Not the only one there for sure.
I still feel I have to drop a few lines about your previous posts. Not because I think your portrayal of basic Pakistani interests and the political relevance of Indian and Afghan hostility is totally inaccurate, but because of how you, imo, process that into a pretty one-sided, pro-Pakistan narrative.
On the one hand you more or less justify Pakistan's decades-long violent meddling in Afghanistan, using quite jingoistic language. On the other hand you shrug off the resulting devastation and social disruption as an exclusively Afghan problem, with Pakistan only choosing between „working with their neighbours“ (which practically amounts to bringing a Pakistan-friendly force into political power) or, if that doesn't work out, „keeping the Afghans contained to their own hell hole“ and „let the Afghans fight it out amongst themselves“.
I see an obvious contradiction between these two narratives, but what they have in common is that they ultimately promote and legitimate Pakistan's/ISI's Afghanistan strategy. The first one by portraying Pakistan's role as solely counteracting Afghan and Indian aggression, the second one by simply omitting how aggressive Pakistan's Afghanistan policies themself were in the last decades, and how much they have contributed to creating that „hellhole“.
The way I see it, the now probably inevitable political integration of the Afghan Taliban is just the other side of supporting their relentless proxy warfare and terrorism, until the conditions are ripe for such a maneuver. You can't talk about one, but not of the other.
