Whittling down opposition groups to leave it as simply Syria vs. ISIS is Assad's goal. That means eliminating moderate groups, extremist groups, and everyone in between. It's why Assad and Russia aren't fighting ISIS directly for the most part (80% of Russian airstrikes are on non-ISIS targets).
ISIS in Iraq and Syria
- Thread starter Suli
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Whittling down opposition groups to leave it as simply Syria vs. ISIS is Assad's goal. That means eliminating moderate groups, extremist groups, and everyone in between. It's why Assad and Russia aren't fighting ISIS directly for the most part (80% of Russian airstrikes are on non-ISIS targets).
In 2011 Assad released Alloush, so Alloush becomes the bad guy in the conflict, to make it a choice between Alloush, the bad guy, and him.
In 2015 Assad killed Alloush, to eliminate the 'good guy' choice, and leave you with the bad guy ("ISIS") or him.
That moderate/terrorist scale is one slippery fecker.
The part about Assad not fighting ISIS directly is bs, because they're already engaged in fierce battles on multiple fronts (just a couple of days ago the regime regained control over the important town of Mahin and its surrounding towns Al-Hadath, Hawarin, ...etc. East of Homs after a very fierce battle). ISIS is the single group the Syrian army and Russia are targeting the most, of all groups.
And by the way, didn't you just admit that Alloush is a Jihadi terrorist? So what's the problem if Russia is targeting Jihadi terrorists when they're not targeting ISIS?
The part about Assad not fighting ISIS directly is bs, because they're already engaged in fierce battles on multiple fronts (just a couple of days ago the regime regained control over the important town of Mahin and its surrounding towns Al-Hadath, Hawarin, ...etc. East of Homs after a very fierce battle). ISIS is the single group the Syrian army and Russia are targeting the most, of all groups.
Allow me to add Deir ez-Zor
That was just an example. They're battling on multiple fronts. Another major front is East Aleppo. In the last couple of months the Syrian army also advanced in the Eastern suburbs of Aleppo, lifting the siege on the Kweris military airport and is still advancing there (yesterday captured another village, Najjara).
A couple of months ago ISIS and Al-Nusra also coordinated an attack against the Khanasir-Ithriya road (from both sides), which forced the Syrian army to call urgent reinforcements from Morek, which eventually led to its fall (at the hands of Al-Nusra and co) marking the only loss for the Syrian army since the Russian airstrikes started (it was in the first couple of weeks after the Russian airstrikes started).
If things go well in Homs, the next major battle with ISIS there should be in Al-Qaryatayn.
http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/ten-most-important-developments-syria-2015/
a fairly long article, that summarises the important developments in 2015.
And ad up to date map: http://umap.openstreetmap.fr/fr/map/desyracuse-syria-civil-war-3-jan-2016_65400#7/34.886/40.424
a fairly long article, that summarises the important developments in 2015.
And ad up to date map: http://umap.openstreetmap.fr/fr/map/desyracuse-syria-civil-war-3-jan-2016_65400#7/34.886/40.424
Geezer shot the feck up by police in Paris because he entered a police station with a knife shouting bad shit and possibly wearing a dodgy vest on the anniversary of the Charlie Hebdo shiz.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-35250344
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-35250344
IS guy kills his own mother as she asked him to leave the group. It really boggles the mind.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-35260475
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-35260475
And ppl talk about reintegrating those guys. Can't help them anymore.
Its a mental illness, there's no other way to describe it.
at about 12:00 a Q&A/discussion starts, where a couple of crucial points a raised.
That's just...wow
Who is this tool? Such a biased and self serving view of the situation.
Is this the mother giving birth to the master?
salafi/wahabi ideology is behind it.
You know what...I didn't even think of it like that.
Also - 'kids will be filled with rage'.
True berba, but this boy actually pulled the trigger on his mother.
Assad has said that the reason why they are not emphasizing their attacks on ISIS, nor are the Russians, is because ISIS is not a state sponsored actor. ISIS is already fighting other groups, and is according to Assad and Russia, the least concern of many different groups. ISIS is not being directly supplied with weapons. They are not being directly fed money, in short, they do not have a major international sponsor backing them up. Other groups in Syria do, and they pose the greatest overall threat. ISIS can be held back with what ISIS is facing now, but the more imminent threats need to be dealt with.
Basically it is common sense. Western powers are bombing ISIS. Kurds are beating ISIS back. Iraq is starting to beat ISIS back. Why would Syria and Russia focus on an enemy that has no future and is being defeated, when they have other, more credible threats to deal with.
I got this from a translation of an interview I read. So, I'm just passing that along. However, from a logical point of view, it makes total sense.
Basically it is common sense. Western powers are bombing ISIS. Kurds are beating ISIS back. Iraq is starting to beat ISIS back. Why would Syria and Russia focus on an enemy that has no future and is being defeated, when they have other, more credible threats to deal with.
I got this from a translation of an interview I read. So, I'm just passing that along. However, from a logical point of view, it makes total sense.
I´d say, that is just half of the truth. The main reason, why he is not focusing on ISIS is, that they hold mostly countryside, that is not important for him. It might look big on a map, but just around 2m people live there and bug chunks are dessert. The important parts are are the big cities, which are threatened a lot more by the other groups. That makes them more dangerous for Assad. Additionally it will be a lot easier to unite the country against ISIS once the other militias are defeated. Last but not least the ideological difference between groups like ISIS and other jihadi movements isn´t that big. His military attacks the biggest threats first; anyone would do that.
Asking Assad to just attack ISIS, is asking Assad to lose the civil war.
Both of these lines of reasoning are essentially correct. The plan of action here by the Russians/Syrians is to defeat the rebel Islamist forces, leaving ISIS as the only credible threat. Meaning the Western world may have to reluctantly side with the Syrian government to take them out.
It works both ways though, its the same reason why Saudi Arabia and Turkey are not only ignoring ISIS, but also arguably playing into their hands.
Accept the Uncomfortable Truth: It’s Time to Support Assad.
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/429355/supporting-assad-best-option?YFgfMEXyt3aZKuRL.01
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/429355/supporting-assad-best-option?YFgfMEXyt3aZKuRL.01
by JAY HALLEN January 7, 2016 4:00 AM
As the Syrian civil war and refugee crisis metastasize, we need a new approach for these unfolding human tragedies. To date, the Obama administration has mostly sat on the sidelines, in part because of war fatigue, but mostly because in the crowded mix of factions fighting in Syria, there are no good actors to support.
After the Pentagon’s embarrassing admission that $500 million put only “four or five” Syrian opposition fighters on the ground, it is clear that it’s fantasy to think we can find reliable Syrian allies who are both anti-ISIS and anti-Assad — which is the official policy of the administration and most leading presidential candidates. It would require threading a needle that is impossibly thin, with the assumption that we could vet and then arm rebels who might claim loyalty to the U.S. one day, but who resort to sectarian and tribal vendettas the next. And even in the event that we did find such a group and it assumed control, we’d still have a long way to go before consolidating power and making the transition to relative peace.
But the gravity of the Syria crisis is such that we no longer have the luxury of holding out for a solution that is ideologically appealing. Realpolitik is the only option. Throwing U.S. support behind President Bashar al-Assad is simply the best, or least bad, option left.
Supporting Assad means confronting three uncomfortable truths, all of which simmer just beneath the policy debates on the airwaves and at Capitol Hill.
First is the admission that the Middle East was a safer and more stable place with Saddam Hussein and Moammar Qaddafi in power. To be clear, both had murdered their own people en masse and were megalomaniacs of the first order. However, they were also secular despots who kept jihadism and sectarian violence in check. Power vacuums stemming from the demise of both tyrants have incubated some of the worst chaos, hatred, and human misery that the world has ever seen. If ISIS represents the worst-case scenario, then Assad is preferable.
The second uncomfortable truth is that realist foreign policy has triumphed over an idealistic one, at least when the Middle East is concerned. The idealist policy reached its high-water mark at the end of the Cold War, when the spreading of American-style democracy and capitalism won hearts, minds, and substantive geopolitical gains throughout Eastern Europe. On 9/11, the tide turned toward a realist policy, particularly when the world learned that many of the hijackers had been middle-class university graduates residing in Germany. Later, realism’s supremacy became apparent as efforts to build a representative democracy in Iraq faltered under the harsh realities of sectarianism and corruption, despite America’s best efforts. Not only did Iraqi democracy become a conduit for sects and ethnic groups to promote their own interests at the expense of others, but it also fomented civil war and strengthened Iran’s strategic position, working directly against American interests. To support Assad, therefore, is to accept that our idealistic goals are unachievable and that only hard-nosed realism can support our strategic interests, at least in the Middle East.
One should note that there is a long-term sustainable, idealist solution to Middle East sectarianism, but it involves erasing and redrawing the ill-conceived borders of Iraq, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon that the Sykes-Picot agreement by Britain and France cemented in 1916, after the fall of the Ottoman Empire. Sykes-Picot ignored tribal and religious affinities, while imposing the foreign concept of the nation-state on groups of people with little in common. Many, even most, Middle East observers long for an idealist final solution that rewrites current boundaries. (I count myself among this group; I have previously written on the desirability and feasibility of Kurdish independence, which the Sykes-Picot negotiators considered and then rejected.) Unfortunately, it will never happen. Today there are simply too many stakeholders, too many vested interests, too many displaced persons, and above all too much oil, which makes redrawing boundaries a winner-take-all prospect. Pushing idealistic solutions might make for interesting debate fodder at the U.N. and on op-ed pages, but it will not end the current violence.
Assad is a viable source of stability also because of his unconditional support from Iran, which fears and detests ISIS for the threat it poses to Shiite dominance of the region. To reiterate, strengthening Iran’s strategic position is no one’s leading choice, and Tehran’s sponsorship of Hezbollah destabilizes Lebanon and threatens Israel. But since the 2006 war with Israel, Hezbollah has mostly kept its ambitions in check and has made efforts to gain political legitimacy. More broadly, since the fall of Saddam, the specter of a Shiite hegemony that spreads across the Levant has paled in comparison with the horrors wracked by Sunni extremist terrorism. We face two undesirable choices, and one is clearly better than the other.
Supporting Assad requires us to face a third uncomfortable truth: Vladimir Putin, for all of his faults, is pursuing the right strategy.
In the year I spent in post-war Iraq, I met many Iraqis who told me that as terrible as Saddam was, they preferred him over the anarchy, sectarian militias, and death squads that followed. Saddam was predictable: Everyone knew what they could and could not do to stay in the regime’s good graces and avoid becoming a political prisoner (or worse). In the current environment, the lack of predictability and the never-before-seen sectarian violence are deeply disturbing to Iraqis and Syrians alike. They contribute significantly to the fracturing of the region. Supporting Assad’s diminishing grasp on power gives us one more chance to act on the lessons learned from the recent past.
All of this raises a core question: Do the administration and foreign-policy community genuinely think it is “impossible” to support Assad? Or have the grim realities detailed above simply made the prospect too unpalatable? No doubt a reversal of course would make for uncomfortable speeches and mockery from pundits. None of that will compare, though, to the death and misery resulting from the status quo.
As the Syrian civil war and refugee crisis metastasize, we need a new approach for these unfolding human tragedies. To date, the Obama administration has mostly sat on the sidelines, in part because of war fatigue, but mostly because in the crowded mix of factions fighting in Syria, there are no good actors to support.
After the Pentagon’s embarrassing admission that $500 million put only “four or five” Syrian opposition fighters on the ground, it is clear that it’s fantasy to think we can find reliable Syrian allies who are both anti-ISIS and anti-Assad — which is the official policy of the administration and most leading presidential candidates. It would require threading a needle that is impossibly thin, with the assumption that we could vet and then arm rebels who might claim loyalty to the U.S. one day, but who resort to sectarian and tribal vendettas the next. And even in the event that we did find such a group and it assumed control, we’d still have a long way to go before consolidating power and making the transition to relative peace.
But the gravity of the Syria crisis is such that we no longer have the luxury of holding out for a solution that is ideologically appealing. Realpolitik is the only option. Throwing U.S. support behind President Bashar al-Assad is simply the best, or least bad, option left.
Supporting Assad means confronting three uncomfortable truths, all of which simmer just beneath the policy debates on the airwaves and at Capitol Hill.
First is the admission that the Middle East was a safer and more stable place with Saddam Hussein and Moammar Qaddafi in power. To be clear, both had murdered their own people en masse and were megalomaniacs of the first order. However, they were also secular despots who kept jihadism and sectarian violence in check. Power vacuums stemming from the demise of both tyrants have incubated some of the worst chaos, hatred, and human misery that the world has ever seen. If ISIS represents the worst-case scenario, then Assad is preferable.
The second uncomfortable truth is that realist foreign policy has triumphed over an idealistic one, at least when the Middle East is concerned. The idealist policy reached its high-water mark at the end of the Cold War, when the spreading of American-style democracy and capitalism won hearts, minds, and substantive geopolitical gains throughout Eastern Europe. On 9/11, the tide turned toward a realist policy, particularly when the world learned that many of the hijackers had been middle-class university graduates residing in Germany. Later, realism’s supremacy became apparent as efforts to build a representative democracy in Iraq faltered under the harsh realities of sectarianism and corruption, despite America’s best efforts. Not only did Iraqi democracy become a conduit for sects and ethnic groups to promote their own interests at the expense of others, but it also fomented civil war and strengthened Iran’s strategic position, working directly against American interests. To support Assad, therefore, is to accept that our idealistic goals are unachievable and that only hard-nosed realism can support our strategic interests, at least in the Middle East.
One should note that there is a long-term sustainable, idealist solution to Middle East sectarianism, but it involves erasing and redrawing the ill-conceived borders of Iraq, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon that the Sykes-Picot agreement by Britain and France cemented in 1916, after the fall of the Ottoman Empire. Sykes-Picot ignored tribal and religious affinities, while imposing the foreign concept of the nation-state on groups of people with little in common. Many, even most, Middle East observers long for an idealist final solution that rewrites current boundaries. (I count myself among this group; I have previously written on the desirability and feasibility of Kurdish independence, which the Sykes-Picot negotiators considered and then rejected.) Unfortunately, it will never happen. Today there are simply too many stakeholders, too many vested interests, too many displaced persons, and above all too much oil, which makes redrawing boundaries a winner-take-all prospect. Pushing idealistic solutions might make for interesting debate fodder at the U.N. and on op-ed pages, but it will not end the current violence.
Assad is a viable source of stability also because of his unconditional support from Iran, which fears and detests ISIS for the threat it poses to Shiite dominance of the region. To reiterate, strengthening Iran’s strategic position is no one’s leading choice, and Tehran’s sponsorship of Hezbollah destabilizes Lebanon and threatens Israel. But since the 2006 war with Israel, Hezbollah has mostly kept its ambitions in check and has made efforts to gain political legitimacy. More broadly, since the fall of Saddam, the specter of a Shiite hegemony that spreads across the Levant has paled in comparison with the horrors wracked by Sunni extremist terrorism. We face two undesirable choices, and one is clearly better than the other.
Supporting Assad requires us to face a third uncomfortable truth: Vladimir Putin, for all of his faults, is pursuing the right strategy.
In the year I spent in post-war Iraq, I met many Iraqis who told me that as terrible as Saddam was, they preferred him over the anarchy, sectarian militias, and death squads that followed. Saddam was predictable: Everyone knew what they could and could not do to stay in the regime’s good graces and avoid becoming a political prisoner (or worse). In the current environment, the lack of predictability and the never-before-seen sectarian violence are deeply disturbing to Iraqis and Syrians alike. They contribute significantly to the fracturing of the region. Supporting Assad’s diminishing grasp on power gives us one more chance to act on the lessons learned from the recent past.
All of this raises a core question: Do the administration and foreign-policy community genuinely think it is “impossible” to support Assad? Or have the grim realities detailed above simply made the prospect too unpalatable? No doubt a reversal of course would make for uncomfortable speeches and mockery from pundits. None of that will compare, though, to the death and misery resulting from the status quo.
Although I suspect antihenry is a Russian bot who just visits us to post pro-Putin links, I gotta agree with the latest. I admittedly fell victim to my own idealism when initially observing the Arab Spring and the migrants dying in the Mediterranean. 2015 has pretty much rid me of any idealism left. There is good in the world, and it should be cherished in the people, communities and institutions where it is found. But when it proves hard to find, better settle for what's less worse.
Nah....propping up dictators is never a solution. It wasn't when the US cozied up to Saddam, Mubarak, the Saudis, and it won't be by doing the same to Assad. Its a shortsighted, bandaid over a bullet wound remedy that never works because the conditions that led Syrians to reject 4 decades of Assad family dictatorship won't go away if ISIS suddenly vanishes. They are deeply ingrained in generations of hatred, which Assad has now further entrenched with his chemical weapons attack, barrel bombs, and random indiscriminate killing of his own population. He is a minority dictator whose time is up sooner or later, and frankly there won't be any sustainable solution until both he and ISIS are done away with.
You're still doing it to the Saudis, Bahrainis and their pals who've murdered scores of Yemeni civilians.
Yep - I don't think people realise here how deeply ingrained the hatred Syrians feel for Assad is. They hate him, more than we can imagine sitting here in the UK, US, Russia etc.
He's only just (last 1-2 days) allowed food aid and supplies to reach the starving dying population of Madaya due to international pressure. The hatred will only grow. And I blame Hezbollah / Iran as much as him. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-35295250
Probably not Assad, but another dictator is not unthinkable. We're currently hoping that democracy and republic will take hold in places where it has never been shown much appreciation by anyone with any actual clout. The Iraqi army retreating from ISIS in 2014 was a bit of a watershed moment for me. The whole Egypt issue too (although I still have to read the recent Politico article), from Mubarak, to the ballot box, out comes the Brotherhood, back to Sisi.
I've just come to think of stability as the name of the game, and not even because of oil which is slowly becoming a thing of the past, but because of terrorism. Isn't the accepted thinking that terrorists manage to plot major attacks when they have peace of mind and resources that come from having a safe haven? Failed states have always made for the best havens. As antagonistic as certain nation states might be, I think they realise the consequences of being found behind any major incidents. Even Iran doesn't dare support an organization that plots major attacks in Europe or the US.
You can't really make that generalisation as a non Syrian. Yes we have a Syrian here who regards him with contempt but the situation is more distorted than you make it out to be.
There are no good guys here, but the number 1 enemy here should be Wahabism - and that's regardless of whether you're Sunni, Shia, Kurdish, Christian or secular.
I wasn't basing that on what I've read by syrian_s. I know a lot of Syrians many who still have family there still. And what have I made the situation out to be? They hate him. That's the reality of the situation. I haven't distorted that. Obviously I'm not going to do a national consensus and ask every single one...but every single one I have asked / listened to / read about hate him. And for good reason.
Blaming Wahabism is nonsense. Wahabism didn't cause Assad to kill the youth in Dara'a in 2011, it wasn't the reason sarin gas, napalm and barrel bombs are dropped and it definitely isn't the reason he has detention centres, sexual assault Shabiha gangs who are paid to rape, and it definitely isn't the reason there are people eating cats and leaves in Madaya as they have no other food. Blaming Wahhabism for Assad's actions is deflective BS, and I know you know it.
Feck - got so into typing that I missed my tube stop.
Likewise I can say the same thing for the dozen or so Syrians I know who hold contrasting opinions to what you've said. The point is, there is no huge consensus supporting the opposition or regime, it is a distorted conflict whether we like it or not. If everyone hated the regime as you claim, it wouldn't have survived this long. And before you mention the Russians and Iranians propping him up, lets not forget the support the opposition have been receiving from the West and pretty much every Middle Eastern state in the region, and yet the government persists. This tells us that the regime isn't universally hated, or at the very least is preferred to the bleak alternative at stake.
And Wahabism is absolutely to blame for this blowing up into a sectarian conflict. If the Saudis and their Wahabist clerics weren't so hellbent on pouring weapons and money into every radical Sunni group in the region to antagonise Iran and her allies, then this wouldn't have been the sectarian clusterfeck it is today. Without Wahabism there'd be no madrasas radicalising marginalised Muslim youth, there'd be no Al Nusra and Ahrar Al Islam, and even ISIS would probably suffer a huge blow. They've been the biggest cancerous strain not only in this conflict, but for the region as a whole.
Have a look at this - it's the closest thing we can have to credible statistics or a consensus:
Edit: For some reasons the graphs didnt copy across, but read it on the link.
Edit 2: Pasted the wrong link...(this is why I hate typing from phone).
Edit 3: Right this is the correct link:
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/w...about-syrian-refugees-in-europe-a6689021.html
More Syrians are fleeing from President Assad than Isis
More Syrians said they fled because of President Assad than Isis.
More Syrians feared kidnap or arrest by President Assad's forces than Isis
Of those fearing arrest or kidnap, more feared detention by President Assad's government than Isis.
Most Syrians said President Assad would have to leave Syria for them to return
The majority of Syrians, 52 per cent, say they will not go back while President Assad is still in power.
-------------
And you're happy to point the finger at Wahhabism, but what about Hezbollah? They were the first group in there, before anyone else. Before any radical Sunni group entered the fray, Hezbollah were there causing mayhem (along with Shabiha). Their presence along with Shabiha paved the way for groups such as AQ and IS to enter. If you blame Wahabism for acts committed by Assad, then that is disingenuous bullshit. Blame attacks by IS on Wahabism by all means, but turning a blind eye and attributing none of the blame on Assad for what he's done is just stupid. That's something I'd expect Danny1980 to come out with, not you.
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Replacing saddan and the Lybia's leader caused more deaths than we had before besides the millions of refugees, was that a good idea? No we fecked up again and I'm a believer we should leave those countries and not be involved again.
Do you really think that whoever they vote to replace Assad will be any better? Or more likely, the puppet America tries to parachute in there will be any better?
A better way of looking at is there won't be any peace in Syria until all stakeholders feel they have some say in how their country is governed. That clearly won't take place under ISIS, Assad, and a few other militant groups in the mix. It can only happen until Syria transitions to a somewhat more Democratic governance.
Qaddafi wasn't replaced and deciding between dictator and jihadis is a false choice since it omits a transition to a viable democratic system.
But that's not exactly what our forces are working towards is it? Everyone, including us, is just trying to look after their own narrow interests, which is why many of us on here want out.
Yes, but that's different from what i am proposing, which is a situation that is actually sustainable over the long run. Nothing will be resolved until all stakeholders have equal access to their own governance, which will never happen under dictatorship. This is the fatal flaw in Assad apologism.
Syria, among many other places in the region, aren't ready for a democracy. We've already learned that in Iraq and Egypt.
Better to have a strongman than absolute chaos.