cities of Islam suggests the degree to which the vision of Wahhabism is not merely a cause, but also a symptom of the broader condition of the Islamic modern."
​
Much of the Sunni world is ripe for the spread of Salafi ideology for a host of reasons, most unrelated to the policies of the Saudi state - the miserable conditions its people have had to endure for almost a century, the actions of Western powers in helping to discredit secularism, and the broader question of how Muslims retain an authentic sense of identity in a modern world which puts in question the kinds of assumptions which helped sustain Islamic civilization in pre-modern times.

Specifically, to take the Syrian example, the nature of the regime since 1970 was to make violence and coercion the primary means of conflict resolution and relations in society, to turn neighbours against each other via divide-and-rule, and to propagate an ideology (Ba'thist Arab nationalism) which emphasized sacrifice and martrydom for the 'cause' as the highest honour one could strive for in society, all the while pursuing possibly the most cynical foreign policy in the region - the 'cause' was often Palestine, but the Syrian regime never fired a shot in anger on their behalf, and even intervened against the Palestinians in Lebanon in 76. Or sometimes it was the 'Arab nation', yet the regime supported Iran against Iraq during the 80s. And eventually, when the regime did turn its guns on someone, it was on the people themselves.

Do you seriously think these types of conditions have nothing to do with the readiness of Syrians to inflict such deadly violence on each other since 2011? Violence that, yes, thanks in part to the Gulf states has come to be expressed through the medium of Salafi ideology, but which was always going to result from the inevitable desire to settle scores? This is why I've never argued that, other than for a thinly spread and politically irrelevant section of Syrian society, this had anything to do with 'democracy' - how could it when the 'leaders' of the FSA were/are former Ba'thist generals and regime men themselves? When I argue that the Syrians have agency in this conflict, and that it is primarily a Syrian-made conflict, I'm arguing that the violence perpetrated by the regime and the opposition is primarily a reflection of the state of the society which emerged in 2011 itself, and that, as the guardian of that society for the previous 40 years, the regime bears primarily responsibility.

These are the kind of long-term factors which help create a constituency for militant Salafism, which the Saudis and Qataris have sought to use to their advantage where they see their interests at stake. But it's noteworthy that al Qaeda and ISIS (like the Taliban before them - who by the way adhere to the Deobandi school of the Hanafi madhhab, which came to prominence in the subcontinent independent of anything to do with Saudi Arabia) have only been able to flourish in areas where the chaos has already prevailed - nowhere have they been able to actually overthrow a ruling regime.

If my stance appears artificially 'neutral' to you it's because I don't believe any one single factor can explain the phenomenon we're discussing, whereas you're hooked on the idea of Wahhabism as this uniquely influential phenomenon which explains almost everything (or everything of any importance at least). The idea that Wahhabism alone turns ordinary Sunni Muslims into crazed beheaders is to me a cartoon version of how these things play out. It is certainly an element in helping create a broader acceptance for that kind of social conservatism and sectarian bigotry which is unfortunately growing in Muslim societies across the world, but it works in tandem with any number of other issues which, for example, help drive foreign fighters into these conflicts. And it also ignores the political element of the jihadi movement - the obsession with capturing state power - which is provided by Muslim Brotherhood ideology (which has its roots in Egypt and, in its Jamaat-e-Islami manifestation, South Asia), not by Wahhabism (which has never really had much to say about a specific political program, being content in Saudi Arabia with tying its fortunes to a tribal monarchy).
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It's 5am bro, this isn't the time for the post you just wrote, you really should be sleeping.

Excellent post all the same.
 
RedTiger said:
It's 5am bro, this isn't the time for the post you just wrote, you really should be sleeping.

Excellent post all the same.
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Meh, I'm up anyway with my daughter, and I've a CE forum essay-writing title to retain this year.
 
2cents said:
Here's what I'm talking about:

...
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The reason I say you're being artificially neutral is because you know this 'theory' is detached from the reality, and that's why you avoid talking about any other country than Syria in this case (you still realise what's happening in other countries, but you turn a blind eye for a moment here just so the theory you're trying to present fits). You're taking a specific case and you try to attribute the spread of Wahhabism/Salafism and the rise of terrorism to the ones you selectively chose in that country.

What you're trying to do here is exactly like someone who tries to theorise that Nazism wasn't the problem. It was merely a "symptom". It was just the result of the actions of the Jews and the communists. Clearly bullsh*t. Nazism was dangerous ideology, adopted by ignorant people, and led to severe consequences for the world.

If you just take a look around you in the world, your "theory" will fall apart pretty quickly. You'll realise that Wahhabism is spreading everywhere, without exceptions. It's spreading because a gigantic amount of money and propaganda is being pushed to promote it, and major powers in the world are supporting or at least have supported that effort until very recently.

Take Pakistan for example, Wahhabism have spread there even more than Syria. Is there an Assad too there? No, there is...

'Tsunami of money' from Saudi Arabia funding 24,000 madrassas in Pakistan

And the same in every other country (don't want to repeat what I have already said in the past).

Now, you could argue that there are some factors that could probably "help" its spread, and I'm not talking about one or two factors that you selectively choose, but a long list of them, however, they are not the cause and the root of the problem, and even without them Wahhabism would still spread under the current circumstances.

Trying to find excuses for Wahhabism is a very dangerous thing to do, because today it's Syria, tomorrow it will be you, and if you're blaming Assad now for Wahhabism, then whom are you going to blame next when it hits you? You? Was the US to blame too for 9/11?

Hate propaganda don't rely on logic. Or economic status. They can spread everywhere and anywhere, in different forms or names, Nazism, Wahhabism, Xenophobia,... That's the main point you're missing. Wahhabism is using hate propaganda to spread everywhere in the world, and they don't care about the circumstances, because they will use any circumstances they have in their propaganda, and more than 90% of their propaganda is lies anyway.

And one final point to make here, many people revolted against dictators in the past, without resorting to terrorism. You trying to imply that Wahhabism and terrorism is the natural result of dictatorship has no grounds at all. Just look at Syria's neighbour, Iraq, when the same Ba'ath party was ruling.

2cents said:
If my stance appears artificially 'neutral' to you it's because I don't believe any one single factor can explain the phenomenon we're discussing
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The presence of multiple theoretical "factors" doesn't mean that their weight is the same in reality. If somebody has diabetes and hypertension, and then dies of lung cancer, you could sit all day long theorising about how the diabetes and the hypertension played a role in the deterioration of his health and his death, and you could probably try to argue that it played a role in the development of the cancer itself (for people who know little about lung cancer, because it makes sense right? "You think somebody this weak could resist the development of cancer?"), but it doesn't change the fact that the major factor leading to his death was smoking. How do we know? Simple, like I said before, just look around and investigate other cases, and you'll easily find that the common factor in this case is smoking, not hypertension or diabetes.

As for my feeling about your artificial neutrality, it's just an impression I had, I could be wrong.

2cents said:
I've a CE forum essay-writing title to retain this year.
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Good luck.
 
Danny1982 said:
Hate propaganda don't rely on logic. Or economic status. They can spread everywhere and anywhere, in different forms or names, Nazism, Wahhabism, Xenophobia,... That's the main point you're missing. Wahhabism is using hate propaganda to spread everywhere in the world, and they don't care about the circumstances, because they will use any circumstances they have in their propaganda, and more than 90% of their propaganda is lies anyway.
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So you really think the success of hate propaganda is largely independent from social circumstances in the broadest sense? Can be switched on and off just with money and political effort?

I'd say the opposite is true: Every fascist, religious-fundamentalist or similar ideology can only spread at this rate if a potential receptiveness already exists in abundance. When this movement appears to be the solution for crucial problems of some kind, may they be clear to see or rather opaque and only perceived on an unconscious psychological level.

And I agree with @2cents here: the failure of the (more or less) secular ME regimes on several levels contributed massively to such a situation. Among other factors, of course. You are certainly not wrong about Saudi Arabia in principle, but you seem to shut out everything else.
 
Danny1982 said:
What you're trying to do here is exactly like someone who tries to theorise that Nazism wasn't the problem. It was merely a "symptom". It was just the result of the actions of the Jews and the communists. Clearly bullsh*t. Nazism was dangerous ideology, adopted by ignorant people, and led to severe consequences for the world.
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This is actually the perfect example to make my point. Nazism didn't just rise in a vacuum, there were a huge number of factors which played a role in its rise and helped make it an appealing ideology - the long-term rise of ethnic nationalism in Europe from the second half of the 19th century onwards, the defeat of Germany in WW1 and subsequent injustices inflicted upon Germany at Versailles, and of course the failure of Weimar and the economic crisis which helped catapult Hitler to power. These are the causes of which the appeal and success of Nazism in 1930s Germany were symptoms.

If you just take a look around you in the world, your "theory" will fall apart pretty quickly. You'll realise that Wahhabism is spreading everywhere, without exceptions. It's spreading because a gigantic amount of money and propaganda is being pushed to promote it, and major powers in the world are supporting or at least have supported that effort until very recently.

Take Pakistan for example, Wahhabism have spread there even more than Syria. Is there an Assad too there? No, there is...

'Tsunami of money' from Saudi Arabia funding 24,000 madrassas in Pakistan

And the same in every other country (don't want to repeat what I have already said in the past).
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There's a different dynamic in each place. For example Egypt has its own indigenous and deeply embedded Islamist movement, the Muslim Brotherhood, whose success and appeal heavily outweigh the Salafists (look at the election results from a few years ago). And Egypt also has a strong national identity which has tended to favour the appeal of populist Islamist movements such as the Brotherhood who have been willing to incorporate nationalist rhetoric and agendas into their political programs. It is similar with Turkey (AKP), Tunisia (Ennahda), and the Palestinians (Hamas). Salafism has been nowhere near as appealing or successful a tendency in these cases as in certain other places.

Pakistan again is different. The Saudis indeed have funded huge numbers of conservative madrassas, however the country has a long tradition of Islamist activism which has sometimes been expressed in the Salafist tendency (the Ahl-i Hadith movement) but which embraces an incredibly diverse range of movements independent of Saudi Arabia or indeed any other region. Deobandi scholarship, for example, takes no lessons from Wahhabism, it's devoted entirely to the Hanafi madhhab and the Darul Uloom in India itself is generally ranked second among Sunnis only to Al-Azhar in terms of the strength of its scholarship. The weakness of the central state in Pakistan has allowed a kind of free-for-all, a competitive religious economy where Salafism is only one product on offer among many. And the takfiri tradition has existed there all along. Today the Barelwis are often seen as cuddly, charas-smoking, hippy sufi types, but the leading figure in that movement, Ahmad Riza Khan, was notorious for takfiring his religious opponents, even traveling to Mecca to obtain a fatwa from leading Hanafi ulama to have some of the leading Deobandi figures declared kafirs. These movements all trace their origins back to one 18th century scholar.

Re: Iraq, the Ba'thist dictatorship there was probably worse than as I've described it in Syria - I'm sure you understand this as well as anyone on this forum. Add in the sectarian dynamic, the country's historic position as a centre and frontline of centuries-old sectarian polemics and conflicts, and Saddam's infamous Faith Campaign of the 1990s, and it's easy to understand why Saudi efforts to propagate Wahhabism among the country's Sunni population have been so successful since the Americans destroyed the state.

What the Syrian, Iraqi and Pakistani cases show is that Salafism can thrive where the central state is weak or has failed, allowing the Saudis and others the freedom to spread the creed in pursuit of their interests. But where the country in question has its own strong Islamist tradition and/or nationalist identity, the appeal and success of Salafism is less.

Trying to find excuses for Wahhabism is a very dangerous thing to do, because today it's Syria, tomorrow it will be you, and if you're blaming Assad now for Wahhabism, then whom are you going to blame next when it hits you? You? Was the US to blame too for 9/11?
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You're confusing attempts at understanding with making excuses. This is why I pointed you to everything I've actually written about Wahhabism and the Saudi role in the region in order for you to see that I have never for one second on this forum tried to excuse that movement or the Saudis. Take the case of a serial killer - attempts to understand the domestic, social, and physiological conditions which drive the killer to commit his crimes in no way constitute an excuse of those crimes.

Hate propaganda don't rely on logic. Or economic status. They can spread everywhere and anywhere, in different forms or names, Nazism, Wahhabism, Xenophobia,... That's the main point you're missing. Wahhabism is using hate propaganda to spread everywhere in the world, and they don't care about the circumstances, because they will use any circumstances they have in their propaganda, and more than 90% of their propaganda is lies anyway.
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So what is your theory for why Wahhabism appeals to so many on an individual level?

And one final point to make here, many people revolted against dictators in the past, without resorting to terrorism. You trying to imply that Wahhabism and terrorism is the natural result of dictatorship has no grounds at all.
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I've been through this with you before - I don't use the term 'terrorism', I don't find it useful in any way when discussing these things, and I don't discern any consistent value in your own use of it (though mostly you seem to use it to refer exclusively to Sunni jihadists).

As you said above, in this case I was strictly speaking of Syria, so I couldn't possibly have implied that Wahhabism is a natural result of dictatorship everywhere. As my Egyptian example above shows, this is not the case. My point is that the particular conditions in Syria which prevailed as the state unraveled from 2011 onward made it a perfect breeding-ground for the spread of Salafism/Wahhabism.

As for my feeling about your artificial neutrality, it's just an impression I had, I could be wrong.
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That's very generous of you. In any case, 'neutrality' is a nothing term in a case like this. I'm trying to understand the dynamics involved in driving the conflict, not win an internet pissing contest.

(Edit) - I thought this felt familiar, we've had this exact debate before in this thread - https://www.redcafe.net/threads/isis-in-iraq-and-syria.392179/page-150#post-18362685
 
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Synco said:
So you really think the success of hate propaganda is largely independent from social circumstances in the broadest sense? Can be switched on and off just with money and political effort?

I'd say the opposite is true: Every fascist, religious-fundamentalist or similar ideology can only spread at this rate if a potential receptiveness already exists in abundance. When this movement appears to be the solution for crucial problems of some kind, may they be clear to see or rather opaque and only perceived on an unconscious psychological level.

And I agree with @2cents here: the failure of the (more or less) secular ME regimes on several levels contributed massively to such a situation. Among other factors, of course. You are certainly not wrong about Saudi Arabia in principle, but you seem to shut out everything else.
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The first important point here is those running the propaganda won't just sit back and talk. They will also create the necessary circumstances (and problems) for their propaganda, ranging from their policies on international level, to the use of their terrorists to trigger a division in the society through repeated terrorist attacks or actions (and this is happening in Europe too by the way and have managed so far to basically divide the European societies into Muslims and non-Muslims, creating another fertile ground for the spread of their extremist ideology).

Also, you're talking about the Middle East like the dictators in the ME are a creation of their own, or the socio-economic situation just happened to be like that. That's also not accurate. There are a lot of external factors that led to this sad reality in the middle East. However, despite all the circumstances, and what happened because of whom, the problem we have at hand here is very specific and has a very specific and clear source. Yes, there are billions of poor people in the world, but there is somebody who is going and actively recruiting them in his dangerous ideology. In the case of extremist ideologies (just like with Nazism) we shouldn't be talking about "circumstances". We should be talking about the people who are actively spreading this ideology.

At what rate extremism can spread? Will this and that help and speed up its spread? We can argue about that, but that's about it like I said in my previous post. These are only "catalyst factors" no more. The danger of this ideology will always be there if you don't cut it from the source, and it's very ignorant to think that would be safe from it just because you don't have Assad.

I will say something though, it will be the ideal solution if we could remove all dictators in the middle East and teach the people there how to live under a democracy (because this is even more important than forcing democracy), however that's not even close to what's happening in Syria, and I don't need to say more about this because I'm pretty sure everybody knows by now what's really happening in Syria.

The second point, shortly, don't underestimate the amount of money and effort put to spread Wahhabism, which they have been doing for many many decades. And don't underestimate the importance of money in any propaganda, or even any election campaign, especially if you were running alone, or running against somebody with very little money. Here is another example which I also posted previously, but will post again just to make the point.

How Kosovo Was Turned Into Fertile Ground for ISIS
Extremist clerics and secretive associations funded by Saudis and others have transformed a once-tolerant Muslim society into a font of extremism.

And thanks to many factors (including the support from many states world wide), Wahhabism had a free run in many countries all over the world, so it's not a surprise that it has spread like that.
 
A local drug smuggling kingpin, after all. Todenhöfer should at least admit the possibility that he was duped.
 
@2cents, I appreciate the time you took to write that reply, but I will stop here not to derail this thread, and I feel I made the most important points I wanted to make. (By the way Pakistan was just an example, and even in Pakistan there is still much to debate about, but it's the same story in many other countries, Egypt, Yemen, Nigeria, ... and it's even starting to appear very evidently in many European countries as well, despite the small Muslim/Sunni base... But may be we can continue this debate another time).

Anyway, back to topic..
2cents said:
Thanks. Pretty damning evidence there.
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There is no need for any evidences. Al-Qaeda will never admit publicly that the US is supporting them. You only need to hear that line to know it's fake.
 
Danny1982 said:
@2cents, I appreciate the time you took to write that reply, but I will stop here not to derail this thread, and I feel I made the most important points I wanted to make. (By the way Pakistan was just an example, and even in Pakistan there is still much to debate about, but it's the same story in many other countries, Egypt, Yemen, Nigeria, ... and it's even starting to appear very evidently in many European countries as well, despite the small Muslim/Sunni base... But may be we can continue this debate another time).
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It's definitely worth another thread mate, I'm sure we'll pick it up somewhere else at another time.
 
antihenry said:
Pentagon Paid for Fake ‘Al Qaeda’ Videos.

http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/10/01/pentagon-paid-for-fake-al-qaeda-videos.html
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How Britain funds the 'propaganda war' against Isis in Syria
Government contractors effectively run a press office for opposition fighters but communications conceal UK’s role
The British government is waging information warfare in Syria by funding media operations for some rebel fighting groups, in the foreign front of what David Cameron has called “the propaganda war” against Islamic State.

The campaign aims to boost the reputation of what the government calls the “moderate armed opposition”, a complex and shifting alliance of armed factions.

Contractors hired by the Foreign Office but overseen by the Ministry of Defence(MoD) produce videos, photos, military reports, radio broadcasts, print products and social media posts branded with the logos of fighting groups, and effectively run a press office for opposition fighters.

...

In both the foreign and domestic campaigns, the government’s role is often concealed. Messages are put out under the banner of apparently independent groups – community organisations in the UK, and armed groups in Syria.
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https://www.theguardian.com/world/2...unds-the-propaganda-war-against-isis-in-syria

Hmmm, why does this sound familiar...? Oh, by the way, where is that independent neutral one-man-show "SOHR" based again?
 
More on the looming battle for Mosul:

Islamic State conflict: How will the battle for Mosul unfold?
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-37487149

Little by little, plans are leaking out regarding the imminent battle to remove so-called Islamic State (IS) from Mosul, Iraq's second largest city.

Michael Fallon, the UK defence secretary, said military co-operation agreements were finalised on 23 September, adding that "the encirclement operation will begin in the next few weeks" with Mosul being liberated "in the next few months".

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan went even further, obligingly providing the start-date of the offensive, 19 October.

What can be said with certainty is that the liberation of Mosul will be a multi-phased operation.

First the logistical base for the operation must be established at Qayyarah airbase, a facility 40 miles (60km) south of Mosul that was seized by the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in early July.

Since then, the airbase has been refurbished to enable the landing of cargo aircraft, enabling ammunition, fuel and rations to be flown directly to the front line rather than being trucked up from Iraq's military depots near Baghdad, 185 miles further south.

Around 560 US military advisers have been moved to Qayyarah to advise and assist the offensive. US and French long-range artillery systems have been emplaced, with mobile howitzers able to range out half the distance to Mosul and with rocket launchers able to shoot into the city itself, taking under 20 seconds and with great precision.

_91329077_mosul_control_624.png


Sealing off the city
Qayyarah is also the collecting point for the Iraqi forces that will liberate Mosul. These are mainly Iraqi army forces drawn from across the country into multi-ethnic, cross-sectarian national units.

There are around 11 Iraqi army and special forces' brigades ready to attack, with each brigade numbering about 2,000 troops.

A further five units of tribal or paramilitary police forces are also ready, comprising about 6,000 troops, mainly Sunni Arabs from the broad Mosul area.

The Kurdish Peshmerga forces and a handful of small Kurdish-backed paramilitary police units manned by micro-minorities (Christians and Kakai) are circling Mosul to the north-east and will close the blockade on the city from that side.

A formula also seems to have been worked out to allow security volunteers from Shia-populated southern Iraq to indirectly support the battle without alarming the predominantely Sunni residents of Mosul.

These Hashd al-Shaabi (Popular Mobilisation forces) will be used to secure the empty rural areas and roads south of Qayyarah and west of Mosul but will not be played into the urban battle.

Desert push
The next phase of the battle will be a multi-pronged advance on the outskirts of Mosul.

Most likely the main thrust will drive up the Baghdad-Mosul highway on the west bank of the Tigris River, halting when the southern outskirts of Mosul are reached.

Another column may swing out west of Mosul into the desert along pipeline roads and tracks to close off the city from that direction, preventing IS from bringing in reinforcements or slipping away to Syria.

A final set of forces may push up to Mosul on the east bank of the Tigris, aiming at the eastern side of the city.

This phase will unfold in fits and spurts: one day 10 miles will be gained easily, another day there will be tough fighting at an IS strongpoint or a pause to bring up supplies.

There will be images of Iraqi Security Forces and Popular Mobilisation units streaming through the desert in large vehicle columns, interspersed with days of air strikes to eradicate stubborn IS fighters.

By the time of the US elections on 8 November the edges of Mosul will likely have been contacted at multiple points.

Civilian fears
During November and December the main battle will likely begin.

First a new base of operations will be established in an area next to the city that can be fortified, such as Mosul's airport to the south.

This will give the ISF and coalition a place to position headquarters, supplies and artillery.

For the Iraqi and coalition forces the issue of civilians will be a tricky factor. Perhaps 700,000 people may still be in Mosul, the largest population to be present during an urban liberation battle in Iraq's war against IS.

As liberating forces line the perimeter of the city, the displaced people will start to leak out in huge numbers once IS can no longer prevent the exodus.

This is one reason why coalition forces may hesitate to approach Mosul before they are ready to take the whole city: the preference is for Mosul civilians to stay in place and hunker down during fighting.

Keeping civilians off the streets will also allow cleaner air strikes that focus on IS vehicles and fighters.

Swift collapse?
For many months the coalition has been intensively watching the IS defenders, profiling their movements and their defences.

Air strikes will be accelerated in places where the coalition wishes to breach the defences. IS commanders will be intensively targeted to disrupt the movement's ability to mount a cohesive defence.

Ultimately, however, IS may not fight very hard for most of Mosul city. The urban area is far bigger than anything they have attempted to defend before: about 10 miles wide by 10 miles long with a 30-mile perimeter - twice as large as their defence of Ramadi.

Instead the 2-3,000 IS fighters are likely to pick a couple of neighbourhoods to strongly defend.

The government centre in western Mosul is a symbolic location and liberation cannot be announced until it is retaken.

The old city is full of narrow streets in which the security forces cannot use armoured vehicles, artillery or air strikes with ease.

When these defensive pockets collapse - and they might collapse surprisingly quickly, as they did when Falluja was liberated within three weeks in June - the final stabilisation phase of the operation begins.

Fleeing IS fighters will need to be distinguished from displaced persons, law and order will need to be quickly but humanely established. These tasks may prove to be more difficult than the battle itself.
 
I worked in Mosul from 05-06. It won't be easy without a lot of civilians dying. At least the Kurds know the area well and will be able to take care of the northern and eastern outskirts. I'd imagine the city will be left booby trapped to the gills after ISIS are booted out.
 
That's a scary battle to consider with all the civilians involved. Unless you're like Assad and don't mind things like barrel bombing indiscriminately, it seems like it'd take ages...
 
Organic Potatoes said:
That's a scary battle to consider with all the civilians involved. Unless you're like Assad and don't mind things like barrel bombing indiscriminately, it seems like it'd take ages...
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I think they'll take most of the city quickly and easily with the older sections holding out for an extended period.
 
There's a good short documentary on Netflix called 'The White Helmets' , gives some insight on the ground about the inhumane barbaric distruction caused by Assad's barrel bombs and indiscriminate Russian air strikes on civilian areas.
 
PedroMendez said:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/201...-educated-than-their-average-countryman-worl/
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The study, which aimed to identify socioeconomic traits that might explain why some are drawn to Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (Isil), made clear that poverty and deprivation were not at the root of support for the group.

...

The data shows clearly, the report said, that "poverty is not a driver of radicalization into violent extremism."

...

Most of the 331 recruits also reported having a job before traveling to join the Islamic State group, also known by its Arabic acronym Daesh, according to the study.
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On the other hand, this German study found that the radicalisation process is actually a matter of weeks rather than months or years, and it found that the Salafist mosques play a 'central role' in the process.

http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/...oschee-lockt-auch-islamisten-an-14468699.html
 
Good piece from Josh Rogin....

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opin...d26847eeed4_story.html?utm_term=.0091aadf095e

".....There is clear and abundant evidence the Assad regime and the Russian government are committing crimes that include, but are not limited to, deliberate attacks on civilians, collective punishment, starvation as a tool of war, torture, murder, inhumane treatment of prisoners and the use of chemical weapons on the battlefield."
 
In the last days a terrorist attack from IS was prevented here in germany, probably the Airport in Berlin was the target. Prevented cause 3 Syrian refugees catched the guy. Any reports in english speaking media about that?
 
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slig said:
In the last days a terrorist attack from IS was prevented here in germany, probably the Airport in Berlin was the target. Prevented cause 3 Syrian refugees catched the guy. Any reports in english speaking media about that?
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Yeah I did hear that on the radio yesterday.
They shopped him just in time thankfully it sounds like.
 
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