Mciahel Goodman
Worst Werewolf Player of All Times
- Joined
- Apr 27, 2014
- Messages
- 30,004
When the public discourse turns to geopolitics, there are always at least two frames of reference in usage at any given moment. Firstly, you have the populist narrative which is given by the media in bitesize chunks for majority consumption (even if their goal was to educate and foster dissent rather than indoctrinate and manufacture consent, on which point I'm open to debate, the sheer volume of material they would have to cover almost debars such attempts). Most of the first frame is dominated by simplistic appeals to emotional sense (scholars of war propaganda will be familiar with the Belgian atrocity stories from the first world war and millions of others before and since). The second, always implicit, frame is geopolitical. Geopolitical strategists, like those who work at state departments around the world, do not live or think in the same frame as the majority of people who get their news from the "news". They instead study maps, troop movements, sociopolitical history, and financial markets. They play the "great game" as a mode of employment (it's what they do, after all). Here's the clash: we, the public, generally do not like to think of it in these terms but geopolitical strategists are not driven by morality but instead by what is optimal for any given state's interest. They speak in terms of the domination of one state (theirs) over another. So here is a good example, which is also prescient as it was written in the 1990s:
If you were to continue reading that book, you would understand that American planners (from all across the spectrum) conceive of conflicts like the current one in terms that are very different/completely removed from the moral frame of reference. They all understand themselves to be competing in the same arena (national/international dominance) and tend to use very similar language despite actual linguistic differences.
Another, related example, from the Financial Times today:
The above is interesting because it frames the first quotation. A lot of simultaneous actions which have many implications beyond any single country. The end of the dollar hegemony is the theme and China's longterm planning for it (understood twentyfive years ago) is the backdrop against which the author is reading the Russian invasion of Ukraine (a hastening or consecration of an inevitable shift in the world order).
The frame of reference for geopolitics is strictly amoral (with a few exceptions: morality is baked into the overall framework as in proportional response theory, but it sits in the background almost never being a forefront issue). As such, it has less to do with with what is right from a moralistic viewpoint and a lot more to do with what is right from a "might is right" point of view ("the strong do what they want, the weak do what they can", as Thucydides said, and that is roughly how state planners engaged in this frame of discourse still tend to think). Or, the dominance hierarchy.
That does not sit well with most people because we like to think that the moral order is primary and the rest is secondary. Reading the newspapers and watching the news, it is the moral frame which is active and the geopolitical is almost always left to the background or brought forward only insofar as it clarifies a given instance of justified morality. Moral views are much truer from a bottom up perspective (it's how we as people, or general public, tend to react) but not from the top down (people who more or less set the tone for political discourse do not think primarily in moral terms). So when people take a view of events from this frame, the one predominantly occupied by state departments, it comes across as amoral largely because it is, technically, amoral: an abstracted, elevated, frame of reference which seeks to understand events in context, both diachronic and synchronic. This does not mean the people are amoral, including state planners or the general person giving an opinion (me in this instance), it just means that two different frames of reference are in play and tend to come into conflict with each other (the reactionary frame criticizes the geopolitical/historical frame as seditious or uncaring and the geopolitical/historical frame criticises the reactionary frame as naive, or generally something along those lines). Often these views are not even mutually exclusive, but appear that way because the centre of one focus is decentered from another.
The point I'm making is probably already understood by most. I am making it here, as the start of a geopolitical thread, because I don't want to derail the Ukraine thread or any other thread with geopolitical "whataboutery" (which is in itself largely the product of two interrelated but temporally distinct frames of reference clashing). I think it's good to have a place where people can put historical and contextual arguments forward, though a live war thread dedicated to updates is definitely not the place for that. So I open this one instead for anyone with any long- or shortform contributions to make about any events that are happening but which contributions are too abstract for the tenor of the tone set by said event (updates are generally what is expected, and that is fair enough).
Not limited to any given conflict, past or present, so no "whataboutery" is possible. I'm primarily interested in understanding the order that is now emerging with Russia/China on one side and US/NATO on the other (with the rest of the world wedged between).
EDIT: This is quite a good video but would threaten to spill into whataboutery as soon as people begin to discuss it in depth and go back a hundred years in history (which is exactly what I mean by two frames that aren't necessarily in disagreement but conflict):
Another example from @VidaRed. This is one of the most well known, or most suggested, videos on geopolitics these days (because of its topic) and has a provocative title, but is actually a very nuanced discussion of the factors which lead up to where we are today.
Zbigniew Brzezinski said:A geostrategic issue of crucial importance is posed by China’s emergence as a major power. The most appealing outcome would be to co-opt a democratizing and freemarketing China into a larger Asian regional framework of cooperation. But suppose China does not democratize but continues to grow in economic and military power? A “Greater China” may be emerging, whatever the desires and calculations of its neighbors, and any effort to prevent that from happening could entail an intensifying conflict with China. Such a conflict
could strain American-Japanese relations—for it is far from certain that Japan would want to follow America’s lead in containing China—and could therefore have potentially revolutionary consequences for Tokyo’s definition of Japan’s regional role, perhaps even resulting in the termination of the American presence in the Far East.
However, accommodation with China will also exact its own price. To accept China as a regional power is not a matter of simply endorsing a mere slogan. There will have to be substance to any such regional preeminence. To put it very directly, how large a Chinese sphere of influence, and where, should America be prepared to accept as part of a policy of successfully co-opting China into world affairs? What areas now outside of China’s political radius might have to be conceded to the realm of the reemerging Celestial Empire?
In that context, the retention of the American presence in South Korea becomes especially important. Without it, it is difficult to envisage the American-Japanese defense arrangement continuing in its present form, for Japan would have to become militarily more self-sufficient. But any movement toward Korean reunification is likely to disturb the basis for the continued U.S. military presence in South Korea. A reunified Korea may choose not to perpetuate American military protection; that, indeed, could be the price exacted by
China for throwing its decisive weight behind the reunification of the peninsula. In brief, U.S. management of its relationship with China will inevitably have direct consequences for the stability of the American-Japanese-Korean triangular security relationship.
Finally, some possible contingencies involving future political alignments should also be briefly noted, subject to fuller discussion in pertinent chapters. In the past, international affairs were largely dominated by contests among individual states for regional domination. Henceforth, the United States may have to determine how to cope with regional coalitions that seek to push America out of Eurasia, thereby threatening America’s status as a global power. However, whether any such coalitions do or do not arise to challenge American primacy will in fact depend to a very large degree on how effectively the United States responds to the major dilemmas identified here. Potentially, the most dangerous scenario would be a grand coalition of China, Russia, and perhaps Iran, an “antihegemonic” coalition united not by ideology but by complementary grievances. It would be reminiscent in scale and scope of the challenge once posed by the Sino-Soviet bloc, though this time China would likely be the leader and Russia the follower. Averting this contingency, however remote it may be, will require a display of U.S. geostrategic skill on the western, eastern, and southern perimeters of Eurasia simultaneously.
If you were to continue reading that book, you would understand that American planners (from all across the spectrum) conceive of conflicts like the current one in terms that are very different/completely removed from the moral frame of reference. They all understand themselves to be competing in the same arena (national/international dominance) and tend to use very similar language despite actual linguistic differences.
Another, related example, from the Financial Times today:
All of this supports China’s long-term goal of building a post-dollarised world, in which Russia would be one of many vassal states settling all transactions in renminbi. Getting there is not an easy process. The Chinese want to de-dollarise, but they also want complete control of their own financial system. That’s a difficult circle to square. One of the reasons that the dollar is the world’s reserve currency is that, in contrast, the US markets are so open and liquid. Still, the Chinese hope to use trade and the petropolitics of the moment to increase the renminbi’s share of global foreign exchange. One high-level western investor in China told me he expected that share would rise from 2 per cent to as high as 7 per cent in the next three to four years. That is, of course, still minuscule compared with the position of the dollar, which is 59 per cent. But the Chinese are playing a long game. Finance is a key pillar in the new Great Power competition with America; currency, capital flows and the Belt and Road Initiative trade pathway will all play a role in that. Beijing is slowly diversifying its foreign exchange reserves, as well as buying up a lot of gold. This can be seen as a kind of hedge on a post-dollar word (the assumption being that gold will rise as the dollar falls).
The above is interesting because it frames the first quotation. A lot of simultaneous actions which have many implications beyond any single country. The end of the dollar hegemony is the theme and China's longterm planning for it (understood twentyfive years ago) is the backdrop against which the author is reading the Russian invasion of Ukraine (a hastening or consecration of an inevitable shift in the world order).
The frame of reference for geopolitics is strictly amoral (with a few exceptions: morality is baked into the overall framework as in proportional response theory, but it sits in the background almost never being a forefront issue). As such, it has less to do with with what is right from a moralistic viewpoint and a lot more to do with what is right from a "might is right" point of view ("the strong do what they want, the weak do what they can", as Thucydides said, and that is roughly how state planners engaged in this frame of discourse still tend to think). Or, the dominance hierarchy.
That does not sit well with most people because we like to think that the moral order is primary and the rest is secondary. Reading the newspapers and watching the news, it is the moral frame which is active and the geopolitical is almost always left to the background or brought forward only insofar as it clarifies a given instance of justified morality. Moral views are much truer from a bottom up perspective (it's how we as people, or general public, tend to react) but not from the top down (people who more or less set the tone for political discourse do not think primarily in moral terms). So when people take a view of events from this frame, the one predominantly occupied by state departments, it comes across as amoral largely because it is, technically, amoral: an abstracted, elevated, frame of reference which seeks to understand events in context, both diachronic and synchronic. This does not mean the people are amoral, including state planners or the general person giving an opinion (me in this instance), it just means that two different frames of reference are in play and tend to come into conflict with each other (the reactionary frame criticizes the geopolitical/historical frame as seditious or uncaring and the geopolitical/historical frame criticises the reactionary frame as naive, or generally something along those lines). Often these views are not even mutually exclusive, but appear that way because the centre of one focus is decentered from another.
The point I'm making is probably already understood by most. I am making it here, as the start of a geopolitical thread, because I don't want to derail the Ukraine thread or any other thread with geopolitical "whataboutery" (which is in itself largely the product of two interrelated but temporally distinct frames of reference clashing). I think it's good to have a place where people can put historical and contextual arguments forward, though a live war thread dedicated to updates is definitely not the place for that. So I open this one instead for anyone with any long- or shortform contributions to make about any events that are happening but which contributions are too abstract for the tenor of the tone set by said event (updates are generally what is expected, and that is fair enough).
Not limited to any given conflict, past or present, so no "whataboutery" is possible. I'm primarily interested in understanding the order that is now emerging with Russia/China on one side and US/NATO on the other (with the rest of the world wedged between).
EDIT: This is quite a good video but would threaten to spill into whataboutery as soon as people begin to discuss it in depth and go back a hundred years in history (which is exactly what I mean by two frames that aren't necessarily in disagreement but conflict):
The economic reasons for the war with Ukraine. TLDR it's about Oil, Gas, Money and probably a canal.
Another example from @VidaRed. This is one of the most well known, or most suggested, videos on geopolitics these days (because of its topic) and has a provocative title, but is actually a very nuanced discussion of the factors which lead up to where we are today.
John Mearsheimer is an American political scientist and international relations scholar, who belongs to the realist school of thought. He is the R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor at the University of Chicago. He has been described as the most influential realist of his generation. Mearsheimer is best known for developing the theory of offensive realism, which describes the interaction between great powers as being primarily driven by the rational desire to achieve regional hegemony in an anarchic international system.
Last edited: