Manchester United bidder Sheikh Jassim: ‘He likes to have nice things’
Mark Critchley
Jun 30, 2023
It is more than four months since, late on a Friday evening, a press release dropped announcing Sheikh Jassim bin Hamad bin Jassim bin Jaber Al Thani’s bid to buy Manchester United.
“The bid plans to return the club to its former glories both on and off the pitch, and — above all — will seek to place the fans at the heart of Manchester United Football Club once more,” it read.
“The bid will be completely debt free via Jassim’s Nine Two Foundation, which will look to invest in the football teams, the training centre, the stadium and wider infrastructure, the fan experience and the communities the club supports.”
Tacked on the end of the email were background notes which went at least some way towards answering the most pressing question that this announcement posed: Who is Sheikh Jassim?
You will know by now he is a member of the Qatari royal family; that he was educated at the Royal Military Academy in Sandhurst; that he is the chairman of Qatar Islamic Bank (QIB); that he was previously on the board at Credit Suisse.
The son of the former prime minister of Qatar, he was born in 1982 and is apparently a life-long United fan.
Some people were confusing the man in question with the Sheikh Jassim who watched on as Emiliano Martinez make that gesture with the Golden Glove after the World Cup final, but the email usefully included a photo.
You know the one: black and white headshot, the sheikh in a suit, hair combed to the left.
Who is Sheikh Jassim Bin Hamad Al Thani?
Is Man United bid really separate from the Qatari state?
What does this mean for Jim Ratcliffe?
What happens now?
There’s that other picture too: Jassim in a white thobe, sat at a table with his hands clasped, looking straight down the camera.
But beyond that short biography and those two ubiquitous images, very little else has been gleaned about the potential new owner of one of the world’s biggest football clubs.
Not even the Glazer family or Raine Group, the US bank conducting the sale on behalf of United’s owners, would be able to shed much light on this enigmatic figure.
When those representing petrochemicals firm INEOS’ bid visited Old Trafford in March, Sir Jim Ratcliffe posed for pictures outside Manchester United’s stadium. When the Qatari delegation had their guided tour, however, Jassim was notable by his absence. In his place were Shahzad Shahbaz — president of the Nine Two Foundation, the vehicle for a prospective takeover — and Fady Bakhos, described as Jassim’s most senior personal adviser.
Jassim has had no direct part in negotiations with Raine or the Glazers, either. Instead, Paris Saint-Germain president Nasser Al-Khelaifi has played a significant role in talks, as revealed by The Athletic.
All of this, of course, has done nothing to lessen the desire to know who Jassim is, as the figurehead of the only bid trying to buy 100 per cent of Manchester United. The air of mystery has led some United fans to ask a slightly more facetious question: Does he even exist?
The first thing to say is that yes, Sheikh Jassim is a real person. And there is more information about him in the public domain than you might expect.
Even the fundamental question of exactly how old he is has proved something of a puzzle, however, with those initial background notes only detailing that he was born in 1982.
Jassim’s records at Companies House, the UK’s company register, confirm he was born in April of that year, while multiple documents filed across several different companies over a range of years list his exact date of birth to be April 10, 1982.
And so the 41-year-old Qatari royal would have been 28 at the time he joined the board of Credit Suisse, in April 2010. That would make him just 16 when — according to his biography in the Swiss bank’s annual reports — he graduated from Royal Military Academy Sandhurst in 1998.
The Ministry of Defence confirmed to The Athletic that a Sheikh Jassim bin Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani from Qatar entered Sandhurst in 1997 and successfully graduated as part of Commissioning Course 973 the following year.
Jassim is listed as one of hundreds of new recruits in the autumn 1997 edition of The Wish Stream, Sandhurst’s journal. Jassim was part of Inkerman Company, named after one of the major battles of the Crimean War.
The current emir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, entered Sandhurst at the same time and was part of the same company.
After graduating in 1998, Jassim joined the senior management of Al Mirqab Capital, a family investment vehicle owned by his father Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Jaber Al Thani, sometimes referred to by his initials, HBJ.
In 2004, Jassim took a place on the board of QIB and became chairman a year later.
Jassim is also chairman of QInvest, Qatar’s first Islamic investment bank; Beema, an insurance firm; and Milaha, a shipping company, among other businesses.
In 2010, the Red Knights, a group of wealthy United fans, wanted to oust the Glazers from the club. So the group asked the Qatar royal family if they wanted to partner up. Talks were later held in Doha, and Jassim was among those present.
The most eye-catching detail on his resume, though, is perhaps his rise to the board of Credit Suisse around this time, despite still being only in his late twenties.
After the 2008 financial crisis, senior executives at Credit Suisse were instructed to raise new capital to keep the bank out of government hands.
One of the first ports of call was Qatar’s sovereign wealth fund — Qatar Investment Authority (QIA) — whose chief executive at the time was HBJ, then Qatar’s prime minister. QIA had already invested around £4billion in Barclays earlier that year, helping the British bank to avoid a government bail-out.
In October 2008, Credit Suisse announced it had raised 10billion Swiss francs (CHF, now worth £8.8bn or $11.1bn) in investment with “the largest participant being the Qatar Holding LLC, a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Qatar Investment Authority”.
A source at Credit Suisse at the time, who like others in this article was speaking on the condition of anonymity to protect relationships, says that Jassim’s appointment to the board was viewed as a direct result of QIA’s investment. But rather than pushing for Qatari interests, Jassim’s role was seen as a way for the Qataris to have “information flow”.
QIA — which still owns a five per cent share in the bank — is not viewed as an investor who would agitate or attempt to influence decisions. “Their view is, ‘We want to be a preferred investor, and to be a preferred investor people need to see us as smart but long-duration capital that supports the management team’,” says one source.
And so at the bank’s annual general meeting in 2010, Jassim was elected to the board with 98.6 per cent of the vote among shareholders.
Credit Suisse’s annual reports during Jassim’s years on the board delve a little deeper into his background. There are at least a handful of new photographs of Jassim included, one featuring Jassim in a thoughtful, pensive pose.
One interesting detail in those reports is that, upon his appointment, Credit Suisse’s board determined that Jassim could not be deemed an independent director under the bank’s independence standards.
The 2010 annual report declares Jassim as a non-independent director due to “the scope of various business relationships between (Credit Suisse) and Qatar Investment Authority, a state-owned company that has close ties to the Al Thani family, and between (Credit Suisse) and the Al Thani family”.
The bank believed the links between Jassim, QIA, the Al Thani family and the bank “could constitute a material business relationship”. As a consequence of this, in 2011, Jassim had to recuse himself from a board meeting regarding the terms of a loan agreement between QIA and Credit Suisse.
HBJ resigned as QIA’s chief executive — and as Qatar’s prime minister — in 2013 after the abdication of the former emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, a close ally. After his father stepped down from the sovereign wealth fund, Jassim continued to be considered a non-independent board member in Credit Suisse’s annual reports until he chose not to stand for reelection in 2017.
The reports state that Credit Suisse performed “an annual assessment of the independence of each board member”. Following the final assessment of Jassim in December 2016, he was still considered non-independent.
The “various business relationships” between Credit Suisse and QIA, and between Credit Suisse and the Al Thani family, are mentioned throughout.
A source close to Jassim said that the Qatari royal’s non-independent director status at Credit Suisse was a standard corporate governance position on the bank’s part to disclose a potential — and not necessarily actual — conflict of interest.
They say, in addition to the QIA’s investment in Credit Suisse, Jassim’s father’s family office also held a stake in the bank through entities owned by Al Mirqab. This stake remained after Sheikh Hamad resigned from QIA and has since been sold.
They add that as an investor in Credit Suisse, QIA could appoint directors even if they had no connection to QIA, and when Jassim’s father left his role at QIA, Credit Suisse asked Jassim to stay on due to his experience.
The Sheikh Jassim bid for United has always maintained that the Nine Two Foundation’s funding is independent of the Qatari state, drawn from his own private wealth, and that Jassim has never had any direct involvement with QIA.
Jassim (far right) in Doha in 2001 (Photo: Karim Jaafar/AFP via Getty Images)
If Sheikh Jassim’s bid for United is drawn exclusively from his personal wealth, the money he earned at Credit Suisse provides at best a tiny fraction of the estimated £5billion figure.
Although he held a prestigious position, Jassim’s compensation for his work at the bank was relatively small. According to the bank’s records, Jassim was paid a total of 1.7m CHF (£1.5m; $1.9m) over his seven years on the bank’s board with just over half that amount — around 875,000 CHF — in cash. The rest was paid in shares.
That figure would have been higher, but unlike other board members, Jassim did not serve on any committees apart from one on which he was a non-voting member. In each of his seven years at the bank, Jassim was the only member of the board not to receive compensation on top of his annual base fee of 250,000 CHF.
With regards to regular board meetings, Credit Suisse only began breaking down each board member’s level of attendance in their annual reports from 2017, after Jassim stepped down.
A source who worked closely with the Qatari royal suggests that, as his portfolio widened away from the bank, he could not always be present every time Credit Suisse’s directors sat around a table, although he insists Jassim did not miss critical quarterly board meetings.
As for how he carried himself in those meetings, Jassim is described as having been quiet at first, and senior executives helped guide him during his early days at the bank.
However, one of those to work closely with the Qatari royal describes him as bright and quick on the uptake. “He asked very good questions. He was very engaged.”
There were times when he came out of his shell, too. Another source with knowledge of those board meetings says Jassim would casually and knowingly refer to himself as ‘JJ’, sometimes even signing off documents with the moniker. A smoker, he was known for lighting up in the middle of a meeting.
Smoking in meetings is something familiar to those who worked with Jassim in Qatar, at the several companies where he has or still does serve as chairman or in other senior positions.
Although business would be largely conducted in English, one source says that Jassim would often switch languages to consult his fellow Arabic speakers, then switch back to English when ready to speak with the Westerners in the room again.
This contributed to a sense that Jassim could be “difficult to read”. Sometimes, even though he would be chairing the meeting, he would almost appear uninterested in what was being discussed. It was not uncommon to see him cross his legs, look away from the table and, once again, start puffing on a cigar.
“Occasionally he’d come out with something and you think he was listening, then occasionally he’d come out with something else and you think, no, he wasn’t,” says a former associate. “Sometimes he really surprised you that he was on the pulse, then other times less so.”
This is attributed at least partly to cultural differences — a more “old-fashioned” way of conducting business in Qatari boardrooms. One source describes an element of ceremony to meetings that was a marked difference from Western boardrooms.
Jassim was not seen as a purely ceremonial chairman or senior executive, though. Even if could appear distracted, he was interested in the details. Corporate governance and compliance did not engage him as much as commercial matters — in other words, making money.
Jassim would invite certain executives and associates to his majlis — a traditional Qatari male-only sitting room, where more discreet items of business might be discussed. An invitation to Jassim’s majlis was essentially an invitation into his inner circle.
Those who have come across Jassim at close quarters in the corporate world use the word “reserved” regularly. “Guarded” is another that often comes up. Whereas his father earned a reputation as a flamboyant and engaging networker, Jassim is not seen as a chip off the old block in that way.
Yet in an image said to have been taken four or five years ago that has been circulating among Manchester United supporter groups of late, Jassim (on the left, below) appears relaxed as he chats on a private jet flying between Los Angeles and New York.
His level of influence as a member of the ruling family means that when he speaks, he commands attention.
“He was not a great orator,“ one former business associate recalls. “He was quiet, guarded in what he said, but people listened because of his status.”
If Sheikh Jassim is largely described as a reserved, private individual by those to have shared a room with him, that goes at least some way to explaining the relative mystery that surrounds him.
One regional expert, with years of experience working in Qatar, had not heard of Jassim until his bid for United was announced. Conversations with colleagues to try and establish more about him brought little back. “I can’t stress enough,” this source says, “he just was not really on the radar.”
Why, then, would Jassim want to open himself up to the scrutiny that comes with bidding for — and potentially owning — Manchester United?
The club’s stature and the status it confers upon its owner is thought to be part of the appeal. As with previous Qatari investments in Harrods, the Shard and the Empire State Building, one source says Jassim is acquiring a “trophy asset”.
“He likes to have nice things,” says one figure who has worked with him. “I can understand why he wants an asset like Manchester United because it makes everyone go, ‘That’s owned by Sheikh Jassim’.”
There is also his life-long support of United though, which another former associate claims is genuine, adding that he watches every United game. Jassim’s view during the club’s decade of indifferent results is that the Glazer family have “under-invested” and that “there is a lot to do”.
Yet when Jassim’s interest in owning United was announced, many expected the bid would simply blow the competition out of the water. That has not happened. Sources close to Jassim stressed at the outset that the Nine Two Foundation would not simply pay whatever it takes. They haven’t, to the point where momentum had built behind INEOS’ rival bid, spearheaded by Ratcliffe.
The fifth bid from the Nine Two Foundation earlier this month, however, has led some familiar with the process to speculate that the winds have shifted in the Qataris favour once again, although no one is getting carried away just yet.
Sheikh Jassim’s team are preparing transactional documents, including on shareholder agreements, so that the takeover can go through immediately if their bid is accepted, but they are yet to hear back from the Glazers and the timeline for next steps is unclear.
Jassim is therefore cautious.
This is in-keeping with a tendency he has to be “risk-averse”, as identified by one former associate. “He sees lots of deals but he’s pretty sceptical and prudent with what he does.” Some note that this is a trait he shares with his father, who publicly questioned the wisdom of buying a football club shortly after Jassim’s bid was announced.
Others question whether Jassim himself has the final say. Al-Khelaifi’s involvement — initiated by the Jassim bid to help guide on United’s valuation — is a key development, one which invites further questions as to whether the Nine Two Foundation’s proposals are entirely separate from the state of Qatar.
If Jassim is successful, claims of sportswashing and concerns surrounding Qatar’s human rights record will abound. The revelation of Al-Khelaifi’s role in negotiations has already heightened concerns among United’s Premier League rivals that they will be competing against a state-backed club.
“You can’t do something of this magnitude as a Qatari citizen without not just approval but full on backing from the top,” says a regional expert. “It can’t happen without the very top of the ruling family being cool with it and being keen on it.”
One source who previously worked with Jassim got in touch with him after news of the bid was announced and came away from their conversation with the impression that he was determined to come out on top. “He doesn’t want to do something where he can’t compete and win,” they said.
But whether he is the smiling face of a state project, as many suspect, or a private individual using his own wealth to fund the bid as his team insists, victory has never been assured and the mystery that surrounds the Qatari royal has not always helped his prospects.
He is certainly real, but more than four months on from the announcement of his interest, and seven months on from the beginning of the club’s “process to explore strategic alternatives”, it remains to be seen whether a Sheikh Jassim-owned Manchester United will become a reality.
