ALL issues relating to the bond issue and club finances

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Looking back, the whole IPO really was a bit of a let down. It is in the fans interests that the club is valued as high as possible. After the roadtrips around asia and the attempts to drum up interest to float there with the original figures reported in the media, the amount made from the float was definitely disappointing.

I suppose I fell for the hype - the club is worth a lot of money, just no where near the figures the Glazer PR machine banded out.
 
I've just been reading the Adobe Acrobat .pdf download of the accounts. One thing puzzled me.

About halfway down, under Net Finance Costs, appears: '£16.9 million decrease in interest payable and accelerated amortisation of debt issue costs on the payment in kind loan repaid in fiscal 2011'. Sounds like the Piks to me, but why are charges associated with them on the club's books?

Any kindly accountant care to explain?
 
I've just been reading the Adobe Acrobat .pdf download of the accounts. One thing puzzled me.

About halfway down, under Net Finance Costs, appears: '£16.9 million decrease in interest payable and accelerated amortisation of debt issue costs on the payment in kind loan repaid in fiscal 2011'. Sounds like the Piks to me, but why are charges associated with them on the club's books?

Any kindly accountant care to explain?

These are financials for Manchester United plc. You're used to looking at Red Football Limited - essentially "the club". The PIKs were a liability of Red Football Joint Venture Limited - the parent of the club - which is now a subsidiary of Manchester United plc. The PIKs consolidate up to Manchester United plc, the ultimate parent, but their only impact on the club's financials was through the tax losses that were passed down and thus reduced our tax payable.

[I've edited this several times for clarity. Apologies to anyone who's been looking at it.]
 
I was wondering, for those who like to follow football finances etc, hypothetically do you think there is any possibility of bringing back Ronaldo?

I mean, is it commercially viable do you think? Obviously the figures involved would be eye watering but at the same time he is a superstar really like no other and there will surely be revenue benefits as a result.

(I can dream)
 
My brother showed me a site called 'shortsqueeze' that tells you how many shares of a stock are being shorted. As of this week there are 3.6 million shorts outstanding of Man Utd stock, out of our 16.7 million.

http://www.shortsqueeze.com/?symbol=Man Utd&submit=Short+Quote%99
 
So it's been a while since the IPO...

What's the verdict? Was it overvalued? Did the Glazer's actually get it right?

Secondly, when do we find out about what happened cash generated from this?
 
So it's been a while since the IPO...

What's the verdict? Was it overvalued? Did the Glazer's actually get it right?

Secondly, when do we find out about what happened cash generated from this?

Without having any source, I seem to remember that half of the cash generated would go towards the debt and the other half to the Glazer's.
 
i wish the kit answer was more along the lines of we will be looking to negotiate with a number of world class companies in hopes of finding a world-record partnership.

I wonder if we will even ask for adidas to submit a bid.

But the deal with Nike is beyond the typical shirt deal a club has - it is much more integrated with their retail operations, for example.

I'm not sure another manufacturer would be able to come close to offering the same overall package.
 
So it's been a while since the IPO...

What's the verdict? Was it overvalued? Did the Glazer's actually get it right?

Secondly, when do we find out about what happened cash generated from this?


My brother showed me a site called 'shortsqueeze' that tells you how many shares of a stock are being shorted. As of this week there are 3.6 million shorts outstanding of Man Utd stock, out of our 16.7 million.

http://www.shortsqueeze.com/?symbol=Man Utd&submit=Short+Quote%99

When a speculator wants to "short" a stock he borrows shares from an investor and sells them in the market. The idea is that, if the stock price goes down, he will be able to buy the shares back at a lower price, return them to the investor, and pocket the difference between the price he sold at and the price he bought at. Of course, if the stock price doesn't go down ...

A "short squeeze" is a situation where the price of the shorted stock hasn't fallen and the time is coming when the speculator(s) have to return the shares they borrowed. Because the shorts have to buy by a specific date, owners of the stock can drive the price up and create a "squeeze". shortsqueeze.com provides the analysis that lets users identify squeeze opportunities. Man Utd looks to be a prime case. There are 3.6 million short sales outstanding - that's about 10.5 times our average daily trading volume. With the price currently at $13.26 (at the time of writing), the shorts could be in a lot of trouble. Covering their positions (basically all at the same time) will require 10 solid days worth of buying pressure - could easily push the price up to the $15-$16 level (or higher).

So, did they get the IPO pricing right? Well, if you discount the effect of the shorts' selling pressure immediately after the IPO and look at the current price and the overhanging short position, it looks likely that the "market" price will turn out to be in the $14-$15 range once the shorts are resolved. Which all seems to suggest that the pricing was pretty much spot on (at least so far as the market is concerned).

As SirAF said, the club's share of the proceeds went to pay down debt, while the Glazers' share was used for who knows what.
 
When a speculator wants to "short" a stock he borrows shares from an investor and sells them in the market. The idea is that, if the stock price goes down, he will be able to buy the shares back at a lower price, return them to the investor, and pocket the difference between the price he sold at and the price he bought at. Of course, if the stock price doesn't go down ...

A "short squeeze" is a situation where the price of the shorted stock hasn't fallen and the time is coming when the speculator(s) have to return the shares they borrowed. Because the shorts have to buy by a specific date, owners of the stock can drive the price up and create a "squeeze". shortsqueeze.com provides the analysis that lets users identify squeeze opportunities. Man Utd looks to be a prime case. There are 3.6 million short sales outstanding - that's about 10.5 times our average daily trading volume. With the price currently at $13.26 (at the time of writing), the shorts could be in a lot of trouble. Covering their positions (basically all at the same time) will require 10 solid days worth of buying pressure - could easily push the price up to the $15-$16 level (or higher).

So, did they get the IPO pricing right? Well, if you discount the effect of the shorts' selling pressure immediately after the IPO and look at the current price and the overhanging short position, it looks likely that the "market" price will turn out to be in the $14-$15 range once the shorts are resolved. Which all seems to suggest that the pricing was pretty much spot on (at least so far as the market is concerned).

As SirAF said, the club's share of the proceeds went to pay down debt, while the Glazers' share was used for who knows what.

Very informative post. Who says the Cafe isn't educational? :D
 
Not sure about posting here but still....


Manchester United and Real Madrid have dominated kit sales over the past five years.

United (Nike) and Real (Adidas) have sold an average of 1.4m official replica shirts globally each year in the past five years – more than any other clubs in the world.

Barcelona are No3 on the sales list (Nike, average 1.15m sales a year) followed by Chelsea in fourth place (adidas, 910,000).

The top 10 also includes Bayern Munich (adidas), Liverpool (adidas during the research period, now Warrior), Arsenal (Nike), Juventus (Nike), Inter Milan (Nike) and Milan (adidas).

Veteran analyst Dr Peter Rohlmann and his team at the consulting bureau, PR Marketing, put the figures together.


A bit surprised at these figures.Thought they would be a lot more for most teams.
 
I'm going to ask the question that everyone (well, me) is thinking here... who the feck are Warrior?
 
Not sure about posting here but still....


Manchester United and Real Madrid have dominated kit sales over the past five years.

United (Nike) and Real (Adidas) have sold an average of 1.4m official replica shirts globally each year in the past five years – more than any other clubs in the world.

Barcelona are No3 on the sales list (Nike, average 1.15m sales a year) followed by Chelsea in fourth place (adidas, 910,000).

The top 10 also includes Bayern Munich (adidas), Liverpool (adidas during the research period, now Warrior), Arsenal (Nike), Juventus (Nike), Inter Milan (Nike) and Milan (adidas).

Veteran analyst Dr Peter Rohlmann and his team at the consulting bureau, PR Marketing, put the figures together.


A bit surprised at these figures.Thought they would be a lot more for most teams.

We might have been surprised too if you had given more than three figures. :)
 
I'm going to ask the question that everyone (well, me) is thinking here... who the feck are Warrior?

They started about the same time as UnderArmor. Where UA were making better lacrosse apparel, Warrior were making better sticks, etc. Warrior and Brine were both bought by New Balance and together pretty much dominate Lacrosse and Hockey apparel and equipment at this point. They haven't been as aggressive as UA in spreading away from their roots until recently. I suppose Liverpool is their way of playing catchup. UA's stated goal is to be first or second in all their markets, so they have to be looking to knock off either Nike or Adidas - i'm not sure how much room there is for Warrior.
 
We might have been surprised too if you had given more than three figures. :)

Well yea its around .8 for Arsenal .7 mil for liverpool and .4 mil for AC Milan.

But what I meant is proportionately.

Was expecting United, Real around the 3 mil plus mark.
 
So it's been a while since the IPO...

What's the verdict? Was it overvalued? Did the Glazer's actually get it right?

Funnily enough I was just checking the share price movements earlier today - it is exactly 2 months since the IPO.
Not that exciting really - slightly down on the $14 float price but generally it seems it was more or less the right value, although it will be the long term trend that matters.

charts.dll
 
I just found this statistic on another forum.

Best-selling-shirts-to-2012.jpg


So only Real has been on par with us over the last 5 years.

What I would love to know is how much do we actually get per shirt sale, or is it a fixed price that we get and Nike is getting the money from the shirt sales?
 
I just found this statistic on another forum.

Best-selling-shirts-to-2012.jpg


So only Real has been on par with us over the last 5 years.

What I would love to know is how much do we actually get per shirt sale, or is it a fixed price that we get and Nike is getting the money from the shirt sales?

We get a fixed deal from nike and nike get the revenue from shirt sales but they also run all of the marketing/stores/merchandising.

I believe Madrid on the other hand get the revenue from shirt sales but they have to incur merchandising/supply chain costs that we don't.

I wonder looking back who's strategy was more beneficial and how we will approach our next deal.
 
Be interesting to see how many international team shirts are sold and compare them. I seem to remember Nike agreeing to pay the French national team something like 300m euros over 7 years for their latest deal.
 
We get a fixed deal from nike and nike get the revenue from shirt sales but they also run all of the marketing/stores/merchandising.

I believe Madrid on the other hand get the revenue from shirt sales but they have to incur merchandising/supply chain costs that we don't.

I wonder looking back who's strategy was more beneficial and how we will approach our next deal.

I reckon we will keep the same type of deal but obviously ask for a shitload more cash - it was a great deal at the time but in hindsight we probably undersold ourselves by signing such a long term deal

On a side note, I was suprised to see how high Chelsea's shirt sales are.
 
We get a fixed deal from nike and nike get the revenue from shirt sales but they also run all of the marketing/stores/merchandising.

I believe Madrid on the other hand get the revenue from shirt sales but they have to incur merchandising/supply chain costs that we don't.

I wonder looking back who's strategy was more beneficial and how we will approach our next deal.

That's not quite correct. While we do get a guaranteed revenue installment each year (£25.6 million for FY2011), we also split the net profits in excess of that share. Means that our total Nike revenue for FY2011 was £31.3 million.
 
Very informative post. Who says the Cafe isn't educational? :D

Educational, but possibly a little misleading. The loans of stock to the short speculators don't have a pre-agreed term - they last until the lender asks for his stock back (or the borrower gives it back voluntarily). Means that, for a real squeeze to take place, a significant number of lenders have to ask for the stock back simultaneously (or, at least, lenders that represent a significant proportion of the loaned stock). No matter, the fact remains that, as the shorts cover their positions, there will be upward price pressure on the stock - roughly equivalent to the downward pressure the original shorting generated.
 
Apologies if this has been posted elsewhere, doesn't really tell us anything new but thought it was worth posting nonetheless.

The Glazer family will not sell Manchester United for "many, many years"

The Glazer family will not sell Manchester United for "many, many years" despite constant interest, according to vice-chairman Ed Woodward.

Woodward insists the American family have no interest in cashing in on all their holdings despite the selling off 10% of their shares in the IPO sale in August, leading to questions over their long-term commitment to the club.

Although Woodward admitted he could not rule out one of the six Glazer siblings selling their holding at some point in the future.

Woodward said: "There is always interest in this business. It is a phenomenal brand and club, but they are not willing sellers at all, they won't even engage, they are long-term investors.

"It's a very popular business that people have interest in. The answer is: 'not for sale'. I talk to them [the Glazers] every day and the excitement they have in this club is undiminished and I don't see them selling completely more many, many years."

He added: "They could - they are a family of six siblings and from time to time, seven to 10 years, who knows if one wants to sell a small piece or not."

Woodward also revealed that India and Australia are both on a shortlist of countries for United to tour in the summer.

While the club will open an office on the east coast of the USA to try to cash in on growing interest in football in North America.


http://www1.skysports.com/football/news/11095/8189107/
 
Wasn't sure where else to put this, prob not worth its own thread.

http://uk.askmen.com/sports/fanatic/why-man-u.html

Visiting Manchester the other day, I was driving down a nondescript road past dreary shops and offices when I saw the top of a sports stadium poking into the gray sky. It was Old Trafford. Team buses carrying soccer players from more glamorous cities such as Barcelona have been known to echo with cries of disgust as they pull in here.

The home of Manchester United is rainy and underwhelming. The estimated 333 million humans who consider themselves United fans don’t all know that Manchester is a city in England, but many of those who do would probably be surprised to find just how mid-ranking a city it is. Yet when United’s American ruling family, the Glazers, sold club shares in August, United was valued at $2.3 billion. That made it the world’s most valuable sports franchise, ahead of Real Madrid and baseball’s New York Yankees, according to Forbes. In short, United is bigger than Manchester. So why on earth did this global behemoth arise precisely here? And how, in the last 134 years, has United shaped soccer, in England and now the world?

When a soccer club was created just by the newish railway line in 1878, the Manchester location actually helped. The city was then growing like no other on earth. In 1800 it had been a tranquil little place of 84,000 inhabitants, so insignificant that as late as 1832 it didn’t have a member of parliament. The Industrial Revolution changed everything. Workers poured in from English villages, from Ireland, from feeble economies everywhere (my own great-grandparents arrived on the boat from Lithuania). By 1900, Manchester was Europe’s sixth-biggest city, with 1.25 million inhabitants.

The club by the railway line was initially called Newton Heath, because the players worked at the Newton Heath carriage works of the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Company. They played in work clogs against other work teams. Jim White’s Manchester United: The Biography nicely describes the L&YR workers as “sucked in from all over the country to service the growing need for locomotives and carriages.” Life in Manchester then was neither fun nor healthy, White writes. In some neighborhoods, average male life expectancy was just 17. This was still the same brutal city where a few decades before, Karl Marx’s pal Friedrich Engels had run his father’s factory. The conditions of the industrial city were so awful it inspired communism. (My own great-grandparents lost two of their children to scarlet fever in Manchester before moving on to much healthier southern Africa.)

Inevitably, most of these desperate early Mancunians were rootless migrants. Unmoored in their new home, many embraced the local soccer clubs. Gathering together at Old Trafford must have given these people something of the sense of community that they had previously known in their villages. That’s how the world’s first great industrial city engendered the world’s greatest soccer brand.

United grew into a big English club, but for long it wasn’t particularly brilliant. From 1878 through 1955 it won just three English titles. United became different from other clubs on February 6, 1958, the day a twin-engine British European Airline plane crashed on its third attempt to take off from an icy Munich airport. On board was Manchester United’s team.

The “Busby Babes,” named for their Scottish manager Matt Busby, had been a gifted young side playing glorious attacking soccer. Eight of the players --including the great 21-year-old Duncan Edwards --were among the 23 people killed in the crash. A tearful nation followed Busby’s own struggle for life in a Munich hospital. White writes that for those who now try to make money out of United, Munich is the “ marketing core from which everything else has stemmed.” It became the first pillar of United’s global brand.

Busby recovered, and with players bought from other clubs, United reached the FA Cup final that same May. He built a new team around Bobby Charlton (who, aged 20, had also been on the plane), Denis Law and George Best. Playing glorious attacking soccer, it crushed Benfica 4-1 in the European Cup final of 1968. Tragedy and rebirth had given United a story.

The club then languished for 25 years, with only its violent “Red Army” of fans to add to its glamour. When Alex Ferguson became manager in 1986, he spoke to everyone at Old Trafford -- from former legends to window-cleaners -- and was astounded at the gap between the team's giant self-image and puny results. Still, Ferguson absorbed three tenets of United’s brand: United teams must attack, the world is against United and United is more a cause than a soccer club. He also made himself part of United’s brand. When he said “I am like the keeper of the temple,” he meant that the cause had become almost unthinkable without

By the early 1990s, as Ferguson’s United started to win titles, a marketing genius named Edward Freedman was turning the club’s brand into gold. Hardly anyone has heard of Freedman, but he was almost as central to the club’s rise as Ferguson himself.

A Londoner who oversaw merchandise at Tottenham in the 1980s, Freedman had yearned to join United because he realized the immensity of the club’s brand. It appalled him, he told me, that United made so little money from it. When he arrived at Old Trafford in 1991, fans could buy little more than a United scarf and shirt. Pirates did sell T-shirts yards outside the grounds, but not a penny of their takings went to the club. Freedman argued that United had a bigger global brand than Nike. After all, Nike was paying United money to put its name on United’s shirts, instead of United paying Nike.

Soon a megastore opened at Old Trafford. Shops around Britain and later abroad began carrying United paraphernalia. Freedman helped develop a range of over 1,000 United products. In 1992 United had had a commercial income of £1.2 million. By 1997, when Freedman left, its merchandising revenues were £28 million. It wasn’t simply that Freedman had exploited United’s brand; by exploiting it, he helped grow it. Meanwhile, almost all other clubs, either secretly or openly, envied United’s commercial success and tried to copy it. United has marked soccer's history more through its brilliant originality off the pitch than on it. (Its three European titles are credible but don’t even match Ajax or Liverpool.)

In the 1990s, the new money, Ferguson’s cunning and a chance generation of great youngsters like David Beckham, Paul Scholes, Ryan Giggs and the Neville brothers finally brought United success. From 1993 to 2003, the club won eight league titles -- more than in all its previous history -- and the Champions League in an unforgettable final in 1999. Moreover, Beckham and Eric Cantona became individual icons arguably as big as the club itself. Like Best, these men were pop stars dressed up as soccer players. Arsenal and Liverpool have had many great players, but never pop stars of this order. Much as Beckham’s fame irritated Ferguson -- in 2003, the manager kicked a boot in his face -- the world’s best-known athlete helped United become the world’s best-known sports club. Happily for United, this happened simultaneously with the so-called third wave of globalization. From the 1990s, cable TV and internet created new United fans around the world.

United became beloved, but it also became hated. Even at England internationals you could sometimes hear the familiar chant, “Stand up if you hate Man Utd.” Partly it was because the team won so often. But partly, too, United’s knack for making money was widely considered somehow unsporting (especially the year it unveiled a “third kit” that existed solely to sell replica shirts to gormless children).

United acquired the nickname Merchandise United. The club’s brand -- buffered by Munich, pop stars and prizes -- gained a new, unwanted core value in the 1990s: It came to be seen as representing corporate greed. That only worsened after the Glazers acquired the club between 2003 and 2005 with the sole aim of taking money out of it. It didn’t help that United’s players, the brand’s main carriers, kept getting richer. In the 1990s, Teddy Sheringham annoyed people by driving his Ferrari down Manchester’s Deansgate. By 2010, it was Wayne Rooney threatening to join Manchester City unless United paid him £250,000 a week.

This disquiet is felt even by many United fans. The Glazers’ strategy of hiking ticket prices has caused widespread upset. Andy Walsh, chief executive of FC United, the local club founded as the anti-commercial antidote to Man United, has lamented, “I still consider myself a Manchester United fan; I can’t afford to go to games anymore.”

United fans come in all shapes and sizes, from lifelong locals like Walsh to eight-year-old girls in Los Angeles. However, they have collectively come to be derided as glory-hunters with no connection to the club. “You’re not from Manchester!” is a favorite chant of opposition fans trying to taunt United’s supporters. There is something to this: So global is the Red Army now that only a tiny proportion of the world’s United fans have ever even seen Old Trafford. Yet that doesn't seem to diminish the fervor. I have witnessed members of United’s Johannesburg fan club putting their entire beings into the chant “And we hate Scousers [people from Liverpool], and we hate Scousers!” even though few of them could have met a “Scouser” in their lives.

Supporting Manchester United has become a way for people from Burma to Nigeria to feel part of something indisputably world class. You see it on Twitter: Somebody might identify himself as “Mohammed from Jakarta,” and the thing he chooses to tell the world about himself in his brief biography is not his nationality or religion or job or family status but “100% Man Utd.” United has pulled off the admirable trick of becoming both global and locally rooted at the same time.

Critics have long been predicting that the moment United starts losing, the glory hunters will get bored and the hype will collapse. This is false. More likely, the club is only going to get bigger. In the seven seasons since the Glazers bought the club, United has won four Premier League titles and finished second three times. It has also reached three Champions League finals, winning one. This may be the most successful seven-year period in the club’s history. Meanwhile, hordes of people in China, India, Indonesia and the U.S. have only just discovered United. In a sports pub in San Francisco last year, I met a female psychologist, wearing a United shirt, who on first encountering soccer in 2010 had thought, “Why did nobody ever tell me about this before?” She hadn’t stopped watching since.

It’s because of people like her that Chevrolet recently paid $559 million to sponsor United’s shirts for seven years -- more than twice the annual amount the club gets from its current sponsor Aon. United should soon also benefit from a bumped-up deal for foreign TV rights to Premier League games, as ever more foreigners switch on. Anyone grumbling about how little Newton Heath lost its soul by becoming a global behemoth ain’t seen nothing yet.
 
Not sure if this is the right place to post this.

Rob Harris ‏@RobHarris
Can disclose that Man United has bought out DHL training kit sponsorship early to secure more cash after $559M Chevrolet deal
 
very well written piece about the Glazer ownership here, echoes a lot of my position on them:
100 Owners: Number 79 – The Glazer Family (Manchester United)

There will be a number of people reading this for whom the initial reaction at seeing The Glazers in the position that they occupy on this list will be one of surprise and, quite probably, anger. There have, after all, been few other football club owners in recent years – particularly in the Premier League – have inspired more vitriol or column inches than the family that acquired – it would be misleading to say ‘purchased’ – one of the world’s biggest clubs during the 2004/05 season. Yet in spite of all the money that they have taken out of the club over the years (and, we might point out, the fact that there is little order to this list below the top twenty), there sit Manchester United, atop the Premier League and comfortable in their Champions League group. Manchester United supporters – probably a majority, though such a statement is difficult to prove definitively either way – are incandescent at the money taken out of their club over the last few years or so, but the supporters of other Premier League clubs may occasionally breathe a sigh of relief at their ownership. Just stop to consider, for example, what the Premier League might look like had the Glazers not straddled the club with such an enormous debt and taken the amount of money out of it.

The Glazer Family, their take-over of Manchester United and the subsequent financial goings-on at Old Trafford should, perhaps, be viewed through the prism of being what happens when neo-liberalisms interaction with professional football reaches its logical conclusion. Put simply, the Glazers didn’t break any laws in their acquisition of Manchester United, and they have broken no laws in terms of their behaviour since then. What they did was opportunistic, for sure, and for those of us who consider all football clubs to be more than just another business it was also morally reprehensible. This of itself, however, doesn’t make them any better or worse than almost all other plutocrats. It’s not a matter of being nice and it’s not a matter of being nasty. It’s a matter of predatory, twenty-first century capitalist behaviour and Manchester United, as one of the very few genuinely profitable football clubs in England and one with a massive global fan base and a record of extraordinary success on the pitch over the previous ten years, was always prone to the sort of take-over which it fell victim to in 2004. To wish that it hadn’t happened and to wish that there had been another way for the club is not to excuse the moral aspect of their behaviour, though. We can acknowledge that capitalism of this nature exists in a moral vacuum which doesn’t have much room for the sentimentality of the football supporter other than to regard it as another income stream to be exploited without ever approving of it.

By the time that the Glazers took control of the club, Manchester United had already been the target of several near misses from a combination of plutocrats and tyre-kickers. Robert Maxwell in 1984, Michael Knighton in 1990 and Rupert Murdoch in 1998 had all expressed considerable interest in buying the club, with Murdochs bid only falling flat after an intervention by the Monopolies & Mergers Commission. The sense that the club would end up in private and completely unaccountable hands, however, lingered, and whilst the Glazer themselves watched on with the detached interest of the circling vultures. They had taken control of the Tampa Bay Buccaneers NFL team in 1995 and Avram Glazer, the son of the head of the family Malcolm, had a keen interest in getting involved in European club football. It took a little over two years for the family to slowly build its shareholding into something decisive.

Starting in February 2003, they bought shares slowly and painstakingly, but it would take a legal dispute elsewhere to grant them the opportunity to assume full control of the club, with shareholders JP McManus and John Magnier locked in a dispute with manager Alex Ferguson over over the ownership of stud rights to the racehorse Rock of Gibraltar the Glazers found themselves in a position in which they could build up their shareholding in the club. Within twelve months of starting to buy shares, they owned 16% of them, and in May 2005 they reached agreement with McManus and Magnier to increase their shareholding to a thoroughly decisive 57%. It all happened in a matter of days from here on. Four days after purchasing from McManus and Magnier, they increased their shareholding to 75%, which allowed them to de-list the company from the stock exchange. This duly followed five weeks later, and from there on the completion of this coup d’etat was a done deal. Little more than a month later, the Glazer Family owned every share in the club.

So far, so rapacious, we might think, but it was not necessarily the fact of the takeover that stuck in the craw with this story, but the financial sleight of hand that financed it. The Glazers method of buying the club was a leveraged buy out, whereby loans secured against the football club itself were used for the very purchase of the shares in the club that that they procured. Manchester United Football Club was paying for its own takeover. We haven’t seen this practice become widespread in English football because most clubs are not profitable enough for it to be able to make it work. The fact that this club had become such a financial juggernaut, however, meant that it could effectively pay for its own purchase and, moreover, since the club has been in their ownership plenty more money has leaked out of Old Trafford in consultancy fees and dividends. Again, nothing illegal has taken place. But something highly immoral has, repeatedly, and this certainly proved to be the straw that broke the camels back for those that broke away to form FC United of Manchester in 2004.

An element of myth has built up surrounding the formation of this club over the years. It is not quite true to say emphatically that FCUM was founded in protest at the Glazer takeover, rather that it was this takeover that proved to be the tipping point for a couple of thousand people for whom disillusionment had become a common currency in spite of the clubs continuing success on the pitch. There are as many different reasons behind why people started supporting this club as there are supporters. For some, the Premier League had become unaffordable. For others, the perpetual switching of kick-off times caused one too many disruptions. For more, the clubs acquiescence to the Murdoch deal and the two year long Glazer coup was plenty of proof that this was no longer their club or something that they could identify with.

For some, this transition was easy. For others, it was agonising. What they created, however, was something quite unique unique in English football – club that stood together in protest, with bloody mindedness and – frequently – good humour. There are many who still follow what has become known as ‘Big United.’ And while there is a unity amongst the clubs support that might even be perceived as an orthodoxy, there are no rules other than to enjoy the football, celebrate their club and run it by their rules, democratically and with principles. Indeed, it is possible to argue that they have had such a positive effect upon the game in this country that their existence in itself comes close to negating much of the negativity that the Glazers have engendered in English football since their cash-devouring arrival in 2003.

It was only ever a minority of Manchester United supporters, however, who completely severed their ties. Other protests, however, garnered greater support. The Manchester United Supporters Trust saw its membership swell to 120,000 people, whilst brilliant writers such as Andy Green took the cogent argument against the family to a new level, combining impassioned rhetoric with the dry and dismal numbers of what was happening to the club. In a purely visible sense, though, it was the Green & Gold campaign that grabbed the headlines. The protest was a simple one. Green and gold – the clubs colours during its formative years as Newton Heath – until the club gets sold. When coupled with the ‘Love United Hate Glazer’ motif that had become part of the shared culture of the clubs support, it was an instantly memorable protest. Mostly visible through coloured scarves at Old Trafford, though, the protest largely failed. Certainly, it raised consciousness of the financial predicament in which the club had found itself to higher levels, but the ultimate hard facts of the Glazer takeover remained unchanged.

They didn’t have to sell, and wearing a differently coloured scarf inside Old Trafford wasn’t going to hit the Glazers in the only place that they could understand pain – the pocket. Few doubted the morality or motives of those involved and it was suggested that waiting lists for season tickets did diminish away to next to nothing, but Old Trafford stayed at or near capacity throughout this period, as it does today. If those that had worn the green and gold scarves had stayed away from Old Trafford, perhaps they might have noticed. But they didn’t stay away, and the Glazers continued to count their money. With a similarly conspicuous lack of success came the Red Knights, a group of very wealthy supporters who sought to buy the club in 2010. Their bid to buy the club for £1bn failed because the Glazers valued it far higher than this. Again, the problem with seeking to dislodge the Glazers from Old Trafford was that the family has built up a fiefdom in its ownership and that the terms to persuade them to sell the club have to be on their terms and their terms alone.

There remain few at Old Trafford that will give the Glazers credit for a great deal of anything positive. The clubs commercial operations have been put into overdrive, whilst Alex Ferguson states that he has the money to buy players if he wants to. Indeed may even be that Ferguson is the single most important character in this entire story. It has been the success on the pitch that Ferguson has continued to bring the club which has taken the edge off the worst of the protests, but even the most successful manager in the clubs history has become a divisive figure to some extent. His comments during the summer that ‘real fans’ wouldn’t protest against the owners seemed odd coming from a former trade union shop steward, but it certainly clarified where he stands on the matter. The big question for the next five or ten years of Manchester Uniteds future may be that who succeeds a man who has brought unprecedented success to the club over the previous twenty-six years. If the Glazers get this decision right, further protest may well be stifled. If they get it wrong, though, the notion of discontent rising again seems far from inconceivable.

We can get caught up with the technicalities of PIK loans, last summers New York-based IPO offer and the other myriad aspects of this most modern of football finance stories, but to concentrate on the specifics of the Glazer family’s time in charge at Manchester United is to see the trees rather than the wood. The sale and management of this club has acted as a barometer in the most extreme of senses – hardly surprising, since Manchester United has over the last twenty years become such a full sensory overload of a club. To say that the Glazers’ behaviour over the last decade has been morally bankrupt is a given, but in this form of neoliberalism the overriding principle is clearly defined – to make more money. And that really is it. The club needs to continue to be successful because winning trophies is feed for a goose that continues to lay golden eggs for its owners on a daily basis, and whilst the Glazers are easy to criticise in many respects, they certainly aren’t stupid. For all of this, however, to give an impression of we can vindicate the family would be fundamentally fallacious. We can’t, but to seek to frame their behaviour in terms of a moral code (or, in this case, a lack thereof) shouldn’t be mistaken for this.

If the protests of supporters had relatively little effect – the FC United protest notwithstanding, of course – and those who owned the shares in the club seemed to have little interest in who they were selling to other than whether they got their money, where does the buck stop with regard to the Glazers and this being allowed to happen? The answer, of course, lays with the Premier League and the Football Association, who could have regulated against leveraged buy-outs prior to the Glazers playing the system in the way that they did. If this family was a symptom rather than the cause of the madness of the Premier League, then the cause was the lack of regulation that allowed them to happen to Manchester United. As we would later see in a broader financial sense with the banking crisis of 2008, when unrestrained neo-liberalism sinks its teeth into something that isn’t properly regulated, the results can be disastrous. Manchester United have avoided calamity because the club remains so profitable and, broadly speaking, successful. Supporters of the club may, however, long wonder what the last few might have been like had so much money not been taken out of the club over the last few years or so. It’s not a pattern that looks like changing any time soon.
 
Manchester United's gross debt has been reduced to £359.7million after the club's owners, the Glazer family, 'retired' a £62.6million-worth of bonds during the first financial quarter.

A 32.4% increase in sponsorship revenues, bolstered by their shirt sponsorship deal with Chevrolet, have contributed to commercial revenues rising by 24% to £43million and an overall profit of £20.5million.

United estimate overall income will reach £350million and £360million over the entire financial year to June 30, 2013.

In the last quarter alone, United entered into 10 sponsorship arrangements, including that incredible £357million deal with General Motors for the Chevrolet logo to be worn on their shirts for seven seasons from 2014.

That astronomical sum prompted United to buy-out their present four-year £40m deal with DHL for United's training kit, which will now come to an end at the season's finale.
 
Manchester United's gross debt has been reduced to £359.7million after the club's owners, the Glazer family, 'retired' a £62.6million-worth of bonds during the first financial quarter.

A 32.4% increase in sponsorship revenues, bolstered by their shirt sponsorship deal with Chevrolet, have contributed to commercial revenues rising by 24% to £43million and an overall profit of £20.5million.

United estimate overall income will reach £350million and £360million over the entire financial year to June 30, 2013.

In the last quarter alone, United entered into 10 sponsorship arrangements, including that incredible £357million deal with General Motors for the Chevrolet logo to be worn on their shirts for seven seasons from 2014.

That astronomical sum prompted United to buy-out their present four-year £40m deal with DHL for United's training kit, which will now come to an end at the season's finale.

What does that mean exactly?
 
I am pretty sure they dont have much money from other sources. If they did they would probably be pumping it into their failing malls.

If I was a gambling man I would be pretty confident in saying they used the club's money.
 
I am pretty sure they dont have much money from other sources. If they did they would probably be pumping it into their failing malls.

If I was a gambling man I would be pretty confident in saying they used the club's money.

Yup.
 
A 32.4% increase in sponsorship revenues, bolstered by their shirt sponsorship deal with Chevrolet.

How come we're already realising revenue from a 2014 shirt sponsorship?

That astronomical sum prompted United to buy-out their present four-year £40m deal with DHL for United's training kit, which will now come to an end at the season's finale.

Didn't we only sign that deal a year ago? Surely this doesn't represent good business acumen, under-selling ourselves so badly we buy out the contract within a year?
 
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