As you say, the dependence on the US has largely governed EU and UK policy. Now that dynamic is potentially changing and the EU/UK is becoming more independent - which requires that military backstop that I was describing above.
The EU as a combined power bloc is a global superpower on a par with China or the US. It needs to be able to protect its interests at home and abroad, and a nuclear deterrent does not achieve that.
One would think that moving forwards, serious military cooperation and joint development of key capabilities between Britain, France and Germany is the key to European security.
Britain need to move away from its reliance on Trident, and along with France develop a new, proprietary land and sea based nuclear deterrent system that can be extended to Germany and other European allies. Currently the two systems are incompatible. This will be enormously expensive but also enormously necessary.
The development of new naval, air force, armour, projectile, AI, and drone defence systems should be done in concert between the three countries to vastly improve intraoperability and achieve economies of scale. The UK is at least developing its own next generation multi-role fighter jet, in Tempest, along with Italy and Japan, but both Britain and Germany are dependent on future F35 tranches (not such an issue for the UK who is an “equal” tier 1 partner with the US), and the French have typically gone it alone. FCAS with France, Germany and Spain is the European answer to Tempest; but moving forwards it would make sense to roll these two programs into one and work together, rather than such a fragmented approach to development.
When you look at the costs of developing new carriers, destroyers, frigates, fighters, submarines etc., and how much of that cost goes into the design and development phase; it makes so much sense to all pursue the same programs together and defray the costs across many more contributors. The overall unit cost of design, development and eventual construction comes down significantly, supply chains, intra-operability, availability and price of parts, and access to qualified repair and maintenance all vastly improve. It’s not just about increasing overall defence spending, it’s making that money go so much further.
It’s also good business, because these joint programs will eventually lead to much better outcomes, in terms of capabilities and superiority, and that alone creates an even more robust export market. Inherently built into the model would be likely, at a minimum, three levels of capability. Tier 1, full capability variants for primary partners; tier 2, reduced capability/scaled down variants for those partners with more limited defence budgets; and tier 3, selective capability variants for foreign market exports.
A great example of how cost savings could be deployed is in the development of new aircraft carriers. The UK spent approximately 6.5bn pounds designing, developing, building and putting to sea two new Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers. Meanwhile, France needs to replace the Charles de Gaulle carrier and is planning to do so with the super-carrier PA-NG by 2038 at an estimated cost of approximately 8-9bn euros. If the British and French had cooperated and developed these projects together, they could not only have already delivered a highly capable replacement to CDG for the French, but the savings in working together likely would’ve meant that compromises such as making the carrier conventionally fuelled as opposed to nuclear powered, would never have had to be made. By working separately, we’ve likely spent double what we needed to (when added together), and in the case of Britain, made significant design compromises to stay even remotely close to budget (still a fail).
That’s just one really obvious example, and there are so many more. The main issue has always been trying to find a tight coupling between unified response to global threats, and maintaining individual national interests. In the case of all three of Europes biggest economic and military powers - the UK, France, and Germany - politicians all tend to agree on having shared security threats, but also prioritise protection of their own national defense industries/economies. And as that second consideration was deemed more important to voters and politicians (protecting jobs in British/French/German defense contractors), we ended up with this hopelessly fragmented approach, with is absurdly inefficient.
Finally it seems that the apparent increasing withdrawal of the US with regards to European security, and the acutely perceived threat from Russia becoming too pervasive to ignore; we may finally see common sense prevail, and a much more unified, collaborative and efficient approach to enhancing European security and military power. I’m not holding my breath, but I am tentatively optimistic. Any move towards greater collaboration and joint development programmes, is a move in the right direction. Individually these countries are second tier players, but as a bloc they can become a legitimate superpower. But what is essential is this close collaboration to dramatically reduce per nation design, development, production and running costs, so we can achieve significant improvements in efficiency and unlock economies of scale. Production in Europe, with resource scarcity and European wages, mean that our nominal defence spending levels don’t go as far as say the Russians or Chinese who have access to abundant resources, cheap energy, and pay their people peanuts.
The question isn’t whether Europe can become a legitimate superpower. It’s whether they will. They are already an economic superpower to some degree, as the largest multi nation single market on the planet (and one the UK simply must regain access to), and they are undoubtedly a regulatory superpower, but in terms of energy and military capability….there is some way to go. The US, with their backwards looking roadmap to progress, which calls for increased reliance on fossil fuels and abandonment of investment in green technologies, is really giving Europe a bit of an open goal to become the world leader in renewable energy and sustainable, clean fuels. A potential huge economy, and an economy of the future, up for grabs. But we’ll have to focus heavily on developing the tech sectors, including AI, because Europe has slipped far too far behind in that area.
So while I am heavily advocating for a sustained increase in defence spending right across Europe, I am even more strongly advocating for a quantum leap forwards in defence operations and development collaborations between the UK and the EU. This is vital and, for me, the key. Of course, no conversation about this can be had without addressing how this can be sustainable in the long term. Potentially with a high level of collaboration, defence spending becomes so much more efficient that even a minor increase leads to vastly improved outcomes, but it also feels like a relevant time to address the rapidly unfolding welfare crisis across European countries with aging populations.
Quite simply, how do you sustain such an ageing population and remain globally competitive? The answer to me seems to be in some sort of tiered change to retirement age, raising the threshold to 70 in most instances. People are living longer and longer, and retirement ages cannot stay static, it’s just not feasible. Older people also have a wealth of experience and skill to contribute to the workforce, a contribution which, after say 65, could become sedentary by definition. No one should be advocating for having 68 year olds on production lines, for example, but there are a plethora of sedentary roles that could not only utilise this highly skilled and untapped resource, and also significantly reduce the social welfare burden. I am sure many will decry this philosophy, but as we continuously make breakthroughs to extend human life and average life expectancies keep going up, is it realistic to keep retirement age pegged where it is? I don’t think so.
In 1950 average life expectancy in the Uk, for example, was just 68. In 2019 average life expectancy was 79 for men and 83 for women. By 2047 the figures are projected to be 89 and 92 respectively. The retirement age in the UK in 1950 was 65 for men and 60 for women, meaning an average expected life on state pension of 3 years and 8 years respectively. Current retirement age is 66, meaning averages of 11 and 15 years respectively. The retirement age is not expected to hit 68 until 2044 at which point those numbers will be 21 and 24 years respectively. Unsustainable.
