Joga Bonito
The Art of Football
- Joined
- Jul 14, 2014
- Messages
- 8,270
Voters are asked to consider the XIs featured as remakes of classic teams, and to consider to what extent the manager has succeeded in re-creating both the individual roles and the overall functionality of the original. THIS IS NOT A FANTASY MATCH BETWEEN TWO SIDES, but rather a comparison of remakes.
Please feel free to tag the managers if you require more information about their set-ups/players etc.
Guardiola:
Few teams, among all I have seen play, have seduced me than that of Ajax under Van Gaal. The ease of creating the game behind the fast side of players and the way they pass the ball to the feet through the spaces. This Ajax could solve completely fantastically all "one-against-one" that can exist in a game. In both attack and defence. They assume the risk that a team can take. This was something that surprised me, which astonished me. Positional discipline: Possession of the ball as the basic idea, the game in constant support. Movements... And they did it all as simple as a sublime way. They were able to do perfectly is what I believe that a football team must always do. Van Gaal's Ajax gave football lessons to those who were familiar with the game
Van Gaal:
It's a footballing philosophy more than a system. A system depends on the players you have. I played 4-3-3 with Ajax, 2-3-2-3 with Barcelona and I can play 4-4-2 with AZ. I'm flexible. The philosophy stays the same though. I don't think that you can adapt it to every possible situation. Preparing your tactical formation is essential. Each player needs to know where he has to be, and that is why there needs to be mutual understanding because you need absolute discipline. This is a sport played by 22 men, and there are 11 opponents out there playing as a team. Each individual needs to know who he has to beat and be there to support his team-mates.
Style - Possession, Wing-Play, forward runs by central players
That Ajax team had more in common with Pep’s Bayern than with Van Gaal’s United of the last two years. The basis was the same - a possession based system with a precise structure, which was capable of transforming into different shapes during the game (as Van Gaal himself said, formation doesn’t really matter, the philosophy does) while maintaining the spatial control at all times. Without a doubt, total football of the 70’s influenced this team massively, but Michels created a controlled chaos on the pitch, while every movement and combination in Van Gaal’s team was invented and nurtured by him personally. The big clash of Cruyff’s and Van Gaal’s philosophies comes mainly from this distinction. And while at their best Van Gaal’s and Pep’s teams looked like a naturally fluid energy flows, they both had a very strict system based on manager’s ideas underneath the fancy dressing.
Defense
Defensive Line - High
Marking - Zonal
Off the ball - Aggressive closing down, creating numerical advantages
On the ball - Direct passing, late runs from De Boer/Abidal and Blind/Badstuber, stretching the defensive line
Louis van Gaal’s Ajax side operated with Danny Blind as a sweeper. Pre-historic as it seems today, playing a sweeper helped negate most opponent’s threat in the attacking third. With 2 forwards being picked up by Reizeger and the stouter de Boer brother – this left Blind to pick up stray balls, runs from deep and anything the opposition threw at him. It’s hard to distinguish defence from midfield - Rijkaard often dropped back to the centre back position, Blind and de Boer were free to join the attack etc. Obviously, with such proactive possession and pressing tactic Ajax played with a higher than usual defensive line, although they were able to regroup and to sustain pressure if needed. Fluid system, along with the cover from 2 box-to-box midfielders allowed Ajax to always maintain numerical advantage in defense
Midfield
Ajax basically had a fluid diamond in midfield - Litmanen as a number 10, Davids and one of Seedorf or R. De Boer as box-to-box midfielders and the great Rijkaard connecting defence and midfield from his hybrid position.
While facing a pair of dangerous wingers, Ajax usually responded by getting Davids and R. De Boer/Seedorf to track the wingers back, and did so wonderfully. When they did this, Jari Litmanen dropped deeper to fill in the central midfield so the deeper lying Frank Rijkaard was not outnumbered in the middle of the field.
The use of Davids and de Boer/Seedorf in the group game against AC Milan in 1995 is interesting too. As well as having defensive responsibilities, they were instructed to run from deep to connect with the wingers and forwards. It was their late runs that were most dangerous to penetrate the Milan high-line in the first-half. To do this, both Davids and de Boer had to have superb tactical understanding and discipline, not to mention supreme physical fitness. The combination of quick passing and runs from deep were a constant menace for the Milan back-line. The implication of this was the high-line played, used to combat the threat of Litmanen, dropped deeper and deeper to negate the threat of these quick triangles through the midfield.
Ajax were always stretching the Rossoneri defence with Overmars and George always looking to stay wide in the build-up of moves. It was therefore unsurprising that either Davids or de Boer would be the one to break the deadlock in this game.
Attack
Again, the separation of midfield and attack is nominal - box-to-box midfielders often were the ones who got at the end of Litmanen’s through-balls for example. Litmanen himself scored lots and can be seen either as a midfielder or as a shadow striker. But let’s just say that the front trio of Overmars - Kluivert (R. de Boer) - George was the attacking unit. Wingers in Van Gaal’s system play a very strict role - their main task is to provide width and to create space for their teammates by stretching the opposition’s defence. Although there was a difference between the flanks - left-sided winger was right-footed and sometimes was allowed to cut inside, while on the right side in George we saw a more conventional right-footed winger. It probably had something to do with the fullbacks - F. de Boer supported attack more often than Reizeger, which gave Overmars more freedom on the pitch.
Please feel free to tag the managers if you require more information about their set-ups/players etc.
Team harms:
Philosophy/Ideology of tactical set-up
Guardiola:
Few teams, among all I have seen play, have seduced me than that of Ajax under Van Gaal. The ease of creating the game behind the fast side of players and the way they pass the ball to the feet through the spaces. This Ajax could solve completely fantastically all "one-against-one" that can exist in a game. In both attack and defence. They assume the risk that a team can take. This was something that surprised me, which astonished me. Positional discipline: Possession of the ball as the basic idea, the game in constant support. Movements... And they did it all as simple as a sublime way. They were able to do perfectly is what I believe that a football team must always do. Van Gaal's Ajax gave football lessons to those who were familiar with the game
Van Gaal:
It's a footballing philosophy more than a system. A system depends on the players you have. I played 4-3-3 with Ajax, 2-3-2-3 with Barcelona and I can play 4-4-2 with AZ. I'm flexible. The philosophy stays the same though. I don't think that you can adapt it to every possible situation. Preparing your tactical formation is essential. Each player needs to know where he has to be, and that is why there needs to be mutual understanding because you need absolute discipline. This is a sport played by 22 men, and there are 11 opponents out there playing as a team. Each individual needs to know who he has to beat and be there to support his team-mates.
Style - Possession, Wing-Play, forward runs by central players
That Ajax team had more in common with Pep’s Bayern than with Van Gaal’s United of the last two years. The basis was the same - a possession based system with a precise structure, which was capable of transforming into different shapes during the game (as Van Gaal himself said, formation doesn’t really matter, the philosophy does) while maintaining the spatial control at all times. Without a doubt, total football of the 70’s influenced this team massively, but Michels created a controlled chaos on the pitch, while every movement and combination in Van Gaal’s team was invented and nurtured by him personally. The big clash of Cruyff’s and Van Gaal’s philosophies comes mainly from this distinction. And while at their best Van Gaal’s and Pep’s teams looked like a naturally fluid energy flows, they both had a very strict system based on manager’s ideas underneath the fancy dressing.
Defense
Defensive Line - High
Marking - Zonal
Off the ball - Aggressive closing down, creating numerical advantages
On the ball - Direct passing, late runs from De Boer/Abidal and Blind/Badstuber, stretching the defensive line
Louis van Gaal’s Ajax side operated with Danny Blind as a sweeper. Pre-historic as it seems today, playing a sweeper helped negate most opponent’s threat in the attacking third. With 2 forwards being picked up by Reizeger and the stouter de Boer brother – this left Blind to pick up stray balls, runs from deep and anything the opposition threw at him. It’s hard to distinguish defence from midfield - Rijkaard often dropped back to the centre back position, Blind and de Boer were free to join the attack etc. Obviously, with such proactive possession and pressing tactic Ajax played with a higher than usual defensive line, although they were able to regroup and to sustain pressure if needed. Fluid system, along with the cover from 2 box-to-box midfielders allowed Ajax to always maintain numerical advantage in defense
Midfield
Ajax basically had a fluid diamond in midfield - Litmanen as a number 10, Davids and one of Seedorf or R. De Boer as box-to-box midfielders and the great Rijkaard connecting defence and midfield from his hybrid position.
While facing a pair of dangerous wingers, Ajax usually responded by getting Davids and R. De Boer/Seedorf to track the wingers back, and did so wonderfully. When they did this, Jari Litmanen dropped deeper to fill in the central midfield so the deeper lying Frank Rijkaard was not outnumbered in the middle of the field.
The use of Davids and de Boer/Seedorf in the group game against AC Milan in 1995 is interesting too. As well as having defensive responsibilities, they were instructed to run from deep to connect with the wingers and forwards. It was their late runs that were most dangerous to penetrate the Milan high-line in the first-half. To do this, both Davids and de Boer had to have superb tactical understanding and discipline, not to mention supreme physical fitness. The combination of quick passing and runs from deep were a constant menace for the Milan back-line. The implication of this was the high-line played, used to combat the threat of Litmanen, dropped deeper and deeper to negate the threat of these quick triangles through the midfield.
Ajax were always stretching the Rossoneri defence with Overmars and George always looking to stay wide in the build-up of moves. It was therefore unsurprising that either Davids or de Boer would be the one to break the deadlock in this game.
Attack
Again, the separation of midfield and attack is nominal - box-to-box midfielders often were the ones who got at the end of Litmanen’s through-balls for example. Litmanen himself scored lots and can be seen either as a midfielder or as a shadow striker. But let’s just say that the front trio of Overmars - Kluivert (R. de Boer) - George was the attacking unit. Wingers in Van Gaal’s system play a very strict role - their main task is to provide width and to create space for their teammates by stretching the opposition’s defence. Although there was a difference between the flanks - left-sided winger was right-footed and sometimes was allowed to cut inside, while on the right side in George we saw a more conventional right-footed winger. It probably had something to do with the fullbacks - F. de Boer supported attack more often than Reizeger, which gave Overmars more freedom on the pitch.