I'm not good at all on these things, but if our shares drop significantly, I would buy some myself.
ALL issues relating to the bond issue and club finances
- Thread starter sammsky1
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Exactly. They are bound to come back up.
Yeah I wish I had money to invest in some shares right now.
As someone had said, it's only hypothetical money and it shouldn't effect anything with us right now.
As someone had said, it's only hypothetical money and it shouldn't effect anything with us right now.
I don't think the Glazers will be indifferent to a drop in share value. It reflects investor concerns about a likely failure to qualify for next years Champions League, with an immediate loss of prize money and a longer term impact on commercial income - Timbuktu Telecom won't be so eager to 'partner' a midtable club.
The owner's strategy, after all, is to 'grow' the club's value, rather than use it as a source of income, which entails the share price going up rather than down. They've had an easy ride so far, with the club's valuation constantly increasing. The demonstration that the upward climb can go into reverse will be a jolt to the system - if nothing happens in January, and the team continues to languish in 7th/8th position in the league, and the share price falls further, it might spur them into action.
The owner's strategy, after all, is to 'grow' the club's value, rather than use it as a source of income, which entails the share price going up rather than down. They've had an easy ride so far, with the club's valuation constantly increasing. The demonstration that the upward climb can go into reverse will be a jolt to the system - if nothing happens in January, and the team continues to languish in 7th/8th position in the league, and the share price falls further, it might spur them into action.
Two questions for those more clued in than me - is it true United shares have taken a nosedive due to recent results? Similarly, how much will our failure to perform impact our earnings? If we were to finish 6th and win no cup, is it a case of sell everyone and become a Leeds or can we expect big signings?
As I say, I'm not very knowledgeable about the current finance situation so any opinions or insight is appreciated.
Tl;dr - We fecked, ya?
As I say, I'm not very knowledgeable about the current finance situation so any opinions or insight is appreciated.
Tl;dr - We fecked, ya?
I am not claiming to be an expert in the clubs finances either however I do know a club like United will have a financial plan in place to deal with not playing in the Champions League. They can operate the same in the transfer market for about two seasons without Champions League football. Rest assured, the club won't do a Leeds. Sure, you don't want to stay out of it for too long and it's far safer to have that income but a club the size of United wouldn't see any real hit if they miss out on a season or two.
I just saw this from a few days ago.
Manchester United: profits before goals
By Simon Kuper and Roger Blitz
Recent setbacks for one of the world’s most famous football clubs reflect the owners’ approach
With a warning that his results “have not lived up to our standards”, the Glazer family lost patience and fired their club’s coach.
The man they sacked on December 30 was Greg Schiano of the Tampa Bay Buccaneers, their American gridiron football team. Yet some fans of the Glazers’ other club, Manchester United, want the same fate for their manager too. David Moyes – who succeeded Sir Alex Ferguson last May – has overseen three United losses in seven days, an exit from the FA Cup, and the club has all but forfeited the league title it won 12 times in 21 years.
United’s long English hegemony may well have ended. Moyes has a modest reputation, having never managed a giant club or won a trophy, but the club’s problems go deeper. Sir Alex also bears some blame. But the chief culprits for United’s slide are probably the Glazers themselves. Almost uniquely in football, they run their club as a profit-seeking business. With Sir Alex gone, the family’s pursuit of profits is now likely to impede United’s pursuit of trophies. Private equity-style management has squeezed investment in the UK’s most famous sports club.
The Glazers represent a new kind of football club owner to have emerged in recent years: the profit-driven investor, usually American. There are now six US majority owners of Premier League clubs, including John Henry at Liverpool and Stan Kroenke at Arsenal. They seek to earn money from their clubs rather than winning at all costs. That makes them different from the “sugar daddies” – the sheikhs and oligarchs who treat their clubs as playthings and throw money at them. A conflict between the two kinds of owner now looms.
When Sir Alex retired after a nearly 27-year reign, decline was almost inevitable given his reputation as one of the most admired managers in British business. He proved his worth particularly after 2003. Before then, United’s dominance had been the logical consequence of money. It had the highest revenues in global football from 1997 to 2004. High revenues usually translate into high salaries for players, and the team with the highest wages typically wins the title.
Yet after 2003, rival plutocrats emerged. In that year, Russian oligarch Roman Abramovich bought Chelsea and began outspending United. Internationally, Real Madrid has topped Deloitte’s “Football Money League” every season since 2005. In 2008 Sheikh Mansour of Abu Dhabi bought Manchester City and began outspending everybody.
By contrast, the new owners of Manchester United completed their £790m leveraged buyout in 2005 intending to earn money. Scarcely anyone in Britain had heard of Malcolm Glazer or his six children before they began buying United shares in 2003. Malcolm, the son of Lithuanian Jewish immigrants to the US, took over the family watchmaking business as a teenager during the second world war. He later expanded into junk bonds, nursing homes and sausage skins. In 1995 he paid $192m for the Buccaneers. His interest in United was driven by his soccer-loving sons: Joel, Bryan and Avram had been season-ticket holders of the Rochester Lancers, a team in upstate New York. By the time Malcolm suffered two strokes in 2006, the sons were running the company. Avram and Joel are now United’s co-chairmen.
They seem always to have envisaged United as a long-term investment. Aware that British football clubs had traditionally kept ticket prices down, and seeing that foreign interest in the Premier League was rising, they bet correctly that revenues would grow – United is now worth at least double what they paid for it. They kept a lid on costs and have since extracted more than £500m in interest, management fees, bank charges and debt repayments to service loans of £525m borrowed to fund the takeover.
In recent seasons, United has had only the third-highest wage bill in England. Still the team kept winning: from 2007 to 2013 they clinched five English titles and reached three Champions League finals, winning one. It was statistically perhaps the club’s best period in history.
If it were possible to copy Sir Alex’s methods, other managers would have done so long ago. Commentators have struggled to identify specific reasons for his success, which is why his new career as a management guru will probably disappoint and why no successor could expect to match him.
Last May he said: “The quality of this league-winning squad, and the balance of ages within it, bodes well for continued success.” It does not look that way now.
Sir Alex constructed a team that peaked in his last season. He sweated United’s assets to the maximum. The £24m he spent on Arsenal’s injury-prone striker Robin van Persie in 2012 had a short-term pay-off: the Dutchman’s brilliant first six months at United sealed Sir Alex’s last title. But now Van Persie is 30 and injured again. Several other players are older.
Manchester United: profits before goals
By Simon Kuper and Roger Blitz
Recent setbacks for one of the world’s most famous football clubs reflect the owners’ approach
With a warning that his results “have not lived up to our standards”, the Glazer family lost patience and fired their club’s coach.
The man they sacked on December 30 was Greg Schiano of the Tampa Bay Buccaneers, their American gridiron football team. Yet some fans of the Glazers’ other club, Manchester United, want the same fate for their manager too. David Moyes – who succeeded Sir Alex Ferguson last May – has overseen three United losses in seven days, an exit from the FA Cup, and the club has all but forfeited the league title it won 12 times in 21 years.
United’s long English hegemony may well have ended. Moyes has a modest reputation, having never managed a giant club or won a trophy, but the club’s problems go deeper. Sir Alex also bears some blame. But the chief culprits for United’s slide are probably the Glazers themselves. Almost uniquely in football, they run their club as a profit-seeking business. With Sir Alex gone, the family’s pursuit of profits is now likely to impede United’s pursuit of trophies. Private equity-style management has squeezed investment in the UK’s most famous sports club.
The Glazers represent a new kind of football club owner to have emerged in recent years: the profit-driven investor, usually American. There are now six US majority owners of Premier League clubs, including John Henry at Liverpool and Stan Kroenke at Arsenal. They seek to earn money from their clubs rather than winning at all costs. That makes them different from the “sugar daddies” – the sheikhs and oligarchs who treat their clubs as playthings and throw money at them. A conflict between the two kinds of owner now looms.
When Sir Alex retired after a nearly 27-year reign, decline was almost inevitable given his reputation as one of the most admired managers in British business. He proved his worth particularly after 2003. Before then, United’s dominance had been the logical consequence of money. It had the highest revenues in global football from 1997 to 2004. High revenues usually translate into high salaries for players, and the team with the highest wages typically wins the title.
Yet after 2003, rival plutocrats emerged. In that year, Russian oligarch Roman Abramovich bought Chelsea and began outspending United. Internationally, Real Madrid has topped Deloitte’s “Football Money League” every season since 2005. In 2008 Sheikh Mansour of Abu Dhabi bought Manchester City and began outspending everybody.
By contrast, the new owners of Manchester United completed their £790m leveraged buyout in 2005 intending to earn money. Scarcely anyone in Britain had heard of Malcolm Glazer or his six children before they began buying United shares in 2003. Malcolm, the son of Lithuanian Jewish immigrants to the US, took over the family watchmaking business as a teenager during the second world war. He later expanded into junk bonds, nursing homes and sausage skins. In 1995 he paid $192m for the Buccaneers. His interest in United was driven by his soccer-loving sons: Joel, Bryan and Avram had been season-ticket holders of the Rochester Lancers, a team in upstate New York. By the time Malcolm suffered two strokes in 2006, the sons were running the company. Avram and Joel are now United’s co-chairmen.
They seem always to have envisaged United as a long-term investment. Aware that British football clubs had traditionally kept ticket prices down, and seeing that foreign interest in the Premier League was rising, they bet correctly that revenues would grow – United is now worth at least double what they paid for it. They kept a lid on costs and have since extracted more than £500m in interest, management fees, bank charges and debt repayments to service loans of £525m borrowed to fund the takeover.
In recent seasons, United has had only the third-highest wage bill in England. Still the team kept winning: from 2007 to 2013 they clinched five English titles and reached three Champions League finals, winning one. It was statistically perhaps the club’s best period in history.
If it were possible to copy Sir Alex’s methods, other managers would have done so long ago. Commentators have struggled to identify specific reasons for his success, which is why his new career as a management guru will probably disappoint and why no successor could expect to match him.
Last May he said: “The quality of this league-winning squad, and the balance of ages within it, bodes well for continued success.” It does not look that way now.
Sir Alex constructed a team that peaked in his last season. He sweated United’s assets to the maximum. The £24m he spent on Arsenal’s injury-prone striker Robin van Persie in 2012 had a short-term pay-off: the Dutchman’s brilliant first six months at United sealed Sir Alex’s last title. But now Van Persie is 30 and injured again. Several other players are older.
Part 2:
Moyes has made mistakes. His sole signing last summer was Marouane Fellaini, bought from his old club Everton for £27.5m. Chelsea’s coach José Mourinho – who was a contender to succeed Sir Alex – once said any manager who buys players from his old club risks looking underinformed about the broader talent market. Fellaini has struggled at United. Moyes, however, is chasing Everton’s Leighton Baines. He also replaced several of Sir Alex’s backroom staff with his own men. Whereas Sir Alex sought a diversity of views, Moyes risks encouraging groupthink.
Yet the Glazers, who gave Moyes a six-year contract, intend to keep him. They expected a bumpy transition. In some senses Moyes suits them more than the autocratic Sir Alex, because he allows them more say in their own club. Ed Woodward, United’s vice-chairman and the Glazers’ appointee, speaks to Moyes at least once a day. The manager will be given time. The squad’s age could work to his advantage, allowing him to bring in his own players this summer.
The Glazers are patient partly because – unlike most of United’s fans – they are not desperate for trophies. The business plan is predicated on finishing third in the Premier League and reaching the Champions League quarter-finals. The Glazers know that with the third-highest wage bill in England, and without Sir Alex, third place is a realistic expectation. Even missing the Champions League for a year or two would not be disastrous.
The Glazers will give Moyes money for transfers (United has £80m in cash) while pursuing profits. They will continue to cap spending accordingly. Three of the four highest transfer fees United has ever paid preceded the Glazers’ takeover, despite inflation and football’s rising revenues since 2005. In 2002 and 2004 United bought the young stars Rio Ferdinand and Wayne Rooney for large sums. If similar players became available today, United probably could not afford their fees or wages. In 2011-12, the last season for which figures are available, United spent just 51 per cent of turnover on wages – the second-lowest proportion in the Premier League, after Norwich. (Similarly, at the Buccaneers, the Glazers spend famously little on players.) Only Sir Alex could be expected to achieve cut-price success. United’s transition has, therefore, redirected attention to the Glazers’ model of ownership.
In the US, many sports franchises, including the Buccaneers, make profits. The American investors who have bought English soccer clubs in recent years have aimed to do the same, or at least to make a large capital gain when selling. Their cost-consciousness puts them at odds with the sugar-daddy owners, who have driven up spending on players. The profit seekers want to drive it down. They hope European football’s new rules on “financial fair play” will stop the sugar daddies’ clubs from spending more than their revenues. There are signs that “FFP” is already modestly slowing growth in players’ wages.
That should keep United’s business purring along. The club’s commercial office has been busy with deals, headed by a seven-year shirt contract with General Motors for $559m. The Premier League’s global television rights also keep rising. United predicts annual revenues of up to £430m and pre-tax earnings of £130m, while gross debt has fallen to £360m.
If that pleases the Glazers, most United fans would probably welcome a new owner less focused on profits. But the family shows no appetite to sell. Jim O’Neill, former chairman of Goldman Sachs Asset Management, who led an attempt by wealthy United fans to buy the club in 2010, believes it is a myth the owners will remain for the long term. The problem, he said, is that “nobody will pay them what they would readily sell the club for tomorrow”.
Although United’s share price on the New York Stock Exchange has slumped from $19 last summer to just over $15 and hedge funds have taken short positions, the club’s market value is still $2.5bn – far above the price of any past sports club deal.
One future for United under Moyes-Glazer rule is as a northern version of Arsenal. The London club has won no trophies since 2005, but always does enough to qualify for the lucrative Champions League, and makes profits. That suits the American majority owner, Mr Kroenke: the club’s market capitalisation has risen over the years to £949m. It does not suit Arsenal’s fans. United’s supporters, having long mocked the discontent of their rivals, may come to share it.
United’s saga raises a fundamental question: what is a football club for? To the Glazers, it is a business. To the fans, it is an ancient glory-seeking institution – more like a museum, or a church, than a company. Sir Alex delivered both profits and glory. In future, the club may have to choose one or the other.
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f33253f0-79f5-11e3-a3e6-00144feabdc0.html?siteedition=uk#axzz2qNe23JFU
Moyes has made mistakes. His sole signing last summer was Marouane Fellaini, bought from his old club Everton for £27.5m. Chelsea’s coach José Mourinho – who was a contender to succeed Sir Alex – once said any manager who buys players from his old club risks looking underinformed about the broader talent market. Fellaini has struggled at United. Moyes, however, is chasing Everton’s Leighton Baines. He also replaced several of Sir Alex’s backroom staff with his own men. Whereas Sir Alex sought a diversity of views, Moyes risks encouraging groupthink.
Yet the Glazers, who gave Moyes a six-year contract, intend to keep him. They expected a bumpy transition. In some senses Moyes suits them more than the autocratic Sir Alex, because he allows them more say in their own club. Ed Woodward, United’s vice-chairman and the Glazers’ appointee, speaks to Moyes at least once a day. The manager will be given time. The squad’s age could work to his advantage, allowing him to bring in his own players this summer.
The Glazers are patient partly because – unlike most of United’s fans – they are not desperate for trophies. The business plan is predicated on finishing third in the Premier League and reaching the Champions League quarter-finals. The Glazers know that with the third-highest wage bill in England, and without Sir Alex, third place is a realistic expectation. Even missing the Champions League for a year or two would not be disastrous.
The Glazers will give Moyes money for transfers (United has £80m in cash) while pursuing profits. They will continue to cap spending accordingly. Three of the four highest transfer fees United has ever paid preceded the Glazers’ takeover, despite inflation and football’s rising revenues since 2005. In 2002 and 2004 United bought the young stars Rio Ferdinand and Wayne Rooney for large sums. If similar players became available today, United probably could not afford their fees or wages. In 2011-12, the last season for which figures are available, United spent just 51 per cent of turnover on wages – the second-lowest proportion in the Premier League, after Norwich. (Similarly, at the Buccaneers, the Glazers spend famously little on players.) Only Sir Alex could be expected to achieve cut-price success. United’s transition has, therefore, redirected attention to the Glazers’ model of ownership.
In the US, many sports franchises, including the Buccaneers, make profits. The American investors who have bought English soccer clubs in recent years have aimed to do the same, or at least to make a large capital gain when selling. Their cost-consciousness puts them at odds with the sugar-daddy owners, who have driven up spending on players. The profit seekers want to drive it down. They hope European football’s new rules on “financial fair play” will stop the sugar daddies’ clubs from spending more than their revenues. There are signs that “FFP” is already modestly slowing growth in players’ wages.
That should keep United’s business purring along. The club’s commercial office has been busy with deals, headed by a seven-year shirt contract with General Motors for $559m. The Premier League’s global television rights also keep rising. United predicts annual revenues of up to £430m and pre-tax earnings of £130m, while gross debt has fallen to £360m.
If that pleases the Glazers, most United fans would probably welcome a new owner less focused on profits. But the family shows no appetite to sell. Jim O’Neill, former chairman of Goldman Sachs Asset Management, who led an attempt by wealthy United fans to buy the club in 2010, believes it is a myth the owners will remain for the long term. The problem, he said, is that “nobody will pay them what they would readily sell the club for tomorrow”.
Although United’s share price on the New York Stock Exchange has slumped from $19 last summer to just over $15 and hedge funds have taken short positions, the club’s market value is still $2.5bn – far above the price of any past sports club deal.
One future for United under Moyes-Glazer rule is as a northern version of Arsenal. The London club has won no trophies since 2005, but always does enough to qualify for the lucrative Champions League, and makes profits. That suits the American majority owner, Mr Kroenke: the club’s market capitalisation has risen over the years to £949m. It does not suit Arsenal’s fans. United’s supporters, having long mocked the discontent of their rivals, may come to share it.
United’s saga raises a fundamental question: what is a football club for? To the Glazers, it is a business. To the fans, it is an ancient glory-seeking institution – more like a museum, or a church, than a company. Sir Alex delivered both profits and glory. In future, the club may have to choose one or the other.
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f33253f0-79f5-11e3-a3e6-00144feabdc0.html?siteedition=uk#axzz2qNe23JFU
I guess that's what a lot of fans feared from the start.
The Arsenal model is far too dangerous to accept as a forward thinking strategy. It's not acceptable on the football side of things and it's dangerous to think any Club will consistently make the top 4; our position is already under threat a year after becoming champions. A football club needs investment on a consistent basis in order for it to flourish in a position where it can become and remain successful. Our fans would not put up with that and Moyes would pay for it with his job IF it came to that because he would be the one who would take half the flak along with the Glazers.
That article presents a false choice between profits and success. Fact is that it is possible to run a club like a business and achieve great success. It is also possible to run a club for success only and end up bankrupt (Leeds?).
So much nonsense dredged up in that article. Most of it has been debunked in this thread over and over again since the Glazers took over.
Comparisons to Tampa Bay have never indicated anything. Weren't we supposed to get cheerleaders and a pirate ship in Old Trafford?
In the NFL the head coach controls every detail. Only a few quarterbacks are even trusted with calling their own plays by their coaches. Every play is meticulously choreographed from the sidelines. The salary cap and the short shelf life for players (three years for a running back) mean that it is impossible for any NFL team to stay on top for very long unless they have a head coach and perhaps a quarterback who are better than the rest. For these reasons, the head coach is going to be changed more often at Tampa Bay than at Manchester United where stability at the club and a strong core of players in the dressing room can guarantee success season after season.
So much nonsense dredged up in that article. Most of it has been debunked in this thread over and over again since the Glazers took over.
Comparisons to Tampa Bay have never indicated anything. Weren't we supposed to get cheerleaders and a pirate ship in Old Trafford?
In the NFL the head coach controls every detail. Only a few quarterbacks are even trusted with calling their own plays by their coaches. Every play is meticulously choreographed from the sidelines. The salary cap and the short shelf life for players (three years for a running back) mean that it is impossible for any NFL team to stay on top for very long unless they have a head coach and perhaps a quarterback who are better than the rest. For these reasons, the head coach is going to be changed more often at Tampa Bay than at Manchester United where stability at the club and a strong core of players in the dressing room can guarantee success season after season.
I didn't really read it as a choice between profits or success at all. Just that they don't plan their model on winning trophies. They have a business that can be very successful with a certain level of achievement, anything more is obviously a bonus.
As for the nonsense, I think it read pretty fair with no real bias on either the pro or against camp and actually gave a decent insight in how they run the club.
The Glazers are well on their way to ruining all the hard work Ferguson put in to get us back to the top of the domestic game and challenging in europe. Without him here we are in big trouble, as they are showing no signs of putting in the investment needed in the playing squad, an investment need caused by there continual lack of investment over there period here. We can't compete at the top level of the transfer market, with the income brought into the club its clear we should be there, it would be unrealistic to compete all the time with the super rich owners but if a player is identified who will improve us, it should be us with our standing in the european game be leading the way in signing that player. NO VALUE, NO VALUE, NO VALUE, yet Bayern, Barca, Madrid always seem to find a away to compete with the impossible ie Chelsea, City, PSG etc.
Depressing article.
A pirate ship bar is the way forward.
With cheerleaders.
A pirate ship hooters bar with cheerleaders.
With cheerleaders.
A pirate ship hooters bar with cheerleaders.
Hooters as our official warm-up bib sponsor seems a no-brainer.
I agree, the Glazers are only in it for the money. This club is in big trouble as long as we have the Glazers owning it. Picture this.. you have all the best players sitting in a pool(as fish). You have all the big clubs sitting around the pool with fishing rods. You got Real Madrid, Barcelona,Bayern München, Manchester City(won the lottery), PSG,(lottery winners) Chelseas(lottery) plus some others. And United of course, all are hanging a large worm over this pool, only problem is that the worm on the United rod is almost completely eaten,even before his toe hits the water. And, sitting close by is a worm munching bunch of Glazers. Big trouble ahead.
No, but it gives you a very big worm.
Not unless this is the Hooters Bar forum.
Is it a fishing forum them? Or a fauna one?
Balanced, sensible article.
Anyone with any sense can see that the Glazer's are strictly money motivated which means they are looking to strike a balance by investing the minimum amount that provides the greatest return.
They see that as third position which it almost certainly is. Chelsea and City do not rely on market forces and are subsidized. Real, Barca, PSG and others are all either subsidized or do not need to make a return on revenues.
If you look at it sensibly, third and quarter finals is absolutely the best you can expect going forward.
We cannot be expected to compete with half the budget (at best) of our rivals. That is not to mention the fact that we operate in a league where clubs are financially comfortable enough to resist bids for players and not be bullied (unlike the situations that Real, Barca, Bayern, PSG benefit from).
Add to that the fact that Britain is producing far less talent.
Foreign players invariably will choose the La Liga two over us, even if money and all other variables where equal which they never are.
So we pay less, have a far, far smaller budget for investing in players, are less appealing in all other factors than a handful of our direct competitors, must buy from a smaller talent pool that is far more expensive etc etc.
Ultimately, it is reasonable to expect us to be a tier 2 club on the European stage for the forseeable future. Playing ability wise, not commercially of course.
Anyone with any sense can see that the Glazer's are strictly money motivated which means they are looking to strike a balance by investing the minimum amount that provides the greatest return.
They see that as third position which it almost certainly is. Chelsea and City do not rely on market forces and are subsidized. Real, Barca, PSG and others are all either subsidized or do not need to make a return on revenues.
If you look at it sensibly, third and quarter finals is absolutely the best you can expect going forward.
We cannot be expected to compete with half the budget (at best) of our rivals. That is not to mention the fact that we operate in a league where clubs are financially comfortable enough to resist bids for players and not be bullied (unlike the situations that Real, Barca, Bayern, PSG benefit from).
Add to that the fact that Britain is producing far less talent.
Foreign players invariably will choose the La Liga two over us, even if money and all other variables where equal which they never are.
So we pay less, have a far, far smaller budget for investing in players, are less appealing in all other factors than a handful of our direct competitors, must buy from a smaller talent pool that is far more expensive etc etc.
Ultimately, it is reasonable to expect us to be a tier 2 club on the European stage for the forseeable future. Playing ability wise, not commercially of course.
Just wanted to add that the article mentions 4 of our 5 biggest transfer fees were before the takeover. Clearly, transfer fees have ballooned from 2005 exponentially so it is a very revealing fact.
In terms of turnover, revenue and especially pegged against fees at the time, the Rooney, Rio and Veron transfers were Bale sized fees today. That's three Bale sized transfer fees. Two of which were the back bone of our success for the last 10 years almost. Do you see us making such signings today?
In terms of turnover, revenue and especially pegged against fees at the time, the Rooney, Rio and Veron transfers were Bale sized fees today. That's three Bale sized transfer fees. Two of which were the back bone of our success for the last 10 years almost. Do you see us making such signings today?
Short answer: no.
That's some inflation rate you're using. Are you Greek by any chance?
Anyone see the Duncan Drasdo tweet? Even he reckons the club will invest heavily in players.
So will the rest of the PL for the short to medium term.
Look at City-they have spent over 700million in the last few years and they only have once got past the group stages and will probably go out against Barca.
But not to be breaking transfer records two or three times, presumably. Or even once.
I think everyone knows the clubs is going to have to spend relatively big. I doubt it will be half of what Real spent in 2009 which is about as much as you'd expect it to cost to rebuild this squad to be competitive at the highest levels of the CL.
It's worth mentioning that the CL TV payments are going to be twice what they are currently in 2015. We definitely need regular CL football for all aspects of the business model that the Glazer's are going for. We definitely don't need to win it or even credibly try. It's just too expensive to have and maintains squad like that. We had one in 2008 and it very quickly declined.
Or we could build a squad like Bayern which wins things instead of going the Real or City route.
Their is no point is risking the whole clubs future for the sake of a few big named players.
It's easier for Bayern when they don't have a club like Chelsea or City to compete with domestically. I mean they cherry pick the best players from the 2nd biggest team in the league, something which we would never be able to do.
I mean take an example like Luke Shaw, a promising young player. A similar talent playing in the Bundesliga would invariably end up at Bayern as his final destination, whilst over here we have to directly compete for him with City and Chelsea who have the upper hand in terms of spending.
I think if we want regular CL football we will have to spend big or get the right team in place behind scenes.
I think we need to keep a similar system going to what we've been doing for years with a modest increase in spending. Kids coming through the ranks, bargain unknown buys interspersed with top talent. Just more of the top talent please.
Developing our own players is something we have to continue doing. But the real top talent that we have been missing out on in recent years requires spending a bit more due to the hefty competition in place. Either that or we be a bit more wily than we have in the last few years.
I think we can allow ourselves a bit of a once off splurge this summer. But in general we should stick to what we are doing.
So essentially we then can't do what Bayern are doing then as they regularly have a splurge in the summer albeit their main splurge next summer is probably on the agents fees/signing on bonuses for Lewandowski.
We could be looking at up to 100m this summer is all problems are to be solved. We'll recoup feck all too on the players we lose so this is going to be a painful one for the owners if they go through with it.
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