Sorry for the late bump, but came across a nice article on the Hungary vs England match.
It's in German, so you have to right click and translate the page.
http://spielverlagerung.de/2012/10/16/retroanalyse-england-vs-ungarn-36-22-11-1953/
Couple of interesting points
The Role of Budai
Umschaltläufe the winger
Generally knew to like the movements of the winger. Good in a direct duel, intelligent browsing gifts and a strong defensive work the cornerstone of the game, especially right outside Budai were knew thanks to the many Zuspiele to convince him.
However, he did something even that he was so conspicuous. By the ball picked up at the back, or even self-conquered, he provided another player in defensive composite, thus not only provided offensive but also defensive about numbers.
He picked up speed through the space in the second period on the wings and had time to look for a face-off station or which generate the attack course. Exactly these runs back and forth were that aspect, five years later, Mario Zagallo practiced for the Selecao.
This vertical play attracted the Brazilians by even more extreme by Zagallo was even deeper in a 4-2-4 system. "El lobo" interpreted his role so a trace more defensive and running intensive, seen thus formative part was a 4-3-3.
Later Lobanovskiy and other coaches pulled in Western Europe of the 70s the second wing a plane back which made for defensive strength, more compactness and 4-4-2.
Nevertheless, the offensive suffered only limited under this deeper alignment of their winger: after all, is to run forward more quickly and easily than backwards. When the Hungarians in the 50s we saw this, of course, in a different way than in the '70s and the' 90s then, but the situational After-back works the winger was outstanding in the context of that time.
Thus it can be said that not only the asymmetric 3-2-5 was the model for the 4-2-4, anticipated the zone defense and the ball game was practiced in its infancy, the winger the Magyars were even the mastermind of their offspring in 4- 4-2 systems and also the modern "defensive winger" .
....
On the left Robb was logged off, who had no real good action and would have no less than can be confused with a lost audience. By this he was not alone to blame, because he simply hardly got balls because Budais defensive work and the team result focus on Matthews, while the tactical corset Englishman anyway constricting the entire collective.
Plans to deal with Hidegkuti
Interestingly enough it seems that the English did have a plan to deal with Hidegkuti and weren't completely taken aback by his quality or style of play as it's made out.
The problem was not the obvious, i.e. the tracking of the opponent and the resulting opening of space, but something else entirely. Jimmy Johnston basically held his position and didn’t track Nandor Hidegkuti at all.
The opponents were ultimately got more right, which probably had to do with the fact that Winterbottom and Johnston had discussed how to deal with Hidegkuti before the game – with the following effect: they decided that Johnston should not track him, as Sweden had done successfully, but that they should use someone from the midfield, probably the left halfback in the 3-2-2-3. – RM
The English were neither surprised nor clueless – they were simply powerless. Hidegkuti had no trackers and set up overloads and combinations; England was shot down. On May 23, 1954, there was a return match, and in an effort to avoid making the same “mistake” the center-half tracked Hidegkuti. The result speaks for itself: England suffered an even bigger 1:7 defeat.
Bozsik
http://spielverlagerung.de/2015/12/03/tuerchen-3-jozsef-bozsik/
A nice article on Bozsik with his role in the WC 1954 final being highlighted in particular (he only misplaced a single, albeit a significant, pass in the entire final)