ISIS in Iraq and Syria

2cents said:
On that particular topic, you should find this article especially interesting -'Lines Drawn on an Empty Map': Iraq's Borders and and the Legend of the Artificial State

Part 1 - http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/21759/lines-drawn-on-an-empty-map_iraq’s-borders-and-the

Part 2 - http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/21780/lines-drawn-on-an-empty-map_iraq’s-borders-and-the
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Really interesting article, thanks. It makes some really convincing points vis-a-vis tearing down the eurocentrism of the artificial state narrative, but at the same time it also sort of fails to provide an alternative explanation for the problems we see now. Is it that the political parties tend to align themselves along ethno-religious lines and create a somewhat adversarial atmosphere which exacerbate inter-communal tensions? Or perhaps was it just that the relatively united voice arguing for Iraq's legitimacy as a state crumbled after the British left and there was no longer a common enemy?

I know you're a historian, can you shed any light on where that sort of Iraqi nationalism stemmed from in terms of the specific border claims? From what I remember of the history, the Abbasids give way to the Mongols who give way to the Oghuz Turks until it was swallowed by the Ottoman Empire, during which there was a lot of back and forth with the Safavids and period of Mamluk rule. What I don't really understand is when and how Iraq sort of gained a sense of itself in terms of 'these areas are in Iraq and these are not', when the larger political units which held dominion over the territory were constantly shifting.
 
Its a great essay and would be worth reading for everyone who is interested in history. He makes a great case against the narrative, that boarders are drawn in some office. That said he doesn’t make a convincing case for Iraq being a nation (or even becoming a nation). I also disagree with his implication that nations are actively build. He also doesn’t take the idea of modern states and its impact into account.

In the end the status-quo is, that there are several cleavages that create friction and violence. Nobody has any plan on how to bridge those gaps. There is always the possibility of autonomous regions, who are kept loosely together by a central government. Sadly even this concept doesn’t seem to work for various reasons.



Btw: there was a interesting article in theintercept a couple of days ago. It’s nothing really new, but explains the influence of ex-Baathists in ISIS:
https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/06/03/isis-forces-exbaathist-saddam-loyalists/
 
jeff_goldblum said:
fails to provide an alternative explanation for the problems we see now. Is it that the political parties tend to align themselves along ethno-religious lines and create a somewhat adversarial atmosphere which exacerbate inter-communal tensions? Or perhaps was it just that the relatively united voice arguing for Iraq's legitimacy as a state crumbled after the British left and there was no longer a common enemy
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I was thinking the same when reading it. I imagine she'd link Iraq's problems to the wider problem of nation-building experienced across the post-colonial world, and in the specifically Arab context to a) the failure of secular ideologies and systems such as liberal monarchism (1922-1958) and various forms of Arab nationalism/socialism 1958 onwards to create a more coherent society, and b) the rise of regional sectarianism following the 1967 defeat and Iranian revolution, both of which she would link to the impact of the West and other regional actors.

jeff_goldblum said:
I know you're a historian, can you shed any light on where that sort of Iraqi nationalism stemmed from in terms of the specific border claims? From what I remember of the history, the Abbasids give way to the Mongols who give way to the Oghuz Turks until it was swallowed by the Ottoman Empire, during which there was a lot of back and forth with the Safavids and period of Mamluk rule. What I don't really understand is when and how Iraq sort of gained a sense of itself in terms of 'these areas are in Iraq and these are not', when the larger political units which held dominion over the territory were constantly shifting.
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I think she covers the specifics of how the borders came about pretty well. In terms of a pre-British, indigenous idea of Iraq as a distinct region, I think a few factors would have played into it:

First, in the Arab-Islamic imagination, there is very much a distinction between Iraq and Bilad ash-Sham (Greater Syria), symbolized by the fact that the Umayyads had their capital at Damascus and looked to Byzantium for models of government and administration, whereas the Abbasids built theirs at Baghdad (although they also used a couple of other places such as Raqqa and Samara at other times) and looked to the Persians. A third region known in Arabic history as al-Jazira was situated between the upper Tigris and Euhphrates, roughly in line with the current boundaries of the Islamic State.

Second, the Tigris-Euphrates region below Anatolia is an obviously distinct geographical area, bounded by deserts on the west and south, and mountains on the north and east, with almost the entire population living along the rivers down to the Gulf.

Third, I could be wrong here (maybe @Kaos or @Danny1982 could confirm) but as far as I understand, the dialect of Arabic spoken in Iraq is quite distinct to that which prevails in Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Palestine (which have their own regional differences, but none as distinct as Iraqi Arabic).

Fourth, European archaeological expeditions during the 19th century helped fuel an interest among local elites in the ancient Babylonian past, which fostered a sense of historical continuity in the idea of a state based on the region.

Fifth, the Arab tribes of southern Iraq were mostly late-comers to Shi'ism, converting to the faith only over the course of the late 18th/early 19th centuries. This meant their secular culture remained based on Arabic tribal norms shared by the Sunnis to the north, and alien to their Iranian co-religionists to the east. While the shrine cities of Najaf and Karbala were often dominated by Iranian mujtahids, these were expelled following the 1920 revolt, leaving the Iraqi Shi'a free to throw themselves into the nation-building project (note that despite all that has gone on since then, there has never been a specifically Shi'i separatist movement in southern Iraq, and the population remained largely loyal even during the Iran-Iraq war).
 
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2cents said:
Third, I could be wrong here (maybe @Kaos or @Danny1982 could confirm) but as far as I understand, the dialect of Arabic spoken in Iraq is quite distinct to that which prevails in Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Palestine (which have their own regional differences, but none as distinct as Iraqi Arabic).
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Yes that's pretty much correct. Almost all Arabic-speaking countries share the same or near-same dialect with their neighbours. The Syrians, Lebs, Jordanians and Palestinians with their Levantine dialect and the Gulf Arabs with their shared dialect. (I'm not going to dare generalise North Africa since that's a whole new spectrum I'm far too ignorant to comment on). Iraqi Arabic finds itself awkwardly on its own pretty much, but that's likely due to its plethora of ethnicites past and present which have assimilated into the general cultural makeup of the country. There's supposedly a tenuous Aramaic link too but I'm not a linguist so not sure what to make of that.

Have to say, these discussions have illuminated how very little I know about Iraq's history (much to my shame :lol:), so I appreciate the crash course in history.
 
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One year since the fall of Mosul. Looking back to the start of this thread, seems we've all severely underestimated ISIS.
 
2cents said:
One year since the fall of Mosul. Looking back to the start of this thread, seems we've all severely underestimated ISIS.
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The help/fight against the ISIS message from counties near by is the most depressing part for me rather than the scale of ISIS(Europe/US could could wipe really out ISIS in a couple of days). The fact that ISIS message isn't seen by many countries with utter disgust is staggering, although this blame is rather on the governments/dictatorships of these's countries rather than the civilians(But with saying that it's clear that the ISIS message has some connection with people in the around the world, with the sheer volume of foreign fighters, let alone local fighters).

Watching a Vice video yesterday about the fight against ISIS with the Peshmerga Kurds(It's worth pointing out that the Kurds themselves have very serious problems - Honour Killing/Forced Suicide of women and Female genital mutilation)and just seen the lack of support they(Kurds) are getting and the sheer support ISIS are getting just kills any hope for the people living there.

It's all be shit at the moment.
 
Sweet Square said:
The help/fight against the ISIS message from counties near by is the most depressing part for me rather than the scale of ISIS(Europe/US could could wipe really out ISIS in a couple of days). The fact that ISIS message isn't seen by many countries with utter disgust is staggering, although this blame is rather on the governments/dictatorships of these's countries rather than the civilians(But with saying that it's clear that the ISIS message has some connection with people in the around the world, with the sheer volume of foreign fighters, let alone local fighters).

Watching a Vice video yesterday about the fight against ISIS with the Peshmerga Kurds(It's worth pointing out that the Kurds themselves have very serious problems - Honour Killing/Forced Suicide of women and Female genital mutilation)and just seen the lack of support they(Kurds) are getting and the sheer support ISIS are getting just kills any hope for the people living there.

It's all be shit at the moment.
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A lot of these nearby countries see ISIS as a necessary buffer against the Shia Islamic spheres of Iran, Lebanon and Iraq. Its why you won't see them lift a finger while rushing to bomb Shia militias in Yemen (Saudi Arabia) and even go as far as covertly supporting them via indirect means (Turkey and Qatar).
 
France, Russia, Tunisia, and Saudi providing ISIS with the most fighters.

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Kaos said:
A lot of these nearby countries see ISIS as a necessary buffer against the Shia Islamic spheres of Iran, Lebanon and Iraq. Its why you won't see them lift a finger while rushing to bomb Shia militias in Yemen (Saudi Arabia) and even go as far as covertly supporting them via indirect means (Turkey and Qatar).
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My knowledge on this subject and the countries around Iraq is lacking to say the least. But do you think only way of rigging Iraq of ISIS would mainly be through US/Europe backing of the Kurds and Iraq Army(Although there's being a complaints mainly by Kurds of a lack of supplies).

At the moment there's seems to be a stalemate between the Kurds/Iraq Army and ISIS
 
Sweet Square said:
My knowledge on this subject and the countries around Iraq is lacking to say the least. But do you think only way of rigging Iraq of ISIS would mainly be through US/Europe backing of the Kurds and Iraq Army(Although there's being a complaints mainly by Kurds of a lack of supplies).

At the moment there's seems to be a stalemate between the Kurds/Iraq Army and ISIS
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Yes, you'd only be halfway there though.

I've always said the solution to this conflict is to starve ISIS's supply lines. If there's a real effort to police Turkey's borders then you essentially stop the flow of new recruits into Syria and Iraq. If you target the Wahabi donors in Saudi and Qatar then you're depriving ISIS of funding and weaponry. Turkey and the Gulf Arab nations are friends and allies of the West, this should be doable.
 
Raoul said:
Wrong. I did work closely with senior members of the Iraqi gov and members of Maliki's inner circle, so I don't need any revisionism on what the Maliki/Da'wa position was on how to deal with Sunni Iraq. There may be some truth to the idea that AQI/ISIS were waiting for the US to leave, just as there is plenty of truth in the fact hat AQI's networks had been severely degraded in most of Iraq. They were beaten into submission and didn't have the ability to get up to what they were doing in 2006-09. There is a good reason why Maliki was chased out of Baghdad last year. He was both incompetent and sectarian, and even members of the Da'wa hierarchy wanted him gone.
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Which shows that his problem is not being "sectarian", because many Shia parties were against him. He was incompetent though, no disagreement there.

So, what about Abadi? Is he also "sectarian" (like Maliki and Jaafari before him)? What's your opinion?
 
Danny1982 said:
Which shows that his problem is not being "sectarian", because many Shia parties were against him. He was incompetent though, no disagreement there.

So, what about Abadi? Is he also "sectarian" (like Maliki and Jaafari before him)? What's your opinion?
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To be honest, its going to be difficult to get the ideal PM who isn't in some way beholden to Sectarian interests. Abadi strikes me as a milder version of Maliki, so lets see how it goes. In my experience, Barham Salih would be the best politician to lead Iraq, in terms of his background and skills, but that's obviously not going to happen.
 
Raoul said:
To be honest, its going to be difficult to get the ideal PM who isn't in some way beholden to Sectarian interests. Abadi strikes me as a milder version of Maliki, so lets see how it goes. In my experience, Barham Salih would be the best politician to lead Iraq, in terms of his background and skills, but that's obviously not going to happen.
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Saleh was generally quite poor as Kurdish prime minister, so I don't see him doing particularly well in the Baghdad hotseat.

Iyad Jamal al Din would be an example of an ideal politician. He's a Shia cleric so would resonate with the country's majority, but he also vehemently campaigns for more secularism and is very critical of Iran's interference in the country. Unfortunately benevolent politicians in Iraq don't get very far, and when they do they don't last very long.
 
Kaos said:
Saleh was generally quite poor as Kurdish prime minister, so I don't see him doing particularly well in the Baghdad hotseat.

Iyad Jamal al Din would be an example of an ideal politician. He's a Shia cleric so would resonate with the country's majority, but he also vehemently campaigns for more secularism and is very critical of Iran's interference in the country. Unfortunately benevolent politicians in Iraq don't get very far, and when they do they don't last very long.
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Saleh was the best Iraqi politician I encountered. Intelligent, technocratic, and able to communicate effectively with foreign leaders. Obviously, as Kurd, his chances of leading Iraq are impossible.
 
Grinner said:
Has there been anything published on who the Saudi moneymen are and where they've got their money from?
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Probably various wealthy individuals in places like Saudi/Qatar etc. Personally I think the links to these countries are a bit overblown. They currently make a vast majority of their money by levying taxes on citizens within territories they conquer and selling what little oil they can.
 
Thousands call on Israel to save Syrian Druze in mass protest
Israel's Druze accepting donations to send to family, friends in Syria who face threat of massacres; 'We are all ready to take them into our homes.'

Thousands protested in Israel's Druze villages Saturday, calling on Israel and the international community to take action and aid the Druze community in Syria, which is facing a growing threat of being massacred at the hands of Islamic State militants, al-Qaeda affiliates and other rebels locked in a civil war with the Syrian regime under Bashar Assad.

"Stop the massacres," cried some protesters, "We want the Druze among us," called others. Donations were accepted during the protests, which the Druze hope will reach their family members in Syria.

"I have family and friends who I'm very worried about and I try to help them in any way I can," said a member of the Israeli Druze community from Mas'ada village in the Golan Heights. "I hope that the State of Israel will help them and let them come to Mas'ada. We are all ready to take them into our homes.

http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4667999,00.html
 
Frontline did a good episode on Syria recently. It's clear that there were no good options but I wonder what will happen now that Assad may be about to use chemical weapons again.
 
Syria has gotten so crazy that America's allies are funding al-Qaeda on purpose

Here is how crazy things have gotten in the international response to Syria: two pieces published in the past month, from the Wall Street Journal and the Independent, reported that Turkey and Saudi Arabia are working together to ship weapons and cash to Jaish al-Fatah, a rebel coalition. Syria's al-Qaeda affiliate, Jabhat al-Nusra, is one of the key partners in the coalition. These allies know that their plan means arming al-Qaeda, and they're totally fine with that.

There's a sort of deranged logic at work here. The way these countries see it, there are three broad factions in the Syrian war: Bashar al-Assad's regime, ISIS, and a fractious, ideologically diverse group of rebels opposed to both of them. That last faction includes Jabhat al-Nusra, which sees ISIS as an upstart competitor to al-Qaeda and has chosen to partner with less extreme rebels.

The Saudi, Turkish, and Qatari governments see this rebel coalition as the least of three evils. Assad's regime is essentially an Iranian client, and these states see curtailing Iran's influence in the region as a top strategic priority. ISIS's sheer brutality and lightning expansion makes it seem like, in the short term, a bigger terrorist threat than al-Qaeda. So if you want Assad to lose, and you oppose ISIS, there's really only one option: arm the rebels. And in their view, the fact that al-Qaeda's fighters are the most effective rebels makes it worth the risk to arm them.

"The Turks, the Saudis and the Qataris have decided that the problem above all is to get rid of Bashar al-Assad, and the Americans don't have leverage over them to change what they are doing," Robert Ford, the US ambassador to Syria from 2010 to 2014, told the Journal.

This is a terrible idea — but it illustrates just how bad things have gotten

problem with this logic is that it's insane. Jabhat al-Nusra is still al-Qaeda: just like ISIS, it wants to topple the region's governments and establish a caliphate run on a vicious interpretation of Islamic law in their place. The fact that Nusra can fight alongside more moderate Syrian rebels doesn't mean it's given up on its regional ambitions: it just means the group is more subtle about them.

"The willingness to believe that Nusra is somehow AQ-lite or 'not super jihadi' is crazy pants," Erin M. Simpson, CEO of the private research and consulting firm Caerus Associates, writes.

This strategy has a pretty clear track record. In the 1980s, the Saudis cultivated Osama bin Laden as an operative in their shadow war against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Bin Laden's network grew stronger in part as a result of recruits radicalized during that war.

The most generous possible reading of that blunder is that at the time, no one could have anticipated what al-Qaeda would become. But today we know exactly what al-Qaeda is — and so do the Saudis, Turks, and Qataris. The fact that they're willing to supporting al-Qaeda, fully cognizant of the risk of blowback, illustrates just how terrible things have gotten in Syria, and how twisted the desperate logic of these participants really is.

http://www.vox.com/2015/6/15/8771999/this-is-how-crazy-syria-policy-has-gotten

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The real problem is actually that they don't see Al-Qaeda as a threat to them (as much as the US), for two reasons: 1- most importantly because they share pretty much the same ideology. 2- and because 9/11 happened only in the US. So for them, it's not really that much of a risk.
 
Jabhat al-Nusra have been very clever in marketing themselves as some kind of moderate alternative to ISIS. A couple of weeks ago Al-Jazeera aired a two-hour interview with their leader al-Julani, one of the lamest interviews you'll see with the interviewer clearly in love with JaN. Amongst other things, al-Julani assured us that the Druze, Alawites and other minorities in Syria would be safe, as long as they repent and become Muslims (!). Then this week we have this:

Syrian civil war: Jabhat al-Nusra's massacre of Druze villagers shows they're just as nasty as Isis
http://www.independent.co.uk/voices...-group-is-just-as-nasty-as-isis-10318348.html

Make no mistake - they are fighting with US weapons given to their 'moderate' partners in the Jaysh al-Islam coaltion, guys like Zahran Alloush (about whom read here - http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/zahran-alloush/) and others.
 
Grinner said:
Frontline did a good episode on Syria recently. It's clear that there were no good options but I wonder what will happen now that Assad may be about to use chemical weapons again.
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Putin made sure he gave them all up, remember? ;)
 
Grinner said:
It increasingly looks like chaos is the best option for the West. Sucks if you're a Syrian civilian.
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Chaos in the middle east has always been the West's modus operandi for imposing regional hegemony via means of dividing and conquering. They've just evolved from the Brits and Ottomans before them who simply used brute and Imperial force to reinforce their hegemony.
 
Kaos said:
Chaos in the middle east has always been the West's modus operandi for imposing regional hegemony via means of dividing and conquering. They've just evolved from the Brits and Ottomans before them who simply used brute and Imperial force to reinforce their hegemony.
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Except there's been no conquering lately, which would call into question the legitimacy of this view. If anything, the west is clearly interested in long term middle eastern democracy and stability to ensure uninterrupted commerce.
 
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