"The development of Qatar from a small tribal sheikhdom to a modern state shares some similarities and differences with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The al-Thani family is considered the founder of Qatar. Sheikh Mohammed bin Thani expelled the Bahraini representative in 1866 and ruled over 18 tribes he united through marriages with their tribal heads, as well as strong neo-patrimonial and patronage systems that bought him their loyalty (al-Kuwari, 1978; Fromherz, 2012).The absence of an established hereditary arrangement made the members of Qatar’s ruling family the most imminent source of potential threat to its political legitimacy. Qatar’s first constitution of 1970, restricted the ruling of Qatar to the al-Thani family, but did not specify hereditary requirements. As a result, Qatar’s brief history has witnessed intense rivalry over political power among different members of the al-Thani family, evidenced by frequent coups between 1972 and 1996 (Kamrava,2013). This competition over power has considerably shaped the ties between the public and private sectors in Qatar.
The advent of abundant petroleum revenues in 1949 allowed Abdullah bin Qassim al-Thani to play a “patriarchal” role in Qatari society (al-Kuwari, 1978). In the absence of formal institutions, he “personally granted oil concessions, personally received the oil income, and personally decided the distribution of wealth” (Rathmell& Schulze, 2000:56). To legitimize and reinforce his political supremacy and prevent potential coups by his family members, he distributed cash handouts to all al-Thani members and also to other tribal leaders (al-Kuwari, 1978). Qatar’s independence from being a British protectorate in 1971 inaugurated the beginning of a centralized administrative development process.
The rapid inflow of petroleum revenues happened in parallel with an unprecedented influx of expatriates to Qatar, and an urgent need for public sector services (Bahry,2013). These changes saw the creation of a “personalized” bureaucratic machine that awarded vital government positions to the trusted members of the al-Thani, as well as other prominent families such as al-Attiyas (Fromherz, 2012; Khodr & Reiche, 2010).The intention behind this practice was to maintain regime stability through patron–client relationships that pay for the political loyalty of tribal leaders through influential and high paying public sector jobs. Qatar, therefore, is like “a corporation with the Sheikh as CEO” (Fromherz, 2012:127) who initiates liberalization initiatives that aim to further centralize, rather than limit, his powers (Kamrava, 2007)...
...In the absence of an independent merchant class in Qatar, the private sector is also predominantly run by the al-Thani and its closest merchant families. In contrast to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, the ruling family members in Qatar were “merchants first and rulers second” (Crystal, 1995). The advent of petroleum revenues and establishment of formal economic institutions witnessed the distribution of economic benefits to key members of the ruling family. Possessing the appropriate connections was particularly rewarding during oil booms, which were times that saw extensive government expenditures in infrastructure building. Because of its small geographical size, land is extremely expensive in Qatar, and having access to the al-Thani family, who own substantial tracts of land in business districts, is a condition to acquire land(Moore, 2002)...
...Since ruling family members support each other through public funds and public policies that are usually geared toward their best interests and those of local merchants, the distinction between public and private funds is also problematic (Mansour, 2007).Al-Kuwari (2012) argues that despite the existence of government institutions that “formally” appear to separate the rulers’ funds from those of the state, in practice, the lack of transparent budgets and financial reports, render these distinctions artificial. Even the appointment of the director of the Qatari Chamber of Commerce is deter-mined by the ruler who invariably appoints an al-Thani family member. Since the business community is not able to elect its own leader to voice concerns to policy makers, the Chamber of Commerce, in effect, acts more “as [a] government agency than an independent social association” (Moore, 2002:49)."